

U.S. ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL SCHOOL

INSPECTOR GENERAL REFERENCE GUIDE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL AGENCY
TRAINING DIVISION
5500 21ST STREET, SUITE 2305
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22060-5935
September 2023



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
1700 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1700

SAIG-ZA

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL U.S. ARMY INSPECTORS GENERAL

SUBJECT: The Inspector General Reference Guide

1. The Inspector General Reference Guide represents U.S. Army Inspector General (IG) doctrine for a variety of topics, most notably the IG's responsibilities in a wartime operational environment, as a member of a Joint Task Force, and as a member of an Army IG staff section in all components. This doctrine is authoritative and has the backing of Army IG policy in the form of Army Regulation 20-1 (Inspector General Activities and Procedures). All IGs will employ this doctrine within the policy framework set forth in Army Regulation 20-1. If a discrepancy exists between the guide and the regulation, the regulation will take precedence.

2. This doctrinal guide's Foreign Disclosure Determination / Designation is FD-1, which means that this doctrine is releasable to members of partner nations and to the general public.

3. If you have questions or comments about this guide, or identify discrepancies or inconsistencies requiring attention, please contact Dr. Stephen M. Rusiecki, Dean of Academics and Deputy Commandant, U.S. Army Inspector General School, (703) 805-3918 or DSN 655-3918.

Droit et Avant!

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Donna W. Martin", is positioned above the typed name.

DONNA W. MARTIN
Lieutenant General, USA
The Inspector General

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Summary of Change

Inspector General Reference Guide

1. **Supersession.** This version of The IG Reference Guide supersedes the March 2020 version.

2. **Summary of Change.** The changes summarized below follow the eight-part structure of the guide and only include significant changes. Editing and other minor administrative changes are not listed.

- a. **Part 1** - The History of the U.S. Army Inspector General
 - Adds history on the first female TIG and TIG sergeant major.
 - Provides historical background on the IG badge.
- b. **Part 2** - Communicative Skills
 - No changes.
- c. **Part 3** - Inspector General Wartime Role
 - Adds doctrine on multi-domain operations.
 - Provides updated doctrine on the IG annex.
 - Updates guidance on requesting exceptions to policy in an operational environment.
 - Provides updated guidance on IG responsibilities regarding Law of War violations.
- d. **Part 4** - The Command Inspector General
 - Updates the Directing Authority Initial Touchpoint slide.
- e. **Part 5** - Ethics and Standards of Conduct
 - Provides an updated extract from ADP 6-22, Leadership.
 - Describes the Soldiers' creed within the context of the Warrior Ethos.
- f. **Part 6** - The Army Components' Inspectors General
 - Updates guidance on Military Technicians.
 - Updates policy on the mobilization, deployment, and demobilization process.
 - Updates the Title 10 and 32 organizational charts.
- g. **Part 7** - IG Office Organization and Operations
 - Updates guidance on automation in the IG office.
- h. **Part 8** - Fort Von Steuben
 - Replaces the Afghanistan deployment scenario for the Extended Practical Exercises with a TRADOC-approved Direct-Action Training Environment (DATE) scenario.

Part 1

The History of the U.S. Army Inspector General

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Introduction

History of the U.S. Army Inspector General

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this section is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with a brief historical overview of the U.S. Army Inspector General system.

2. **Historical Relevance:** The U.S. Army Inspector General (IG) system emerged and developed during a time of war -- the Revolutionary War in 1778. The Army IG system that enhanced the warfighting and readiness capabilities of the Continental Army in 1778 is still serving that same critical purpose in today's 21st Century world of various overseas contingency operations. The overall concept of the Army IG system has remained constant through more than two centuries of war and peace. The major changes have occurred in how we execute and apply the Army IG system to today's transforming and operationally oriented Army.

Today's Army IG -- like the Army IG of the past -- is an extension of the Commander's eyes, ears, voice, and conscience. IGs serve their Commanders; their commands; and the Soldiers, Civilians, and Family members that comprise that command. For nearly 240 years, IGs have served their Commanders and commands by teaching and training, inspecting, assisting, investigating, and sometimes auditing. Today, the four functions of Inspections, Assistance, Investigations, and Teaching and Training define our Army IG system. But these functions -- like the overall Army IG system -- emerged over the years principally during times of war. The rich history of the Army IG system has contributed to its effectiveness and philosophy today. A solid understanding of that history will allow today's IGs to understand their role in the context of the Army, the Army's readiness, and the Army's warfighting capability.

IGs who would like a more detailed study of the evolution of the Army IG system and its history from 1778 to 1939 should consult the two-volume history commissioned by The Inspector General in the 1980s. These two volumes, written by Joseph W. A. Whitehorse and David A. Clary, are available on The U.S. Army Inspector General School's Web site or in hard copy from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

3. **Historical Constants:** Over the last 240 years, the IG's contribution to combat and mission readiness has proved essential, invaluable, and constant. The consistent contributions that the IG system has made to the Army appear as four historical constants. Those four constants are as follows:

- a. Commanders have often relied on the IG as the substitute for experience.
- b. Commanders have used the IG to check and instill discipline, ethics, and standards.
- c. IGs have enabled Commanders to obtain rapid responses to their own higher-level interests.
- d. Commanders have assigned IGs unanticipated items necessary for the unit's successful mission accomplishment.

4. **A Note on Sources:** The principal sources for the information contained in this section are the two volumes on the history of the U.S. Army Inspectors General by Joseph W. A. Whitehorne and David A. Clary (see complete citations below). All other sources will appear in notes sections following the relevant chapters, to include any direct quotations from Whitehorne and Clary.

Clary, David A. and Joseph W. A. Whitehorne. *The Inspectors General of the United States Army 1777-1903*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Inspector General and Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987.

Whitehorne, Joseph W. A. *The Inspectors General of the United States Army 1903-1939*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Inspector General and Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998.

Chapter 1

The Birth of the U.S. Army Inspector General System

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with an historical overview of the emergence of the U.S. Army Inspector General system during the Revolutionary War from 1775 to 1783.

2. **The First Inspectors General:** The concept of an Inspector General began in France in 1668, when France's King Philip appointed several officers to serve as his eyes and ears when French forces were in the field. These Inspectors General worked directly for the monarch, maintained a geographical focus, and had full authority to impose punishment, even on senior Commanders. The Prussians further developed the Inspector General concept so that by 1750, Prussian Inspectors General not only served as their monarch's eyes and ears but also worked with field Commanders to improve drill, discipline, and unit efficiency. Thanks to Baron von Steuben, this Prussian system would have the greatest influence on the development of an American Inspector General system. By 1760, the British armed forces had adopted the Inspector General but employed it narrowly to focus solely on key functional areas, such as logistics and manufactories. British Inspector General duty was also not a primary function but an additional responsibility for an officer. One of the Inspector General's main tasks was to enforce accountability among the British ranks.

3. **The Need for an Inspector General in the Continental Army:** The Continental Army, when formed in 1775, represented a disorganized array of militia from different colonies with little uniformity in organization, procedure, drill, appearance, or equipment. The Continental Army's leaders could not compare to the experienced, solid officer leadership of the British Army. General Washington, the Army's newly designated Commander-in-Chief, was clearly dissatisfied with the training and readiness of his diversified and inexperienced forces.

By the time of the American Revolution, the appointment of inspectors had become routine in European armies. The tactics of the day -- volley fire from phalanx formations and massed bayonet charges -- required stern discipline and extensive drill and training. Commanders needed a way to assess the readiness of their units.

On 29 October 1777, General Washington, recognizing that the future of the Army and the Nation was in peril, convened a council of 14 general officers. This council decided, among other things, that an Inspector General for the Army was necessary. This Inspector General would superintend the training of the entire Army to ensure troop proficiency in common tactics. Moreover, the Inspector General would be the Commander's agent to ensure tactical efficiency in the Army by focusing on the greatest and most pressing need of the troops -- tactical competence. The duties envisioned by the council were those of a "drillmaster general" or a "muster master general."

At the same time, the Continental Congress recognized the need for an Inspector General who would provide that governing body with information concerning military affairs. Quality training was expensive and required significant public investment. Therefore, Congress wanted an agent within the Army who would oversee and account

for military investments. Congress also wanted assurances that the Army -- and all of the armed forces -- would remain subordinate to Congress's authority.

This parallel requirement for an Inspector General for both General Washington and Congress created tension between the military and civilian authorities. However, General Washington's preference for an Inspector General who answered only to him finally prevailed, and subsequent Inspectors General received orders to report only to the Commander-in-Chief.

Two of the first officers recruited (by both Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane) to be Inspectors General were Augustin Montin de la Balme, a pompous troublemaker who resigned in protest, and another troublemaker, MG Philippe Charles Jean Baptiste Tronson du Coudray, an artillery officer whose focus was on the production of arms and ordnance. Du Coudray, like his predecessor de la Balme, did not last long. The bad experiences that Washington suffered with these two would-be Inspectors General clearly solidified in his mind the type and nature of the Inspector General the Continental Army needed.

On 13 December 1777, Congress created within the Army the Office of the Inspector General. The Congressional resolution authorized two Inspector General positions. These Inspectors General would be responsible to review the troops, ensure that officers and Soldiers received instruction in exercise maneuvers established by the Board of War, ensure that discipline was strictly observed, and ensure that officers commanded properly and treated their Soldiers with justice.

The first Inspector General officially appointed by Congress was MG Thomas Conway, an Irish Soldier of fortune who had been a member of Washington's council of 14 generals. Unfortunately, Conway had self-serving and political motives. He was quickly marginalized due to his ineffectiveness and his inability to work with his fellow general officers -- most notably General Washington.

The next Inspector General who arrived on the scene thanks to Franklin's recruiting efforts became the model for all Inspectors General and certainly the first effective Inspector General -- Friedrich Wilhelm Augustin *Freiherr* (Baron) von Steuben. Von Steuben was a retired Prussian captain who spent a significant amount of his time on the general staff of Frederick the Great. Benjamin Franklin recruited him in Paris in 1777, and Franklin immediately recognized the quality of the man. But Franklin was concerned that Congress might not offer a retired captain a position of such responsibility, so he 'doctored' von Steuben's letter of introduction to Congress and made the Baron a former lieutenant general, a grade Franklin knew would be acceptable to the Continental Congress.

Washington, clearly skeptical due to past problems with Conway and others, accepted von Steuben as the Army's Inspector General on a temporary basis. Von Steuben reported for duty at Valley Forge in February 1778. Although he spoke no English, he used French to communicate with the troops through a translator. He immediately set to work and impressed everyone with his tireless efforts to improve the Continental Army's training, drill, discipline, and organization.

Within a month, von Steuben had trained several of Washington's best Soldiers, who in turn trained and drilled other Soldiers. Von Steuben also began writing down drill

practices and standardized approaches to tactics -- the beginning of the Army's first real doctrine and standards.

A clearly impressed General Washington sang von Steuben's praises and, in May 1778, Congress officially appointed the Prussian officer as the Inspector General with the rank and pay of major general. Congress also appointed two ranks of Inspectors General subordinate to von Steuben, thus creating the first Inspector General organization (see Appendix A for a detailed discussion on the development of von Steuben's role).

The duties Congress outlined for the Inspector General included 'reporting all abuses, neglect, and deficiencies to the Commander-in-Chief.' Many of the Continental Army's regimental colonels bitterly resented von Steuben's efforts and saw the Baron as a threat. But von Steuben's character, tact, and innate military experience overcame this resistance and set the precedent for the conduct of all future Inspectors General. What von Steuben had established for the Army was a model approach -- a principle -- behind how all Inspectors General performed their duties. That approach, known today as the von Steuben model, required Inspectors General to assist their Commanders in enhancing the **Readiness and Warfighting Capabilities** of the Army. In effect, von Steuben not only served as the Army's first effective Inspector General but became the father of the Army's Inspector General system.



Major General Friedrich
Wilhelm Augustin *Freiherr*
(Baron) von Steuben

3. **Further Reading:** For further reading about MG von Steuben's life and contributions to the American Revolution, consult the following books:

Lockhart, Paul. *The Drillmaster of Valley Forge: The Baron De Steuben and the Making of the American Army*. New York: Harper Collins, 2008.

Palmer, John McAuley. *General von Steuben*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937.

Chapter 2

The Inspector General System in the Late 18th and 19th Centuries

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with an historical overview of the U.S. Army Inspector General system following the Revolutionary War and throughout the 18th and 19th Centuries.

2. **A Turbulent Time for Inspectors General:** During the late 18th and early 19th Centuries, the number of Inspectors General and their relative influence in the Army rose and fell -- sometimes dramatically. Army strength fluctuations, changing personalities among the senior leadership, and differing philosophical approaches by Army policymakers of the era caused these problems.

In 1790, the prestige of the Inspector General -- as established by MG von Steuben -- led that position to become the second in command of the Army. But changing viewpoints among senior leaders following von Steuben's tenure eventually resulted in a more diminished standing for the Inspector General. The absence of a standing Army in the years before the Constitutional Convention (1783-1787) left the position of Inspector General in limbo; but, after the Constitution's ratification, a small standing Army began to emerge as required in Article I, Section 8. For a brief period after 1800, the Inspector General's responsibilities fell to the Department of the Adjutant General. In several instances, the position had been abolished altogether and then re-established.

The Inspector General finally became a department -- The Inspector General's Department -- on 3 March 1813. But 65 years would pass before the department became a formal part of the Army's organization in 1878. The same act that established the Inspector General department also formally codified the position of Inspector General and provided for eight subordinate Inspectors General and many assistant Inspectors General. The real problem with these Inspectors General and their activities throughout most of the 19th Century was that they lacked a uniform doctrine and a clearly defined role.

The role of Inspectors General during the Civil War from 1861 to 1865 was spotty at best. The rapid mobilization of the Union Army in 1861 brought with it a flurry of Congressional legislation, to include the appointment of five Inspectors General in the grade of majors of cavalry. These Inspectors General were clearly 'inspectors without portfolio' and lacked a clear mission and purpose. In fact, they were likely appointed more for their potential to be promoted to colonel than for any other reason. The Confederate Army also used inspectors general as part of their field army structure but with an equally spotty record.

A formal Army inspectorate did not exist early in the Civil War, and the loose band of appointed Inspectors General operating throughout the Army lacked clearly defined purposes and roles. However, the duties of Inspectors General began to increase as the war progressed. In 1863, as an example, Inspectors General were detailed to supervise the organization of Federal and State volunteer regiments consisting entirely of black men.

By the summer of 1863, the Inspector General system began to take on greater shape and direction. The staffs of all corps had an Inspector General, and beneath them acting Inspectors General reviewed most divisions and brigades. The assistant Inspectors General assigned to corps and field armies were actually the permanent War Department representatives of the Inspector General Department.

Yet the lack of common doctrine still nagged the system. Some assistant Inspectors General would not follow instructions. All the War Department wanted to know from its Inspectors General each month was their location, activities during the month, and any changes of place of assignment.

Despite the numerous problems with the Inspector General system, some Inspectors General served their Commanders and their commands quite well. Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs had six Inspectors General by 1864 -- all in the grade of colonel -- reporting directly to him. These colonels visited depots, armies, and military posts to inspect quartermaster officers and their duties and to detect abuses. Meigs used their reports as important sources of information when making critical decisions.

After the Civil War, Commanders began relying on their Inspectors General to a greater degree -- especially since the War Department published an order that clearly defined the duties of an Inspector General. In 1876, the Secretary of War directed the Inspector General of the Army to report to the General of the Army on all subjects pertaining to military control and discipline and that all field Inspectors General were to report directly to their Commanding Generals. This directive placed Inspectors General under the Commander's control for all matters. No one could view the Inspector General as a 'spy' from higher headquarters any longer thanks to this directive. This same relationship between Commanders and their Inspectors General, first developed by von Steuben and Washington at Valley Forge, still exists today.

Chapter 3

Inspectors General in the First Half of the 20th Century

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with an historical overview of the U.S. Army Inspector General system from the Spanish-American War in 1898 through World War II.

2. **Serving a Deployed Army:** The Spanish-American War of 1898 resulted in the first large-scale global deployment of the Army, far exceeding the scale of the Army's cross-border deployment into Mexico during the Mexican-American War of 1846 to 1848. During the Spanish-American War, Army troops occupied islands in the Caribbean and struggled to suppress a growing rebellion in the Philippine islands.

The new challenge for all Inspectors General was to inspect an Army scattered across the globe. By 1900, Inspectors General inspected all regiments deploying to the Philippine Insurrection. Later, Inspectors General established an inspectorate directly in the islands.

3. **Relevance During a World War:** The beginning of World War I in 1914 would eventually involve -- by 1917 -- all Army Inspectors General in inspections aimed directly at the readiness of troops deploying from the United States to an overseas theater of operations, to include those units already there. General John J. Pershing's strong relationship with his Inspector General, MG Andre W. Brewster, during World War I clearly boosted the effectiveness of Inspectors General during America's participation in the war from 1917 to 1918.

Pershing, as Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France in 1917, relied heavily upon Brewster's counsel, advice, and discretion when making training, readiness, and officer assignment decisions. Although Pershing recognized Brewster's inherent potential to command a division in the field, the AEF Commander plainly realized that "the services of . . . Brewster cannot be spared." ¹ Pershing's memoirs contain praise of Brewster that suggests not only Pershing's esteem for his Inspector General but also the close relationship the two men shared throughout the war. Pershing wrote that Brewster "possesses the personal and military qualifications that make him of exceptional value, especially in determining the efficiency and fitness of officers for command." ²

The confidence that Brewster enjoyed with Pershing meant that he could now grapple with the overarching problems of unit and Soldier readiness with a strong degree of credibility. Brewster struggled to organize his burgeoning and inexperienced AEF Inspector General Department while still remaining focused on the essential role that he and his subordinate Inspectors General played in enhancing the AEF's combat readiness.

But constant personnel turnover plagued Brewster's AEF Inspector General Department. As officer casualty rosters grew, Pershing felt compelled to strip away all Regular Army officers from staff positions and send them to command units in the field.

Soon, Brewster's department comprised mostly inexperienced reserve officers who struggled to learn and understand the things that Brewster charged them with inspecting.

In spite of these problems, MG Brewster, with Pershing's full support and confidence, shaped the AEF Inspector General Department into an agency that enhanced markedly the readiness of all American units within the theater of operations. AEF Inspectors General -- at all levels down to corps and division -- tirelessly inspected the readiness of newly arrived units at the ports, the quality of unit march discipline, the effects of strength and equipment shortages, issues of discipline, and even special items of concern to General Pershing such as a sudden rash of venereal disease cases among the enlisted ranks.

When World War I ended on 11 November 1918, MG Brewster had shaped and matured the AEF Inspector General Department into a true inspecting and teaching force that helped Commanders at all levels identify and correct problems that threatened their units' combat readiness. In General Pershing's preliminary report to the Secretary of War submitted mere days after hostilities ended, the Commander-in-Chief lauded his Inspectors General as follows: "The Inspector General's Department has risen to the highest standards, and throughout has ably assisted Commanders in the enforcement of discipline." ³ Pershing clearly wanted the positive role his Inspectors General played in the final victory to become a matter of historical record.

4. World War II and Emerging Inspector General Functions: America's entry into World War II in December 1941 sparked the expansion of the Inspector General's Department to meet the needs of a now rapidly expanding Army. The strength of the department jumped from 60 officers in 1939 to 1,438 officers in early 1945. Each combat division now boasted a full Inspector General Section staffed specifically to conduct the same type of readiness inspections that the AEF Inspector General Department conducted under General Pershing's command in World War I. Unlike the one-man, division-level Inspector General sections of World War I, the table of organization for an infantry division in World War II (T/O&E 7 dated 15 July 1943) afforded each division one lieutenant colonel as the principal Inspector General, a captain as the assistant Inspector General, a warrant officer as chief auditor, a master sergeant as chief clerk, and two technicians as stenographers. ⁴

Inspections still served as the primary function of Inspectors General at all levels during World War II. General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff in Washington, D.C., charged his Inspector General, MG Virgil L. Peterson, to look into mobilization and training issues and report ways to fix any identified problems. In one instance, Peterson inspected -- and then reported on -- the effectiveness of the Second and Third Armies' massive, 350,000-man maneuvers in Louisiana in September 1941. MG Peterson's report to Marshall gave the Army Chief of Staff the confidence that the Army was on the right track in training its troops for combat. In the report, MG Peterson stated that: "[Lieutenant] General McNair [Chief of Staff and Director of General Headquarters, or GHQ] and his headquarters have accomplished, and are continuing to accomplish, an outstanding job in the supervision of training of the Army." ⁵

Although readiness and training inspections served as the mainstay of the Inspector General's charter, more and more incidents that demanded investigations surfaced during mobilization and, later, in combat. General Marshall entrusted Peterson to look into -- fairly and impartially -- some highly sensitive, and sometimes racially charged,

incidents. Peterson's deputy, BG Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., the Army's only African American general officer, carried the mantle of investigating several of the racially charged incidents. Marshall knew Davis to be a hard but fair fact-finder -- even when looking into allegations of Soldier misconduct in units like the all-black 364th Infantry Regiment. Other sensitive allegations that the Inspector General Department handled concerned the ill treatment of Soldiers and trainees, poor living conditions for the troops, and so on. Some of these issues on the surface seemed like systemic problems best handled by an inspection; however, the investigative approach often led to the reprimand or relief of a Commander.

Investigations continued to become a primary Inspector General function even in the combat theaters of operation. Towards the end of the war in Europe in April 1945, LTG Alexander M. Patch, Commander of the Seventh Army, was faced with a highly sensitive issue that began receiving negative press. Seventh Army Soldiers from the 42nd and 45th Infantry Divisions who had converged on -- and then seized -- the Dachau Concentration Camp north of Munich on 29 April were alleged to have killed several unarmed SS camp guards.⁶ The men, in an apparent fit of rage over the utter depravity and horror they witnessed in the camp, supposedly lined up and then shot several unarmed SS guards.

Patch recognized the potential seriousness of such an allegation and the public relations disaster that would surely ensue. Therefore, he entrusted his army's Inspector General Section to investigate the allegations formally on 2 May 1945.⁷ Although no record is available as to the true nature of Patch's relationship with his principal Inspector General, COL Leerer, Patch's faith in the assistant Inspector General, LTC Joseph Whitaker, appeared quite strong, since Whitaker became the lead -- and sole -- investigator for the incident. Whitaker spent the next several weeks taking sworn, recorded testimony from the subjects and suspects involved in the incident. Staying true to his role as a fair and impartial fact-finder, Whitaker presented his final Report of Investigation (now labeled "Secret") to the Seventh Army's Judge Advocate General without recommending any adverse action. He simply stated the facts as he found them. The Judge Advocate General translated Whitaker's findings into charges against four of the suspects. Ultimately, no action was taken against the four men for a variety of reasons.⁸ However, Patch's faith in his Inspector General Section appeared justified since LTC Whitaker handled the investigation professionally and thoroughly.

As the U.S. Army demobilized rapidly from nine million troops to a few hundred thousand immediately following World War II, Inspectors General found themselves involved in solving individual problems for scores and scores of soon-to-be-discharged Soldiers. Soldiers complained about a variety of things such as pay and perceived injustices by their chains of command. The principal complaint was that the Army was not releasing Soldiers from the service fast enough -- especially since the war in both the European and Pacific theaters was over.⁹ Resultantly, the Inspector General Assistance function emerged from this demobilization process and still stands today as one of the four primary Inspector General functions.

Notes

1. Quoted in Joseph W. A. Whitehorne. *The Inspectors General of the United States Army 1903-1939* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Inspector General and Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998), 158.

2. Quoted in Whitehorne, 158.

3. Quoted in the *Handbook for Inspectors General* (Washington 25, D.C.: War Department, Office of the Inspector General, June 1947), 2.
4. Yves J. Bellanger. *U.S. Army Infantry Divisions 1943-45: Volume 1 - Organization, Doctrine and Equipment* (West Midlands, England: Helion and Company, 2002), 8.
5. Quoted in Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley. *The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1947), 45.
6. John Frayn Turner, and Robert Jackson. *Destination Berchtesgaden: Saga of the US 7th Army* (New York: Charles Scriber's son, 1975), 173.
7. Letter from Chief of Staff, Seventh Army, to Inspector General, Seventh Army, dated 2 May 1945.
8. Flint Whitlock. "Liberating Dachau." *World War II Magazine*, Volume 14, Number 7, March 2000, 76. Copies of the sworn, recorded testimony from Lieutenant Colonel Whitaker's report are available on the Boston Globe's Web Site at [www.boston.com/globe/nation/packages/secret /index5 transcript 2.shtml](http://www.boston.com/globe/nation/packages/secret/index5_transcript_2.shtml).
9. Personal letters of Staff Sergeant William J. McMurdie, Company A, 394th Infantry, 99th Infantry Division, from May to December 1945. Staff Sergeant McMurdie closely monitored the Army's point-release system during his occupation time in Germany immediately following the war. He commented profusely in his letters home about the point system's problems and the general feelings of his fellow Soldiers.

Chapter 4

Standardization throughout the 1950s and 1960s

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with an historical overview of the U.S. Army Inspector General system during the period from 1950 to 1961.

2. **Statutory Basis for the Inspector General System:** The 1950 Army Reorganization Act -- enacted the same year the Korean War began -- created the statutory basis for the current Army Inspector General system. This act replaced the Inspector General Department with the Office of The Inspector General (OTIG). The statute further defined The Inspector General (TIG) as directly subordinate to the Army Chief of Staff (CSA) and responsive to the Secretary of the Army.

The reorganization act charged TIG with inquiring into -- and reporting upon -- the discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Army. Specifically, Inspectors General were to focus their efforts on training and combat readiness -- the latter a key aspect of the von Steuben model.

Despite this reorganization, the Inspector General system functioned throughout the three-year Korean War from 1950 to 1953 in much the same way as it performed during World War II. Inspections were the Inspector General system's mainstay, especially with regard to measuring unit readiness for those combat units deploying to Korea.

3. **The Emergence of Trained Inspectors General:** In 1952, OTIG developed and implemented an orientation course for officers selected to serve as Inspectors General. Prior to 1952, no formal provision existed requiring Inspectors General to receive formal instruction on Inspector General duties, even though the old Inspector General Department had developed and distributed instructional material to each Inspector General in the form of inspection and investigation guides, handbooks, and other procedural material. The most noteworthy of these early attempts at standardized procedures was the June 1947 Handbook for Inspectors General (see Appendix B). At 23 pages in length, the handbook addressed the three main functions -- Inspections, Complaints (later to become Assistance), and Investigations -- in a broad, cursory manner.¹ This handbook also introduced the requirement for Annual General Inspections (AGIs) and defined the purpose of the AGI as follows: "to observe, report upon, and promote the efficiency and economy of the command and other activities inspected."²

4. **The Classification of Inspector General Records:** A legal case in 1953 resulted in the classification of Inspector General records as restricted in both access and use. Inspector General Inspection Reports and Reports of Investigation were declared 'privileged' as a matter of law. Inspector General records could not be used as evidence in judicial proceedings except as specifically authorized by the authority ordering the investigation or a higher authority.

5. **Inspector General Qualification Standards:** The Army formally codified qualification standards for Inspectors General in the first edition of Army Regulation 20-1, Inspector

General Activities and Procedures, dated 29 January 1957. In addition, Army Regulation 614-100 echoed these standards and stated that only the highest caliber of Army officers be detailed as Inspectors General. Those individuals should meet the following minimum qualifications:

- a. The person must be mature with broad military experience.
- b. The person must not have previously completed a three-year tour as an Inspector General.
- c. The person must exhibit moral and personal traits necessary for a position of dignity and prestige.

6. Formalizing Inspector General Training: The mission to conduct the orientation course for all officers assigned as Inspectors General transferred from the OTIG Inspections Division to a newly established Field Service Division on 5 November 1956. The course became a more formal three-week enterprise and was originally targeted to officers with stateside assignments. The course provided formal instruction in Inspections, Investigations, and Procurement Matters.

In 1958, the frequency of the course increased from four to six times a year. Attendance expanded to include civilians and non-commissioned officers assigned to assist Inspectors General. A two-week orientation course also began in some overseas areas.

7. The Technical Inspections Mission: In May 1956, the Secretary of the Army directed the Department of the Army to assume responsibility for technical proficiency inspections (TPIs) of Army atomic organizations worldwide. General Order Number 40, dated 24 August 1956, placed these TPIs under the jurisdiction of The Inspector General. The 2 May 1960 edition of Army Regulation 20-1 provided for the first time specific policy governing Inspector General TPIs.

8. The Assistance Function: Inspector General Technical Bulletin Number Four, published in 1960, standardized the approved methods and procedures for Inspectors General to receive and process Inspector General Action Requests (IGARs). These procedures formalized the Assistance function and made it into one of the four primary functions conducted by the Inspector General.

9. Training America's Allies as Inspectors General: The Inspector General shared the U.S. Army's Inspector General philosophy and procedures with members of allied nations beginning in 1961. In that year, OTIG presented its standard course of instruction to groups composed entirely of international officers. The first groups to receive this training were Army officers from the Republic of Korea in Seoul, South Korea, and Nationalist Chinese Army officers in Taipei, Formosa. The school today continues to host foreign officers and civilians from allied nations around the globe.

10. The Army Inspector General System from the Early 1960s and into the 1970s: The formally defined modern Army Inspector General system that emerged in the 1950s and early 1960s was the system that served the rapidly mobilized draft Army that deployed to fight in Vietnam throughout the 1960s until 1972. The three primary functions of Inspections, Assistance, and Investigations became the Inspector General

system's way of enhancing the warfighting and readiness capabilities (the von Steuben model) of all deploying units and those serving in the Vietnam theater of operations. Among the things Inspectors General investigated during the Vietnam War were supply and equipment management, fraud in procurement and contracting, and racial issues. Inspectors General also processed complaints of leadership deterioration and allegations of offenses against civilians. But the Annual General Inspections (AGIs) conducted by Inspectors General for the readiness of all units became the bulwark of the Inspector General system.

Even before the Vietnam War began in earnest, The Inspector General was already looking into readiness issues for other events such as the Berlin crisis in 1962. An OTIG investigation during that crisis looked into allegations of inefficiencies during the activation of Army Reserve and National Guard units. Readiness continued to be the Inspector General's focus well into the 1970s -- a decade that many call the high-water mark of our Nation's Cold War with the Soviet Union.

Notes

1. *Handbook for Inspectors General*. Washington 25, D.C.: War Department, Office of the Inspector General, June 1947.
2. *Handbook for Inspectors General*, 9.

Chapter 5

A Changing Philosophy in the Late 20th Century

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with an historical overview of the U.S. Army Inspector General system during the period between 1977 through 2000.

2. **An Inspector General with a New Philosophy:** In 1977, LTG Richard G. Trefry became The Inspector General, a post he would hold until his retirement in 1983. With LTG Trefry came a significant change in philosophy and a paradigm shift for the Inspector General system, principally with regard to the function of Inspections.

As an artillery officer who boasted an understanding of how the Army functioned that was without peer, Trefry quickly recognized that the Annual General Inspections (AGIs) conducted by Inspectors General throughout the Vietnam War period to measure individual unit readiness was not working. In fact, AGIs were having an adverse effect on readiness.

The AGIs conducted in the late 1970s and early 1980s were best characterized by a group of clipboard-bearing Inspectors General arriving by bus in front of some battalion's headquarters, offloading, rapidly conducting compliance-oriented inspections on the battalion's functional areas, providing a terse out-briefing, and then reloading the bus and driving off. These compliance inspections -- a type of one-size-fits-all approach -- proved intimidating and eliminated Commanders from the process of making informed readiness decisions about their own units. Commanders felt victimized by the AGI process and often were relieved because their units did not 'measure up' to the Inspector General template. Likewise, the Inspector General system's credibility had reached an all-time low due to these "black-hat-style" inspections, and no one trusted an Inspector General enough to ask for assistance. The Assistance function back then did not generate the caseload that Inspectors General see today.

LTG Trefry quickly re-vamped the philosophy behind Inspector General inspections. He pushed compliance-oriented inspections back to where he believed they belonged -- to Commanders. Commanders could now inspect their own units using their own staffs and make their own readiness judgments. This Commander-led inspection program eventually evolved in 1986 into the Organizational Inspection Program (OIP).

Trefry then changed the inspections paradigm. He re-oriented all Inspectors General on inspections that concentrated on the problems that Commanders in the field could not solve -- systemic problems. These topics suggested a pattern of non-compliance throughout the command and meant that some functional area -- such as logistics or personnel -- was not operating as it should. As someone who understood how the Army operated through these functional areas (or systems), Trefry expanded the Inspector General School from three weeks to six weeks; the additional three-week curriculum taught Inspectors General how the Army functioned and managed the force. Inspectors General soon began conducting special Inspector General Inspections of systemic issues that sought causes rather than symptoms, examined existing policy for errors or omissions, and traced unit-level problems to Army-level problems. A new Inspector

General Inspections Process began to emerge that also emphasized the key principle of follow-up to ensure that those things that Inspectors General found were fixed in a timely manner. This significant paradigm shift in the Inspector General system's approach and philosophy quickly began to mature and blossom throughout the mid to late 1980s.

2. The Inspector General Oath: LTG Trefry further recognized the important relationship that each Inspector General shared with his or her Commander. In an effort to emphasize further that special relationship, Trefry created the Inspector General oath in 1981, an oath which the Commander administered to all categories of Inspectors General within the command. Trefry even developed oaths for Acting Inspectors General and Temporary Assistant Inspectors General.

3. The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986: The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act, a result of glaring problems in how the armed forces operated jointly during the attempted Iran hostage rescue mission in 1980 and the Grenada operation in 1983, amended the Inspector General portion of the 1950 Army Reorganization Act by making The Inspector General responsible to the Secretary of the Army and responsive to the CSA. The Secretary could now direct TIG to focus on a broader spectrum of Army-related and joint interoperability matters. TIG's other responsibilities remained the same, and the Inspector General Agency's office symbol changed from DAIG to SAIG in keeping with the shift from the Army Staff to the Secretariat. We still use DAIG today as the acronym to describe both the combined OTIG and the Inspector General Agency.

4. The First Female Deputy, The Inspector General: When BG Evelyn P. Foote was assigned as the Deputy, The Inspector General (DTIG) for Inspections on 17 June 1986, she became the first female general officer to serve in the U.S. Army Inspector General system. BG Foote had joined the Army in 1960 as part of the Women's Army Corps (WAC). Ironically, she served on the very committee that disbanded the WACs in 1978, opening the door for major advancements and opportunities for women in the Army. After serving as DTIG for Inspections for two years, BG Foote was promoted to major general and reassigned in July 1988 as the Deputy Commanding General, Military District of Washington. By the time she retired in September 1989 after a nearly 30-year career, she had commanded at all levels from platoon up through brigade. In 1987, her Alma Mater, Wake Forest University in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, named a room in her honor: "The Evelyn P. Foote Leadership Laboratory." The position of DTIG for Inspections was eventually removed from DAIG's organization in May 2001 as part of the general down-sizing effort in all major Army headquarters, leaving only one two-star DTIG position in the agency.

5. The First African American TIG: LTG Henry Doctor, Jr. was the first African American general officer to serve as TIG. LTG Doctor graduated from South Carolina State University in 1954 and later served as an infantry officer in Vietnam. He rose through the ranks and commanded at all levels, culminating in command of the 2nd Infantry Division just prior to his assignment as TIG. TIG was the last position LTG Doctor held from 1 July 1986 to 31 July 1989. More than 40 years before LTG Doctor's appointment, BG Benjamin O. Davis had been the first African American general officer to serve both in the U.S. Army and in the Army Inspector General system. BG Davis was recalled from retirement during World War II to serve as one of several DTIGs.

6. Automating the Inspector General System: In the late 1980s, the Inspector General system crossed into the realm of automation with the advent of a common Inspector

General network and database. This automated system allowed Inspectors General to assimilate more effectively all available Inspector General information as well as audit reports written by outside agencies. The first effort was called the Inspector General Management Resource System (IGMIRS). The Inspector General World-Wide Network (IGNET) later replaced IGMIRS.

7. Emerging Doctrine: With Inspector General policy firmly in place in the form of Army Regulation 20-1, more substantive doctrinal guides began to emerge from The Inspector General School (colloquially called TIGU at the time for 'The Inspector General University'). These doctrinal guides existed in the form of Technical Bulletins. The first of these bulletins was TB IG 4, Inspector General Investigation and Action Request Guide (dated August 1986), which loosely provided an outline for what Inspectors General know today as the Inspector General Action Process (IGAP).¹ The bulk of this 100-page guide contained letter formats and interview guides for sworn, recorded testimony.

TB IG 1, Inspector General Inspection Guide (dated November 1986), soon followed. This guide was a thin, 45-page pamphlet that introduced the Root Cause Analysis Model and a rudimentary Inspector General Inspections Process consisting of a Pre-Inspection Phase, an Inspection Phase, and a Post-Inspection Phase. Each phase had four sub-steps.²

8. An Increase in Operational Tempo: As the 20th Century drew to a close and the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the operational tempo of the Army intensified greatly. Likewise, the demands on the Inspector General system increased markedly.

The increase in operational tempo really began on 20 December 1989 when the United States invaded Panama and toppled General Manuel Noriega's corrupt, militaristic regime. Operation Just Cause lasted a mere 40 days and ended on 31 January 1990, but many units remained deployed in the country well into April hunting down remaining Panamanian forces that had not surrendered.

The rapid nature of Operation Just Cause did not allow Inspectors General to prepare in advance for such a large deployment of forces into combat. Inspectors General primarily assisted in facilitating communications between deployed Soldiers and their Family members. For the most part, Inspectors General served as the eyes and ears of their Commanders by observing base housing security in Panama, the utilization of volunteers, personnel security at Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and commissary facilities throughout the country, and command information programs.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait several months later in August 1990, the build-up of forces in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East (Operation Desert Shield) allowed Inspectors General to become more proactive. The Inspections function proved critical as Inspectors General conducted inspections on a variety of critical topics, such as Family support organizations, the mobilization process, and the Army postal system. Inspectors General also monitored closely the issuing of chemical protective over-garments and assisted hundreds of Soldiers and Family members to resolve a myriad of wide-ranging issues.

Since Inspectors General now deployed forward into the theater of operations, a reach-back capability became critical. Forward-deployed Inspectors General needed

help from stay-behind Inspector General offices to solve Soldier problems and issues that surfaced in the theater of operations. This critical technical-channel link back to the U.S. became the center of gravity for Inspector General operations.

To illustrate the importance of the Inspector General system during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Inspector General function of Assistance became critical for the VII Corps Inspector General's Office and a linchpin to morale and Soldier readiness for the corps Commander, LTG Frederick M. Franks, Jr. Franks's close relationship with his Inspector General, COL Roosevelt Speed, became key to gauging not just the morale and preparedness of his Soldiers in the theater of operations but also of the Families that remained in Germany.

Franks recognized early in the deployment that the morale and readiness of his Soldiers in the field would be directly proportional to the morale and welfare of the Families they were leaving behind in Germany. After soliciting Speed's advice, Franks decided to split his Inspector General office into a forward section that served the troops in the field and a rear section that responded to the needs and concerns of the Family members back in Germany. Inspections and Investigations still remained critical VII Corps Inspector General functions, but Assistance became the predominant function.

Speed's direct access to Franks greatly facilitated the Inspector General's responsiveness to a variety of issues. When the forward Inspector General section received numerous individual assistance complaints about mail, Speed discussed this emerging trend with the corps Commander, who directed that an inspection occur immediately to solve this systemic issue.

Back on the home front, the corps rear Inspector General section, headed by MAJ Kurt Langenwalter, attended numerous town hall meetings and assisted Family members with problems of indebtedness, mail, and other issues. Franks's primary concern was that the corps Family support systems stay intact now that the units had deployed forward. Franks entrusted Langenwalter, and the rear Inspectors General from all of the corps' divisions, with this mission. Franks believed that if all was well on the home front, his VII Corps Soldiers could focus on the task at hand: expelling the Iraqi army from Kuwait.³

Other operations soon followed throughout the 1990s that allowed the Army Inspector General system to refine its functions and further mature the paradigm shift in philosophy begun by LTG Trefry in the early 1980s. Operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo saw a marked increase in forward-deployed Inspectors General directly supporting their Commanders and units in the operational theaters. Inspectors General, as a rule, no longer supported from the rear, another paradigm shift that began with Operation Just Cause in Panama.

9. The First Inspector General Sergeant Major: Although NCOs had been part of the IG system for many years, it was not until the early 1980s that NCOs became what we know today as Assistant IGs. Until 1 January 1999, when SGM Jeff Howard assumed the position of IG sergeant major, making him the first IG sergeant major for the U.S. Army Inspector General Agency, NCOs serving as IGs had no dedicated advocate for their professional-development and assignment needs. SGM Howard quickly became a trusted advisor to TIG on all NCO-related matters within the agency and, more broadly,

throughout the Army IG system. As of 2023, the Army IG system has had eight sergeants-major serve in this capacity.

Notes

1. TB IG 4, Technical Bulletin: Inspector General Investigation and Action Request Guide. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 28 August 1986.
2. TB IG 1, Technical Bulletin: Inspector General Inspection Guide. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 24 November 1986.
3. Interview with LTC (Retired) Kurt Langenwalter, former Inspector General with VII Corps during Operation Desert Storm, on 6 December 2002. LTG Franks eventually appointed MG Bean as the corps rear Commander in Germany, and MAJ Langenwalter's rear Inspector General section often responded directly to him. Langenwalter's rear Inspector General section also conducted inspections of the rear detachments to ensure that Families were receiving the support they needed.

Chapter 6

The 21st Century and the Global War on Terror

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with an historical overview of the U.S. Army Inspector General system from 2000 to the present.

2. **A Fully Matured Inspector General System:** The dawn of the new millennium brought a fully developed Army Inspector General system into the 21st Century. After more than 222 years of growth and enhancement, the Inspector General system entered the 21st Century as a mature, fully adaptable system of four primary functions -- Inspections, Assistance, Investigations, and Teaching and Training -- executed through two well-defined and time-tested processes -- the Inspector General Action Process (IGAP) and the Inspector General Inspections Process. Doctrine had matured from brief bulletins into comprehensive guides that offered detailed techniques and approaches to executing the Inspector General Inspections Process and the Inspector General Action Process.

3. **The Global War on Terror:** With the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, the nature of warfare changed dramatically for the Army. The need for a massive Cold War military machine shifted to the need for smaller, rapidly deployable brigades and special operations units that could travel quickly to any theater of operations and engage any terrorist or other elements that threatened the United States and her allies. The Army quickly engaged in a revolutionary transformation effort that saw the creation of more rapidly deployable brigades (Units of Action) while at the same time fighting the Global War on Terror.

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq punctuated the nature of the Global War on Terror and the demands the war placed on the Army and all services. The Inspector General system quickly adapted to meet the rapid requirements of this transforming Army that was also simultaneously combating enemy forces overseas. Doctrine emerged at The U.S. Army Inspector General School (TIGS) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, in 2003 for the conduct of compressed Inspector General Inspections that provided forward-deployed Inspectors General with guidance on how to adapt the three-phased, 17-step Inspections Process to short-fused inspection requirements that were critical to immediate mission readiness. Policy and doctrine quickly began to incorporate new ideas, approaches, and techniques learned on the battlefield into the Army Inspector General system, a process that continues today at TIGS with the constant updating of the doctrinal guides and the revision of Army Regulation 20-1.

4. **Reorganizing the Schoolhouse:** The U.S. Army Inspector General School physically reorganized in the summer of 2003 to meet the rapidly changing demands of a transforming Army and the Global War on Terror. The school reorganized with a Dean of Academics overseeing the faculty and generating the school's very first Academic Program. This Academic Program incorporated the Training and Doctrine Command's Systems Approach to Training Process to ensure that a constant cycle of feedback,

analysis, and revision occurred in the school's curriculum and in Army Inspector General policy and doctrine. That cycle of constant refinement and improvement continues today in the form of the Army's Training and Education Development Process.

In addition, the Commandant formed agreements with the National Guard Bureau and the U.S. Army Reserve Command for the assignment of an Army National Guard officer and a U.S. Army Reserve officer to serve as primary instructors. The three primary instructors soon reflected the multi-component Army with an active-duty officer teaching Inspections, a Reserve officer teaching Assistance, and a National Guard officer teaching Investigations.

5. Greater Civilian Presence in the Army Inspector General System: In 2004, Department of the Army civilian positions became more predominant within the Army Inspector General system. Although Civilians had served as Inspectors General for many years, a military-to-civilian conversion plan at both DAIG and through the Army's various Inspector General offices saw the creation of many senior-level Inspector General positions (such as Deputy Inspectors General) becoming 'civilianized'. This effort sought to create a greater level of continuity within the system and to ensure that the Inspector General corps, as a non-branch entity within the Army, did not suffer from its own normal turnover. At the DAIG level, leadership and supervisory positions such as the Chief, Operations Division; Chief, Information Resource Management Division; Chief, Technical Inspections Division; and Dean of Academics / Deputy Commandant at The Inspector General School became civilian GS-15 positions.

6. The Trends Analysis Cell: In 2004, The Inspector General, LTG Paul T. Mikolashek, reestablished a Trends Analysis cell as part of DAIG's Inspections Division. This cell was similar to the Plans and Analysis Cell first established by LTG Trefry back in 1978. This early cell focused primarily on follow-up but stood down in 1995 when DAIG transferred the larger Army follow-up mission to the Army Audit Agency along with five spaces. But instead of focusing on Army-wide follow-up activities for all Army-wide inspections, evaluations, and audits, this two-person cell, according to The Inspector General, would identify emerging trends throughout the Army using the IGARS database, recommend Army-level inspection topics, and provide follow-up but only for DAIG-level inspection recommendations. But with the adoption of Lean Six Sigma (LSS) as an Army-wide approach to increasing the efficiency of Army processes, the cell soon became the natural proponent for LSS training and projects. When both members retired in 2008, the cell stood down.

7. A New Inspections Mission: In early 2006, the Army Chief of Staff charged The Inspector General, LTG Stanley E. Green, with providing another layer of oversight for the Army's information operations. The result was a sixth operational division in DAIG named the Information Assurance Division. The first division chief, COL Frederick Henry, built the division in July 2006 around qualified officers and Civilians who would conduct Army-wide compliance inspections of information systems as part of the Department of Defense's larger effort in the 'cyber war' against foreign hackers and others who would disrupt the Defense Department's computer infrastructure and architecture. The division (later renamed the Cybersecurity Inspections Division) now issues an annual report on its inspections to the senior Army leadership.

8. The End of Major Army Commands (MACOMs): The publication of Army Regulation 10-87 on 4 September 2007 heralded the end of MACOMs and the

introduction of Army Commands (ACOMs), Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), and Direct-Reporting Units (DRUs). These name changes more closely aligned the Army's major headquarters with their higher echelon Joint counterparts in the Combatant Commands. This change resulted in the greater likelihood of ASCCs -- and not just divisions and corps -- to assume missions as a Joint headquarters in the form of either a Joint Task Force or Joint Force Land Component. Resultantly, IGs in the ASCCs had to become aware of, and in many cases become trained in, Joint IG policy and how to balance the Joint IG approach with Army IG requirements.

9. A New Law Requiring Inspections of Wounded Troop Housing: The Walter Reed Army Medical Center scandal in late 2007 that highlighted sub-standard housing for recovering troops wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan prompted Congress to direct the Army's Regional Medical Command (RMC) IGs to inspect all such housing annually. Public Law 110-181, dated 28 January 2008, specifically required the RMC IGs to inspect annually all housing facilities occupied by recovering service members and provide reports to the facility Commander, affiliated hospital Commander, The Surgeon General, Secretary of the Army, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. The Army's Medical Command IG oversaw the first two inspections and assisted the RMC IGs by enlisting the help of other IGs throughout the Army. This requirement remains in place in 2017.

10. A New Trends Analysis Cell: In 2009, The Inspector General reestablished the Trends Analysis Cell specifically to follow-up on the results of DAIG-level inspections but also to identify broader Army trends that could lead to other Army-wide systemic issues. The cell was re-designated as the Analysis and Inspections Follow-Up Branch and began work on a database that would not only track DAIG-level inspection recommendations but also capture IG inspection findings throughout the Army to identify trends relevant to Army readiness.

11. A DAIG Civilian Director of Inspections: In October 2009, The Inspector General established the new position of Principal Director to The Inspector General for Inspections (PDTIG-I) held by an SES-level civilian to oversee DAIG's various inspections divisions. Mr. Joseph Guzowski became the first SES director of inspections with responsibility for the new Analysis and Inspections Follow-Up Branch. Following Mr. Guzowski's departure from DAIG, Ms. Laura Jankovich served as PDTIG-I from January 2019 to March 2021. Following Ms. Jankovich's departure, the Army withdrew the SES position from DAIG. But then, after a two-year hiatus, DAIG reestablished the PDTIG-I position in July 2023. Mr. William "Bill" Jenkins is the current PDTIG-I.

12. ARFORGEN and Readiness Assistance Visits: In 2010, the integration of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model into the way the Army resets, trains, and makes available forces (specifically brigade combat teams, or BCTs) for overseas contingency operations drove the development of new IG doctrine regarding the Teaching and Training function. The school developed doctrine -- primarily focused at the division level -- that allowed IGs to conduct Readiness Assistance Visits (RAVs) to help recently redeployed BCTs re-establish internal systems that may have withered as a result of high personnel turnover and other factors. These RAVs, although led and organized by the IG, were not IG inspections but instead collective Teaching-and-Training efforts that gathered subject-matter experts from within the division to visit a BCT and show the leaders in that BCT how to re-build internal systems and then how to inspect those systems. RAVs quickly became one of the primary approaches used by

division IGs of all components to assist the command in enhancing its warfighting and readiness capabilities.

13. The Emergence of the Records-Screening and Oversight Division: In 2014, LTG Peter M. Vangjel, the 64th TIG, established the Records-Screening Division (SAIG-RS) under the leadership of a colonel in response to the Army's growing effort to vet officers and NCOs under consideration for a specific duty, command position, or promotion. DAIG's Assistance Division and Investigations Division each had separate branches to screen IG records for non-senior officials and senior officials respectively. As the scope and nature of the records-screening mission grew, LTG Vangjel recognized that these two branches were straining the resources of the two divisions, so he consolidated them into a separate division. The division was organized with two branches: a Screening Branch and an Oversight Branch. The new Records-Screening and Oversight Division's mission was to support the legally mandated Personnel Suitability Screening Process by conducting a thorough review of IG records to identify and report adverse information in response to requests from authorized agencies. The division was charged with screening NCOs for selected assignments, schools, and positions of trust and officers for promotion (O-3 and above), command and special assignments, and general officer retirements. Further, the division was required to analyze all cases containing adverse information and prepare written summaries of substantiated allegations recorded in the IGARS database that a General Officer Review Board or Selective Early Retirement Board would review formally prior to a selection board. Additionally, the Oversight Branch within the division prepared amendments for substantiated cases when evidence did not support the findings. By the end of 2014, the division had screened 33,710 names on 907 lists, resulting in 269 individual case summaries. Of that number, 103 cases required amendments of the IG records for varying reasons.

14. The End of Operations Iraqi Freedom (2011) and Enduring Freedom (2014). The end of the U.S. Army's major operational presence in Iraq and Afghanistan between the years 2011 and 2014 resulted in a significant spike in IG workload as the Army began negotiating the rough road of postwar transition. This anticipated spike, a historical constant for IGs since the early 20th Century, prompted LTG Peter M. Vangjel in 2013 to argue for, and successfully secure, a manning rate of 95 percent for active-component positions and 100 percent for all U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard IG positions. During this period, the IG system saw significant growth in the number of Whistleblower Reprisal investigations, prompting LTG Vangjel to request and receive 12 directed military over-strength (DMO) positions to handle the sudden case backlog. These DMOs remained in DAIG for two years.

15. IG Functional Community. Between 2012 and 2014, the IG system's career program for 1801-series Civilians, Career Program 55 (CP 55), reached full maturity. DAIG's Operations and Support Division developed competencies and career maps, a governance structure through the establishment of an IG Force Proponency Branch, and the identification of Army Career Program Managers within the IG system. Funding also became available for IG Civilians for the IG Advanced Course and for various writing-improvement programs available through the USA Graduate School. On 1 October 2020, the Army Civilian Career Management Activity (ACCMA) was established under the Civilian Human Resources Agency, and CP 55 transferred into the ACCMA under the Professional Services Career Field. With this transfer, CP 55 was re-designated as the IG Functional Community as part of the effort to provide an enterprise-wide approach

to acquiring, training, developing, and retaining a high quality and diverse Army Civilian workforce.

16. The IG Advanced Course. The IG Advanced Course began at the U.S. Army Inspector General School (TIGS) in April 2014 as a five-day resident course designed to enhance the skills of experienced IGs in selected aspects of Inspections, Assistance, and Investigations; to teach strategies for critical thinking; and to improve the quality of written IG products. The need for this course arose specifically in response to a decline in the quality of written IG products over time. TIGS was able to gauge the average writing level of IGs by conducting writing assessments of all students beginning in December 2013. The faculty used the Graduate Record Exam standard of 1 through 6 (6 was the highest score while scores of 3 and under were below the acceptable standard). After more than a year of conducting assessments, the average score was a 3, further prompting TIG and TIGS, in addition to the Advanced Course curriculum, to seek funds to support more robust writing-improvement strategies. The IG Advanced Course, conducted three times a year, formally replaced the Refresher Course, which began in 1999 as a “back-to-the-basics” course. The Refresher Course later became a recertification event after the 11 September 2001 attacks to meet wartime needs.

17. Continuing Operations: After 13 years of combat operations, the United States and NATO ended their combat mission in Afghanistan on 28 December 2014. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (OEF-A) became the longest war in American history. However, American forces remained in Afghanistan until 31 August 2021 to support the training and operations of the Afghan Army as part of Operation Resolute Support and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. But situations in the Middle East prompted the return of American forces to Iraq in the latter part of 2014 under Operation Inherent Resolve. At the same time, the “Pacific Pivot” strategy also continued to mature. Despite these continued deployment realities, the Department of Defense still faced numerous budgetary challenges and reduced manpower levels. Terms like “sequestration” and “draw-down” became common in the months prior to, and immediately following, the end of OEF. Due to the critical importance of the Army IG system in reducing the friction inherent in periods of transition, U.S. Army Central Command (Third Army) maintained an Army-only IG presence in Kuwait and continued to support the Joint IGs engaged throughout the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations.

18. The First Military Police Officer to Become TIG: LTG David E. Quantock was sworn in as the 65th Inspector General of the Army in December 2014. He was the first Military Police (MP) corps officer to attain the rank of lieutenant general and the first MP to serve as TIG. Prior to becoming TIG, he was the Provost Marshal General and Commander of Criminal Investigations Division Command (CIDC).

19. A Major Cultural Shift in Investigations: On 26 January 2018, Dr. Mark T. Esper, the Secretary of the Army, approved a significant change in Army Inspector General policy and culture by signing Army Directive 2018-01 (Inspector General Investigations). The directive required Army IGs to refer all allegations first to the command for resolution. If the command elected to resolve the matter, the IG would later verify that the command in fact investigated the same allegation referred by the IG before the IG closed out the case in the IGARS database as “command referred.” This significant policy shift absolved IGs of reviewing and evaluating command investigatory products after the fact and instead allowed a Commander’s findings to stand. The IG would no longer capture substantiated or not-substantiated findings in the IGARS database based

upon command-referred allegations. Instead, this information would be stored in other Army repositories maintained by The Office of the Judge Advocate General. This significant shift in culture lifted from IGs from the overwhelming administrative burden of crafting Modified Reports of Investigative Inquiry for every command product and instead allowed IGs throughout the enterprise to commit more time, resources, and energy to the functions that most directly enhance Army readiness -- Teaching and Training and Inspections.

20. The First Female TIG: LTG Donna W. Martin assumed responsibility as the 67th Inspector General of the Army in September 2021 as the first woman to serve as TIG. Prior to being named TIG, LTG Martin served two tours as an IG: first as the Command IG for 3rd Infantry Division from June 2008 to July 2010 and later as DAIG's Investigations Division Chief from July 2014 to March 2015.

21. The First Female IG SGM: SGM Delia Quintero assumed duty as the 9th Inspector General Sergeant Major in June 2023 and is the first woman to serve as TIG Sergeant Major. Prior to becoming TIG Sergeant Major, SGM Quintero served as the Command Sergeant Major of the Cyber Center of Excellence and Fort Gordon at what is now known as Fort Eisenhower, Georgia.

Chapter 7

Inspector General Insignia

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with a description and explanation of the Inspector General insignia.

2. **Background:** The IG insignia was proposed to the Secretary of War by the senior Inspector General for the Army, MG Joseph C. Breckinridge, on 14 February 1890. The Secretary of War approved the new insignia a few days later. The IG insignia was authorized to be worn by IGs beginning on 23 May 1890 and has represented IGs and the IG system for 125 years.¹

The requirement to wear the IG insignia and the IG insignia itself is described in Army Regulation 670-1 and Department of the Army Pamphlet 670-1. The IG insignia "is worn" by officers detailed as IGs; NCOs serving as IGs "will wear" the IG insignia.² The branch colors of the IG are dark blue and light blue.³ Even though branch colors existed at one time for IGs, there is no requirement today for IGs to wear IG-specific shoulder boards or to modify the Army Service Uniform (ASU) with the branch colors. These items are no longer available through the military clothing system. Instead, Army officers serving as IGs will maintain their basic branch colors on their ASU. For officers and NCOs, the IG insignia will be worn while serving as an IG; however, the IG insignia will not be worn for official Department of the Army photos used in promotion or selection boards. Inspectors General must wear the branch insignia of their basic branch for promotion and selection-board photos.

In December 2021, LTG Martin announced the establishment of the Inspector General Identification Badge (IGIB).⁴ Designed to increase the visibility of IGs within units and to recognize the efforts of Army IGs, all current and former IGs in good standing --throughout all three Army components -- are authorized to wear the IGIB.

3. **Elements of the IG Insignia:** The U.S. Army Inspector General insignia has four distinct parts: the sword, the fasces, the wreath of olive and laurel branches, and the inscription (see figure below).

a. The sword represents military power and justice and is subordinate to the fasces.

b. The fasces consists of a military axe enclosed in a bundle of birch or elm rods tied together with a strap. Since the Roman Republic, the fasces has symbolized civil authority.

c. The wreath ties the sword and fasces together. Since classical times, the wreath has been a mark of honor and distinction for winners of athletic, cultural, and academic honors. Today the wreath is especially symbolic of academic and intellectual achievement.

d. The inscription *Droit et Avant* is French and literally means "right and forward." Freely translated, this French maxim means "First be right and then take action." The text is in blue, which represents loyalty, faith, and fidelity.

**Notes**

1. Joseph W. A. Whitehorne. *The Inspectors General of the United States Army 1777 - 1903* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Inspector General and Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987), 324.
2. Army Regulation 670-1, *Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia*, 26 January 2021, paragraph 21-9d and 21-9j (2), 31.
3. Department of the Army Pamphlet 670-1, *Guide to the Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignias*, 26 January 2021, paragraph 21-10 (23), 206-207.
4. ALARACT 091/2021, Implementation Guidance Inspector General Identification Badge / Inspector General Lapel Pin.

Appendix A

Historical Article: Washington and von Steuben: Defining the Role of the Inspector General

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this appendix is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with a more in-depth historical analysis of how Generals Washington and von Steuben defined the role of the Inspector General.
2. **Journal of Public Inquiry:** The following article appeared in the Fall / Winter 2003 edition of The Journal of Public Inquiry: A Publication of the Inspectors General of the United States. The article appears in facsimile as published.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL
STEPHEN M. RUSIECKI

U.S. Army Inspector General School

Washington and von Steuben

Defining the Role of the Inspector General and Celebrating 225 Years of the U.S. Army Inspector General System

Major General Friedrich Wilhelm Augustin *Freiherr* (Baron) von Steuben has always stood as the U.S. Army's defining inspiration for the role of the Inspector General (IG). As General George Washington's expert drillmaster and organizer of the Continental Army in 1778, von Steuben not only trained the bedraggled American troops at Valley Forge for immediate success on the battlefield but also defined a role for the IG that would ensure the continued growth and refinement of the Continental Army for years to come. On May 5, 2003, the U.S. Army celebrated the 225th anniversary of Major General von Steuben's appointment as the IG, a role that has remained largely unchanged. But defining that role required that the Commander in Chief, General Washington, limit the IG's authority and instead have the Inspector General serve, with great effect, as an agent of the commander and not as an independent entity. This fully defined and accepted relationship between Washington and von Steuben allowed the Prussian officer to flourish and provide his greatest service to the American cause.

Freiherr von Steuben's introduction to the position that would earn him an unquestionable place in American history began somewhat inauspiciously.¹ Born in Magdeburg, Prussia, on September 17, 1730, von

¹ The principal source for this paper is David A. Clary and Joseph W. A. Whitehorne's *The Inspectors General of the United States Army 1777-1903* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Inspector General and Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987), Chapters 2, 3, and 4.

Steuben entered the Prussian Army at the age of 17. He served with credit in the Seven Years' War as an infantry and staff officer and, after assignment to the general staff in 1761, achieved the grade of captain, the highest rank that he would attain in the Prussian Army.

His personal skills and energy brought favorable attention upon him, but not so much attention that his military career soared to great heights. Following his discharge from the army (for reasons unknown), he served as a chamberlain at the court of Hohenzollern-Hechingen and received a knighthood and the honorific title of *Freiherr* (Baron).² Strangely enough, this modestly successful former Prussian captain fell into bankruptcy by 1775 and was out of work. He could not even secure military service with the armies of France, Austria, and the Margrave of Baden. But he soon stumbled upon an acquaintance of Benjamin Franklin, who suggested that he might find some work fighting for the American cause and therefore earn some money to pay his debts.

Benjamin Franklin had ensconced himself in Paris with the purpose of lobbying for overseas assistance to the American revolutionary cause. Franklin knew that the Continental Army needed European soldiers skilled in the martial craft, and he learned of von Steuben's reputation as a fully trained Prussian staff officer from the French minister of war, *Comte* (Count) de St. Germain. Von Steuben arrived in Paris in the summer of 1777, but his reputation as a practical expert on military training preceded him. Franklin and Silas Deane met with von Steuben and developed a very favorable opinion of the man and his abilities.

Franklin, St. Germain, Deane, and French author and merchant Caron de Beaumarchais immediately began negotiating for von Steuben's service in the Continental Army. De Beaumarchais offered to pay the cash-strapped von Steuben's travel expenses while Franklin doctored the Baron's

resume. When Franklin wrote Washington in September 1777 about this new Prussian volunteer to the American cause, he stated that von Steuben had served as a lieutenant general in the Prussian king's service. Franklin felt that the altered resume would at least get Congress to give von Steuben a chance. Von Steuben went along with the ruse.

When von Steuben arrived at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on December 6, 1777, he immediately wrote to Congress to volunteer his services. In exchange for his skill and expertise, he requested only payment for his expenses and, if the war concluded successfully, reimbursement for the loss of income he would have earned in Europe (he failed to mention that he was unemployed at the time). He closed the message by stating that he only wanted to serve General Washington in the same way that he had served the Prussian king in seven different campaigns. He also wrote to Washington that same day and requested American citizenship as compensation for his services.

Von Steuben's letter evoked a favorable reaction from Congress. Henry Laurens, the president of the now displaced Continental Congress in York, Pennsylvania, warned von Steuben that the Continental Army at Valley Forge was suffering under the most austere of conditions and not to expect much. Von Steuben offered no reaction.

Meanwhile, General Washington was more determined than ever to institute an IG system in the Continental Army. Still smarting from the grievous failures of three previous IGs, Washington vowed to proceed cautiously before selecting his next candidate for the position.

Freiherr von Steuben arrived at Valley Forge on February 23, 1778 to a polite reception. But Washington soon warmed to the gregarious Prussian as von Steuben readily displayed a remarkable knowledge of all things military. Von Steuben was a breath of fresh air to Washington and his staff as they grappled with the problems of an army that was, for all intents and purposes, dying. The bitter winter nagged the underdressed and poorly fed troops. Meat was unavailable to the

² Historic Valley Forge Web Site <http://www.ushistory.org/valleyforge/served/steuben.html>.

men. Horses died almost hourly. Von Steuben was aghast. He inquired about the logistics system only to learn that quartermaster agents scored a commission for what they spent on supplies. Von Steuben immediately proclaimed the system to be “a mere farce,” but the neophyte’s entreaties fell upon deaf ears.³

Although not yet designated as the IG, *Freiherr* von Steuben set to work as an advisor to General Washington. Von Steuben began assessing the Army’s organization. Exasperated, the Prussian officer stated that: “I have seen a regiment consisting of thirty men, and a company of one corporal!”⁴ The most onerous task for von Steuben was obtaining an accurate roster of the companies, regiments, and corps within the Army. Many men had deserted and taken their weapons with them. Most of the remaining troops were employed on work details or serving as orderlies for officers.

From this chaos, von Steuben began to define his personal role and ultimately the role of the IG. On his own initiative, he undertook the daunting task of overhauling the Army’s discipline. He recognized fully that European methods would not work with the American troops, so he simplified the drill manuals and replaced Prussian formality and rigidity with practicality. He stated that: “In our European armies a man who has been drilled for three months is called a recruit; here, in two months, I must have a soldier.”⁵ He also realized that he must not concern himself simply with tactical matters but also with financial issues to ensure that supplies flowed steadily and in abundance.

By the middle of March, General Washington allowed von Steuben to prove himself and his theories. The Baron’s reward would be the position of IG. Von Steuben decided to begin on a small scale. He requested that Washington supply him with 100 of the Army’s best men to be attached to the Commander in Chief’s guard for training

purposes. Washington complied and on March 17, 1778 ordered only “well limbed” men of “robust constitution” to report to von Steuben for duty.⁶

Freiherr von Steuben’s training regimen began immediately. On March 19, von Steuben drilled and trained one squad while his sub-inspectors (whom Washington had recently appointed) watched and learned. The sub-inspectors then drilled and trained other squads under von Steuben’s watchful eye. When the squads were trained, he drilled them as a company. Von Steuben began each day with squad drills and ended the day with company drills. The troops quickly learned the simplified manual of arms devised by von Steuben. As the training progressed, Washington’s observant officer corps began to recognize the development of American battle tactics and techniques. The officers were impressed.

Von Steuben also instructed the officers in how to train their own troops and units. After the first company was trained and ready, von Steuben shifted his drilling system to battalions and then brigades. Within 3 weeks, he maneuvered an entire division before Washington’s delighted eyes. Washington now firmly believed that his Prussian adviser really knew his craft. On March 22, Washington ordered all other training stopped and directed that his officers adopt von Steuben’s training system immediately. On March 28, he rewarded von Steuben with the title of IG. When Washington asked Congress to approve and finance his new IG system, he suggested expanding (at von Steuben’s prodding) the role of the Inspector General from that of mere drillmaster to one that was more comprehensive in nature. Washington also considered bestowing the rank of major general upon von Steuben. Washington had to proceed carefully with this new system so that he did not alienate his officers or suggest that von Steuben held greater stature than them.

Now that the drilling and training program designed by von Steuben was at work under the

³ Clary, page 37.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Clary, page 38.

direction of the lower inspectors and troop commanders, von Steuben proceeded to set down on paper the new drill regulations. Since Valley Forge lacked printing presses, von Steuben wrote by longhand each chapter of the drill manual.

With the drill regulations complete, von Steuben turned to the Army's organization. He immediately divided the brigades into provisional training battalions of 112 to 224 privates and then further divided these battalions into companies and platoons with officers and non-commissioned officers assigned throughout. Each battalion now became a known quantity of trained troops that could achieve specific results on the battlefield no matter how many losses the Army suffered in battle.

The Baron also addressed the Army's standing problem of being unable to attack from a march column effectively. By marching in columns, the Army was always strung out and could not reinforce the lead units in a timely manner. This inability to advance quickly had cost the Continental Army dearly at the battles of Brandywine and Germantown. Von Steuben also emphasized the use of the bayonet and within mere weeks turned the men into expert bayonet fighters. This skill would serve them well within a few weeks at Monmouth and the following year at Stony Point. Von Steuben also established rules for military inspections which, he proclaimed, were not simply a function of designated inspectors but were a function of command.⁷

By the end of April 1778, the Continental Army was eager to show the British what the Americans could do on the battlefield. Von Steuben had his chance to witness the fruits of his labors on May 19 when the Marquis de Lafayette, in command of 2,200 Continental troops and 800 militia men, was cut off by the British at Barren Hill across from the Schuylkill River. Only a skillful withdrawal would save the troops. As the British advanced for what they believed to be an easy kill, Lafayette barked an order, and the troops

⁷Ibid. page 42.

von Steuben had trained withdrew quickly and in good order from the trap. The old rabble that marched in long columns could never have escaped such a trap. This success caused von Steuben's stock to increase greatly in the eyes of his Commander in Chief, General Washington.

Washington soon forwarded his plan for the IG system to Congress for final approval. In that plan, Washington stated that the IG and his inspectors would be "the instructors and censors of the Army in everything connected with its discipline and management."⁸ Washington proposed that the IG serve directly under the Commander in Chief and that the IG's deputies would inspect wings or divisions commanded by major generals while brigade inspectors would serve their brigade commanders. Washington wanted inspections to remain a command function and for inspectors to stay subordinate to the commanders. The order Washington issued on May 4, 1778 further stated that all subordinate inspectors would receive their technical direction from von Steuben to ensure standardization throughout the Army.

On May 5, 1778, Congress approved Washington's plan.⁹ The resolution also carried with it a promotion for von Steuben to the grade of major general and back payment in that grade for services rendered since February. Congress further authorized additional pay for inspectors based upon the demands that their duties would entail and authorized Washington to appoint all inspectors below the IG. The Inspector General system had now taken root in the Army, but the Inspector General's role still required some greater refinement. The IG was no longer just a drillmaster.

As many officers in the Army feared, Major General von Steuben's success in training and organizing the troops gave way to greater ambition for the Prussian officer. Many officers worried that he

⁸Ibid. page 43.

⁹*Handbook for Inspectors General* (Washington 25, D.C.: War Department, Office of the Inspector General, June 1947), page 1.

would seek a command position as a means to cement further his prestige and power within the Continental Army. The lack of a fully defined role created further angst among the officer ranks since they did not understand the limits placed upon von Steuben as the IG.

Major General von Steuben also began developing his own ideas for the role of IG. He opined that the IG should have legal authority and status equal to that of the Commander in Chief and answer separately to Congress. These proposals resulted in great rumblings among Washington's senior officers, who still struggled to grasp the intent and parameters of von Steuben's rather novel position.

Washington acted immediately to curb von Steuben's ambitions. He published a general order on June 15, 1778 that established an interim role and duties for the IG until Congress could define the role officially. Washington charged the Prussian officer and his subordinate inspectors with setting rules and standards for drill and maneuvers as well as policies for camp and garrison routines. But commanders at their respective levels would have to approve of these rules. In addition, all brigade and divisional inspectors worked directly for their commanders, which established for the long term the notion that inspections are a function of command and that inspectors are agents of the commander.

Freiherr von Steuben challenged Washington's attempt to curb the IG's authority. First, he sought an independent command and then attempted to release the IG from the Commander in Chief's grip. Feeling cocky over the Continental Army's recent success at Monmouth (largely due to his personal efforts), von Steuben opted to lobby Congress directly for these changes. Washington had even given von Steuben temporary command of three brigades after the battle of Monmouth to mollify the Prussian's ambitions; however, Washington removed von Steuben when the original commander returned from temporary duty. Von Steuben protested in vain.

With Washington's permission, von Steuben went to Philadelphia on personal business. Washington was unaware of the Prussian's desire to lobby Congress directly. When he arrived, several highly placed friends told the Baron that they did not support his attempt to secure a command but felt that he should become chief of all inspectors. Congress soon granted his request. Von Steuben then suggested that he report both to the Board of War and the Commander in Chief. In August, a Congressional committee outlined this proposed role for the IG and asked General Washington to comment. Washington balked. He believed that inspectors should not operate independently of commanders but should serve a valuable staff function. Congress compromised and, by the end of the summer of 1778, issued a plan acceptable to both Washington and von Steuben. Von Steuben had become the chief of all inspectors but remained subordinate to the Commander in Chief. At some point during the discussions over his future role, von Steuben recognized the merits of Washington's perspective and the fact that he did not require the powers of command to be effective.

With the issue of the IG's role resolved, the energetic Prussian resumed his invaluable service to Washington and to the Continental Army. Instead of simply serving as the drillmaster-general of the Army, he became a staff officer in the greatest sense and offered sage counsel to Washington based upon the Baron's years of service in the Prussian Army. Von Steuben realized that he could be more effective by serving within Washington's command than by serving outside of it. Likewise, Washington could not have asked for a better staff officer and advisor. At that moment in time, von Steuben had no peer within the Continental Army.

Major General von Steuben immediately immersed himself and his inspectors in the business of training and inspecting the Army. He instituted an inspection system and inspection service for the whole Army under the direction and

approval of General Washington. His inspectors inspected all organizations for discipline, logistics, equipment, and administration. He and his inspectors offered constructive criticism and, since von Steuben reported these results directly to Washington, did not need the powers of command to fulfill his charter. Fairness and thoroughness became the IG's watchwords, and setting and maintaining high standards became part of the Continental Army's culture almost overnight.

When the Army settled into winter quarters in 1778, von Steuben's inspection service was operating under its own power throughout the Army. Von Steuben then turned his attention to codifying the initial regulations that he had scratched out at Valley Forge nearly a year earlier. Von Steuben gathered a literary committee in Philadelphia in late 1778 and began work on a comprehensive set of drill regulations based upon the early Valley Forge documents.

The final product was a text entitled *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States*. Printing and binding the book became a major problem for von Steuben due to a shortage of ink, paper, and other materials. Instead of leather binding, the printer used blue paper to cover the book, which forever gave the manual the nickname of the Blue Book. Major William North, von Steuben's most trusted aide-de-camp, recalled in 1814 that: "except [for] the Bible, it [the Blue Book] was held in the highest estimation."¹⁰

The Blue Book endured 75 printings through 1809. Instead of simply outlining von Steuben's simplified manual of arms, the book taught officers to inspect their troops. Chapter XX, "Of the Inspection of the Men, their Dress, Necessaries, Arms, Accoutrements and Ammunition," set the standard and established a tradition of inspections that has endured into the 21st Century. The Blue Book directed that "Every Saturday morning the captains are to make a general inspection of their

¹⁰ Clary, page 49.

companies," an Army tradition that lasted well into the 20th Century.¹¹ Remarkably, the Blue Book did not address the role of the IG and his inspectors or their relationship to their commanders. Perhaps von Steuben wanted to keep open the possibility that his role, and the role of his inspectors, might change again in the near future.

While von Steuben worked on his Blue Book, Congress formally issued a charter on February 18, 1779 authorizing the position of IG with the rank of major general. The charter specified that the IG's principal task was to form a system of regulations for maneuvers and discipline. The IG and all inspectors also reported directly to their commanders, thus placing commanders in complete control of all officers in their charge. Von Steuben's reports would go directly to General Washington with a copy furnished to the Board of War. The Congressional charter finally put to rest the long-standing debate and controversy over the role and authority of the IG that had surfaced the previous year.

Major General von Steuben clearly embraced his newly defined role as IG and showed Washington and Congress that he was not a man to abuse power. As a result, his invaluable counsel as a staff officer to General Washington elevated him and his office to a stature that made him a de facto Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. Congress even entrusted the IG office with the mustering of troops in January 1780 since so many problems had resulted in that area. Although von Steuben's influence and reputation helped to increase the stature and scope of his office, his role never changed. He worked for his Commander in Chief, and he never forgot that simple fact.¹²

Limiting the authority of the IG not only helped to define von Steuben's role within the

¹¹ Frederick William Baron von Steuben. *Baron von Steuben's Revolutionary War Drill Manual: A Facsimile Reprint of the 1794 Edition* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1985), page 88.

¹² Clary, pages 52-53.

Continental Army but also allowed the Prussian officer to recognize the importance and effect of his position while still serving as the Commander in Chief's subordinate. As the eyes, ears, and conscience of General Washington, Major General von Steuben did not have to serve as a sitting commander to have a positive impact on the Army. He realized that by serving as an agent of the Commander in Chief, he could have an equal effect on the training and discipline of the troops. Von Steuben's usefulness and productivity flourished in the wake of a well-defined role that limited his authority but not his influence. The American Revolution would have faltered and, dare one say it, failed if not for the ingenuity and raw talent of this great Prussian-American soldier. 🦋


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Appendix B

Facsimile: Handbook for Inspectors General

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this appendix is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with a glimpse into past Inspector General doctrine by providing a facsimile copy of the 1947 Handbook for Inspectors General.
2. **Historical Doctrine:** The following handbook, published by the Office of The Inspector General, War Department, in June 1947, appears in facsimile.



HANDBOOK FOR INSPECTORS GENERAL



WAR DEPARTMENT
Office of The Inspector General
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department Special Staff
Office of The Inspector General

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

1 JUNE 1947

MEMORANDUM:

Handbook for Inspectors General, Office of The Inspector General, is published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

E. L. MILLER
Colonel, IGD
Executive

DISTRIBUTION.

1. *General* (less AAF and National Guard):
 - To each inspector general----- 1 copy
 - In addition, to each headquarters commanded by a general officer where an inspector general is detailed----- 2 copies
 - In addition, to each headquarters not commanded by a general officer where an inspector general is detailed----- 1 copy
 - When requested, to each post, camp, station, training center, general hospital or depot where no inspector general is on duty----- 1 copy
2. *AAF*:
 - a. Continental United States:
 - To each inspector general----- 1 copy
 - To each air force, independent command and wing----- 2 copies
 - To each AAF base and procurement district----- 1 copy
 - b. Overseas:
 - To each inspector general----- 1 copy
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3. *National Guard*:
 - To each infantry and armored division----- 2 copies
 - To each wing and group, AAF (NG)----- 2 copies
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FOREWORD

This handbook is primarily a collection of basic data, in digest form, related to the history, mission, composition, activities, and procedures of the Inspector General's Department. As such, it will be of greatest value to officers newly detailed to the Inspector General's Department and to others who have had little experience with its activities. Although comprehensive, it is not considered to be an all-inclusive document; appropriate Army Regulations and allied sources of information should also be studied by all Inspectors General. In this connection, reference is made to inspection and investigation guides prepared by the Office of The Inspector General and published in the form of War Department Technical Bulletins (IG series). These bulletins are published for discretionary reference only, are of an informative character, and carry no mandatory provisions for use. While suggesting approved methods and procedures as aids to inspectors general, they do not take the place of regulations or orders. It is not intended that the War Department Technical Bulletins (IG series), nor that this Handbook for Inspectors General, will limit the scope of inspections, investigations, or other inspector general activities, either by topics included or the manner in which they are treated.

This publication supersedes Inspection Guide No. 1, "General Instructions for Inspectors General," Office of The Inspector General, 24 May 1940.

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AN INSPECTOR GENERAL'S CODE

1. **MY DUTY** is to assist my commanding officer in accomplishing his mission.
2. **MY STATUS** is the same as other members of the commander's staff and I will coordinate my activities with theirs.
3. **MY ACTIVITIES** shall be devoted to all matters affecting the welfare of the command.
4. **MY EFFORTS** shall be unceasing in advancing the efficient handling, maintenance and safeguarding of supplies, equipment and funds.
5. **MY INSPECTIONS** shall be constructive rather than critical.
6. **MY INVESTIGATIONS** shall be so conducted as to establish all pertinent facts.
7. **MY REPORTS** shall be governed by strict impartiality.
8. **MY FINDINGS** shall include all matters meriting commendation as well as those requiring adverse comment.
9. **MY WHOLEHEARTED ATTENTION** shall be given to complaints of individuals and to allegations of irregularities within the military establishment.
10. **MY CONSTANT GOAL** shall be to protect the best interest of the military service and the rights of its individual members.

SECTION I

HISTORY AND INSIGNIA OF THE IGD

I. History

The Office of The Inspector General dates from 13 December 1777. Shortly before that date, General Washington had assembled a council whose final decision, signed by every member, was that "such an office was desirable." As a result, the Continental Congress, on 13 December 1777, created the office of The Inspector General of the Army, but made him independent of every authority except that of Congress itself. General Washington objected to The Inspector General making his reports direct to Congress and finally succeeded, on 28 February 1779, in having the law amended to make The Inspector General answerable to the War Board, the Commander in Chief, and Congress.

In March, 1778, about a month after Baron Frederick William Augustus von Steuben had reported to General Washington, the latter published an order announcing that the Baron has "obligingly undertaken the exercise of the Office of The Inspector General of the Army." Therefore, it may be properly said that Baron von Steuben was the first Inspector General of the Army. This was followed by a letter to Congress in which Washington explained the ill consequences arising from a want of uniformity in discipline and instruction throughout the Army, and the necessity for a well-organized inspectorship, explaining what had been done by Baron von Steuben. As a result of this correspondence, Congress, on 5 May 1778, approved Washington's plan and appointed Baron von Steuben The Inspector General with the rank and pay of major general. Following von Steuben's resignation and retirement to private life, after six years in office, another Inspector General to make comparable contributions during this early period was Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton was serving during the critical period of 1798 when Congress authorized a provisional army with Washington again being made Commander in Chief.

Not too unlike the duties of an inspector general today, the duties of The Inspector General in those early days, in the main, were: to muster the troops monthly, noting the number and condition of the men, their discipline and drill, state of arms and equipment, clothing, rations, etc.; to reject unserviceable recruits and discharge or transfer

to the invalid corps all men disabled in the service; and to report all abuses, neglect, and deficiencies to the Commander in Chief, the commander of the organization, and the Board of War.

Shortly after the year 1865, the War Department published an order defining the duties of the Inspector General's Department to include "all matters pertaining to the military art or having interest in a military point of view." In 1874, the inspection of disbursements of funds was required by law, and it was directed "that officers detailed for this duty should not be in any way connected with the departments or corps making the disbursements." Later, under the provisions of the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, in addition to all the traditionally accepted responsibilities, the Inspector General's Department was required to make systematic inspections of the National Guard.

During World War I, one or more officers of the Inspector General's Department were on duty with each combat division and at each of the large camps or cantonments in the United States. In addition to such inspections of camps, divisions and units as were made by their own inspectors, each division was inspected at least twice, before going overseas, by inspectors general from The Inspector General's Office. This was one of the most important functions performed by inspectors general, resulting in the detection and prompt correction of many irregularities and deficiencies, in the elimination of certain unfit officers and in the promotion of certain others whose efficiency warranted it.

In his preliminary report to the Secretary of War, dated November 20, 1918, in reference to the organization and operations of the American Expeditionary Forces from May 26, 1917, to the signing of the Armistice, November 11, 1918, General John J. Pershing stated:

"The Inspector General's Department has risen to the highest standards, and throughout has ably assisted commanders in the enforcement of discipline."

As the Army expanded to meet the needs of global warfare, in World War II, so the Inspector General's Department had to expand to meet the demands of the War Department and to satisfy the requirements of each new command for an inspector general. This brought about an increase in the Department from 60 officers in 1939 to 1,438 officers early in 1945.

Soon after troops began moving from their training areas to ports of embarkation, and thence by ship to overseas theaters of operations, the Office of The Inspector General was directed by the Chief of Staff to inspect all units prior to their departure from the United States for an oversea station with a view to determining whether the units were qualified to perform their missions and whether their equipment met the necessary requirements of the theater for which they were destined. Also with every major unit going overseas went an inspector general, to every far-off land and corner of the earth.

No sooner had American troops landed overseas than individual complaints, such as those regarding treatment, conditions, pay, and food, began coming back through various channels to the War Department. To meet this new requirement for inquiry and investigation, an Overseas Inspections Division was organized in the Office of The Inspector General, and its members were soon being dispatched to all parts of the world, by land, sea and air.

2. Insignia

The insignia of the Inspector General's Department has three distinctive parts: (1) the sword; (2) the fasces; and (3) the wreath of laurel branches and leaves. The fasces rests diagonally atop the sword while the wreath, which is in diameter about half the length of the sword and fasces, holds both the sword and fasces in their respective positions.

The symbolism of the sword is obvious. It represents military power and justice. In the insignia, the sword occupies the foundational or primary position. The fasces, which consists of a military ax inclosed within a bundle of birch or elm rods tied together with a strap, since early times of the Roman emperors has symbolized authority. The third part of the insignia, the wreath, ties the sword and fasces together. Beyond its artistic and functional value it, too, has a symbolism of its own. Since the Pythian games in Greece, about 500 B. C., the laurel wreath has been a mark of honor and distinction for winners of athletic, cultural, and academic honors. Today it is especially symbolic of academic and intellectual achievement.

The French inscription, "Droit et Avant," literally means "right and forward." Freely translated it means "First be right; then take action." This motto is in blue, the color of the Inspector General's Department. Blue, it is recalled, stands for loyalty, faith, and fidelity.

SECTION II

MISSION, COMPOSITION, SPHERE OF INQUIRY OF THE IGD

3. Mission

The Inspector General's Department is an instrumentality placed at the disposal of the Secretary of War to assist him in the administration of the War Department and the Army of the United States. Precisely, the mission of the Inspector General's Department is to inquire into and report upon all matters which affect the efficiency and economy of the Army of the United States and to make such inspections, investigations, surveys, studies, and reports as may be prescribed by

law or regulations, as may be directed by the Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretaries of War, or the Chief of Staff, or as may be requested by the Commanding Generals of the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, armies (ZI), and Military District of Washington, the commanders of oversea commands, or the chiefs of administrative and technical services.

It is the duty of the Inspector General's Department to assist commanders and other members or employees of the military establishment in the performance of their duties by supplying information when appropriate, by recognizing and reporting meritorious conduct and performance of duty, and by suggesting ways and means to improve conditions. Also, throughout its existence, the Inspector General's Department has been charged with the responsibility of seeing that no fraud is perpetrated against the military establishment by any of its members, and that no injustice is done to any member or employee of the Army.

4. Composition

The Inspector General's Department consists of one inspector general of appropriate general officer grade and such number of other officers of appropriate grades as may from time to time be authorized within the provisions of the National Defense Act, as amended, or cognate acts.

The Department on 1 April 1947 consisted of 2 major generals, 4 brigadier generals, and 526 officers of other grades from captain through colonel. In addition there were an indeterminate number of acting inspectors general appointed under the provisions of paragraph 1a (3), AR 20-5, by various commanders, particularly for the purpose of hearing complaints and assisting in making inspections of National Guard units.

Officers of the Inspector General's Department are obtained by detail (not assignment) of officers above the grade of first lieutenant from other arms and services, except that officers of the Finance Department, Judge Advocate General's Department, and Corps of Chaplains will not be so detailed without the approval of the chief of service concerned. Officers are detailed in the IGD for assignment to IG positions at the headquarters of a specific command, installation, activity or station and, upon relief from assignment thereto, will be relieved from detail in the IGD. Formerly all orders effecting the detail or relief from detail of officers in the IGD were published by the War Department. Current regulations, however, prescribe that Commanding Generals of the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces and oversea commands are authorized to, and will, detail suitable officers under their assignment jurisdiction to the IGD, to authorized IG positions within their commands, and are likewise authorized to

relieve from detail in the IGD and assign to other duties, officers of the IGD under their assignment jurisdiction. War Department orders will be issued only for the relief and detail of officers in the IGD to fill authorized positions in the War Department Special Staff and in commands, installations, and activities under the control of the chiefs of administrative and technical services and other War Department agencies.

The foregoing method of detailing officers in the Inspector General's Department accentuates the fact that an inspector general of a command belongs to his commander; and that he does not operate directly under the control of The Inspector General of the Army. This is a matter that is frequently misunderstood. Many persons are of the opinion that an inspector general is entirely apart from the remainder of the staff and works directly under *The* Inspector General. On the contrary, the inspector general of a command is the chief of a special staff section on the staff of his commander and, as such, his relations with his commander are the same as those of any other member of that commander's staff. Since the duties of an inspector general of any command are so broad in scope and often involve the determination of the efficiency with which members of other staff sections are functioning, he should not be placed under the operational or administrative control of any general staff section; but he should perform his duties under the direct control of the Commander or his Chief of Staff.

5. Sphere of Inquiry of the IGD

The sphere of inquiry of the Inspector General's Department includes every branch of military affairs, except where specifically limited in Army Regulations or in orders. Inspectors general exercise comprehensive and general observation over all that pertains to the efficiency and economy of the Army:

- a. The preparedness of the Army as an agency of national defense.
- b. The conduct, discipline, efficiency, living conditions, and morale of units and individuals.
- c. The condition and state of commands, posts, services, and installations, and of their arms, equipment, and other supplies.
- d. The economical, efficient, and lawful expenditure of funds and property, including the purchase, receipt, storage, issue and sale of property and the condition of accounts pertaining to funds and property. Inspectors general must report their findings with strict impartiality, note specially meritorious performance of duty, and make recommendations for the correction of deficiencies and irregularities.

The sphere of inquiry also includes:

- a. An annual inspection of the United States Soldiers' Home, Washington, D. C., which is made by The Inspector General.

b. Annual inspection of the National Guard and Civilian Components.

c. Inspections of accounts of United States Property and Disbursing Officers of the National Guard.

d. Inspections and investigations of any nonmilitary activity of the War Department when so directed by the Secretary of War.

In other words, the sphere of inquiry may be briefly defined as "Observation over all that pertains to the efficiency and economy of the Army." It is all-inclusive. Some inspections are mandatory by law, others by Regulations. The local inspector general program must be a balanced one, searching for the intangibles as well as recognizing the obvious. Funds and records are only minor phases of the program.

SECTION III

DUTIES OF PERSONNEL

6. Duties of The Inspector General

The Inspector General is stationed in Washington, D. C., and assists the Chief of Staff in keeping the Secretary of War informed as to the state of the Army. He is a member of the War Department Special Staff. In addition he does the following:

a. Insures that all commands, installations, and activities, and records of account of accountable disbursing officers and class B agent officers are inspected periodically by inspectors general as prescribed in Army Regulations.

b. Causes an inspector general to investigate and report upon complaints and allegations as may be directed by the Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretaries of War, or the Chief of Staff, or as may be requested by the Commanding Generals of the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, armies (ZI), the Military District of Washington, the commanders of oversea commands, or the chiefs of administrative and technical services.

c. Reviews reports of annual general inspections, or special inspections directed by the War Department, or extracts therefrom, and reports of investigations requiring consideration by the Chief of Staff and will submit them to the Chief of Staff or other appropriate War Department agencies. In initiating necessary action, The Inspector General deals directly with the appropriate commander, or chief of administrative or technical agency concerned.

d. Serves as the custodian of all War Department records referred to above and, from time to time designates the articles which, in his opinion, should be procured and kept for sale by the Quartermaster Corps to officers and enlisted personnel while in garrison or permanent

camp and while in temporary camps or on active campaign. These recommendations are submitted to the Secretary of War for his action.

7. Duties of Unit Inspectors General

The staff of the commander of a division, or comparable units, or of a larger unit, includes one or more officers of the Inspector General's Department. The official designation of the senior inspector general of such a staff is Division Inspector General, Corps Inspector General, Army Inspector General, and so on.

In addition to the general duties prescribed in Regulations, inspectors general assigned to military commands make such inspections and investigations as their commanders may direct. It is the duty of an inspector general to inquire into all matters that pertain to the efficiency and economy of the command and to report his findings to his commander with strict impartiality and to make recommendations for the correction of deficiencies and irregularities.

Before proceeding on any mission, an inspector general makes known his orders or instructions to commanding officers or other officers whose troops and affairs he is directed to inspect or investigate. He gives orders only when specially authorized to do so. Such orders are given in the name of the commander authorizing them, and report is made by inspectors general of any orders so given.

Commanding officers facilitate the work of inspectors general by furnishing transportation, clerical help, and such other assistance as will enable the inspector general to ascertain promptly all pertinent facts. Inspectors general follow the policy of disrupting local routine only so far as may be necessary for the early completion of their missions.

SECTION IV

COMPLAINTS

8. Complaints

Inspectors general are enjoined to give careful consideration to complaints affecting individuals and to allegations of facts or conditions detrimental to the service. How? In the course of his inspections each officer of the IGD takes such steps as may be necessary to ascertain whether or not any members of the personnel on duty at the station where the inspection is being conducted (especially those in confinement) have been given an opportunity to present, in person or in writing, to an inspector general (or to an officer designated to act as such) their individual grievances not less frequently than once a month. Further, each inspector general ascertains whether through the generous use of bulletin-board notices, posters, training talks, or

SECTION V

INSPECTIONS

9. Annual General Inspections

One formal general inspection, known as "the annual general inspection," is made during each fiscal year of all commands and other activities of the Army, except national cemeteries and soldiers' lots under War Department jurisdiction which are inspected once every two years.

The purposes of annual general inspections are to observe, report upon, and promote the efficiency and economy of the command and other activities inspected. They include an inquiry as to whether law and regulations are being complied with, and observations of the condition and preparedness of commands, installations, and activities to fulfill their respective missions.

Inspection being a function of command, annual general inspections of commands, installations, and activities are made by inspectors general on the staffs of commanders of the appropriate commands, installations or activities. Annual general inspections of the headquarters of any echelon of command are made by the inspector general on the staff of the commander of the next higher echelon of command. Annual general inspections of commands, installations, and activities not thus provided for are made as ordered by the Secretary of War, upon recommendations of The Inspector General.

Annual general inspections are of two kinds or types, the *continuing* and the *noncontinuing*. The former pertains to large units and activities; in this case the IG may work on the inspection throughout the year, making one final report. The noncontinuing type is associated with the case where the IG stays on the job until the inspection is finished; that is, an inspection of an *entire* command or other activity which is completed within a definite and relatively short period of time. Examples are: (continuing type) in an infantry division, the Division IG will inspect the elements successively during the year, as may be convenient; (noncontinuing) the IG of a higher echelon will inspect the Division Headquarters during a continuous period, such as three days or one week, until the task is completed. At installations and activities where inspectors general are stationed, and in divisions and similar organizations of the field forces, the annual general inspection may be a continuing one in which case it will be considered incomplete until all units or elements of the organization, installation or activity concerned shall have been inspected.

In conducting a noncontinuing type of annual general inspection of an activity such as a Recruiting District, the inspecting officer may be in doubt as to the required scope of the inspection. There will be a number of components; the district office will have several

other information media the members of the commands have been acquainted with the procedures whereby they may seek redress for alleged grievances, and whether each complainant is advised in writing of the final action taken in his case.

The Inspector General's Department has always been a medium through which military personnel have been able to submit complaints and state their grievances. In the past these grievances could be submitted at any time to the inspector general, if one was available, or otherwise during the annual general inspection. However, because this general inspection was conducted only once a year, the War Department directed that an opportunity be made available at least once a month, and it is so written in Army Regulations. Commanders are thus given a new working philosophy for improving efficiency and morale within their commands. They are directed by the War Department to encourage frequent contact between their personnel and the inspectors general and to keep all individuals acquainted with the procedures for seeking redress for alleged grievances. Also, commanders, through their inspectors general, must: (1) Follow through on each complaint to see that appropriate corrective action is taken; (2) See to it that no retaliatory action whatever is taken against any complainant for having made a complaint; (3) Inform each complainant in writing of the final action taken on his complaint; and (4) Keep a record of all complaints received in order that apparent or potential defects in command and administration may be determined and corrected before they reach major proportions.

Every soldier now can be sure that his grievance, however large or small, will be handled immediately, either by his commander or by the local inspector general. He may go directly to the inspector general, without seeking permission or applying through channels; and he will not be discouraged from doing so whenever the need arises.

As might be expected, many complaints received are of a trivial nature and many are cases where an individual simply wants to unburden himself. Yet others are cases where the individual has not exhausted appropriate command channels for the solution of his problem. The right of an individual to complain cannot be denied, nor is it appropriate for an officer or noncommissioned officer to insist upon his holding a preliminary hearing with a view to denying permission to register a complaint; but he can counsel the men on separating their problems into appropriate channels. Personal and family affairs usually belong to the Chaplain or the Special Services Officer; legal matters to the Judge Advocate; matters pertaining to pay and allowances to the Finance Officer; and these local officials should be consulted by the complainant before submission of a complaint to the Inspector General. The IG, however, as already pointed out, is required to follow through on each complaint presented to him.

main stations which in turn probably will have several substations. Questions frequently asked are: "Must every element be inspected?" and "Should a separate report be rendered on each element inspected if the element has been assigned a separate ASU designation?" The answer to both questions is "No." The inspecting officer will inspect each element only when so directed, or when in his opinion it is warranted. An ASU designation is made for purposes of personnel accounting only, and does not determine whether an annual general inspection will be made. One report will cover the entire activity.

10. Special Inspections

Special inspections are supplementary inspections, usually covering only one subject or phase and are ordered by a commander having an IG on his staff. The disposition of the report and the action taken are according to the desires of the commander ordering the inspection. Examples are: Inspections of messes, post operations, etc.

11. Records of Account of Disbursing Officers

The records of account of *accountable* disbursing officers, including special disbursing agents, are inspected by an inspector general on the staff of the commander who exercises command or inspectional jurisdiction over the accountable disbursing officers concerned, unless otherwise provided for by the commander of a higher echelon of command.

The accounts of class B agent officers are normally inspected during the course of the annual general inspection of the post, camp or station at which the inspecting officer is serving.

Prior notice of the inspection is not given to an accountable disbursing officer, a fact which is an exception to the general rule.

12. Reports of Inspections

Irregularities and deficiencies of a major nature are reported, as discovered, through the medium of "Action-letters, IGD." These action-letters, IGD, constitute a special form of military correspondence peculiar to the Inspector General's Department and which are utilized exclusively by inspectors general or by officers designated to act as such. In general, an "irregularity" is a failure to comply with the letter or spirit of regulations, laws, or orders, or else is an assumption of authority beyond that authorized. In referring to irregularities, the specific regulation, law or order violated is cited. A "deficiency," on the other hand, is a lack or shortcoming of facilities, either in personnel, matériel, or services. The subject matter of each action-letter, IGD, is restricted to a single topic in order to provide celerity of action within large headquarters and within the War Department itself.

An action-letter, IGD, is classified according to the subject about which it is written. It may be secret, confidential, restricted, or unclassified. It is forwarded through all interested headquarters and agencies to The Inspector General, War Department. Normally the indorsements thereon indicate that corrective action has been taken at the earliest practicable date by the appropriate headquarters in the chain of command. When the action-letter, IGD, finally reaches The Inspector General, War Department, he reviews it to determine whether or not the proper corrective action has been taken and makes recommendations accordingly. This procedure enables the commander on whose staff the inspector general is serving, and all other higher commanders, to become acquainted with the conditions existing within their commands and gives them an opportunity to take timely action to correct matters under their control.

Properly, the report of the annual general inspection is as brief as possible. It includes a detailed list of the component commands or other activities covered by the inspection together with a general rating given each such command or activity. In addition, the following information is included in the report:

- a. When, where, and by whom the inspection was made and the authority for making it.
- b. When, where, and by whom the last preceding annual general inspection was made.
- c. A description of the mission of the activity or installation whenever it is other than a troop organization.
- d. Whether or not the major and minor irregularities and deficiencies reported at the last preceding annual general inspection have been corrected.
- e. Conditions noted in connection with each subject that has been designated as a War Department special subject for inspection.
- f. Irregularities, deficiencies, commendations, or other pertinent matters noted by the inspector general.
- g. Appropriate recommendations.

h. Inclosures:

(1) List of action-letters, IGD, pertaining to the report.

(2) A summary and analysis of the total number of complaints submitted to the local inspectors general during each three-month period since the last annual general inspection.

During his inspection, the inspector general looks for the good as well as the bad; he should report favorably upon all who have rendered meritorious service.

In addition to the main report, described above, the inspector general transmits directly to the commander of the organization inspected a detailed memorandum of all minor irregularities and deficiencies discovered. This is frequently a voluminous document.

Although a reply may not be required, prompt corrective action is called for; and at the time of the next annual general inspection, the inspector general will call upon the commander for the following:

- a. His retained copy of the last annual general inspection, or the extract, and

- b. The memorandum of minor irregularities and deficiencies, together with a statement of the corrective action that has been taken.

The inspector general will, of course, inquire into the results achieved.

13. War Department Special Subjects for Inspection

Periodically there are published what are known as War Department special subjects for inspection. Such a subject is one into which the War Department desires inspectors general to inquire particularly. They, therefore, should become of similar interest and importance to all commanders who are responsible for annual general inspections. Immediately upon receipt of a War Department directive setting forth a special subject, the inspector general should present to his commander an appropriate plan for determining the prevailing state of compliance with the directive, and a suggested course of action for following through. These matters should not be permitted to lie dormant until the time of the next annual general inspection.

Results of such special inquiries into these special subjects, which are made during the course of an annual general inspection, are reported in the report of the annual general inspection. Results of special inquiries thereinto which are made at any time other than during the course of an annual general inspection are reported to the commander on whose staff the inspector general is serving, but, unless otherwise specifically directed, such reports will not be submitted to the War Department. When such special reports are directed they will be submitted to The Inspector General through appropriate channels of command.

14. Fundamentals of Procedure—Inspections

Once the inspection has been directed or approved by his commander or chief of staff (and approval must always be secured), an inspector general finds his efforts in the field of inspections devoted to three primary phases:

- a. Preparation for the inspection.

- b. Conducting the inspection.

- c. Preparing the report of inspection.

In making a schedule for an inspection, an inspector general should select those dates which will insure the presence of the greatest num-

ber of components of the activity to be inspected. This applies especially to the inspection of National Guard units, which are inspected at times convenient to the National Guard authorities with a view toward securing the maximum attendance of personnel.

Prior to starting his inspection, an inspector general should study previous reports of inspection and become familiar with the mission, Table of Organization and Tables of Equipment of the activity to be inspected. He should procure and study pertinent available inspection guides, such as War Department Technical Bulletins (IG series), and from this study prepare his own detailed check list for specific application during his inspection. While a considerable amount of inspection guide or check list material is published by the Office of The Inspector General, War Department, Washington 25, D. C., an inspector general preparing to conduct an inspection properly should supplement these guides with those prepared locally and with his own check list notes. Many published guides are not to be carried by an inspector general into the field but are designed for use as reference sources.

An inspector general should have in his possession copies of his orders and all other pertinent and necessary papers. His uniform should be correct in every detail. His personal appearance should be beyond criticism. A brief questionnaire may be mailed to the commander before the inspection takes place asking for any essential data. However, statistics, copies of the organization charts of units, lists of the officer personnel, and similar information may be asked for at the beginning of the inspection, if required. Information should not be requested unless it is to be put to some definite use. When inspecting the money accounts of disbursing officers, advance notice of the inspection will not be given.

The inspector general should ascertain from other staff sections of the headquarters to which he is assigned whether there is any special information desired concerning the activity to be inspected, and whether the activity has had any difficulties of administration, supply, or similar operation, with which it may need assistance.

In conducting the inspection, the inspector general should report immediately upon arrival to the commanding officer of the installation and to the commander of the activity to be inspected. In many cases these two will not be the same person. A copy of his orders will be presented to these officers. At the headquarters of the activity to be inspected the details of the inspection should be arranged and clerical or other assistance secured. A definite schedule for the inspection is helpful to both the inspector general and those being inspected. The schedule of the inspection should, of course, interfere as little as possible with the routine duties of the activity. The inspection should

be made, as far as possible, while all concerned are engaged in normal duties. The schedule, once established, should be followed exactly, despite a need to return to some activities for further inspection.

An inspector general should make his inspections helpful and constructive. He should secure the confidence of all persons with whom he deals and should be courteous, approachable, and tolerant. In pointing out discrepancies, his manner should be free from sarcasm or ridicule, and any criticism should be accompanied by suggestions for correction or improvement.

From time to time during the inspection, the inspector general should confer with the commander on matters developed by the inspection. Matters of a minor nature which require his corrective action, but which will not be included in the formal report, should be discussed. Irregularities should be brought to the attention of the responsible officer as soon as convenient after discovery.

A time and place may be set aside to hear complaints. Both time and place should be selected for the convenience of all personnel concerned. The place for hearing complaints should be so located that personnel will feel free to enter and leave the room without fear of embarrassment or reprisal through having been seen by others. For instance, a room in the headquarters, such as one opposite the office of the commanding officer, is completely undesirable for this purpose. On the other hand, a room in the post chapel would contribute to securing free and uninhibited responses. Advance notice giving time and place of the complaint period should be announced so that anyone desiring to register a complaint may be present.

In hearing complaints, inspectors general must secure the whole story, verify the facts and then submit fair and impartial recommendations in each case. Only in this way can the Inspector General's Department accomplish one of its principal missions, which is to protect the best interests of the military service and the rights of its individual members.

Of particular importance is the fact that at the close of the inspection a final conference on the results of the inspection should always be held with appropriate commanders.

Upon his return to his station from an inspection trip, the inspector general should report orally to his commander any matters which, in his judgment, require immediate attention. This oral report should be followed as early as practicable by a written report covering the entire inspection and containing the information as called for in paragraph 12, above.

SECTION VI

INVESTIGATIONS

15. Duties and Powers of Inspectors General in Investigations

The officers of the Inspector General's Department are confidential agents of the Secretary of War and of the commander on whose staff they are serving. Their investigations and reports thereof are confidential. The Inspector General's Department is not a tribunal; it may, in its advisory capacity, reach conclusions from developed facts and make recommendations, but it has no power to reach findings, nor to impose punishment.

16. Purpose of Investigations

The purpose of an investigation is to provide the commander or directing authority with a sound basis for just and intelligent action regarding matters for which he is responsible and about which doubt or allegations of wrong-doing, inefficiency, or maladministration have arisen. Because of the confidence placed in inspectors general, the commander's action in such matters may hinge upon the soundness of the conclusions reached by the investigating officer and the recommendations based thereon. It is, therefore, imperative that every investigation be complete, factual, fair to both sides, and that conclusions and recommendations resulting therefrom be based upon clearly established facts.

17. Fundamentals of Procedure—Investigations

Inspectors general are trained as investigators, not as detectives and criminologists. There are Criminal Investigation Division personnel and Provost Marshals for criminal investigations. The field of investigations is broad and varied; however, there are five chief phases in the conduct of any investigation. These are as follows:

- a. Study the directive—understand the mission.
- b. Prepare a plan of procedure.
- c. Study the plan, discuss it with and secure its approval from the section chief (senior staff inspector general).
- d. Conduct the field work to get the facts.
- e. Prepare the report.

Although definite principles govern the procedure in each of these phases, the procedure itself, governed by the everchanging nature of cases for investigation, is not susceptible of blue-printing. Each phase must be studied to understand its characteristics and requirements.

The characteristics common to investigational procedures are:

- a. Testimony should be taken under oath.
- b. The witness, if a citizen of the United States, must be reminded of his rights under the 24th Article of War or Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
- c. Occasionally questions arise concerning the authority of an inspector general to require or compel a witness to testify. There arises first the statutory right of any witness to avail himself of the absolute protection afforded by the 24th Article of War, or by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Should the witness indicate a reluctance to testify, possibly through fear of reprisals, it should be explained to him that investigations by officers of the Inspector General's Department are confidential and that his rights and interests will be protected so far as practicable. However, regardless of the witness' desires in the matter, it should be understood that he is required to testify and that this requirement applies to the accused as well as to other witnesses subject, of course, to the limitations imposed by the 24th Article of War, or by the Fifth Amendment.

If a witness who is subject to military law should decline or refuse, on grounds other than the provisions of the 24th Article of War or the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, to testify in an investigation, the inspector general, in a literal sense, has no actual authority or powers to *compel* the witness to testify. Should such an occasion arise, the recourse and proper procedure of the inspector general would be to report the matter to the commanding officer of the witness with request for appropriate action by the said commanding officer: (a) to cause the witness to testify; or (b), in the event of his continued refusal, to initiate appropriate corrective or punitive measures.

In the case of an employee under the jurisdiction of the War Department or of any other branch of the Federal Government who is not amenable to the Articles of War and who might refuse to testify on any grounds other than his constitutional right to decline to testify against himself, the procedure of the inspector general should be substantially the same as outlined above, namely: to report the matter to the commanding officer if the witness is under the jurisdiction of the War Department, with request that the commanding officer take appropriate steps to cause the witness to testify, or in the event of his continued refusal to do so, to take appropriate disciplinary action in the case. If the witness should be an employee of a branch of the Government not under the jurisdiction of the War Department, the proper procedure would be for the inspector general to report the facts to the employee's local superior officer if there be one, with request that the employee be required to testify, or, in the event of his continued refusal, that appropriate disciplinary action be taken in his case. If there be no local superior officer of the obstinate witness,

the inspector general should report all the facts and circumstances to his Commanding General in order that appropriate presentation of the matter may be made to the proper official of the Government (through the War Department in Washington, if appropriate) should the Commanding General deem such action advisable.

If a civilian who is not connected with the Federal Government refuses to testify, there is nothing the inspector general can do about it other than perhaps to attempt, by friendly and persuasive argument, to appeal to the witness' sense of fairness and his civic duty to aid in the administration of justice by giving whatever testimony he is able to give. Should the witness still refuse to testify, and his testimony is considered material and essential to a proper determination of the case, the inspector general should record in his report a statement to that effect for the information of higher authority.

In any case such as those illustrated above, it might be well to omit the suggested procedure and ignore the refusal of the witness to testify, unless his testimony is considered as being in fact material and essential to a proper determination of the matters under investigation.

d. The testimony usually consists of questions and answers, plus exhibits.

e. If the subject matter concerns accusations prejudicial to the character, standing or efficiency of a person, then the nature of the allegations must be explained to that person and he must be afforded an opportunity to defend himself.

f. Sworn testimony does not have to be signed by the witness.

g. The entire matter and the report are confidential. Inspectors general must refrain from informal conversation or comment upon subjects under investigation.

h. The investigating officer submits a report of his work, the report generally following a pattern which includes the following sections:

I. AUTHORITY

When, where, and by whom the investigation was made and the authority in the first instance for making it.

II. MATTER INVESTIGATED

Digest of allegations. Name of complainant or source of allegations.

III. FACTS

Coherent presentation of all pertinent established facts which should be free from argument or bias and must be supported by evidence appended to the report. Facts should be presented in chronological order and woven together in a logical narrative form so as to make a cohesive and readable presentation.

IV. DISCUSSION

Presumptions and inferences to be drawn from all the circumstances in the case. Resume of mitigating or extenuating circumstances, if any.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Concise summary of results of investigation directly consequent from and supported by the facts.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

Practical suggestions as to appropriate action to be taken to make suitable disposition of all phases of the case. Recommendations must be consistent with conclusions.

As may be seen from the above outline of the report, when an inspector general has completed an inspection or investigation, particularly an investigation, his mission is but partially completed, for he still has before him hard, important and laborious work and study in the writing of his report. It must be borne in mind that every investigation which an inspector general is called upon to make, regardless of how unimportant the subject matter may at first glance appear to be, has some important angle or phase; otherwise it would not be in the hands of an inspector general for investigation. The material facts, discussion, conclusions, and recommendations must be stated in a language that expresses exactly what is meant. Extravagant language or statements couched in words that do not give a temperate, accurate and fair account of the occurrence or matter under discussion often have repercussions and aftermaths that bring criticism or embarrassment upon the author, and even upon the Inspector General's Department or the War Department.

The preparation and completion of the inspector general's report of an investigation are, for these reasons, of great importance and entail a thorough study and analysis of the testimony or exhibits if it is to be of the usefulness and helpfulness expected and usually found in reports submitted by inspectors general.

18. Classification and Routing of Reports of Investigations

Reports of investigations are normally classified as "confidential." They are submitted to the commander who ordered the investigation to be made. However, once such reports are submitted they become part of the records of the headquarters where the inspector general making the reports is serving. It is the commander's decision as to who may or may not see those reports, with one very important limitation. The Manual of Courts-Martial states that such reports are "privileged," which means that they may not be introduced as evidence in a court-martial unless the parties thereto consent.

In the case of an investigation directed by his own commanding general, the inspector general conducts the investigation and makes report thereof in the manner and form desired by his commander. No copy or report thereof is communicated to any higher headquarters, unless the commander considers such action necessary and proper in his own interests or the report brings up a matter the correction of which is beyond his control.

In the case of an investigation directed by some other higher authority, the inspector general functions for his commanding general in making the investigation and preparing the report. No such report of investigation is complete until his commanding general has indorsed thereon such remarks and recommendations as he may deem necessary and appropriate. These remarks and recommendations should be indicated, with the date, on the copy of the report retained in the office files. This provides a record of complete action, to be studied by inspectors general during subsequent visits to the headquarters concerned. After the commanding general has made his remarks and recommendations, the report of investigation is forwarded through channels to the authority who ordered the investigation. Those reports which are to be forwarded to the War Department are transmitted through channels of command to The Inspector General with such remarks and recommendations as intermediate commanding officers deem necessary and appropriate. In no case is a report of investigation forwarded except through the office of the commanding general on whose staff the inspector general is serving.

Inspectors general do not ordinarily initiate formal investigations of their own accord but only when directed to do so by the commander on whose staff they serve. Yet, in the course of any duly authorized inspections should there come to the attention of an inspector general conditions or circumstances indicating a major irregularity or a major deficiency, it is the duty of that inspector general to find out all the facts so that the proper authorities may take corrective action. However, it must be remembered that no investigation, survey, or study is to be conducted without prior approval or authority of the commander exercising jurisdiction and on whose staff the inspector general is serving.

SECTION VII

SUMMARY—PERSONAL EQUATION OF INSPECTORS GENERAL

19. Basic Premise

An Army is composed of two factors—men and matériel. The latter, a constant factor, can be planned, designed, ordered, and made according to specifications. The former must be accepted as procured and then organized, equipped, trained—and is always an inconstant factor. Human nature cannot become perfect. It is uncertain under stress and subject to the commission of errors, irrespective of good intentions and training. Consequently, an army of human beings must be subjected to inspection for correction of irregularities and deficiencies that are, by nature, expected to exist.

20. Personal Guide for Inspectors General

There are four fundamental principles which must become deeply ingrained in the consciousness of every officer of the Inspector General's Department. The degree of success achieved will be in direct proportion to the thorough knowledge and application of these principles, which are:

a. Development of the faculty of approaching every mission with a determination of developing the facts that have a direct bearing upon the main issue or function. Almost anyone can find dust in some corner, but a well-trained inspector general will raise his sights and aim at the primary issue.

b. The ability to inquire into and report the facts concerning the efficiency and economy of the Army without bias or prejudice.

c. Exceptional and extensive powers of observation, a photographic mind, and a retentive and recording memory.

d. Meticulous adherence to uniform regulations and strict personal observance of "military discipline, courtesy, and customs of the service."

The inspector general must inquire into and report facts without bias or prejudice. Facts are established only on truth. A mission can be accomplished only by reporting the truthful facts as seen and heard. All inspections should be commenced with an open mind and not prejudiced by former reports or hearsay evidence. An inspector should not start a mission thinking he will find many irregularities and deficiencies or that he will find none whatever. If he has such a mental attitude, his mind is biased, and he is likely to report something as wrong or right which might be contrary to the facts. He must remember that his job is to assist his commander by having answers and not questions. His staff work must be complete.

The third principle, (c), observation and memory, may be amplified by the fact that an officer talking with other officers about their training programs, progress, operation, care of equipment and installations must have exceptional and extensive powers of observation. He must mentally observe and record what he sees, what he hears, what he learns, and what he thinks. He should base his conversation on questions, suggestions and recommendations. He must automatically know what questions are to be propounded.

It is natural that any unit or installation being inspected is on the defensive. Some commanding officers and staff officers may mentally resent the inspection and erect a mental barricade. In all inspections being made under orders from higher authorities, the inspecting officer *must* have full cooperation from officers and enlisted personnel. To secure this assistance the inspector general must at all times exercise tact, tolerance, diplomacy, and intelligence. He should avoid arguments and discussions of controversial subjects. In his initial

meeting with the unit commander, he should be attentive to details, listening much and talking little. His composite attitude should dispel and allay any suspicion of snooping. He should make his presence a pleasure and his absence a regret.

Carrying a note book and pencil in the open is not encouraged. All written notes should preferably be made in private and not in the presence of officers or troops. Should any notation of factual or statistical data become necessary in public, the note book and pencil may be withdrawn from the pocket, but the inspecting officer should indicate what he is recording.

It is desirable for every inspector general to develop his own individual method of memorizing. Mental notes can generally be recorded by associating facts with names, units and locations for later transcription by a review of the sequence of events that have occurred. The mission to be accomplished should be kept constantly in mind during the inspection and/or investigation. It is well to recall that it is a matter of selecting the wheat from the chaff. One may become easily side-tracked or carried away on a tangent, if not careful, to become involved in trivial, irrelevant matters. One should not let himself become engrossed over the "dust in the corners" to the detriment of an appraisal of the overall task at hand.

Minor irregularities and deficiencies should be immediately and orally brought to the attention of the proper authorities and followed by written memorandum to the commanding officer if not currently corrected. An inspector general's remarks should never be of a brusque or critical nature nor bluntly stated. Neither should they be too direct or forceful. Attention should not be directed by remarks such as "Why don't you follow instructions in ———?" or "How do these men happen to be quartered over here?" or "What's the trouble with that man's overcoat?" Instead, language should be used such as "I think you will find the instructions about as follows, etc.," "I presume there is a reason for these men being quartered over here," or "That man does not exactly fit his overcoat, does he?" The policy of politeness will produce far better results than caustic and sarcastic questions.

Above all, the inspector general must be specific. For instance, it is not sufficient to report: "Two mess halls were dirty;" or "Two men needed haircuts and shaves." The comments should be "The floors and tables in the mess halls of Companies A and B were dirty;" and "Privates A. Lawes and B. Robinson needed haircuts and shaves."

If an inspecting officer is questioned regarding policies, regulations, programs, etc., and has not the information presently in mind, he should not guess but should check the matter and advise the questioner at the earliest practicable time. It is, therefore, essential that an inspector general must be generally familiar with all regulations and

directives. He should see all such papers received by his unit headquarters and prepare a small personal reference file for his own records. Appearance, manners and military demeanor are vital assets. (d) To secure truthful information he must have the respect and confidence of the individuals being inspected. While an inspector general is inspecting, he must realize that he, also, is being inspected by both officers and men. An inspector general must look, act and talk like an officer and a gentleman. His uniform must be regulation and he must wear it properly. He must not put on a stern, severe or overbearing front. He must be gracious and cordial but not familiar and he should maintain this attitude when questioning enlisted men as well as officers. The use of profanity is uncalled for in making an inspection, nor is smoking advisable in the presence of troops when they are not permitted to smoke. In other words, he must be a gentleman and an outstanding soldier at all times.

During the course of an inspection, an inspector general properly may be invited out socially to an officer's quarters, to a mess or club. However, it is not good policy to occupy the status of a house guest of the commanding officer, because of possible situations wherein it later becomes necessary for an inspector general to render an adverse report on the commander, and further because of influences, potential or actual, which may arise from this unofficial relationship.

By and large, an inspector general must be a versatile officer. His position is positive, his missions are manifold, his duties are directed, his actions accurate, his conduct cooperative, his inquiries relevant, his reports impartial, and his conclusions should be correct.

Detail in the Inspector General's Department is at once a challenge and an opportunity—a challenge to resourcefulness, ingenuity, initiative, and an opportunity to serve in the spirit of the motto of the Department—"Droit et Avant"—"Be sure you are right—and then go ahead," or "First be right; then take action."

**KEEP YOUR SIGHTS ALIGNED ON THE MAIN ISSUE; THE
DUST IS LIKELY TO BLOW AWAY**

SECTION VIII

REFERENCES

21. List.

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Part 2

Communicative Skills

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Communicative Skills

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Introduction

Communicative Skills

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this part is to assist Inspectors General (IGs) at all levels in developing written products, engaging in critical thinking, and conducting interviews and sensing sessions.

2. **IGs as Communicators:** IGs are in the communication business. An IG's ability to communicate effectively verbally and in writing is essential to the success of the IG system. This part contains three chapters that will assist IGs in communicating effectively and clearly as they gather, and then report upon, information of all types. The three chapters address the writing process, interviews, and sensing sessions. These chapters will help to improve the effectiveness of IGs in these commonly used communicative skills.

This part further assumes that an IG has achieved a certain level of expertise and experience in the use of basic communicative methods such as speaking and writing. This part draws from a variety of Army and civilian sources, but the IG must not consider this text to be all-inclusive. Other resources exist that address writing and speaking in greater depth, and IGs should explore these resources as necessary. The ultimate purpose of this part of the guide is to help already accomplished communicators sharpen further their communicative skills.

In addition to discussing the writing process, this part of The Inspector General Reference Guide will explore in detail two of the five techniques (or domains) of information gathering used by IGs as mentioned above. For further information on the other information-gathering domains, see the U.S. Army Inspector General School's two primary doctrinal publications: The Inspections Guide and The Assistance and Investigations Guide. This text serves to supplement -- and complement -- these two doctrinal publications.

3. **The Information-Gathering Domains:** IG inspectors have five information-gathering techniques -- or domains -- available to them. These domains apply to the Inspections, Investigations, and Assistance functions and represent the primary methods that IGs use to gather information for an Inspection, an Assistance Inquiry, or an Investigation or Investigative Inquiry. The five domains are as follows:

- a. Interviews with key leaders or other personnel.
- b. Sensing sessions with enlisted Soldiers, NCOs, and officers.
- c. Reviews of documents such as Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), policy letters, post regulations, training-guidance memorandums, documentary evidence, and so on.
- d. Observation of major training events, live-fire exercises, after-action reviews, inspections, and so on.

e. Surveys and Questionnaires (normally used for topics that require a sampling of a unit's population).

Inspections usually apply all five of these domains while Assistance and Investigations principally employ interviews. The way an interview occurs in an Inspection differs from an interview conducted during an Investigation. However, the same basic principles apply. An IG conducting an Assistance Inquiry often conducts walk-in interviews and -- on occasion -- scheduled sensing sessions. All three IG functions employ document review to some degree; however, observation most often occurs during Inspections. This part will focus on the two domains that require the most polished of communicative skills -- interviews and sensing sessions.

Chapter 1

The Writing Process

1. **Purpose:** This chapter assists Inspectors General (IGs) at all levels in developing, crafting, and producing effective written products as required when engaging in the Inspections, Assistance, or Investigations functions.
2. **The Purpose of Writing:** As IGs, you will write to inform your intended audience of something they do not already know, or you will write to defend a particular point of view or finding. In either case, IGs must write to transmit their message clearly and concisely and in a manner and style that is clear and generally free of spelling and grammar errors.
3. **The Army Writing Style:** IGs communicate effectively in written form by adhering to a writing style (long advocated by the Army) that is not dense with complicated or obscure words or that relies on long, complex sentences. IGs must write using clear, short sentences as much as possible. Avoid using the passive voice since this writing style robs verbs of their subjects, muddles meaning, and avoids responsibility. Be aware of grammar pitfalls, such as punctuation and pronoun reference. In effect, IGs should develop a writing style that will allow the reading audience to glide through the text with minimal distraction or confusion. Public Law 111-274, Plain Writing Act of 2010, mandated that all writing produced by Federal employees meet these same general guidelines. The Army writing style fully complements the requirements of this law. See paragraph 1-36 in Army Regulation 25-50, Preparing and Managing Correspondence, and Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-67, Effective Writing for Army Leaders, for further information on the Army writing style.
4. **Approaching the Writing Task:** Most IGs feel that writing is an ominous task. They approach the writing of Inspections Findings Sections, Reports of Investigation (ROIs), and so on as an exceedingly complex, linear process. The opposite is true. Writing can be as free flowing and without form as necessary -- until the writer must package the final product using the prescribed format or outline. Until that point, an IG's approach to writing depends upon the individual IG. When first approaching the writing topic, the writer should do the following:
 - a. Explore what you already know or believe about the topic at hand. Reflect on the subject abstractly or engage in free writing in an attempt to capture these random thoughts. If you are writing to defend a specific position, critically evaluate the evidence you intend to employ in the service of your argument according to four factors: **(1) accuracy (is it trustworthy, exact, and undistorted?); (2) relevance (is it authoritative, pertinent, and current?); (3) representativeness (is it true to context?); and (4) adequacy (is it plentiful and specific?).** In this sense, "argument" does not mean a contentious engagement with someone else; it means that you feel that you have strong evidence to support a particular position, such as an Inspections Finding Statement or substantiated conclusion for an Investigation. Keep in mind that when you think critically, you question, test, and build on what others say and what you yourself think. **The word critical does not mean "negative" in this context. A critical**

thinker, reader, or writer separates a subject into its parts, discerns how the parts work together and how the subject relates to other subjects, and (often) judges the subject's quality and value.

b. Clarify the writing task. What are you ultimately trying to achieve?

c. Develop a writing plan that allows you sufficient time to develop and then revise at least two drafts of the written product before considering the task complete. In effect, your writing plan should consider these six basic steps:

(1) Pre-writing and research (includes delving into, studying, and critically evaluating your sources)

(2) Thesis development

(3) First draft development

(4) Second draft development

(5) Final editing and grammatical check

(6) Production of the final product in the prescribed format (Inspections findings section, Report of Investigation, and so on).

The actual steps an IG uses to write will vary from person to person. The writer must keep in mind his or her time constraints and approach the writing task accordingly. Some writing assignments may be short-fused while others will afford the writer sufficient time to do a thorough job of developing the written product. In any case, the final goal is a solid, well-crafted, and well-packaged written product that will effectively communicate its point to the desired audience.

5. The Writing Plan: An explanation for each of the six steps in a standard writing plan is as follows:

a. **Pre-Writing:** IGs should first approach any writing task without worrying about form, style, or content. The first step of the writing process should be to understand the requirement and what the writer must achieve with the final product. This step is called pre-writing and requires the writer to explore the topic mentally and reflect upon the writing task at hand. Pre-writing may also include the writing down of random thoughts and ideas about the topic without regard to form or structure (once called mind-mapping in the Army). Pre-writing also includes critically evaluating the **accuracy, relevance, representativeness, and adequacy** of the evidence you intend to employ in the service of your argument. Most importantly, pre-writing means that the writer is willing to take the time to develop the essay, paper, findings section, or report and not simply bang out a hasty product on the computer. Waiting until the last minute to generate a written product that requires thought, illustration, and analysis will almost certainly spell disaster for the writer. Setting aside the time to do it properly is essential. Pre-writing will soon give way to some sense of what the final product will resemble in both substance and structure.

b. **Developing a Thesis:** Most written products that an IG will produce require a bottom-line-up-front (BLUF in Army parlance). In effect, IGs will write to support a thesis, or BLUF. This form of writing is generally known as the argumentative style, in which a writer presents a thesis and then supports it through illustrations, analysis, and other types of information. Remember that an argument does not necessarily imply a combative attitude; instead, the writer is rationally and soberly defending his or her position as stated in the thesis.

Thesis development can be difficult if the writer has not formed a complete opinion about the subject based upon available evidence or supporting information. Therefore, most writers develop a draft thesis prior to crafting the written product with the intent of revisiting that thesis later to revise it and -- in some cases -- change their position completely. Resultantly, all IGs should consider their thesis statements to be in draft form until they develop a final draft of the entire written product.

But what is a thesis statement? The thesis statement is the main point of the written product and shapes the form and content of that product. Generally, thesis statements are assertions that normally comprise a **fact** (or topic) and an **opinion**. In other words, the writer is defending in the essay an opinion about the fact or topic. In a formulaic sense, the thesis can appear as: I think x because of a, b, and c. The x is the fact derived from the writer's opinion and analysis of the available evidence, and the a, b, and c portions are the supporting facts or evidence that reinforce that particular stance. By shaping the draft thesis in this manner, the writer can capture the main point of the written product and then offer a preview of the evidence that will support that main point (or thesis) by hinting at that evidence directly in the thesis statement. Naturally, the thesis statement will not begin with "I think" but will instead take the form of an assertion. Here's an example:

The surprise German counterattack through the Ardennes forest in December 1944 (**fact**) resulted from an intelligence failure (**opinion, or x**) caused by (**a**) the senior leadership's overly optimistic view that the Germans were beaten, (**b**) needless bickering and second-guessing among the intelligence chiefs at the Army Group and Army levels, and (**c**) poor analysis of the information gathered by numerous frontline patrols in the days immediately preceding the attack.

This example clearly illustrates the point made by Irene L. Clark of the University of Southern California that: "The thesis serves as a unifying thread throughout the essay, tying together details and examples" (Writing About Diversity: An Argument Reader and Guide, Harcourt-Brace College Publishers, Fort Worth, Texas, 1994). This thesis states the fact, the writer's opinion, and then outlines the critically evaluated evidence that supports that opinion (an intelligence failure). In effect, the thesis has helped to establish the basic structure of the final written product.

Infinite possibilities for thesis statements exist, so the writer should not mechanically attempt to conform to any particular formula. However, structuring a draft thesis in a certain way can help the writer visualize the essay or written product before creating the first draft of that product.

After drafting the thesis statement, the writer should develop an outline of the written product so that he or she can continue the writing process with some clear sense of direction. This outline will give the written product its intended structure.

c. **Developing First and Second Draft Versions of the Written Product:** The writer should develop the first draft of the written product without worrying about mistakes such as grammar errors or stylistic problems. The IG can fix those problems when editing and refining the first and second draft versions of the document. However, the writer must select some basic structure before writing that first draft. Many written products that an IG will craft often have their own pre-established structures, such as an Inspection findings section or a Report of Investigation (ROI). However, most of these formats will generally adhere to a basic pattern as follows:

(1) **Introduction:** The written product will usually begin with an introductory paragraph that presents the written product's main point or thesis. Depending upon the written product's purpose and intended audience, the introduction can take on many forms such as presenting a problem or issue; providing historical context; expounding upon the particular importance of the topic; or introducing the topic through a lively anecdote, vignette, or description. Above all, the introduction's primary purpose is to lead the reading audience into the written product, give them a clear sense of the subject, and present the thesis statement. The introduction and thesis statement will always exist in draft form until the writer completes the final draft of the written product. The writer must go back and ensure that what he or she supports in the main body of the essay is logically linked to the assertion made in the thesis statement.

(2) **Main Body:** The main body of the written product consists of the individual paragraphs that will support the thesis. The writer must develop at least one paragraph for each point or idea (the a, b, c, etc.) that he or she wants to make or introduce in order to support the thesis (some evidence may take several paragraphs to discuss). The main paragraph of each point discussed must have a topic sentence that captures -- like a thesis statement -- the main point of the evidence presented in that paragraph. In effect, topic sentences for paragraphs are similar to thesis statements for essays; each one captures the main point of what the writer wants to discuss so that the reading audience is not struggling to determine where the written product is going or what it is trying to achieve. The main body of the written product -- the supporting paragraphs -- develops the main thesis using various strategies such as analysis, comparison-contrast, illustrations, and other types of information. In IG Inspection Reports, each Findings Section has an Inspection Results portion, which represents the main body of that five-part written product; this Inspection Results portion outlines the evidence that supports the finding statement (or thesis) for that particular Findings Section. Likewise, the main body of an IG Report of Investigation or Investigative Inquiry (ROI / ROII) will be the portion that discusses -- and logically sequences -- the evidence that supports the IG investigator's conclusion of substantiated or not substantiated.

(3) **Conclusion:** The written product ends with a concluding paragraph that redirects the audience's attention back to the main point. The conclusion may reaffirm the main point, pose a question, summarize what the writer has just stated, or elaborate upon the significance of the topic that the writer has just discussed. More captivating conclusions will offer the reading audience an illustrative anecdote or vignette that further reinforces the main point outlined in the thesis statement.

Once the first draft is complete, the writer should review the written product for content, meaning, accuracy, and completeness. Changes made to the first draft will lead

to a second draft. Once again, the IG should review the second draft for structure and content but also with an eye toward finding and correcting any nagging spelling and grammatical errors. Seeking out a peer to review the second draft is an excellent idea since a writer can sometimes get too close to his or her own work and not be able to see any problems with the text clearly.

d. **Final Editing:** Once the writer is satisfied that the written product successfully communicates -- or argues for -- the writer's main point, then the writer should carefully review the text for all remaining grammar errors. Computer spell- and grammar-checking programs greatly facilitate this process; however, not all grammar recommendations made by the computer are correct. The writer is ultimately responsible for the content of the final written product. Don't let a computer do the thinking for you.

e. **Producing the Final Product:** This final step can occur as part of the final editing process or later as a separate step. The writer must now package the written product in final form using the prescribed format. For example, if the writer is developing a findings section for an Inspection report, the writer will state the thesis up front as the Finding Statement followed by a paragraph that outlines the applicable standards. The Inspection Results and Root Cause come next and actually represent the main body of the written product. The recommendations come last and serve as the conclusion.

6. **Style and Grammar Tips:** The following style and grammar tips will assist IGs from making common writing errors.

a. Passive Voice. Passive voice -- as opposed to the active voice -- robs the verb of its subject and inverts the order of a sentence by placing the subject after the verb. The natural sequence of a sentence is subject, verb, and direct object -- in that order. Furthermore, passive voice allows the subject to escape responsibility for the verb and the thing acted upon through that verb -- the direct object. In addition, passive voice increases the number of words in a sentence and is therefore less direct and more verbose. The active voice increases the tempo of the written language and encourages a clearer, more immediate understanding of the text. An IG can identify passive voice in a sentence by looking for three distinct things:

(1) Some form of the verb *to be* (am, are, is, was, were, be, being, and been).

(2) A past participle of some verb (usually ending in *-ed* such as *chopped*, *whipped*, and *kicked* or as an irregular past-participle verb form such as *seen* or *written*).

(3) The subject of the sentence follows the verb or is missing completely.

Consider this example of the passive voice:

The dog was kicked by John.

The sentence is written in the passive voice because we have a form of the verb *to be* (was), a past participle of a verb (kicked), and the subject following the verb (John). The dog is the receiver of the action -- the direct object -- and should follow the verb. To convert this sentence to the active voice, place the subject (John) before the verb (kicked).

John kicked the dog.

The sentence is now in the active voice because the subject precedes the verb. Notice how the words *was* and *by* disappeared, making the sentence shorter and more direct. Some passive-voice sentences will also suffer from the absence of a subject.

The dog was kicked.

To convert this sentence into the active voice, the writer will have to name the otherwise unknown subject (John) in the sentence. A sentence written in this manner allows the subject to escape responsibility for the action. Consider this example:

The critical memorandum was lost.

The person who lost this important piece of paper is clearly avoiding responsibility by not naming himself or herself as the subject. Accepting responsibility in the active voice would read as follows:

Senator Jones lost the critical memorandum.

Since leaders in the Army routinely accept responsibility for their actions, the use of the active voice in Army writing is essential.

b. Pronoun Reference. Many writers often use the pronoun *this* without naming a clear antecedent. This failure to name an antecedent routinely creates confusion in the text and causes the reader to refer back to previous sentences to determine what *this* really is. Consider the following example:

Many Soldiers failed to complete the obstacle course on time. *This* resulted in several Soldiers receiving a poor grade on their Soldier Skills test.

The pronoun *This* in the second sentence vaguely refers to the main idea in the first sentence. But to what does *this* really refer? To ensure clarity, insert a clear antecedent for *this* immediately following the pronoun.

Many Soldiers failed to complete the obstacle course on time. *This failure* resulted in several Soldiers receiving a poor grade on their Soldier Skills test.

The pronoun *This* now clearly refers to the notion of failure outlined in the first sentence. Always try to insert a clear reference after the pronoun *this* to ensure absolute clarity and to keep the reader from guessing.

c. Forming the Possessive for Singular Nouns Ending in s. The standard rule for forming the possessive for singular nouns ending in *s* is simply to add 's to the end. Here are some examples:

Charles's friend

Burns's poems

Ross's rifle

Dickens's novels

d. The Use of *It's* and *Its*. A common error is to write *it's* for *its* or vice versa. *It's* is a contraction meaning *it is*, and *its* is a possessive form. Consider this example:

It's (it is) a wise dog that scratches *its* (possessive) own fleas.

e. Commas for Items in a Series. In a series of three or more items, use a comma after each item except for the last one. Here are some examples:

red, white, and blue

gold, silver, or copper

Failure to use the second comma in the series (sometimes called the "Oxford Comma") can create some striking errors in meaning. Consider this example:

I owe my success to my parents, Joan Smith and Jesus Christ.

In this case, omitting the second comma, as some style guides recommend, suggest that the subject's parents were Jesus Christ and Joan Smith. Jesus was certainly not married to a Joan Smith. The proper way to avoid this predicament is to add the second comma as follows:

I owe my success to my parents, Joan Smith, and Jesus Christ.

If one or more of the items in a series has internal punctuation such as a comma, use a semi-colon to separate the items.

During the inspection, the IG discovered a general willingness to comply with the standard; a desire to excel at all things within the battalion; and a patriotic fervor that resulted in the Soldiers painting each rock in the unit area a bright red, white, and blue.

f. The Use of Commas with Dates. Dates usually contain parenthetical words or figures. The correct punctuation is as follows:

April 6, 2003

February to July, 2002

Wednesday, November 11, 1999

In the Army, we often invert the date to read as day-month-year. In these cases, punctuation is not necessary.

20 July 1944

g. Comma Splices. Comma splices normally occur when a writer joins two complete, independent sentences with a comma. In many cases, comma splices occur

using a conjunctive adverb such as *likewise*, *however*, *moreover*, etc. Here is an example of a comma splice that uses a conjunctive adverb:

The snow fell quickly today, however, the snowplows cleared the streets within an hour.

The two sentences are spliced together inappropriately using the conjunctive adverb of *however*. To correct this fault, a semi-colon belongs after the word today -- or the two sentences should be separated.

The snow fell quickly today; however, the snowplows cleared the streets within an hour.

The snow fell quickly today. However, the snowplows cleared the streets within an hour.

h. Coordinating Conjunctions. Coordinating conjunctions help to connect two closely related -- but independent -- sentences. There are seven coordinating conjunctions, and each one requires a comma before it when connecting two separate sentences. The seven coordinating conjunctions are as follows: *and*, *or*, *nor*, *for*, *yet*, *but*, and *so*.

The men started to chase Bill, so he turned and ran away.

Frank liked Bill's poems, but he preferred to read short stories.

i. Dashes. A dash represents an abrupt break or interruption in a sentence. A dash is a mark of separation stronger than a comma, less formal than a colon, and more relaxed than parentheses. Use dashes sparingly and for effect.

His first thought on getting out of bed -- if he had any thought at all -- was to get back in again.

The rear axle began to make a noise -- a grinding, chattering, teeth-gritting rasp.

The style and grammar tips listed above represent some of the more common grammar and stylistic errors made by writers today. For a more complete guide to grammar and writing style, refer to The Elements of Style by William Strunk, Jr. and E. B. White. Although written in the 1930s, most writers today still refer to Strunk and White as the "gold standard" for effective writing (even though their discussion of passive voice is a little unclear to some people). MacMillan Publishing Company in New York routinely keeps Strunk and White in print; MacMillan produced a Third Edition in 1979. Online grammar resources, such as the Purdue Online Writing Lab (located at <https://owl.english.purdue.edu>), can be very helpful as well.

Chapter 2

Conducting Interviews

1. **Purpose:** This chapter outlines a general approach to conducting interviews.
2. **The Purpose of Interviews:** An interview is an information-gathering technique designed to allow an IG to gather information through one-on-one, face-to-face contact with an individual. Interviews are not interrogations.
3. **Types of Interviews:** Two types of interviews exist: scheduled and walk-in. Scheduled interviews normally occur during Inspections and Investigations. Walk-in -- or unscheduled -- interviews normally occur as part of the Assistance function (for example, when someone comes to the IG office to lodge a complaint, make an allegation, or request assistance). The primary difference between a scheduled interview and a walk-in interview is the amount of preparation on the IG's part. Scheduled interviews will follow a well-prepared interrogatory (or list of questions) while walk-in interviews will result in an IG developing on-the-spot questions to gather the information necessary to assist the individual. Scheduled interviews may also occur by telephone and require some coordination. The IG must pre-brief the person he or she plans to interview by telephone on the purpose, time, and location of the interview in addition to conducting a pre-interview telephone-line and, if taking testimony for an Investigation, a tape-recorder check as necessary.
4. **Setting the Conditions for an Interview:** Scheduled interviews often last one hour, but the actual duration will vary based upon the amount of information required. The same notion applies to walk-in interviews. The IG should always conduct the interview in a private place that will be free from interruptions and will readily set the interviewee at ease. If necessary, place "do not disturb" signs on the door or find a place that is free from distracting telephone calls or repeated interruptions by co-workers or subordinates. Always be friendly and personable to the person you are about to interview. This behavior will set the person at ease. For a walk-in interview, greet the person by coming from behind your desk with your hand extended and a smile on your face. IGs may also conduct interviews in pairs; one IG can record the information while the other IG asks the questions. Interviews conducted as part of an Investigation (recorded testimony taken under oath) will normally occur with two IGs present. IG offices should establish in their internal SOP a personal electronic devices policy for interviews and sensing sessions. TIGS's recommended PED level for interviews conducted as part of an Investigation is PED 0. For all other interviews, TIGS recommends PED 2 with the caveat that the interviewee(s) power-off all PEDs. For definitions of the PED levels, see Part 7, Chapter 3, and paragraph 8 of this part.
5. **Introduction:** Scheduled interviews during Inspections will begin with a prepared introduction recited by the IG to the interviewee. This introduction will explain the purpose, scope, and ground rules of the interview. The introduction will also explain the notion of confidentiality and set a prescribed time limit for the interview (see the example at the end of this chapter). Scheduled interviews for Investigations will begin with a read-in briefing and end with a read-out briefing (see The Assistance and Investigations Guide). Walk-in interviews will not normally have a prepared introduction; however, IGs

who routinely work in the Assistance function and receive Inspector General Action Requests (IGARs) on a daily basis may develop and use a standard introduction that explains the type of information required for the DA Form 1559 and what information the complainant must provide to allow the IG to solve the problem.

6. Conducting the Interview: Immediately following the introduction or read-in briefing, scheduled interviews will continue with the prepared questions (for an Inspection) or interrogatory (for an Investigation). Develop no more than 10 questions since time will not allow for many more. The IG must always ask one question at a time and present the questions in a logical sequence. Give the interviewee enough time to answer each question thoroughly. Do not ask bullying or trick questions. The questions should be open-ended and promote discussion. Close-ended questions -- questions that normally require only a yes or no response -- will often keep the IG from determining the root cause or deeper meaning behind a problem or issue. The IG should ask each question in a friendly yet business-like manner, and the IG should probe for answers only as far as is necessary to obtain the required information. The same principles apply to walk-in interviews -- even though the IG will not be using prepared questions to gather information. Avoid tape-recording the interview, since a recording device may cause the individual to remain silent for fear of reprisal or for some other reason. The only interviews that IGs record are testimony taken under oath as part of an IG Investigation or Investigative Inquiry. The following are some helpful hints about conducting interviews:

a. Establish rapport. Rapport is a relationship built on harmony and will immediately set the interviewee at ease. The interview will proceed well if the interviewee senses that the IG is someone with whom he or she can speak easily and comfortably.

b. Maintain Control. The IG must always control the interview and not allow the discussion to digress to irrelevant issues. IGs can maintain control without being overly assertive. Instead, the IG can simply keep re-directing the discussion back to the interview's primary topic.

c. Avoid Arguing. An IG must not argue with the interviewee, even if he or she disagrees strongly with what the person says. The IG's mission is to gather the required information and to remain as neutral as possible.

d. Maintain Strict Impartiality. IGs should never make value judgments about the information gathered. In cases where an interviewee misquotes a regulation or standard, the IG can -- and should -- intercede and correct the error as part of the IG's Teaching-and-Training function. Likewise, IGs should not proffer an opinion about anything an interviewee says or commiserate with that person on any real or perceived injustices.

e. Do Not Try to Solve Problems on the Spot. Numerous issues and personal problems may arise during the course of scheduled interviews. The interviewee may attempt to solicit the IG for a response or an agreement to fix a problem as soon as possible. This same notion especially applies to walk-in interviews for Assistance. In all circumstances, IGs must refrain from attempting to solve a problem on the spot or promising that he or she will get something "fixed" for the interviewee. If the IG is unable to comply with that promise at a later date, the IG's credibility will invariably suffer.

f. Do Not Allow the Interviewee to Interview You. If the interviewee begins asking questions of the IG such as "What do you think of this situation?" or "Would you put up with that stuff?", the IG should ignore the queries and continue with the questioning. If the interviewee persists, then the IG should simply state that he or she is not familiar enough with the situation to render an opinion. An opinion proffered by an IG may compromise that IG's impartiality at a later date.

g. Be a Good Listener. The quality of an IG's listening can actually control another person's ability to talk. Listening is an active process in which the IG thinks ahead, weighs the points, reviews the information already covered, and searches the information for greater meaning. Most people need some feedback to ensure that the IG is being attentive and hearing them. If the IG stares at the responding interviewee impassively, the interviewee will be less forthcoming and feel that what he or she is saying is unimportant. The IG should be a positive listener who uses non-judgmental expressions or gestures that show interest or understanding. A small gesture such as a nod, a smile, or eye contact are often enough to maintain rapport with the interviewee. The IG may also try neutral phrases such as "Tell me more about it" or "Go on and explain what happened next."

h. Silence. Silent pauses during an interview should never embarrass an IG. A respect for silence is often helpful and can allow both the interviewer and interviewee to collect their thoughts before proceeding. A hasty interruption on the IG's part may leave an important part of the story forever untold. The IG may also use silence to compel a response from a reluctant interviewee. If the IG must ask a lot of questions in order to keep the person providing information, the interview can quickly become an interrogation.

i. Accept the Interviewee's Feelings. IGs must learn to accept a person's feelings during an interview and avoid passing judgment on someone. Gather only the facts, and do not dole out false reassurances about anything.

j. Make Perception Checks. A perception check is a test that the IG can conduct to ensure that he or she has interpreted the other person's feelings about a particular fact or issue correctly. The interviewee's information may suggest displeasure with a person or system even though the person never actually states those feelings as a fact. The IG can clarify this perception by simply making a statement such as: "I am under the impression that you are upset with what your commander is doing." The interviewee will either confirm or deny the statement.

7. Ending the Interview: For scheduled interviews conducted as part of an Investigation (recorded testimony taken under oath), the IG should follow the read-out briefing provided in The Assistance and Investigations Guide. All other interviews -- scheduled and walk-in -- should conclude with the IG doing the following:

- a. Informing the interviewee that he or she has provided all of the required information.
- b. Asking if the interviewee has anything else to offer.
- c. Establishing a continuation date and time if a follow-up interview is necessary.

- d. Reminding the interviewee of confidentiality.
- e. Thanking the interviewee for his or her time and for providing the information.
- f. Avoiding making promises or commitments.

8. **Sample Introduction for a Scheduled Interview:** The following sample introduction is for a scheduled interview conducted as part of an inspection on Risk Management:

Risk Management Interview Introduction

Hello, I am _____ of the _____ Inspector General office.

- I am talking to you as part of an inspection that the IG is doing on the Army's Risk Management process to determine that process's integration and institutionalization in training, operations, and high-risk training. The commanding general directed this inspection.
- I am interviewing you to get your thoughts and opinions about Risk Management training and its function in your on- and off-duty activities. We will combine what you tell us with what others say. We will look for patterns and trends in the collective comments and perceptions and then report that information to the commanding general.
- We define Risk Management as: The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (AR 385-10, The Army Safety Program).
- This command may describe the program by a different name or term. If so, please let me know. If you do not recognize a term, please ask.
- I want you to feel perfectly at ease and talk freely with me. To this end, I propose these ground rules:
 - I am interested specifically in your thoughts, feelings, opinions, or anything relevant to the subject.
 - I will take notes to capture the essence of what you say. However, I will not use your name or in any way attribute what you say to who you are. I am sensitive to the fact that you might not talk as freely about things if you think your comments could later be attributed to you in a negative way.
 - The only time that I might attribute a name to a statement is in the unlikely event that you indicate that you have evidence of a crime, a security violation, or a serious breach of integrity. If that happens, I will discuss that issue with you immediately following this interview.

- Inspectors General are the only persons allowed to take notes and / or record this interview. The PED level for this interview is PED 2; however, we ask that you power off your PEDs at this time.
- I will take about one hour of your time.
- Do you have any questions about the ground rules? Great! Let's begin!

Chapter 3

Conducting Sensing Sessions

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance on how to conduct a sensing session.
2. **Discussion:** Sensing sessions are, by definition, group interviews that can serve as an excellent source of information. The purpose of a sensing session is to gather information from multiple individuals simultaneously with the ultimate objective of providing IGs with the perceptions and opinions of the group's members (Soldiers, Civilians, Family members, and so on). If conducted properly, the group that the team is sensing will feel comfortable and share some critical opinions and observations about a certain topic.

The key to a successful sensing session is to make the group feel comfortable, even though the facilitator may be a lieutenant colonel while the group members are junior enlisted Soldiers. The facilitator must not assert his or her authority directly but instead do so in a subtle manner through body language and tone. The sensing-session group will understand that authority if the facilitator conducts the session professionally and treats everyone with equal respect throughout the session. The key features of a successful sensing session are as follows:

- a. Location: The setting should be in a classroom-sized environment and -- preferably -- away from the unit. The location must support the notion of anonymity, since the Soldiers you are sensing will expect some measure of confidentiality. The preferred structure of the room is to arrange the chairs into a "U" shape so that the facilitator and recorder can position themselves at the open mouth of the "U." All participants should be able to see each other. Avoid using a classroom set-up with tables or desks, since the participants cannot see each other and the facilitator will have difficulty maintaining eye contact.

- b. Group Size and Composition: A successful sensing session cannot occur with fewer than eight (8) people. The preferred group size is 15 since the facilitator cannot maintain eye contact or rapport with a group larger than 15. Groups smaller than eight people will not support -- in each participant's mind -- the IG's promise of anonymity and will normally devolve into a discussion between the facilitator and one or two of the more outspoken participants.

The unit will select the participants based upon criteria established by the IG. The IG must not, under any circumstances, select the participants by name. The IG should stratify the group by unit, gender, race, and grade as required. The facilitator must not allow members of the group's chain of command to observe the session. Likewise, the facilitator must ensure that none of the group members shares a supervisory relationship with another member.

- c. Preparation: The facilitator must develop no more than 10 open-ended questions that will help capture the desired information about the topic. Close-ended

questions require yes or no responses and will not allow the IG to get at the root cause of the problem or any other underlying issues.

The facilitator must also consider the group's composition when developing sensing-session questions. The questions that the facilitator asks a group of enlisted Soldiers will vary from the questions posed to a group of junior officers. In addition, the facilitator must know and understand the questions thoroughly. The facilitator must be prepared to allow the discussion to ramble a bit and not simply force the group to answer a series of questions in succession. The facilitator should ultimately ensure that the group answers all of the questions but within the context of a free-flowing discussion.

d. Recording: Another team member, who will serve as a recorder (or scribe) for the session, must accompany the facilitator. The recorder will take notes to capture the essence of what the group members say without quoting anyone directly. The recorder will never list the names of those present for the session. Also, some situations may require the facilitator to also serve as the recorder. Avoid tape-recording the session, since a recording device may cause many members in the group to remain silent for fear of reprisal or for some other reason. In accordance with HQDA EXORD 042-17, Personal Electronic Devices (PEDs) Level Designation, IG offices should establish their personal electronic devices policy for sensing sessions in their SOP. TIGS's recommended PED level for sensing sessions is PED 2 with the caveat that those individuals participating in the session power-off all PEDs. For definitions of the PED levels, see Part 7, Chapter 3, paragraph 8, of this guide.

e. Introduction: The facilitator must have on hand a prepared introduction or statement that captures the purpose and intent behind the session. Likewise, this introduction must establish ground rules for the session such as confidentiality, actions taken if a Soldier inadvertently gives evidence of a crime, and so on. The introduction must mention that the IG is interested in the group's opinions and perceptions about the topic at hand and that the recorder will only take notes to capture the essence of what the group says but will not take names (see the end of this chapter for a sample introduction).

f. Conducting the Session: The session should not last for more than two hours, since most of the group members will become fidgety and fatigued by this time. The preferred time for a sensing session is 90 minutes. The facilitator can begin with some humor but should do so only if the comments do not compromise the seriousness or professional nature of the session.

The facilitator should ask the first question and then allow the discussion to develop naturally. Once the facilitator obtains the required information from the group concerning the first question, the facilitator can begin with the next question. Asking the questions in sequence is less important than gathering the required information. A rambling, naturally developing discussion may ultimately answer all of the questions, so the recorder has to know how to capture the relevant information as it surfaces. When the discussion begins to wind down, the facilitator can ask those questions not answered during the larger discussion.

The facilitator must make every effort to involve everyone in the discussion and treat each group member's comments as valid and useful -- even if some of the comments may seem strikingly ridiculous. In effect, the facilitator must never "shut out" a

participant by evaluating someone's statement in front of the group. The facilitator and the recorder must be good, active listeners and show interest in the comments made by the group's members. The recorder may also interject and ask follow-up questions or request clarification as necessary. The recorder may also summarize the feedback periodically to ensure that he or she has captured the group's thoughts accurately.

Since the sensing session is not a complaint session, the facilitator must remind the group to hold all complaints or personal issues until after the sensing session (if complaints begin to surface). The IG must never make a commitment or a promise during the session -- even if pressed to do so by a member of the group.

The facilitator must also be prepared to teach and train the group on aspects of the topic that the group may not understand. If a member of the group makes an incorrect statement about an existing standard or regulation, the facilitator should correct the individual to ensure that the group does not consider the person's statement to be correct and thus perpetuate some misinformation.

g. Ending the Session: The facilitator should begin ending (or winding down) the session 15 minutes before the scheduled completion time. If the group answers all questions before the time is over, then release the group early. Most of these Soldiers will have other things to do and will appreciate the extra time. The facilitator or recorder should summarize the key points made during the session before releasing the group. Be sure to thank them for their assistance and remind them one last time about the issue of confidentiality.

3. Sample Introduction for a Sensing Session: The following sample introduction is for a sensing session conducted as part of an inspection on Risk Management:

Risk Management Sensing Session Introduction

Hello, I am _____ of the _____ Inspector General office. This is my partner, _____.

- We are talking to you as part of an inspection that the IG is doing on the Army's Risk Management process to determine the process's integration and institutionalization in training, operations, and high-risk training. The commanding general directed this inspection.
- We are interviewing you to get your thoughts and opinions about Risk Management training and its function in your on- and off-duty activities. We will combine what you tell us with what other groups say. We will look for patterns and trends in the collective comments and perceptions and then report that information to the commanding general.
- We define Risk Management as "The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits" (AR 385-10, The Army Safety Program).
- Your unit may describe the program by a different name or term. If so, please let us know. If you do not recognize a term, please ask.

- We want you to feel perfectly at ease and talk freely with us. To this end, we propose these ground rules:
- We are interested specifically in your thoughts, feelings, opinions, or anything relevant to the subject. Speak for yourself and avoid speeches or philosophical statements.
- Respond to the questions we ask, stay on track, and avoid sidebars with your neighbors.
- Keep each other's input confidential; what is said in this room stays in this room.
- My partner will take notes to capture the essence of what you say. We will not use your name or in any way attribute what you say to who you are. We are sensitive to the fact that you might not talk as freely about things if you think your comments could later be attributed to you in a negative way.
- The only time we might attribute a name to a statement is in the unlikely event that you indicate that you have evidence of a crime, a security violation, or a serious breach of integrity. If that happens, we will discuss that issue following this session.
- Inspectors General are the only persons allowed to take notes and / or record this session. The PED level for this sensing session is PED 2; however, we ask that all of you power off your PEDs at this time.
- We will take about one hour and 30 minutes of your time.
- Do you have any questions about the ground rules? Great! Let's begin!

Appendix A

Sensing Session Diagnostic Test

1. What is a sensing session?

- a. A group interview.
- b. A session where Soldiers are allowed to air complaints.
- c. A rap session.
- d. A command-climate survey.

2. Which of the following locations is best suited for a sensing session (assuming that the room meets your needs)?

- a. Conference Room in the battalion headquarters.
- b. IG's Conference Room.
- c. Unit Dining Facility.
- d. Classroom away from the unit area.

3. Which of the classroom set-ups mentioned below is best suited for a sensing session?

- a. Three rows of chairs facing the facilitator.
- b. Three rows of tables and chairs facing the facilitator and the recorder.
- c. Chairs in a "U" shape with the facilitator and recorder at the open end of the "U."
- d. Chairs in an "O" shape with the facilitator and the recorder in the middle of the "O."

4. What is the best way for selecting individual participants for a sensing session?

- a. Randomly by the IG.
- b. By the IG based upon a roster and Social-Security Numbers.
- c. By the IG based upon pre-established criteria.
- d. By the unit based upon criteria established by the IG.

5. How many participants are normally in a sensing-session group?

- a. Fifteen for each IG present.
- b. Thirty per facilitator.
- c. Five to eight.
- d. Eight to 15.

6. The preferred time for a sensing session is _____.**7. Sensing-session participants can be grouped by:**

- a. Grade.
- b. Unit.
- c. Gender.
- d. Race.
- e. All of the above.

8. The feedback you may gather from sensing-session participants can include:

- a. Facts.
- b. Opinions.
- c. Perceptions.
- d. Rumors.
- e. All of the above.

9. Sensing sessions are designed to:

- a. Provide commanders with individual complaints and problems.
- b. Provide IG facilitators with the perceptions and opinions of particular groups.
- c. Assess the climate of the command only.
- d. None of the above.

10. The recorder (scribe) should:

- a. Never interrupt the sensing session.
- b. Periodically summarize the feedback or ask questions for clarification.
- c. Covertly take notes.
- d. Record all comments verbatim.

11. Should you allow members of the chain of command to attend the sensing session?

- a. Yes.
- b. No.

12. The facilitator must set the ground rules for the sensing session.

- a. True.
- b. False.

13. The facilitator should inform the group that the sensing session is NOT a complaint session.

- a. True.
- b. False.

14. The facilitator's only job is to gather feedback on the issues and not to teach and train.

- a. True.
- b. False.

15. When closing a sensing session, the facilitator should:

- a. Summarize the key points made during the session.
- b. Remind the group about confidentiality.
- c. Thank the group for participating.
- d. All of the above.

Answer Key

- 1 - a
- 2 - d
- 3 - c
- 4 - d
- 5 - d
- 6 - 90 minutes
- 7 - e
- 8 - e
- 9 - b
- 10 - b
- 11 - b
- 12 - a
- 13 - a
- 14 - b
- 15 - d

Part 3

Inspector General Wartime Role

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Introduction

Inspector General Wartime Role

Our Army is serving our Nation at War ... This war will require all elements of our National power applied in a broad, unyielding, and relentless campaign. This campaign will take a long time, and will require our deep and enduring commitment."

General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (2003-2007)
commenting on the Global War on Terrorism

Born under necessity during the American Revolutionary War, the Army IG system has played a key role for more than two centuries in training our Army to standard and maintaining the Army's readiness during times of conflict. The IG's role as the eyes, ears, voice, and conscience of the Commander are especially relevant in times of war. By using the inherent functions of inspections, assistance, investigations, and teaching and training, the IG can help the Commander identify and eliminate areas of friction -- both on and off the battlefield -- that adversely impact the readiness and warfighting capability of the unit.

General Westmoreland, while Commander, U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV), and later as Army Chief of Staff, promoted a large and active wartime IG system "to be alert and smell out and solve problems while they are small." His vast military experience taught him that Soldiers needed assistance and Commanders needed the ability to inspect and investigate even in war. The IG's relevance during military operations has further increased in the three decades following the Vietnam era, especially with the dramatic increase in operational deployments since 1989.

Since 11 September 2001, we have been an Army fully mobilized for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and other overseas contingency operations. For example, in late 2009, the Army had over 266,000 Soldiers deployed in 80 countries around the world. In 2012, the nation had 632,000 Soldiers serving on active duty with over 58,000 Army National Guard and almost 30,000 Army Reserve Soldiers mobilized or deployed. On any given day, we have numbers equivalent to an Army division of Soldiers supporting homeland security missions throughout the U.S. Most Soldiers are either deployed, preparing for deployment, or returning and refitting for the next deployment. This elevated operational tempo creates a high demand for the unique skills and qualifications of IGs who -- as fair and impartial fact-finders -- can take on the difficult issues for the Commander and track them until they are resolved.

General Raymond Odierno, who became Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army in 2011, championed the role of the IG in helping Commanders improve readiness and warfighting capability. In 2013, he stated, "The need for an effective IG oversight capability, especially as we transition from war in Iraq and Afghanistan, is recognized by Congress and manifest every day. Therefore, it remains critical that we resource the

Army IG ... and continue to select the right officers with the requisite operational experience necessary to inspect, investigate, and report on the overall fitness of our Army.”

The purpose of this part of The IG Reference Guide is to provide IGs with the facts and tools needed to prepare them for their future role in deployments and military operations and to demonstrate to their Commanders that –

- The conditions may change, but the tasks and standards for the IG functions remain the same as the operating environment transitions from peacetime operations to decisive action.
- The IG provides important feedback to the Commander during all phases of the deployment to assess the unit's readiness and warfighting capabilities.
- The IG is an essential part of the wartime staff at all levels of Command.

Chapter 1

Historical Overview of the IG Wartime Role

Section 1-1 -- First Wartime Inspectors General

Section 1-2 -- Nineteenth Century Wartime Inspectors General

Section 1-3 -- World War I (1917-1918)

Section 1-4 -- World War II (1941-1945)

Section 1-5 -- Vietnam (1965-1973)

Section 1-6 -- Desert Shield / Desert Storm (1990-1991)

Section 1-7 -- Operation Enduring Freedom / Operation Iraqi Freedom (2001-Present)

Section 1-1

First Wartime Inspector Generals

The U.S. Army Inspector General system emerged in a time of war. The Continental Congress authorized the appointment of Inspectors General in the midst of the Revolutionary War (1775 - 1781) primarily to improve the training and warfighting efficiency of the American Army. These first IGs were charged with "reformation of the various abuses which prevail in the different departments ... to review, from time to time, the troops ... to see that every officer and soldier be instructed in the exercise and manoeuvres ... that rules of discipline be strictly observed and that officers Command their soldiers properly and do them justice." (Papers of the Continental Congress, No. 152, V. folio 233). Major Revolutionary War IG issues were:

- Training and readiness (no standard drill regulations)
- Administration (accountability of personnel)
- Class I (no meat rations)
- Maintenance (sick horses)
- Pay
- Weapons security (loss of firearms)

Section 1-2

Nineteenth Century Wartime Inspector Generals

1. The position of Inspector General lost its prominence after the Revolutionary War with the standing down of the Continental Army but came back to life, at least in name, with the War of 1812 (1812 - 1814). Reauthorized by Congress and with duties specified by the War Department, the IG during this war was to assess discipline, facilities, and equipment; to conduct musters; and to examine financial accounts. But the War Department also permitted the IG to Command; and the Army's senior IG, Brigadier General Alexander Smyth, did just that during a campaign along the Niagara River. BG Smyth led so poorly that by the end of the campaign, his troops demonstrated their frustration and discontent by shooting at his tent. The Army released Smyth, and Congress abolished the position of IG.

2. The Regular Army expanded from 8,500 to more than 30,000 when the United States went to war with Mexico (1846 - 1848). This expansion included two authorized IGs, who were deployed to the field with the troops not because Army senior leadership recognized the value of IGs as inspectors but because they had no concept of anything better for IGs to do. Instead, IGs were used as Commanders, mustering agents, assistants to other generals, and to process Mexican prisoners of war.

3. The United States Army was authorized two IGs and five assistant IGs at the beginning of the Civil War (1861 - 1865). There was neither a formal IG department at the War Department level to give centralized guidance to these IGs nor was there an established, clearly defined duty description. But as the war advanced, wartime requirements forced the evolution of an IG organization and a clearer definition of its purpose.

4. An IG was assigned to the War Department staff in January 1863. This assignment proved significant because though it was not the birth of the Office of the Inspector General, it was the starting point whereby the IG became a permanent War Department fixture.

5. During the Civil War, the Secretary of War first used the IG on a regular basis to conduct inquiries and investigations. In January 1863, for instance, the Secretary of War ordered an IG to investigate a mutinous unit of the Army of the Cumberland, the Anderson Cavalry. The IG conducting the investigation found merit in the men's complaints that they had been misled about their assignments but recommended that examples be made of the more rebellious ringleaders.

6. Major Civil War IG issues were:

- Audits (e.g., quartermaster accounts)
- Care / utilization of horses
- Ordnance / equipment production and procurement
- Personnel (skill / specialty violations, pension applications)

- PX / Sutler operations (Sutlers were merchants who accompanied each regiment)
- Training (military college programs)

7. The Office of the Inspector General at the War Department did little inspecting during the Spanish-American War, and few unit IGs were able to transition out of their peacetime mode. Transportation calamities, epidemics in the southern camps, inedible or undelivered rations, and unit lack of preparedness for deployments overseas were among the major problems Soldiers faced in the Spanish-American War (1898). IGs should have detected and corrected all of these Command and management inefficiencies, but they did not. The situation was only made worse when TIG said he felt it more honorable to be near danger with no particular job than to be safe at home on the staff. Thus, senior inspectors went to the field not to inspect or assist but to follow TIG's emotional guidance to advance toward the sound of the guns for one last time. The IG received considerable journalistic and Congressional criticism for failing to report trouble when it developed during this war. These problems nearly resulted in the abolishment of the IG as an office and position in the Army.

Section 1-3

World War I (1917-1918)

1. The U.S. Army entered World War I with 40 authorized IGs. This number peaked at 215 assigned officers. IG wartime activities were more centralized and inspection-oriented during World War I than in any previous war.

2. Continental United States (CONUS): The Office of the Inspector General inspected all combat divisions at least twice prior to their overseas deployment. Teams of inspectors were stationed at ports of embarkation with the authority to delay movement if they felt that personnel or equipment were not ready.

3. European Continent.

a. The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) IG, MG Andre W. Brewster, was among the original group of staff officers to accompany the AEF Commander, GEN John J. Pershing, to France. Brewster remained on Pershing's personal staff throughout the war.

b. IGs did not conduct periodic, routine, organizational inspections for the units in France. Inspections were general in nature and for the purpose of determining whether units were ready for service at the front. In addition, the AEF Commander required that at least one division in each corps receive a daily visit by an AEF IG.

c. As war casualties mounted and replacements arrived to fill the losses, IGs were often used as teachers and advisors to the inexperienced unit Commanders. When the war ended, IGs evaluated the condition of units preparing for redeployment to CONUS and monitored the disposition of surplus property and the settlement of civilian claims.

4. Major WWI IG issues were:

- Administration
- Animal and motor transport
- Combat efficiency
- Equipment maintenance
- Fiscal / property accountability
- Leadership
- Morale
- Officer efficiency
- Preparation for overseas movement (POM)
- Purchasing oversight
- Readiness for deployment
- Training (e.g., care of animals, property accountability, debt collection)

Section 1-4

World War II (1941-1945)

1. There were 10 officers on duty in the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and 30 in the field in 1939, just two years prior to the United States' entry into World War II. This number rose to 219 officers in December 1941, 937 in November 1943, and over 3,000 by 1945. The Office of the Inspector General was one of the few departments to remain on the War staff after the Reorganization of 1942. It was a credit to senior Army leadership to realize that placing the IG anywhere else would handicap IG effectiveness.

2. Continental United States (CONUS).

a. The 1942 OIG consisted of Procurement, Construction, Field Service, Reviews, Inspection, Investigations, and Miscellaneous Divisions. The OIG later consolidated its functions into only two divisions: an Investigations Division and an Inspections Services Division. A third division, the Special Section, was established in June 1941 to monitor race relations.

b. As in World War I, IGs inspected units deploying overseas and were given the authority to determine whether a unit could depart. As the war progressed, investigation issues evolved from matters of sabotage, disloyalty, and defeatism to issues concerning the morale and welfare of enlisted personnel and finally to contract fraud, bribery, deficiencies in administration, treatment of POWs, and medical care.

c. Division-level IGs in CONUS spent most of their time concentrating on preparation for overseas movement (POM). The depth of their responsibilities varied in accordance with the wishes of their particular Commander and the situation of their unit. The XII Corps IG, for example, was required to review the personnel and health records of every member of the Command to ensure shots had been given, allotments made, and so forth. The 71st Infantry Division IG monitored insurance and War Bond briefings and administration. Tactical unit IGs were especially concerned with training and the packing, crating, and marking of organizational equipment. There are recorded cases where, at the port of embarkation, IGs gave, or arranged, classes on new equipment which had been issued to the unit at the last minute.

3. Outside Continental United States (OCONUS).

a. The Army organized the Overseas Inspections Division, OIG, in December 1942 to respond to problems affecting personnel and Department of the Army programs outside CONUS. The division monitored individual personnel problem trends such as consistently late pay in a given area and tried to determine the causes and solutions. The division did numerous surveys, inquiries, and investigations into topics ranging from general officer misconduct to replacement flow into the Pacific Theater. The division produced a final series of surveys late in the war to assist in demobilization planning and redeployment of overseas personnel. The final burst of wartime activity was spent investigating the statements of returned U.S. Prisoners of War as to their treatment and the circumstances of their surrender.

b. Army-level IGs averaged three to four Command-directed investigations a month. Topics ranged from escaped prisoners and violations of the Geneva Convention to racial problems and the maintenance of motor vehicles. Commanders tasked several IGs to continue annual general inspections. For example, the Sixth Army IG in the Pacific inspected, on the average, four units a month even during the Philippine campaign. Major unit IGs were also given the task of coordinating inspections and staff visits from their level so they would not overwhelm subordinate units with visitors.

c. The trend was for IG sections to grow once units entered the combat zone. Unit IGs did many of the same duties they had stateside with modifications to accommodate each Command's desires or unique situations and requirements. A major IG concern was the timely distribution of publications and directives unique to the theater of operations and unit compliance with the new requirements.

4. The IG workload almost doubled with force demobilization issues after victory in Europe (VE-Day) and victory over Japan Day (VJ-Day). Major World War II IG issues were:

- Absentee voting
- Audits
- Black market and illegal currency transactions
- Casualty treatment
- Contracting
- Disloyalty
- Health records
- Inspection and evaluation of federalized National Guard units
- Looting / pilfering
- Maintenance
- Medical readiness / training
- Morale / welfare
- Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM)
- Prisoners of War (POW)
- Post Exchanges
- Race relations
- Readiness for deployment

Section 1-5

Vietnam (1965-1973)

1. The American Army that took to the field in Vietnam had an IG system with duties and procedures very similar to those of today. Some CONUS IGs developed inspection programs for units deploying to Vietnam; however, these programs were not DAIG-directed programs as they once had been in World Wars I and II.

2. The U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV), IG office was authorized 13 officers, 20 enlisted Soldiers, and two local support personnel. They worked complaints, assistance, investigations, and general inspections. In 1968, the Army Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland, directed that annual general inspections (AGIs) would be given Army-wide (to include units in Vietnam). The USARV IG conducted 130 unit AGIs from 1968 to 1971. USARV inspected all types of units in Vietnam but concentrated on those organizations which did not have detailed IGs assigned in their direct chain of Command.

3. USARV regulations authorized those Commanders with a detailed IG on their staffs to appoint acting IGs for any subordinate unit battalion-sized or higher. The 1st Cavalry Division in 1969 had acting IGs in each battalion because of its wide dispersion over large areas. The 25th Infantry Division, on the other hand, operated with only its detailed IG (and IG office / section) because it was much more geographically concentrated.

4. Investigations and complaint issues were similar to those encountered in earlier wars. It was noted that the number of complaints dropped as combat intensity increased. DAIG policy directed complaints to the lowest level where a detailed or acting IG was assigned.

5. At the joint level, the IG, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), had four officers and four enlisted members in 1967. This number grew to 115 U.S. officers and enlisted Soldiers and 15 Vietnamese interpreters before the war's end. This increased manning was a direct result of the IG's value to the Command in uncovering and solving problems while they were still small. For example, in one year alone, the IG, MACV, performed 300 investigations and handled 20,000 IGARs.

6. Demonstrating this importance of the IG system to the Vietnam War effort was the fact that the joint, annual campaign plan routinely included an IG annex, Annex S. This annex outlined the scope and authority given the IG by the Commander.

Section 1-6

Desert Shield / Desert Storm (1990-1991)

1. The IG experience in Desert Shield / Storm was initially similar to the Spanish-American War in one aspect. The war was brief and surprisingly successful in large part because combat, combat support, and combat service support units entered the conflict proficient with their equipment and trained in the latest Air-Land Battle doctrine. However, many IGs entered the war with procedures, plans, manning, and equipment tables based on almost 20 years of peacetime requirements.

2. For some IGs, the rapid transition out of the peacetime routine was difficult. But unlike IGs in the Spanish-American War, Desert Shield / Storm IGs adapted rapidly and positively to the changing situation.

3. As for Command use of the IG during the war, the IG, 416th Engineer Command, after-action report says it best for the majority of cases: "The IG personnel in our Command were not used for any other function than official IG business."

4. CONUS.

a. Unit IGs were initially involved in deployment activities ranging from ensuring units were doing the CG's mandatory pre-deployment training to monitoring convoy, rail-loading, and port of embarkation operations. As units physically left CONUS, the average IG staff section initially divided into two elements: one element remained at the unit's home station and the other accompanied the deploying force to Southwest Asia (SWA). In many cases, the deployed IG element had to subdivide further its people once in theater in order to serve the heavily dispersed Command.

b. The home-station element maintained a full-service IG staff section for the non-deploying Soldiers and dependents. In almost all cases, this population far exceeded the number of troops deployed. IGs at installation level and below spent the majority of their time on mobilization, reserve component, and dependent support issues while DAIG focused on doing mobilization assessments with the objective of providing the Army leadership feedback on the process.

5. OCONUS.

a. Many IGs were in the "first string" sent to SWA such as the IG of the 3rd Armored Division. The first major obstacle to IG mission accomplishment was a lack of organic equipment. Some IGs that did arrive with assigned vehicles and adequate tentage, cots, light sets, and field desks did so in most cases only because they were lucky enough to hand-receipt such items from deactivating divisions (e.g., the 8th Infantry Division). Later, some IG staff sections were issued leased vehicles through host-nation support agreements.

b. Lack of communications was another major obstacle for IGs. The majority of IGs had improper communications equipment for the situation or no equipment at all. The

Inspector General Worldwide Network (IGNET), the IG community's primary means of automated communications, was tested with one deployed corps IG office. IGNET did not do well in SWA because it was neither designed as a deployable system nor intended for the rigors of combat. The situation improved when IGs received the capability to link their e-mail into the Defense Data Network (DDN) via Terminal Access Control (TAC) points; but, for a considerable amount of time, IGs had to rely on couriers and telephones.

c. Many IGs in SWA found that assistance became their first priority, primarily because of the volume of complaints. IG inspections took less time and priority than IG assistance. Inspections were typically intense, short-duration efforts with rapid feedback provided to the unit leadership. IGs inspected units for safety and security, casualty evacuation plans, enemy prisoner of war (EPW) plans, and unit fighter management plans while waiting for the ground war to begin. The Command IG also became a credible means of obtaining the latest changes to regulatory policies and procedures.

d. IGs did not get the opportunity to do much during the ground war because of its short duration (roughly 100 hours). However, IGs were prepared to inspect the handling of displaced civilians, reconstitution operations, personnel replacement, graves registration and civil military operations, and many other primarily combat-service-support issues.

e. Like past wars, the IGs' workload increased significantly with the war's end. They became involved with unit reconstitution, property accountability, awards and war-trophy accountability, and security. Major Desert Shield / Storm IG issues and associated tasks in addition to those already discussed were:

- Awards
- Conscientious objectors
- Deployability of Soldiers on permanent physical profiles
- Reserve component issues
- Pay entitlements for Reserve Components (RC)
- Abuse of Command authority
- Theater living conditions
- Involuntary service beyond Expiration of Term of Service (ETS) / retirement
- Table(s) of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) augmentation (full mobilization not declared)
- Personnel policies (married / dual-service Soldiers and enlisted promotions)
- Mail
- NBC (optical inserts for protective masks)

Section 1-7

Operation Enduring Freedom (2001 – 2014) / Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003 – 2010)

1. The IG experience in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq built on experiences gained in 1990. These two conflicts shared in common an adaptive enemy, ethnic strife, political issues, and cultural challenges. Both operations involved large geographic areas and restricted mobility due to the advent of the improvised explosive device (IED). IEDs caused the services to convert rapidly an inventory of mainly thinned-skinned HMMWVs to up-armored HMMWVs. The Army and Marine Corps later invested in Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and an array of other specialized all-terrain, mine-resistant vehicles to protect the force from a very adaptive and creative enemy.

2. In October 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom (sometimes called the 'forgotten war' following the invasion of Iraq in 2003) began in Afghanistan. The rugged terrain and vast distances placed significant limits on IG inspections due to transportation requirements. Inspections and support to DAIG and DoD Inspection teams competed for these precious resources. Some IGs were able to obtain higher priority for air assets from their directing authorities to allow them to conduct IG operations more effectively. Force size and visibility remained low due to lower casualty rates in comparison to those inflicted later in OIF. Then in 2009, with a spike in enemy activity, the focus shifted to OEF with a gradual increase in forces and resources. Yet in 2009, there were still no Inspector General Worldwide Network (IGNET) servers in country. Though installed in 2010, the lack of IGNET servers was yet another factor that has made Afghanistan the most challenging place to conduct IG operations.

3. Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission concluded in December 2014. However, operations continued after that date in Afghanistan, and U.S. forces continued to contribute to the NATO force serving in support of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In January 2015, the NATO-led training, advisory, and assistance mission consisting of 12,500 Soldiers began in Afghanistan as a follow-on mission to the ISAF.

4. In March 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began in Iraq. Post-invasion Iraq was characterized by attacks against coalition forces and among various sectarian groups. This situation soon led to the Iraqi insurgency, strife between many Sunni and Shia Iraqi groups, and al-Qaeda-led operations. This non-permissive environment -- with large expanses of deserts, mountains, and large cities -- complicated logistics and limited movement for IGs. DAIG installed IGNET servers in January 2009 to increase speed and connectivity.

5. As part of the U.S. drawdown efforts to OIF, the U.S. transitioned from OIF to Operation New Dawn (OND) in September 2010. OND was largely characterized by a reduction in combat action and a surge of U.S. advisory teams that advised, assisted,

and trained Iraqi Security Forces. The last combat troops departed Iraq in December 2011, marking the end to OND.

6. The extensive use of the ARNG and USAR forces transformed both components from their historic role to a more operational one, which required IGs to become 'fluent' in all components since most Commands were composed of all three components. National Guard Affairs and Army Reserve Affairs directorates provided assistance and expertise in reserve matters. The use of State IGs, CONUS IGs, and USAR CONUS IGs were important in providing accurate and timely support to reserve-component Soldiers.

7. CONUS.

a. Unit IGs were initially involved in deployment activities that ranged from ensuring units were conducting theater-mandated pre-deployment training to mobilization disputes. Those IG sections large enough or with enduring missions divided into two elements: one remained at the unit's home station and the other accompanied the deploying force to theater. For smaller IG staff sections, the entire section deployed after establishing support agreements for CONUS-based units not under the unit's command and control during the deployment.

b. The home-station element maintained a full-service IG section for the non-deploying units, Soldiers, and dependents. In many cases, this population far exceeded the number of troops deployed. IGs at the installation level and below spent much of their time on mobilization, medical board, reserve-component, and dependent-support issues. All CONUS-based IGs supported the deployed force in one form or another. Reserve-component IGs supported those deployed IGs with reserve-component units as part of their task organization. These reserve-component IGs provided familiarity with reserve-component policies, procedures, and policies and were well suited to support the IG in theater. This interaction also served to promote rear-detachment support and better awareness of issues facing the deployed organization.

8. OCONUS.

a. Multi-National Division (MND) IGs served their respective units within an ever-changing force structure and boundaries. Initially, a Corps Support Command (COSCOM) had Command and control over the logistics force. When an Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) replaced the COSCOM in Iraq, a shortfall in IG authorizations resulted. This change in mission led to an enduring support arrangement of an organization not organically structured to provide IG support to an extremely large area or task organization, requiring three times the organic IG strength. Changes in force structure took place in both countries as they expanded and reduced in response to changing conditions. The role of the IG in the planning process, with identification of IG shortfalls, proved critical for future success in IG operations.

b. Initially, a lack of organic communications was an obstacle for IGs. More important than actual equipment was access to communications systems, to include Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet), Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), intranet portal, iPerms, etc. IGMET access was initially limited but eventually developed with the theater. Equally important was establishing a separate place to conduct business where IGs could meet with Soldiers confidentially.

c. The use of IGs depended on the Directing Authority, type of Command, mission, and location. IGs in combat units were more heavily involved in inspections and had a lower assistance mission than force sustainment organizations, which often had three times the assistance mission. Inspections varied with the priority of the Commander. IGs routinely conducted training for leaders and Soldiers throughout the theater. The success of these training programs was due to the emphasis placed by the Directing Authority, giving the IG the authority to carry out training endorsed by the Commander.

d. The deployed IG's workload had peaks and valleys coinciding with unit transfers of authority (TOAs). One trend that developed during this entire period was increased family-support requests. Starting at a low percentage of cases, Family support saw a steady increase. Today, Family-support cases are the number one IGAR composing 20 percent of IG cases Army-wide. Other common cases received during OIF / OEF were:

- Reserve component promotion issues
- Senior leader misconduct
- Mobilization of Soldiers with physical profiles
- Pay, bonus, and incentive pay entitlements for Reserve Component Soldiers
- Abuse of Command authority
- Stop-loss issues
- Personnel policies (married / dual-service Soldiers, enlisted promotions).
- General Order Number 1 violations
- Rest and Recuperation policy (R&R)
- Emergency leave
- Awards
- Personnel Effects and Inventory
- Mortuary Affairs Collection Point (MACP)

e. Deployed IGs encountered a significant increase in external audits, assessments, and inspections from the Department of Defense IG (Special Plans and Operations, Audit, and DISPOC), Government Accountability Office, the Army Inspector General, the Army Audit Agency, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). In an effort to reduce redundancy and to synchronize the external audits / inspections, DoD IG assigned a Deputy Inspector General for Southwest Asia, who was located in Kuwait and Qatar. Deployed IGs also experienced a significant increase of command-directed inspections, such as:

- Prisoners of War

- Quality of Life
- Contracting Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
- Captured Weapons
- Human Trafficking (Living Conditions of Third-Country Nationals)
- Location of abandoned shipping containers
- Property Accountability

f. During the drawdown, deployed IGs received issues related to Forward-Operating Base (FOB) closures. The Army Audit Agency was instrumental in providing assistance and worked with U.S. Forces' logisticians in developing an automated matrix clearance tool for all base closures or transfers.

Chapter 2

Role of the IG during Multi-Domain Operations

Section 2-1 The IG in Multi-Domain Operations

Section 2-2 IG Functions during Operational Missions

Section 2-3 Staff Planning and Operations

Section 2-4 IG Mission Essential Task List

Section 2-1

The IG in Multi- Domain Operations

1. Multi-Domain Operations. Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) are the combined-arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders. Whether the purpose is to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, or create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution, the IG is a relevant participant in the full range of military operations. Field Manual (FM 3-0) expands on the Army’s capstone doctrine for multi-domain operations described in ADP 3-0. It describes how Army forces contribute landpower to the joint force and integrate joint capabilities into operations on land to achieve military objectives and fulfill policy aims. FM 3-0 focuses on large-scale combat operations and their relationship to the full range of military operations that support joint campaigning. Army forces meet a diverse array of challenges and contribute to national objectives across a wide range of operational categories, including large-scale combat operations, limited contingency operations, crisis response, and support to security cooperation.

The Army strategic contexts generally correspond to the joint competition continuum and the requirements of joint campaigns. Because cooperation is generally conducted with an ally or partner to counter an adversary or enemy, Army doctrine considers it part of competition. Army doctrine adds crisis to account for the unique challenges facing ground forces that often characterize the transition between competition and armed conflict. The graphic illustration below (Figure 1) is an illustration of Army strategic contexts.




Figure 1: Army strategic contexts and operational categories

The IG is a special staff officer to the Commander that he / she supports. As a result, the IG must understand his / her role as an IG, understand the Commander’s “big” picture (vision), be well-versed in current doctrine and standards, and be a contributing member of the Commander’s staff. Additionally, the IG must develop his / her concept of

support to meet the needs of the Commander, as well as support transitions as the focus of the Commander changes from one operation to the next.

While the IG is a member of the Commander's special staff and may enjoy certain latitudes, authorizations, and empowerment by the Commander, the IG must never forget that they are part of the staff and that they must work closely with the staff in the Operations Process so that plans can be developed that support the Commander's needs.

2. IG and the Operations Process.

a. ADP 3-0 describes the process by which Commanders and staffs develop plans in support of MDO. ADP 3-0 also describes the Army Operations Process; however, for a more detailed understanding of the process, refer to ADP 5-0 and FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. The Army Operations Process follows a cycle of planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing. The figure below (Figure 2) illustrates this cycle.




Figure 2. The Operations Process

b. Both the Commander and staff have important roles within the operations process. The Commander's role is to drive the process and the staff's role is to assist Commanders with understanding situations, making and implementing decisions, controlling operations, and assessing progress. Arguably, the Commanders are the most important participants in the process, but the staffs perform essential functions that amplify the effectiveness of operations. The IG performs essential functions in the operations process and assist Commanders in improving readiness and warfighting capability.

It is highly recommended that IGs become familiar with the Army's current doctrine (ADPs and FMs), vision of their Commander, and local Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

c. In their role as fair and impartial fact-finders, IGs play a highly influential part in the assessment activities. **Assessment** *is the continuous monitoring and evaluating-- throughout planning, preparation, and execution -- of the current situation and the progress of an operation.* The inspections, assistance, investigations, and teaching and training functions render the IG as a logical consultant to the Commander on the readiness condition and efficiency of the Command. IGs are uniquely qualified to help Commanders identify any areas of weakness or vulnerability in a mission and prevent or eliminate problem areas that can interfere with mission accomplishment. In solving both the systemic problems through special inspections and the local problems through IG assistance and investigations, the IG can reduce any "friction points" occurring during the operations process.

Section 2-2

IG Functions during Operational Missions

Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war . . . The military machine -- the army and everything related to it -- is basically very simple, therefore seems easy to manage. But we should keep in mind none of its components is of one piece: each part is composed of individuals . . . the least important of whom may chance to delay things or somehow make them go wrong.

Karl Von Clausewitz

1. IG Role in Military Operations.

a. A distinguishing feature of the IG mission is that the four basic functions -- Inspections, Assistance, Investigations, and Teaching and Training -- are applicable throughout the full range of military operations, whether in peace or war. In other words, your role as an IG is never static. During military operations you still support your Commander as an extension of the Commander's eyes, ears, voice, and conscience. You still report issues that affect readiness, warfighting, discipline, and quality of life. The IG's priority of focus during military operations must be on tasks and systems that directly relate to the Command's readiness during phases and types of military operations.

b. Just as the role of the IG is constant, the standards for IG activities remain the same during wartime as in a peacetime, garrison-like environment. AR 20-1 and IG doctrinal publications apply to IGs in wartime as in peacetime. Confidentiality, release of records, duty restrictions, reprisal prevention, directing authorities, and reporting requirements are all matters of policy that apply to IGs regardless of the difficulties surrounding an operational deployment. The doctrinal applications of the seven-step IG Action Process (IGAP) still apply in assistance and investigations cases. IGs conducting wartime inspections must still consider the use of the 17-step IG Inspections Process when planning, executing, and completing an inspection. In many cases, compressing this process becomes necessary.

c. Though the tasks and standards for the IG's mission remain unchanged during military operations, you can expect a change in conditions. These conditions will often cause more difficulties for IGs to perform their mission -- especially in a tactical environment. The tactical threat, geographic dispersion of units, diminished communications, harsh environment, and high operational tempo can create unique challenges for IGs.

2. IG Functions in Military Operations. Though they may be difficult to perform, the four IG functions of Inspections, Assistance, Investigations, and Teaching and Training are vital to ensuring the Command's readiness during military operations. This section describes the relevance of each of the IG functions during operational missions and describes some of the expected conditions associated with these functions.

a. Inspections.

(1) Inspections are the most direct way an IG can influence the Command's mission readiness during operations. The context of the IG's inspections function entails assisting Commanders and staffs with their Organizational Inspection Programs (OIPs) as well as conducting IG Inspections and Intelligence Oversight Inspections as part of the OIP. The OIP ensures high standards for readiness and warfighting capability of the unit before, during, and after combat or other operations. A strong inspection program is one of the most proactive ways to reduce the battlefield frictions that jeopardize mission success or conditions that create an unnecessary risk of U.S. Soldiers.

(2) During deployments, inspection plans (to include IG Inspections) are never static. The Commander continually refines the topics and objectives of inspections to ensure they are tailored to resolve high-payoff issues. Commanders often direct the IG to inspect a function or process for feedback needed to make decisions critical to mission accomplishment. The Commander's need to make timely decisions may require the IG to compress the Inspections Process (see AR 20-1 and Section 8-2 of The Inspections Guide for details on compressed inspections). Regardless of whether or not the inspection is compressed, the IG must always ensure that inspections are fair and impartial and gather enough information so the Commander may make informed decisions. Here are some of the high-payoff issues the IG may consider during each phase of operational deployments:

Mobilization.

- Readiness / certification training
- Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP)
- Mobilization of Reserve Component (RC) units
- Family readiness issues
- Equipment readiness issues
- Rear Detachment procedures

Deployment.

- Reporting / accountability
- Load planning / load teams
- Fort-to-port operations
- Theater reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI)
- Rules of Engagement (ROE) / Geneva Convention / general orders training
- Force protection
- Supply / procurement procedures

Employment.

- Force protection / threat vulnerability assessments
- Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) / detainee operations
- Captured equipment processing
- Casualty evacuation
- Composite risk management
- Information management / net-centric operations
- Active Component (AC) / Reserve Component (RC) integration

Sustainment.

- Intelligence oversight
- Convoy operations
- Personnel replacement operations
- Weapons system replacement operations
- Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) and fighter management programs
- Ammunition resupply
- Equipment readiness issues
- Combat feeding
- Line of duty investigations
- Mail services
- Supply accountability
- Awards and badges
- Contract support and procurement
- Sustainment training
- Finance and entitlements systemic issues

Redeployment.

- Accountability and serviceability of returning equipment
- Ammunition / excess equipment turn-in procedures
- Supply / contracting account terminations
- Camp clearances / turnovers
- Load planning / load teams
- Tactical Assembly Area (TAA)-to-port operations
- U.S. Customs / Agriculture clearances
- Port of embarkation procedures

Demobilization.

- Reverse SRP procedures
- Reception, integration, and Family reunification training
- Reconstitution of personnel and equipment
- Awards, evaluations, and personnel records systemic issues
- Finance and entitlements systemic issues

b. **Assistance.** Both deployed and supporting IGs can expect increases in requests for information and assistance. Studies of recent military operations indicate that assistance cases account for the majority of the deployed IG's workload. A thorough analysis of each phase of the operational spectrum will provide insights into the nature of requests that the IG can expect. For instance, whenever combat operations cease, IGs can expect and plan for an increase in IGARs. IG technical channels and increased flexibility are essential to responsive support to Commanders, Soldiers, and other interested parties. Wherever possible, the deployed IG must forward inquiries initiated outside the theater of operations to the appropriate IG for resolution. Typical requests for assistance include the following:

- Early return of Family members
- Emergency leave procedures
- Rest and relaxation (R&R) and environmental leave procedures
- Other questionable leadership decisions / policies
- Nonsupport of Family members
- Reserve and National Guard Family support issues (ID card, health care, post exchange commissary privileges)
- Reserve Component (RC) entitlements (pay, promotion, etc.).
- Active Component (AC) / RC disparity issues
- Family care plans
- Information requests from members of the indigenous population (contract service disputes, request for information on captured / detained family members, civil affairs issues)
- Awards and decorations issues
- Intelligence Oversight (Procedure 15 Reports)

c. **Investigations.** The IG investigations function during military operations differs little from peacetime investigations. Investigations conducted while deployed are more difficult to complete because of the limited access to the Directing Authority (Commander), time and distance factors, and a generally greater reliance upon technical-channel support from other IGs who may also be deployed. Records-release policies for IG records such as ROIs do not change during military operations. Typical allegations brought to the IG during military operations include:

- Misconduct or abuse of authority (leaders)
- Improper Mental Health Evaluations (MHE)
- Whistleblower reprisals
- Sexual harassment / misconduct
- Fraudulent purchasing practices
- Reports of Law of War violations (see DoD Directive 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program, Chapter 6 - Information Requirements); Law of War is also addressed in ADP 3-0, paragraphs 3-55 through 3-59.

d. **Teaching and Training.** During both peace and war, IGs have traditionally been the bridge that spans the gap of experience. The time-sensitive need for teaching and training Soldiers at all levels on fundamental tasks essential to mission success is an inherent IG function. As extensions of the eyes and ears of the Commander, the IG should view the teaching and training function as a key factor in a unit's ultimate success and therefore plan its inclusion as a fundamental portion of all other IG activities. The IG's ability to acquire and understand rapidly the changing regulatory and policy standards inherent during major operations is especially important in this process. For instance, the IG should have knowledge of all the policies and procedures published for the operation in fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs). A good understanding of information management operations will help the IG get timely access to mission requirements and standards and coordinate these requirements with units, functional proponents, and IGs operating in split locations. While most teaching and training is fundamentally integrated into other IG activities, the following are some proven approaches to bridge the knowledge gap in a more deliberate way:

- IG bulletins and an IG section in unit newsletters
- New Commander / 1SG / CSM orientations
- New Soldier orientation briefings
- Deployment and redeployment briefings
- IG Handbooks for Commanders and staff agencies (Web-based, media CDs, printed)

3. **Organization for Military Operations.** During military operations, the IG must consider both deployed and stay-behind capabilities in people and equipment. These considerations especially apply to IGs who serve both a tactical Command and an installation. Deployment considerations must include the deploying IG's ability to provide coverage during all phases of the operation, to include split-based operations in the theater. Stay-behind IGs (or non-deploying supporting IGs) not only support the installation, non-deployed units, and rear detachments, but they also provide the deploying IG a "reach-back" capability to help resolve issues and allegations. The IG should consider the following factors in the planning process to assemble the best possible task organization to support the full range of requirements:

a. Identify the proper TOE and TDA personnel combinations to retain flexibility for the deploying elements while maintaining adequate resources at home station to meet

supporting IG operational requirements. If RC units are assigned to the Command for the operational mission, the IG office must request augmenting IGs to represent the unique requirements and issues concerning these components.

b. Identify individual mobilization augmentees (IMA) and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) IG staffing needs. IGs should identify IMA personnel by name.

c. Determine training requirements for RC IG personnel upon activation.

d. Determine the method of coverage in the theater of operations where units may be widely dispersed. Indicate the methodology in the operation plan / operation order (OPLAN / OPORD).

e. Consider appointing and training acting IGs to cover assistance to Soldiers in remote locations. When possible, identify the acting IGs and request their appointment from the ACOM / ASCC / DRU Commander prior to deployment. Strongly consider training the acting IGs at home station prior to deployment if time permits.

f. Determine the bases of IG operations required at home station, staging bases, and deployed locations, to include the Command posts from which the IG will operate.

g. Given there may not be enough IG manpower to task organize the shop functionally (i.e. Inspections, Assistance and Investigations, Intelligence Oversight), the IG should ensure that all members of the deploying IG team are cross-trained to perform all functions when directed.

Section 2-3

Staff Planning and Operations

1. **Staff Estimates.** IGs are essential staff members in all scenarios during both peacetime and wartime operations. IG involvement in the military decision-making process (MDMP) from the receipt of the mission to the production of the order is continuous. The IG should have a clear understanding of the higher headquarters' order, the Command's mission, and the Commander's intent. The IG must ensure that the Commander's expectations of the role and functions of the IG are addressed early in the mission-analysis process.

2. **IG Annex.** Once the IG understands the mission and the Commander's intent, the IG is in a position to formulate or plan detailed mission requirements as part of the Commander's staff and the operations process. This process should include anticipated IG actions (inspections, assistance, investigations, teaching and training) during each phase of the operation such as mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and reconstitution. FM 5-0, Planning and Orders Production, includes a format with instructions for completing Annex U, Inspector General, to an Operations Plan (OPLAN) or Operations Order (OPORD). Appendix D reproduces the exact format for the IG annex found on pages E-96 through E-99 of FM 5-0, Appendix E.

3. **Exercises.** As discussed in the previous section, the IG mission and standards by which we operate remain relatively constant, but the conditions and environment in which we operate in wartime can be dramatically different. Realistic training scenarios provide an excellent tool to determine how to operate in all types of environments. The old adage "*train as you fight*" holds true for the IG. As with any staff element, IGs must participate as full-fledged staff members in all Command post exercises, field-training exercises, Combat Training Center rotations, and mobilization and deployment readiness exercises. Command IGs will not perform non-IG duties such as liaison officer, rear Command post Commander, or detachment noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) during training exercises that would detract from their wartime mission or compromise their ability to remain fair and impartial. Only TIG can lift these duty restrictions on a case-by-case basis (See Army Regulation 20-1). During these exercises IGs should include concurrent, split operations training involving the home-station installation IG office in order to practice reach-back procedures and other techniques normally used during operational deployments.

Section 2-4

IG Mission Essential Task List

1. **IG Training Focus.** What should the IG be prepared to do when his or her unit is alerted, mobilized, deployed, and engaged in a combat environment? The answer is simple: do the essential things first. But determining the mission essential tasks for the IG in a given scenario will vary depending on many factors. For example, a CONUS-based division IG's initial areas of interest may be with deployment issues while a forward-deployed division IG is concerned with the issues associated with a no-notice, go-to-war scenario. For this reason, IGs should develop a Mission Essential Task List (METL), like all members of the battle staff, to focus training for wartime missions. ADP 7-0, [Training](#); FM 7-0, [Training](#); and the on-line resource known as the Army Training Network (ATN) explains the METL-development process.

2. **What is an IG METL?** FM 7-0 describes a METL as a tailored group of mission-essential tasks that an organization / unit could perform based on its design, equipment, manning, and table of organization (TOE) / table of distribution and allowances (TDA) mission. The METL development process is the catalyst to focus training on wartime operational missions and allows the IG to maximize all training opportunities, execute training to standard, train as the IG will fight, and develop Soldier and leader confidence among the IGs. In developing the METL, the IG should consider the following key points to ensure the METL has a battle focus and leads to "buy in" and commitment to the IG's training plans:

a. Wartime operational plans, enduring capabilities, operational environment, directed missions, and external guidance are all inputs to the IG's mission analysis and resulting IG METL. Along with the Commander's guidance, the IG analysis considers these inputs when identifying and selecting tasks that make up the METL.

b. All key IG personnel must know and understand the METL so they can integrate their efforts and resources.

c. METL applies to the whole IG staff section. However, the supporting battle tasks may be different among various elements of the IG section.

d. The IG must brief the Commander on the METL and gain the Commander's approval of the list to ensure it meets the Commander's intent and guidance.

e. Resource availability does not affect METL development. The METL is an unconstrained statement of tasks required to accomplish the wartime mission.

f. METL is not prioritized; however, all tasks may not require equal training time and resources.

3. Sources for Input to the IG METL. IGs derive their METL primarily from organizational war plans and related tasks in external guidance. The following are some sources for an IG METL:

- Authorization documents (e.g., TO&E)
- Tactical standing operating procedures (TSOPs or TAC SOP)
- Doctrinal manuals or policy documents (e.g., IG guides and regulations)
- Lessons-learned databases (e.g., Center for Army Lessons Learned)
- Readiness standing operating procedures (RSOP)
- Mobilization plans
- State operational contingency plans for ARNG

4. Effects of Change in Mission. In most cases, the IG's METL will not change when the organization is directed to conduct a mission other than its assigned wartime operational mission. These missions could range from major combat operations to providing humanitarian assistance or other types of stability and support operations. There are, however, some considerations in how the IG provides IG support if the unit is designated as a Joint Task Force (JTF) and augmented with additional joint assets. In these cases, Joint IG policies and doctrine apply and will likely result in adjustments to the METL.

5. Battle Tasks. After the Commander approves the IG METL, the Command IG approves those tasks his or her subordinates IGs must accomplish that are critical to the success of the IG METL. For example, in the Assistance and Investigation (A&I) branch, some battle tasks might be:

- Conduct assistance inquiries.
- Conduct investigative inquiries and investigations of allegations.
- Manage a case in the IGARS database.

These tasks become IG battle tasks. The selection of these battle tasks allows the primary IG to focus on those tasks he or she wants to emphasize during internal planning, training, and evaluation of the shop. These tasks also enable the IG to prioritize the allocation of scarce resources such as time, TDY funds, and clerical support.

6. Summary. The METL is based on the wartime mission and provides the foundation for the IG training and readiness plans. IGs develop METLs because the IG section cannot necessarily maintain standards-based proficiency on every possible task. The METL-development process allows the IG to maximize all training opportunities, execute training to standard, train as the IG will fight, and develop Soldier and leader confidence among the IGs.

Chapter 3

IG in Today's Operating Environment

Section 3-1 The Army Plan

Section 3-2 Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) for Deployed Units

Section 3-3 Contractors on the Battlefield

Section 3-4 IGARs from Indigenous People

Section 3-5 IG Considerations for Deployment

Section 3-1

The Army Plan

We must immediately begin the process of re-examining and challenging our most basic institutional assumptions, organizational structures, paradigms, policies, and procedures to better serve our Nation. The end result of this examination will be a more relevant and ready force -- a campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset.

From the former Army Chief of Staff's paper (GEN Peter J. Schoomaker),
"The Way Ahead: Our Army at War ... Relevant and Ready"

1. Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The operating environment for our Army changed dramatically following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. When the President declared the GWOT shortly thereafter, he forewarned the Nation and its Army that this would be a war fought like no other before, requiring our deep and enduring commitment. By October 2009, the Army and its partners on the joint / coalition team were fighting across the globe and across the full range of military operations against rogue states and terrorists to prevent them from striking against the U.S., our allies, and our national interests. More than 98,000 Soldiers were in Iraq and 44,000 Soldiers were in Afghanistan fighting the most evident prosecution of the GWOT. By 31 December 2011, all U.S. troops were out of Iraq, and the full emphasis of U.S. military resources were placed on Afghanistan.

2. The Army Campaign Plan. To meet the Nation's strategic commitments around the world, the former Army Chief of Staff, GEN Schoomaker, launched the Army Campaign Plan (ACP) to "obtain a more relevant and ready campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary mindset". The first ACP provided direction for the preparation and execution of a full range of transformation tasks necessary to provide relevant and ready land power to the Nation while maintaining the quality of the all-volunteer force. This ACP heralded the most comprehensive transformation of Army forces since World War II. Because supporting Soldiers, civilians, and their Families have always been a critical part of the Army's ability to defend our Nation, the guiding principle of the initial and subsequent ACPs is that the Soldier remains the centerpiece of our units and our most important combat system. The initial ACP, which is now updated annually, provided strategies to –

- **Stabilize** the force to reduce the stress on Soldiers and their Families that the current high-deployment tempo creates. The plan addresses the problem by making initial tour lengths longer, increasing the number of deployable units, creating predictability in the deployment schedule, and minimizes turbulence in units just prior and during deployments periods.
- Make the force more **modular** and capable at the brigade level. The creation of brigade-sized Units of Action (UA) with standardized unit designs and robust

capabilities allows for "plug-and-play" responsiveness to the Combatant Commanders.

- **Rebalance** the force to optimize the capabilities of the units needed on today's battlefields. The plan creates more of the high-demand units by reducing some of the heavy forces and creating more infantry, military police, and civil affairs units.
- Redefine the **Army culture** by emphasizing the principle that every Soldier, regardless of specialty, is a fighter imbued with a "Warrior Ethos" as described in the Soldier's Creed (see Figure 2). The Army also defined its core competencies to: *1) train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders; and 2) provide relevant and ready land power capability to the Combatant Commanders as part of the joint team.* The Army becomes a more joint, CONUS-based expeditionary force under the ACP.

The ACP has been updated numerous times over the past several years, and its most recent update has not yet been approved at the time of this publication. The ACP is one of five components of the larger document known as The Army Plan. Additional documents influence and shape the ideas espoused in the Army plan, such as the recently published Army Operating Concept and the Force 2025 and Beyond—Setting the Course, both published by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). IGs should read these documents so they maintain an understanding of the big picture that their supported Commanders face.

3. The IG during and after Transformation. The IG must be vigilant for any systemic problems to ensure that transformation, and the effect of transformation, does not interfere with mission accomplishment. The role of the IG has been to ensure an organized and fluid transformation over time because IGs help leaders identify and prevent problem areas that are a by-product of any major change. Though major changes – as found in the current Army Campaign Plan – are necessary to adapt to today's operating environment, problems and inefficiencies are certain to arise. There is little argument that the rebalancing of forces to ensure the right force mix for today's battlefield is necessary, but it can certainly create a number of residual issues as well. In some cases the systemic issue may rest with the particular policy or doctrine that is no longer relevant to the structure or capabilities of transformed units. By performing their four functions, IGs are exceptionally skilled in identifying these issues without regard to difficulty in resolution. The Army is always transforming and adapting to meet current and future threats. The annual Army Campaign Plan establishes guideposts for these transformations and adaptations, so IGs must be familiar with the current version of the Army Campaign Plan and assist Commanders in anticipating future friction points that the IG system can help remedy. As the Army progresses towards Force 2025 and Beyond, the IG must continue to assess his or her role and remain proactive in assisting the Commander in improving readiness and warfighting capability.

4. Overseas Contingency Operations. In March of 2009, emails and memorandums from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Defense Department's Office of Security began a shift in terminology from the terms 'Long War' and 'Global War on Terror' to Overseas Contingency Operations (OCOs). This new direction had its beginning in budgetary proposals, with an endorsement from the White House, and began entering the Department of Defense's lexicon. Although not yet recognized officially as a replacement catch-phrase for the "Global War on Terror," OCO has

steadily entered the Federal government's parlance as a way to characterize a fresh approach to external threats to the U.S.

5. The Changing Operational Landscape. Recent events in the world enabled the U.S. to transition operations in Iraq from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to Operation New Dawn (OND) and, ultimately, to the closing of operations in Iraq. Similarly, the U.S. has transitioned operations in Afghanistan from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to Operation Resolute Support (ORS); however, drawdown discussions in Afghanistan are still ongoing. Conflict in the world has not ceased. The rise of various extremist groups, such as the Islamic State (known in America by the acronym ISIS and to Arabs and others in the world as the more pejorative *Daesh*) and Houthi rebels, have caught the world's attention. America's response to these extremist groups remains a matter of strong political debate, but the U.S. armed forces remain an option available to our elected leaders. As IGs, our responsibility is to assist our Commanders with improving readiness and warfighting capability, a charter made even more relevant by a world in chaos and an ever-changing operational landscape.

6. The Army of 2030. As the Army emerges from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and refocuses on the pacing challenge of China and the acute threat posed by Russia, Army leaders are directing the most significant reorganization and technical innovation since the end of the Cold War — ensuring our adversaries cannot outrange or outpace us on traditional battlefields or on the new frontiers of space and cyberspace. The world is changing, and the Army is changing with it.

Section 3-2

Organizational Inspection Program for Deployed Units

1. **The Organizational Inspection Program.** Army Regulation (AR) 1-201, Army Inspection Policy, requires all Commanders at battalion level and higher to have an Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) to manage all inspections within the Command. The OIP serves to coordinate inspections and audits into a single, cohesive program focused on Command objectives. The Commander's OIP provides him or her with an organized management tool to identify, prevent, and eliminate problem areas, to include problems that arise during deployments. Because inspections are such an important feedback mechanism for leaders, the Commander should consider crafting an OIP focused on objectives related to the particular operation, especially for deployment cycles of greater than six months. An OIP for a deployed unit must be flexible and support the mission. In many cases the existing OIP must adapt to the tactical environment, the diversity and composition of the subordinate units, and time constraints. Regardless of the challenges, Commanders should always have a plan for the OIP when deployed.

2. **Considerations for a Deployed Unit OIP.** As directed by AR 1-201, a deployed-unit OIP must include the Command's priority and goals, explain the mechanism for scheduling and executing inspections, assign responsibility for scheduling and monitoring inspections, provide standards for inspectors, and discuss a way to track feedback and corrective action. A strong inspection program is one of the most proactive ways to reduce the battlefield frictions that jeopardize mission success or mitigate conditions that unnecessarily risk the lives of American Soldiers. The OIP should address the primary inspection categories of Command, staff, and IG inspections. The following paragraphs address some of the additional considerations for each of the inspection categories:

- **Command Inspections.** During the full range of military operations, the policy for Commanders to inspect their company-level Commanders for compliance with applicable standards is still intact. The requirement to conduct the Initial Command Inspection (ICI) is especially important to teach and train new company-level Commanders. The inspecting Commander should focus the evaluation on areas that support the mission and have a direct impact on readiness and warfighting capability. During Subsequent Command Inspections (SCI), reevaluating every area inspected in the ICI is not necessary, but the Commander should target those areas of weakness identified in the ICI and ensure that corrections from the previous inspection worked.
- **Staff Inspections.** There may be fewer opportunities for conducting Staff Inspections in a deployed environment, but these inspections are particularly useful in providing feedback to Commanders on various functions and services related to mission accomplishment. Staff Inspections frequently identify local problems that the battle Command can fix by providing resources or training. Similarly, Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs) are an excellent means to bridge any knowledge gaps in operational

policies and procedures by teaching and training subordinate units. SAVs are especially critical when the tactical situation requires a change of mission for units not doctrinally organized for their new role. For example, during the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, battlefield necessity required field artillery and air defense artillery units to perform assorted force protection missions, conduct military traffic control, and establish training camps for Iraqi forces and police. SAVs can help by teaching and training these units to ensure they are organized and prepared to perform the assigned missions successfully.

- **IG Inspections.** IGs inspect programs, systems, and functions that are important to the Commander (Directing Authority). IGs receive specific training on how to conduct systemic inspections and are well suited to conduct all types of inspections -- general, special, and follow-up. IGs conduct inspections to assist Commanders with improving readiness and warfighting capability. IGs must provide the Commander with sufficient information and suitable recommendations that allow the Commander to make an informed decision for improving readiness and warfighting capabilities. The IG must be proactive and develop the IG inspection portion of the Commander's OIP.

3. Intelligence Oversight (IO) Inspections. IGs involved in Decisive Action in support of multi-domain operations must be assertive in providing IO inspections of intelligence components within the Command as part of the OIP while deployed. See Chapter 4 of The Intelligence Oversight Guide on methodology for the conduct of IO inspections. Recent high-profile cases of improper activities by military intelligence interrogators only highlight the necessity to have solid IO programs. AR 20-1 requires an IO inspection program, and it serves to ensure compliance with standards on intelligence activities; ensure that units know how to identify, investigate, and report questionable activities; deter inappropriate conduct by intelligence employees; and preserve the 'good name' of the Army. In all matters relating to IO, the IG should work closely with the Command's Operational Law Attorney. DAIG's Intelligence Oversight Division (SAIG-IO) also stands ready to assist in all matters concerning the identification and reporting of questionable activity. The IG must include IO inspections in the IG inspection portion of the Commander's OIP.

Section 3-3

Contractors on the Battlefield

1. **Background.** The Army has a long history of using civilian contractors in times of war. During the Revolutionary War, General Washington used civilian wagon drivers to transport supplies on the battlefield. Sutlers, the merchants who accompanied each regiment, supported Union Soldiers during the Civil War. The Army contracted dockworkers, rail maintainers, and road construction crews to support the logistical demands in the Korean War. From Vietnam to present-day conflicts, the military has increasingly looked to contractors to support base operations and provide petroleum and water supply, ground transportation, and maintenance / technical support for high-technology systems. Today, the U.S. armed forces are becoming more reliant on contractors to perform functions beyond the traditional logistical support role. For example, we are now outsourcing a number of operational functions once performed by military members such as enemy interrogations, force protection / personal security functions, interpreter support, and various civil affairs functions to support current operations in Southwest Asia. In many cases, contractors are training Soldiers to use newly fielded equipment such as weapon systems, electronic sensors, communications systems, and other highly technical gear while the equipment is actively employed on the battlefield.

2. **IG Assistance.** With the increased presence of contractors on the battlefield and the Army's increased dependence on civilian contractors to support the operational mission, the question becomes – **to what extent should the IG support contractors?** AR 20-1 states that when IGs receive IGARs from contractor activities, they "must analyze the substance of complaints and requests for assistance from contractors involved in commercial activities, procurement activities, or contracting, to determine if they are proper for IG action." The IG Action Process (IGAP) is still applicable to complaints and issues from contract employees, but there are some specific considerations.

a. If the contracted employee presents matters concerning a contracting process or acquisition issues, there are normally other established avenues of redress. In these cases the IG can determine the best form of redress by contacting the supporting judge advocate, general counsel, or DAIG Legal Advisor. Another possible solution may be to exercise IG tech channels and contact the IG for Army Contracting Command (ACC). The ACC IG may be able to provide advice or recommendations on the issue you are working.

b. Some issues and allegations may be beyond the IG's influence to resolve because they are not directly related to members of the military or concern military matters. For instance, there is little assistance you can provide to contract employees who complain about a pay problem or about decisions their supervisor made that are within that supervisor's discretion to make and do not violate laws or contract provisions.

c. When contract employees present criminal allegations, the IG should refer the allegations to the appropriate investigative authorities. Allegations against a member of the armed forces should go to the Provost Marshal or nearest Criminal Investigations

Division (CID) detachment for resolution. The IG should forward criminal allegations against other contract employees or indigenous civilians to the Provost Marshal or to the local civil authorities if applicable. Contact the Command's SJA whenever there are questions on where to refer a particular criminal matter.

d. There are many circumstances where complaints of non-criminal issues and allegations from contract activities and employees may be appropriate for the IG to resolve. In deciding whether or not the issues and allegations are IG appropriate, he or she must first consider the following questions –

- *What is the impact, or potential impact, of the complainant's issue(s)?*
- *Does it affect readiness, warfighting capability, or responsible use of government resources (fraud, abuse, or waste)?*
- *Is there an impact on the good order, discipline, morale, or welfare of Soldiers?*
- *Could the issue bring discredit upon Soldiers, the Army, or the United States?*
- *What would be the impact if the IG does not accept the complaint from the contractor?*

e. Once the IG determines that accepting and resolving the IGAR from a contract employee is appropriate, he or she should consider the option of referring the issue for a Commander or supervisor inquiry, especially when allegations or issues are against the contractor activity. The Command or contracting official in charge of oversight of the contractor activity is normally in the best position to investigate because civilian-civilian employees in contracted activities may refuse an interview by an IG if the requirement to cooperate is not specified in the contract. However, the contractors normally cannot refuse to be interviewed by a contracting officer who has access to all facts and information affecting the contract. Regardless of who ultimately investigates and resolves a contract employee's issues or allegations, the IG follows the IGAP to render assistance and close the case in the IGARS database.

2. IG Inspections. With the pervasive use of contractors on today's battlefields, the Commander and his or her IG need to consider the impact that contracted activities have on the unit's ability to perform the mission. When applicable, the IG should include contracted activities as part of applicable special inspections. In those cases, the IG should work through the contracting officer or the contracting officer's representative (COR) assigned oversight of the contract to ensure there is a provision for the contract employees to cooperate with the IG. (Note: IGs may need to provide some teaching and training up front to contract specialists to ensure that this IG cooperation provision appears in future contracts).

a. If, during the course of an inspection, the IG finds non-compliance of certain standards, the IG should crosswalk the information with the contracting officials and / or the SJA to determine the following:

- *Does the contract specify the appropriate standards for the particular service?*
- *Is there a failure of the contracting official to enforce the standard within the terms and conditions of the contract?*

- *Should the standard apply to contractor activities?*
- *Do the terms of the contract require changes to ensure compliance with guiding standards?*

b. Answers to these questions will be relevant to the root causes and recommendations the IG provides in the final inspection report to correct deficiencies.

Section 3-4

IGARs from Indigenous People

1. Though military IGs do not necessarily promote their services to people outside the U.S. armed forces, IGs should prepare themselves for the possibility that a person who is indigenous to the area of operations may request IG assistance on a matter of Army interest. The principle that **anyone** can submit an IGAR still applies in the deployed, operational environment. Indigenous civilians, host-nation service members, and foreign nationals do occasionally file requests for assistance with Army IGs. In most cases, the IGARs are from local workers hired by U.S. forces. They seek out the IG because they either have some knowledge of the IG or a military member interested in getting the person some help with a problem refers them to the IG. Examples of IGARs from indigenous persons include:

- Requests to locate family members in the custody of U.S. forces (detainees, EPWs)
- Disputes over contracts for goods and services they provide to U.S. or coalition forces
- Issue(s) relating to their work conditions on U.S. military camps
- Complaints of discriminatory practices by local public services against tribal or political factions (i.e. discretionary pricing for gas, electricity, public transportation)
- Requests to cease culturally offensive public displays or activities

2. The IGAP method still works for resolving IGARs from indigenous people, but there are some additional considerations. For instance, by-the-book answers do not exist when determining if the issues and allegations are appropriate for the IG to resolve. Prior to making these decisions, the IG should consider the following guiding questions:

- *What is the impact, or potential impact, of the indigenous complainant's issue(s)?*
- *Does it affect mission readiness, warfighting ability, or responsible use of government resources (fraud, abuse, or waste)?*
- *Could the issue / allegation bring discredit upon Soldiers, the Army, or the United States?*
- *Does the issue have an impact on keeping local order and stability in the region?*
- *Is there an impact on winning or losing the hearts and minds of the local people to support U.S. and coalition interests?*
- *What would be the impact if the IG does not accept or resolve the complaint?*

3. The steps and sub-steps of the IGAP are not a perfect design for resolving IGARs from indigenous persons in a deployed environment. For instance, when operating in an area with non-existent or unreliable telephone and postal networks, the IG may have to develop some innovative alternatives for acknowledging receipt and making final

notifications. Course-of-action selection and fact-finding plans will also be more difficult unless the IG has a good understanding of the activity related to the IGAR and the Command and staff agencies in a position to help resolve the specific issue or allegation. Although these cases are often difficult, the underlying principle for the IG is to use good judgment and existing experience on how best to resolve these complaints. Regardless of the decision made by the IG, the IG should ensure that Steps 1 and 2 of the IGAP are completed and that the IGARS database is updated appropriately.

Section 3-5

IG Considerations for Deployment

1. The greatest benefit of the IG system is that it works much the same way in a deployed, wartime environment as it does in the garrison, peacetime setting. However, it would be unwise not to consider prior to deployment some of the challenges IGs can experience on the modern battlefield. The IG must remember that the tasks and standards for the IG in Army Regulation 20-1 do not change; therefore, must adapt to the conditions that may create challenges for the IG in completing the mission. This section offers some tips and considerations for IGs to perform their duties effectively during operational deployments.

- **Remain "tuned-in" to Command priorities.** Periodic meetings between the IG and the Commander are not enough to stay informed on the operational picture and the Commander's guidance and objectives. The IG must be a regular participant in Battle Update Briefs (BUB), the Commander's staff planning guidance, plans and orders briefs, and Command briefs for visiting dignitaries. The IG is always looking for high-payoff issues and guidance -- relevant to the Commander's objectives -- which he or she can incorporate into inspection plans, assistance visits, and teaching and training forums.

- **Consider the use of acting IGs.** The use of acting IGs can help extend the IG's access to Soldiers in remote locations; in locations where an IG may not normally be located; or in locations where the IG is not able to visit frequently. An acting IG is a commissioned officer or DA civilian appointed by the ACOM or ASCC Commander (or senior Army Force Commander if deployed). An NCO may, with an approved exception by TIG, also serve as an acting IG. The acting IG role is an additional duty for the officer, NCO, or civilian. The acting IG takes the IG oath but is not required to complete the three-week IG basic course at TIGS. The acting IG assists a detailed IG (usually a Command IG) with receiving IGARs in population areas for which the detailed IG has responsibility.

- **Conduct cross training and refresher training** so your assistance and investigations (A&I) and inspections personnel are multifunctional. Especially with intra-theater split-operations, the IG may not have sufficient people to organize the shop functionally. The overarching principle is that every IG is a 'full-service IG'.

- **Anticipate and drill new challenges.** Because a deployment and battlefield situations often create unique challenges, you should consider developing contingency battle-drills for situations that IGs do not typically encounter at home station. Start by identifying some of the possible nuances of doing IG business during operations, such as --

- Law of war violations and reportable incidents.
- Communication plan to DAIG for allegations against senior officials, Procedure 15 violations, or reprisal complaints, as examples.
- Information management and updating IGARS.
- Spillage of classified information.

- Large increase / decrease in troops (attachment / detachment of units) and IG access.
 - Digital 'black-out' periods.
 - Contractors on the battlefield.
 - IGARs from indigenous civilians.
 - Use of translators in IG inspections and investigative work.
- **Establish your IG tech channels early.** If you know your Command is replacing a particular Command in theater, contact the IG from that Command as soon as possible to get a "lay of the land" to ease the transition and ensure your IG task organization and load plans are viable. Likewise, exercise IG tech channels and contact IGs at higher, lower, and possibly adjacent Commands to establish rapport and gather existing trends and lessons learned.
 - **Maintain a "reach-back capability"** with your home station. You should strongly consider maintaining a small IG presence at home station because, in most cases, some of the important factors in a deployed IG's inspection, assistance inquiry, or investigation are away from the battlefield. A home-station element can facilitate the mission accomplishment of the forward IG by providing technical assistance such as researching standards, interviewing witnesses, gathering information from proponents and subject-matter experts, referring cases to other agencies or Commands, etc. The home-station element can also continue to serve as the extension of the Commander's eyes, ears, voice, and conscience by providing assistance to those Soldiers and Family members of the units that did not deploy and by potentially conducting Inspections or assisting with IG Investigations.
 - **Read and save all OPORDS / FRAGORDs.** They may become standards for later use in Inspections, Teaching-and-Training, Investigations, and Assistance. Ensure you mark / label data files appropriately so you do NOT have classified information spillage or unauthorized release of IG records.
 - **Stay on top of task organization changes.** IGs normally provide support to all units in their Command's sector, to include those units attached, under operational control (OPCON), or in a direct supporting role. When units are added to your task organization, you should contact the Commanders so they know where to go for IG support. When units are detached from the task organization, you may want to contact the gaining Command's IG to alert them to the added forces to their organization that they can expect to support. As described earlier in this section, the detailed IG may consider the use of acting IGs in order to expand the IG's reach and to provide IG access to Soldiers.
 - **Know your USAR and National Guard (NG) points of contact both in country and CONUS.** Reserve-component advisors in country can assist in policy and procedural assistance in NG and USAR affairs. They are there to support leaders, Soldiers, and IGs with reserve-component issues, which may vary from State to State. Reach-back to USAR functional Commands and NG State IGs can be of great assistance in expediting support and case resolution.

- **Address an in-theater OIP policy with your Commander**, to include your IG Inspection Plans. Refer to Part 3, Section 3-2, of The IG Reference Guide for some OIP considerations while deployed.

- **Seek new opportunities to Teach-and-Train**. Look for forums and media outlets to teach and train leaders and Soldiers to prevent and eliminate systemic issues in the Command in much the same way as in a home-station environment. Some examples of teaching and training opportunities typically used by IGs include:
 - Deployment and Reception Team / Leader Briefs.
 - Redeployment and reintegration training briefs.
 - Resiliency Training venues.
 - New Commander / CSM / 1SG Orientations.
 - Articles in bulletins, unit newsletters, and on web pages.

Appendix A

Recommended Equipment Checklist for Deploying IGs

Though not intended to be all-inclusive, the following list provides some equipment considerations for IG load plans when deploying in support of multi-domain operations and conducting decisive action.

- ☑ **Vehicles with secure radio communications.** The eyes, ears, voice, and conscience of the Commander should have the mobility to perform those duties and be able to move and communicate on the battlefield.
- ☑ **Tactical phones** with associated communications wire. At a minimum the IG needs phone connectivity to communicate with Commanders, staff members, and Soldiers. Also, to facilitate the use of world-wide IG technical channels, ensure the G-6 plans for the IG to have Defense Switched Network (DSN) access.
- ☑ **Secret and unclassified laptop computers with printer.** Both systems are equally important. Deployed IGs require access to SIPRNet because most of the battlefield information is exchanged through secret Web and e-mail systems. For instance, fragmentary orders (FRAGORD) that may become standards for inspections, assistance, and investigations are posted on SIPRNet-based systems. Deployed IGs also have the requirement to access unclassified internet through the NIPRNet. The NIPRNet also provides access to the World-Wide Web sites required to research standards (for example www.apd.army.mil). Coordinate in advance with DAIG's Information Resource Management Division (SAIG-IR) for access to IGMET / IGARS while deployed.
- ☑ **Scanner or digital sender.** When passing documents through IG technical channels, scan and email documents, which is more reliable than sending by telephonic fax machines.
- ☑ **Basic load of office supplies** with plenty of highlighters, folders, paper, tabbed dividers, media storage, etc. When deploying to an immature theater, consider deploying with at least a 90-day supply of consumable office items to allow time for a re-supply or local procurement system to work.
- ☑ **Dry-erase or butcher boards** with markers. One or the other, or both, is useful for planning meetings, IG In-process Reviews (IPR), and activity reports.
- ☑ **Compact Discs (CD)** loaded with unit policies, common regulations and FMs, the IG guides, and SOPs. Most load plans do not allow room for robust reference libraries, and Internet access is not always an option or is not always reliable.

Appendix B

Inspector General Annex Format and Instructions

The IG Annex: Field Manual 5-0, Planning and Orders Production, May 2022, includes a format with instructions for completing Annex U, Inspector General, to an Operations Plan (OPLAN) or Operations Order (OPORD). This appendix reproduces the exact format for the IG annex found on pages E-96 through D-99.

ANNEX U (INSPECTOR GENERAL) FORMAT AND INSTRUCTIONS

D-62. This annex provides fundamental considerations, formats, and instructions for developing Annex U (Inspector General) to the base plan or order. This annex follows the five-paragraph attachment format.

D-63. The inspector general uses Annex U (Inspector General) to describe and outline the inspector general support to the concept of operations described in the base plan or order. Staffs include this annex when they need to expand the inspector general functions beyond the base plan or order. The inspector general is responsible for developing Annex U (Inspector General). (See figure D-18 on pages D-92 through D-95.)

<p>[CLASSIFICATION]</p> <p><i>Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the attachments. Place the classification marking at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph in parentheses. Refer to AR 380-5 for classification and release marking instructions.</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;"> Copy ## of ## copies Issuing headquarters Place of issue Date-time group of signature Message reference number </p> <p><i>Include heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.</i></p> <p>ANNEX U (INSPECTOR GENERAL) TO OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]</p> <p>(U) References: <i>List documents essential to understanding the attachment.</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">a. <i>List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet names or numbers, edition, and scale.</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">b. <i>List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">c. <i>Policy references for this annex include AR 1-201 and AR 20-1. A doctrinal reference for this annex is FM 6-0.</i></p> <p>(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: <i>Write the time zone established in the base plan or order.</i></p> <p>1. (U) Situation. <i>Include information affecting inspector general operations that paragraph 1 of the OPLAN or OPORD does not cover or that needs expansion.</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">a. (U) <u>Area of Interest</u>. <i>Describe the area of interest as it relates to inspector general operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">b. (U) <u>Area of Operations</u>. <i>Refer to Appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(1) (U) <u>Terrain</u>. <i>Describe the aspects of terrain that impact inspector general operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"> [page number] [CLASSIFICATION] </p>

Figure D-18. Sample Annex U (Inspector General) format

<p>[CLASSIFICATION]</p> <p>ANNEX U (INSPECTOR GENERAL) TO OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]</p> <p>(2) (U) <u>Weather</u>. Describe the aspects of weather that impact inspector general operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.</p> <p>c. (U) <u>Enemy Forces</u>. Describe the possible or anticipated impact of enemy activities and courses of action on inspector general operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.</p> <p>d. (U) <u>Friendly Forces</u>. Outline the higher headquarters' inspector general plan. List designation, location, and outline of plan of higher, adjacent, and other inspector general assets that support or impact the issuing headquarters or require coordination and additional support.</p> <p>e. (U) <u>Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations</u>. Identify and describe other organizations in the area of operations that may impact the conduct of inspector general operations. Refer to Annex V (Interagency Coordination) as required.</p> <p>f. (U) <u>Civil Considerations</u>. Describe the aspects of the civil situation that impact inspector general operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) and Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required.</p> <p>g. (U) <u>Attachments and Detachments</u>. List units attached or detached only as necessary to clarify task organization. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) as required.</p> <p>h. (U) <u>Assumptions</u>. List inspector general-specific assumptions that support the annex development.</p> <p>2. (U) <u>Mission</u>. State the mission of the inspector general in support of the base plan or order. For example, "On order, the inspector general provides the full range of inspector general functions (inspections, assistance, investigations, teaching, and training) in support of assigned and attached units of (unit name) for the duration of this operation."</p> <p>3. (U) <u>Execution</u>.</p> <p>a. (U) <u>Scheme of Inspector General Support</u>. Describe how the inspector general supports the commander's intent and concept of operations. Establish the priorities of support to units, or the concept for inspector general employment, for each phase of the operation. Focus on the commander's guidance, mission, and intent, and emphasize how inspector general operations reduce friction that affects readiness and warfighting capability. List any general areas the commander has asked the inspector general to assess in any travels. Refer to Annex C (Operations) as required.</p> <p>(1) (U) <u>Inspections</u>. Outline inspection plan by phase based on the commanding general's guidance and the compressed inspection plan for unanticipated inspection topics when directed. Inspection plans should focus on high-payoff issues for the commander related to each phase of the operation (such as mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment). Include command guidance on requirements for the Organizational Inspection Program in theater, to include command inspections, staff inspections, inspector general inspections, intelligence oversight inspections, and audits. Include request and tasking procedures for subject-matter experts to serve as temporary assistant inspectors general. List upcoming outside agency assessments—Government Accountability Office and Department of Defense—that may impact the command's resources.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[page number] [CLASSIFICATION]</p>
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Figure D-18. Sample Annex U (Inspector General) format (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]
ANNEX U (INSPECTOR GENERAL) TO OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]
<p>(2) (U) <u>Assistance and Investigations</u>. <i>Develop assistance coverage plan for subordinate units with considerations for geographically dispersed units and split-based operations. Description of coverage should include unit visitation plans and plans for use of acting inspectors general for assistance. Emphasize the inspector general's role of underwriting the chain of command in addressing issues and allegations, including handling of law of war violations. The inspector general assistance plan should also address support for units under the operational control or direct-supporting role of the inspector general's organization (such as assistance support on an area-support basis).</i></p> <p>(3) (U) <u>Teaching and Training</u>. <i>Detail plans for deliberate teaching and training tools, such as deployment and reception briefs, inspector general bulletins and newsletters, and new commander orientations.</i></p> <p>b. (U) <u>Tasks to Subordinate Units</u>. <i>List inspector general tasks assigned to specific subordinate units not contained in the base order, and areas of responsibility for inspectors general and acting inspector general elements geographically separated from the command inspector general.</i></p> <p>c. (U) <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>. <i>List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base order. Include instructions for coordination between inspector general elements conducting split-based operations and coordination for reachback assistance from nondeployed supporting inspectors general at home station. List coordination and reporting requirements to the higher command inspector general and other inspector general technical channels. List the unit's reporting process for Questionable Intelligence Activities (QIAs), law of war violations, whistle-blower reprisals, and other Department of Defense-level critical information requirements. List the standard "before you see the inspector general" checklist.</i></p> <p>4. (U) <u>Sustainment</u>. <i>Identify priorities of sustainment for inspector general key tasks and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.</i></p> <p>a. (U) <u>Logistics</u>. <i>Identify unique sustainment requirements, procedures, and guidance to support inspector general teams and operations. Specify procedures for specialized technical logistics support from external organizations as necessary. Use subparagraphs to identify priorities and specific instructions for inspector general logistics support. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) and Annex P (Host-Nation Support) as required.</i></p> <p>b. (U) <u>Personnel</u>. <i>Identify inspector general-unique personnel requirements and concerns, including global sourcing support and contracted linguist requirements. Use subparagraphs to identify priorities and specific instructions for human resources support, financial management, legal support, and religious support. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.</i></p> <p>c. (U) <u>Health Service Support</u>. <i>Identify availability, priorities, and instructions for medical care. Identify inspector general-unique inspection requirements for medical specialty personnel, medical logistics personnel, and medical equipment maintenance personnel. Identify availability, priorities, and instructions for medical care. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.</i></p> <p>5. (U) <u>Command and Signal</u></p> <p>a. (U) <u>Command</u></p> <p>(1) (U) <u>Location of the Commander and Key Leaders</u>. <i>Identify current or future command post locations or map coordinate locations of inspectors general. Identify the inspector general chain of command if not addressed in the unit standard operating procedures (SOPs).</i></p>
[page number] [CLASSIFICATION]

Figure D-18. Sample Annex U (Inspector General) format (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]
<p>ANNEX U (INSPECTOR GENERAL) TO OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]</p> <p>(2) (U) <u>Succession of Leadership</u>. <i>State the succession of leadership if not covered in the unit's SOPs.</i></p> <p>(3) (U) <u>Liaison Requirements</u>. <i>State the inspector general liaison requirements not covered in the base order.</i></p> <p>b. (U) <u>Control</u>.</p> <p>(1) (U) <u>Command Posts</u>. <i>Describe the employment of inspector general-specific command posts (CPs), including the location of each CP and its time of opening and closing.</i></p> <p>(2) (U) <u>Reports</u>. <i>List inspector general-specific reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required.</i></p> <p>c. (U) <u>Signal</u>. <i>Address any inspector general-specific communications requirements or reports. List signal instructions and network-centric instructions, to include call signs, phone numbers, and addresses to reach the inspector general. Address unique digitization connectivity requirements or coordination to meet functional responsibilities. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required.</i></p> <p>ACKNOWLEDGE: <i>Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order.</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">[Commander's last name] [Commander's rank]</p> <p><i>The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy of attachment. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase "For the Commander." The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarters' files.</i></p> <p>OFFICIAL:</p> <p>[Authenticator's name] [Authenticator's position]</p> <p><i>Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer (normally the command inspector general) requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.</i></p> <p>ATTACHMENT: <i>List lower-level attachments (appendixes, tabs, and exhibits).</i></p> <p>DISTRIBUTION: <i>Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">[page number] [CLASSIFICATION]</p>

Figure D-18. Sample Annex U (Inspector General) format (continued)

Appendix C

Requests for Exception to IG Duty Restrictions

1. **IG Duties.** As the Inspector General, you support the Commander. You address issues that affect readiness, warfighting ability, and quality of life. You are nominated and selected as IGs based on backgrounds that reflect outstanding performance and demonstrated adherence to Army values. You enter your IG tours as qualified officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians in your respective branches and career fields. Your IG training and experience marks a maturity and breadth of professional knowledge that may not be otherwise available to the Commander.

2. **Exceptions.** Consequently, in times of crises and need, Commanders may turn to you to assume responsibilities or provide services that are normally prohibited by AR 20-1. However, there may be operational necessities that require the use of an IG in a non-regulatory role. Commanders may submit requests for policy exceptions to The Inspector General (TIG) for case-by-case consideration and approval. The request should address the operational requirement, duty responsibilities, and the expected period of time. The local Command IG must first support requests, and the Commander (Directing Authority) must recommend approval prior to submission to The Inspector General for final approval or disapproval. Use a memorandum format per AR 25-50 FROM the Commander TO The Inspector General. The exception request must be fully justified as follows:

- a. Paragraph 1, Cite all references.
- b. Paragraph 2, Clearly cite the AR 20-1 or AR 1-201 paragraph for which the Commander is seeking the exception. Additionally, state the required duration of the exception.
- c. Paragraph 3, JUSTIFICATION. Clearly state why the exception is needed (mission purpose) and why the IG in question is the only person available or qualified to fulfill the requirement. Address the IG office backlog and how it will be completed if the exception is approved. Finally, clearly state that the IG in question will be recused from assisting, investigating, or inspecting any area associated with the exception. Depending on the nature of the exception and / or the IG involved, this request may result in the recusal of the entire IG office.
- d. Paragraph 4, IMPACTS. Cite the impacts if TIG disapproves the exception request and that the Commander will abide by the decision.
- e. Paragraph 5, POINT OF CONTACT INFORMATION. Usually, the Command IG or Deputy Command IG. Ensure email addresses and phone numbers are included.
- f. SIGNATURE. Must be the Commander / Directing Authority. A digital signature or cursive signature are acceptable. Anyone other than the Commander's / Directing Authority's signature will be returned without action.

3. **Considerations.** You support the Commander. However, as an IG you also serve the Commander's Soldiers and their Family members, civilian employees, retirees, and other civilians needing assistance with an Army matter. As an IG, you have a sworn duty to be a fair and objective fact-finder and problem-solver. You are a valuable readiness resource for the Commander -- especially in times of war. Therefore, the continued

availability of IG support to the Command is a consideration for every exception-to-policy request regarding the non-regulatory use of IGs.

3. Contact the Office of the Inspector General Operations and Support Division with your questions, (703) 693-7848 (DSN prefix 223); Fax: (703) 697-8807 (DSN prefix 227).

Appendix D

Reporting Law of War Violations

1. **Background.** An Army at war must remain committed to the established laws of war.

According to ADP 3-0, "Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement" (iii) The law of war—also call the law of armed conflict—is that body of international law, founded upon both treaties and custom, that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities (see FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare). Compliance with the law of war is not situationally dependent, contingent on the nature of the conflict, contingent on the nature of the enemy, nor otherwise optional.

The DoD Directive 2311.01, DoD Law of War Program, implements the provisions of law and customs of land warfare from standing international treaties and agreements and regulates the conduct of our Soldiers during hostilities. As the Command's senior operational law advisor, the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) is the lead staff agency on all matters concerning Law of War rights and responsibilities. The IG has an important role in reporting and, in some cases, investigating Law of War violations.

2. **Reportable Incidents.** A reportable incident is a possible, suspected, or alleged violation of the Law of War. DoD Directive 2311.01 describes the reporting requirements for Law of War violations as follows:

" 4.1. REPORTS OF INCIDENTS.

a. All military and U.S. civilian employees, contractor personnel, and subcontractors assigned to or accompanying a DoD Component must report through their chain of command all reportable incidents, including those involving allegations of non-DoD personnel having violated the law of war.

b. Contracts must require contractor employees to report reportable incidents to the commander of the unit they are accompanying or the installation to which they are assigned, or to the appropriate Combatant Commander.

c. Reports of incidents may be made through other channels, such as the military police, a judge advocate, or an inspector general. Reports made to officials other than those specified in this paragraph will, nonetheless, be accepted and immediately forwarded through the recipient's chain of command. Reports will also be forwarded to the chain of command of the subject of the allegation, where appropriate."

3. **What and Where to Report.** An IG who becomes aware of a reportable incident must report the incident as soon as possible to the Commander (Directing Authority) for action AND inform the next higher echelon IG with a concurrent report to TIG through DAIG's Assistance Division (SAIG-AC) using IG communications within **two** working days after receipt.

An IG should **NOT** rely on his or her own experiences or training with respect to law of war violations. The Command's SJA is responsible for questions, concerns, and interpretations of the law of war. The IG should notify the Command's SJA to ensure he or she is aware of the incident and prepared to advise the Commander.

An IG that receives a reportable law of war incident should record the readily available facts surrounding the incident and report the incident to the Commander (Directing Authority) as soon as possible. Additionally, the IG will notify TIG, using appropriate IG communication and channels, within two working days of receiving the reportable incident. The IG should also inform the complainant of the IG's intent to report the alleged law of war violation to the Command while at the same time striving to preserve the complainant's confidentiality.

IMPORTANT NOTE: An IG will **NOT** conduct any fact-finding activities without the approval of the Commander (Directing Authority).

4. Law of War Investigations. Investigative assets from USACID, or another Service's criminal investigation office, have the primary responsibility to investigate suspected or alleged war crimes. Law of war crimes are generally not IG appropriate; however, the Commander (Directing Authority) does have the authority to direct the IG to conduct an investigative inquiry or investigation if absolutely necessary. The IG should use the same investigative tools provided in The Assistance and Investigations Guide, but the IG should always consult with the SJA on the investigative plan during IG Preliminary Analysis (IGPA). Depending on the nature of the allegations, the IG may consider requesting that an SJA attorney accompany the IG investigators during fact-finding as well.

Part 4

The Command Inspector General

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Introduction

Selection as a Command Inspector General

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this section is provide Command IGs (CIGs) with an understanding of their unique role as leaders of an IG staff section and as members of the Directing Authority's personal staff.

2. **Selection as a Command Inspector General:** Congratulations on your selection as a Command Inspector General (CIG)! As a CIG, you have additional responsibilities as indicated in your title. You are the face of your IG staff section and responsible for all actions and products produced by the IGs you supervise. Additionally, you serve as the primary IG interface between the Soldiers, Family Members, Civilians, and IGs of your Directing Authority's command. You are a trusted agent to your Directing Authority and have unfiltered, unrestricted access to your Directing Authority.

Always keep in mind that you and your staff section represent the Army IG system to your Directing Authority and to the broader command. You are responsible for ensuring that your IGs follow Army IG policy and doctrine while ensuring that a sub-culture does not develop in your office that deviates from those rules and guidelines. Always remember that your primary mission is to enhance the readiness and warfighting capability of your command, a mission that you and your team must perform in the context of the guidance and direction you receive from your Directing Authority, whomever that person may be. Technical channels are your greatest resources, so do not hesitate to contact the Department of the Army Inspector General Agency for any assistance you may need.

Another great resource is this guide -- [The Inspector General Reference Guide](#). Parts 7 and 8 of the guide provide you with methods of organization for your IG office and an example of an IG office Standing Operating Procedure (SOP). These parts of the guide will assist you and your IG office in adding value to your Directing Authority's overall mission accomplishment.

No single document can account for every situation or spell out every responsibility. That fact is true for this guide. However, the intent Parts 4, 7, and 8 of this guide is to assist you, the CIG, in understanding key aspects and concepts of your new role and to stimulate thoughts and ideas that will be useful in your tour as a CIG.

Good luck as a Command Inspector General. Always strive to be correct before taking action!

Droit et Avant!

Chapter 1

Roles and Responsibilities of the Command Inspector General

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to describe the roles and responsibilities of Command Inspectors General.
2. **Command IGs Required by Policy:** The position of Command Inspector General is described in Army Regulation (AR) 20-1, Chapter 1, paragraph 1-6c, "Command Inspectors General." Each IG staff section assigned to a command or any of the several States contains a commissioned officer or Civilian who is designated as the Command Inspector General (CIG).
3. **Roles and Responsibilities:** CIGs are qualified as inspectors general at The Army Inspector General School's Basic Course (TIGS) and responsible for the performance of the four IG functions in the command. The CIG is an Inspector General in role, responsibility, and function. Like all IGs, CIGs must be professionals and adhere to laws, policies, and regulations. CIGs occupy a position of increased responsibility within the IG system. They serve as the "face" of the IG system to their Directing Authorities as well as to the Soldiers, Civilians, and Family Members of the command. At a minimum, CIGs should strive to fulfill the following tasks:
 - Establish and maintain credibility by creating value and velocity. A good start to earning the Directing Authority's confidence is by demonstrating that your staff section adds value to the command. Remember Baron von Steuben's guiding philosophy: "IGs assist commanders in improving readiness and warfighting capability." IGs do not overtly make policy or "speak for the commander."
 - Earn a spot into the Directing Authority's "inner circle" of confidence. Consult with your Directing Authority often and maintain clear and open communications.
 - Educate the force. The IG function of Teaching and Training is important to the command's success.
 - Develop relationships. Find opportunities to earn the confidence of subordinate commanders, and the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). Trust is essential for successful IGs and often takes a personal effort by the CIG to establish and maintain.
 - CIGs are responsible for their IG staff sections and must provide a clear vision in order to keep the command's IGs focused on the mission. The IG functions of Teaching and Training and Inspections must be your priority; however, CIGs must not lose sight of the remaining two functions of Assistance and Investigations.
 - Embody the seven Army Values, especially the value of personal courage. At times you, as the CIG, will be challenged, but you must choose the hard right over the easy wrong.

- CIGs are responsible for building and maintaining strong relationships with their Directing Authorities, providing leadership and vision for their IG staff sections, and ensuring their IG staff sections provide value to the Directing Authority and to the command.
- Review the force structure of the IG offices for which you have oversight. How are they manned? Have replacements been identified? What is the plan to nominate local personnel as a replacement source?
- Examine key processes in your office. Look for practices that require updating. Start with a review of the basic office SOP; the layout / functionality of the office; reoccurring staff involvement (calendar events), especially IG updates to the Directing Authority; your authority to direct and approve inquiries; your authority to approve case closures; what annual Inspection Plans are on file and formally approved by the Directing Authority; and the IG Information Plan / Campaign for the command. Does the office have one?
- Run open and closed case reports immediately upon your arrival as the CIG and continue to run these reports monthly. Review your open cases and look for those cases that your section should have closed. Also, look at closed cases that your IGs are still actively working (should be in reopen status). Determine and track your Investigating Officer (IO) workload and production to ensure they are performing up to standard. Maintain your situational awareness and facilitate efficient assignment of new cases by attending and participating in regular "round tables" for all IG Investigations cases. You can determine the frequency depending on case load -- weekly, bi-weekly, etc. The Investigating Officer should be the Subject-Matter Expert (SME) and provide a detailed status of his or her case in addition to identifying challenges.
- Be aware of interpersonal office relationships affecting performance. Your IGs are human, too. Look out for actual or perceived "cliques" within your organization that can harm morale. Expect, demand, and enforce professionalism.
- Beware of the "Last IG" syndrome. Just because "we have always done it this way" does not make the process or procedure correct. For example, an out-of-date or nonexistent SOP: "No need for an annual inspection plan; we never execute it anyway"; Investigation and Investigative Inquiry direction / approval process (must be the Directing Authority or officially designated Deputy); and so on. Treat the office environment like assuming command. Address potential problems early but in a positive manner.
- You are responsible for managing your office's budget. Things to consider are travel resources required to execute your inspection plan and to conduct Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs) on lower echelon IG offices for which you have oversight; replacement of recording devices and transcription services; office supplies; additional training opportunities for military and Civilian IGs, etc.

Chapter 2

Communicating with the Directing Authority (DA)

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to describe the CIG's role in communicating with the Directing Authority.
2. **Establishing Communications.** Communicating with one's Directing Authority is arguably more art than science but absolutely essential in a successful relationship. The intent of a successful CIG is "to assist commanders with improving readiness and warfighting capability" throughout the command, also known as the Von Steuben Model. As such, the CIG must gain the Directing Authority's trust and confidence. In doing so, the CIG must determine the best means, methods, and frequency to communicate with the Directing Authority. Each Directing Authority possesses a unique battle rhythm and method of receiving information, and the CIG must become part of this battle rhythm.
3. **Initial meeting(s) with the Directing Authority.** As a CIG, you may have one or several meetings with your Directing Authority. Do not attempt to overwhelm or impress the Directing Authority with lots of slides or information. Focus on the most important information; be clear, succinct, and respectful of the Directing Authority's time.
4. **Subsequent Meetings with the Directing Authority.** As a CIG, you must determine the frequency and method necessary to keep your Directing Authority informed. While there are numerous techniques to share information, the preferred technique is to conduct routine, face-to-face exchanges of information that are focused, prioritized, and useful. The recommended frequency to meet face to face with the Directing Authority is no less than once or twice a month. If you find that your information exchanges are largely through e-mail or a third party (i.e. Deputy CG or Chief of Staff), or your Directing Authority does not seem to make time for you on the schedule, you must re-assess the relationship and the value you bring to the organization. If you are making a difference and assisting commanders in improving readiness and warfighting, the Directing Authority will want to hear from you.
5. **Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR).** Establish the CCIR for Inspector General matters. What are the "wake-up criteria" for the Directing Authority? You have a direct line to the Directing Authority regardless of where he or she is in the world. Be sure that you use that access wisely and keep your Directing Authority informed.
6. **Direct Line to The Inspector General of the Army (TIG).** If the relationship between you and your Directing Authority is strained for some reason, keep in mind that you, as the CIG, also have a direct line to The Inspector General (TIG). Ask for help or advice from TIG or the Deputy TIG (DTIG).

Chapter 3

Communicating with the Staff and Subordinate Commands

- 1. Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to describe what you can communicate to the staff and to subordinate commanders. Inspector General staff sections are a part of the Directing Authority's special staff in accordance with (IAW) FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations.
- 2. Basic Building Block of the IG System:** As described in Army Regulation (AR) 20-1, Chapter 1, paragraph 1-6g, "Assignment of Inspectors General," the first command echelon that normally has an assigned command IG is the division headquarters. As a result, the division IG staff section is the basic building block of the Army IG system's force structure.
- 3. Building Relationships:** The CIG must communicate and integrate with the staff and build relationships across the organization. These relationships will go a long way in establishing trust with the IG throughout the command. When directed by the Directing Authority, the CIG will brief information to senior leaders, staff members, and subordinate Commanders. You can present trends and systemic issues that affect morale and readiness in an effort to assist the Commander in maintaining a positive command climate. Take care to maintain the confidentiality of complainants, unit, or individuals.
- 4. The Directing Authority's Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Implementing Guidance:** The requirement to obtain TIG's approval to share IG investigatory information does not apply to the Directing Authority's CSM. The Directing Authority may release, or authorize the release of, IG investigatory information to his or her CSM without first seeking TIG's approval. This release applies only to the Directing Authority's CSM and includes allegations referred to the command by the IG and those investigations conducted by the IG, but it excludes any information related to allegations or investigations involving senior officials as defined in AR 20-1. The Directing Authority does not have to be present for the release of this investigatory information to the CSM. This clarification will ensure that a Directing Authority is able to seek the counsel of his or her Command Sergeant Major regarding IG investigations conducted within the command and those allegations referred to the command by the IG.
- 5. Staff Judge Advocate:** The Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) is also a member of the Directing Authority's Special Staff. You must develop and maintain a special relationship with him or her. Develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for the assistance your office will need from the SJA with such things as legal reviews and advice with standards.
- 6. Subordinate Commanders:** One-on-one briefings with subordinate Commanders may be necessary, and the Directing Authority often encourages them. Keeping the chain of command informed and allowing Commanders the opportunity to work through issues demonstrates two things: (1) the intent to work within the authority of the command and not outside of it; and (2) reinforces the confidence in both the IG system and the command. In short, the Inspector General is here to help.

7. **The Chain of Command:** The chain of command is a powerful network. You should build rapport with the chain of command in your unit and outside your unit. Commanders make decisions, and your access to commanders allows you to understand the thought process behind those decisions. Additionally, commanders possess invaluable insights from their foxholes.

8. **Other Army Agencies:** As a CIG, you will also know or meet members of other Army agencies that work to help Soldiers and Families. This network is not formal; rather, it depends on your efforts to get out and engage with these people. Granted, the people of this network are neither IGs nor commanders, but they have invaluable insights and experiences that will help you in assisting Soldiers and conducting fact-finding for your Directing Authority.

Chapter 4

Role of the Senior Enlisted Inspector General

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to describe the role of the Inspector General Senior Noncommissioned Officer.
2. **The IG Senior Noncommissioned Officer:** The Senior Noncommissioned Officer, as the senior NCO in the IG staff section, must earn the Directing Authority's trust and also demonstrate that he or she adds value to the command. The IG Sergeant Major (SGM) or Senior NCO is an excellent source of information, knowledge, and mentorship and a person with great influence. Use him or her to focus on NCO issues. He or she should meet regularly to discuss issues affecting the command and solicit the Command Sergeant Major's (CSM's) recommendations for potential inspections.
3. **Command Sergeant Major (CSM):** The CSM is allowed into the Triangle of Confidentiality at the Directing Authority's or discretion, See the TIG Implementing Guidance and the current version of AR 20-1. The tenet of confidentiality still applies. The IG Senior NCO can share assistance trends and issues occurring within the command; share observations and inspection reports (results and recommendations); and work with the CSM as another way to pass information to the Directing Authority.
4. **Team Players:** The bottom line is that you both serve on the same team, work for the same person, and are committed to the same goal: to enhance the readiness and warfighting capability of the organization and its Soldiers.

Chapter 5

The IG Staff Section Force Structure and Requirements

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to describe the IG staff section force structure requirements.
2. **IG Force Structure:** IG sections vary. They are not standardized due to the mission and functions of the supported commanders. Commanders determine the size of their IG staff sections in accordance with AR 71-32, Force Development and Documentation, and other applicable regulations. CIGs must be familiar with the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) and the table of distribution and allowances (TDA) documents for their IG section. Contact Mr. Kent Elliott, Operations and Support Division (SAIG-OP), for information specific to your IG section and reporting requirements: kent.m.elliott2.civ@mail.mil, 703-695-9480, DSN 865-9480.
3. **Force Management Report to DAIG:** Twice a year (October and April), CIGs are required to submit a force-management report for their staff section to DAIG's Operations and Support Division as part of their force-management requirements. Likewise, any changes to the MTOE or TDA that affects an IG space (Civilian or military) must be coordinated through SAIG-OP. This requirement applies to all components.
4. **Army Civilian IGs:** Army Civilian IGs are not included in a unit's MTOE or TDA. Generally, the Army Civilian IG is authorized on the Senior Commander's Augmentation TDA, and the Senior Commander determines the placement of the Army Civilians. Army Civilian IGs, as 1801s, are part of the Career Program 55 (CP55) community.
5. **Career Program 55:** CP55 was established in April 2011 as part of the Army Civilian Workforce Transformation and provides CIGs with the ability to forecast, attract, and retain quality candidates. CIGs and their Command Career Program Managers are responsible to communicate with Commanders and assist in the life-cycle career management of that workforce. A tool to assist with effectively managing those careers is the Individual Development Plan (IDP) located on the Army Career Tracker (ACT) portal.
6. **Individual Development Plans (IDPs):** The IDP provides a developmental action plan that builds on strengths and overcomes weaknesses as employees improve job performance and pursue career goals. Ensure that all Civilians in the IG staff section document education and training requirements in their respective individual IDPs and update them annually.

Chapter 6

IG Technical Channels

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to describe IG Technical Channels and provide a quick reference to useful points of contact for IGs at the Headquarters, Department of the Army, (HQDA) level.
2. **IG Technical Channels:** IG technical channels are described in AR 20-1, Chapter 1, paragraph 1-6i: "Inspector General technical channels." IGs may request, and are expected to provide, assistance to others within the IG system using IG technical channels. Technical channels guarantee the effective functioning and value of the IG system to each IG's command and to the Army as a whole. IGs must be prepared to assist others within the IG system as well as other IGs outside the system. IG technical channels are for mutual assistance and information-sharing purposes, and IGs within the vertical command chain are not to use IG technical channels to task or otherwise interfere with a subordinate command's Commander-IG relationship. A vertical command relationship for IGs does not exist; IGs work for their Commanders / Directing Authorities and not for other IGs.
3. **Other Networks:** As a CIG, you also have other networks that are critical for your success and will provide you with invaluable information, insight, and expertise. You must understand that these networks are NOT in the IG channels; therefore, the members of those networks are not authorized access to IG records. Your mission is to protect confidentiality.
4. **Beware Cognizant of IG Confidentiality:** Take the time to build strong connections within your IG technical channels and networks, such as the chain of command or Army agencies. However, ensure that you fully understand your obligation to protect IG confidentiality and how the IG Triangle of Confidentiality functions. One of the leading allegations against IGs is the unauthorized release of IG records or the failure to maintain IG confidentiality. You are responsible for your actions.

Chapter 7

Final Thought

By now, you should have numerous ideas for your Directing Authority, the unit, and your IG staff section. Teaching and Training and Inspections are the IG system's proactive functions and are best suited for preventing severe readiness issues. The IG functions of Assistance and Investigation are reactive but important and relevant to the credibility and utility of the IG system. Collectively, the implementation of these functions at the ground level enhances the Army's overall readiness as an institution capable of fighting and winning our Nation's wars.

General Colin Powell once said that: "The day the Soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you stopped leading them. They have either lost confidence that you can help them or concluded that you do not care. Either case is a failure of leadership." Army leaders and IGs must recognize the importance of this quotation. IGs are Army leaders, so when you assess the actions and products of your IG staff section, consider what the Soldiers are saying or not saying, and ensure that you accurately convey your assessments to your Directing Authority.

TIGS welcomes all input and feedback that will improve this portion of The IG Reference Guide. Please provide specific recommendations to TIGS's Dean of Students via email or by phone at (703) 805-3904.

Appendix A

Command IG Checklist

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this appendix is to offer a list of items a CIG should consider or assess in order to lead a cohesive, productive, and effective IG staff section in accomplishing the IG mission. The list is neither comprehensive nor prescriptive but appears here as a way to promote thought and to serve as a basic guide.

2. General.

- IGs serve as an extension of the Directing Authority's eyes, ears, voice, and conscience.
- IGs assist the Directing Authority in improving readiness and warfighting capability.
- IGs add value and enjoy the respect of the Directing Authority, Commanders, staffs, and Soldiers.
- IGs perform the four IG functions.
- IGs are effectively and appropriately safeguarding IG records and protecting the Triangle of Confidentiality.
- CIG has a positive relationship with, and unimpeded access to, the Directing Authority.

3. Administrative.

- Understand your MTOE and TDA.
- Contact your G-1 to ensure requisitions for vacant IG slots are valid.
- Contact DAIG's Operations and Support Division (SAIG-OP) to confirm the status of an IG nomination packet that has already been submitted.
- Conduct developmental counseling in accordance with applicable regulations and policies.
- Ensure you and your NCOIC are on the appropriate DAIG email distribution lists used by TIG and TIG's SGM.

4. By IG Function.

Teaching and Training.

- IGs have insight, foresight, and oversight of issues and recommendations to improve the readiness and warfighting capabilities of the unit.
- IGs engage with Commanders, staff members, Soldiers, and Family members to educate and inform.

Inspections.

- Inspections are proactive, helpful, and not disruptive. IGs adhere to the Inspection Plan approved by the Directing Authority.

- Inspections adhere to the Principles of Army Inspections found in AR 1-201.
- Commanders have effective Organizational Inspection Programs (OIPs).

Assistance.

- CIGs oversee and manage the open cases to keep them moving forward and to prevent backlog.

Investigations.

- CIGs oversee and manage the open cases to keep them moving forward and to prevent backlog.
- CIGs understand the variety of special investigations and the restrictions and reporting requirements.
- CIGs have informed the Directing Authority on the variety of special investigations and the restrictions and reporting requirements.

Personnel / Staff.

- The IG section is a cohesive and effective organization.
- CIG works closely with G-1 to ensure IG vacancies are filled.
- CIG works closely with DAIG's Operations and Support Division (SAIG-OP) when adjustments to the MTOE / TDA are needed.
- CIG has a current staff estimate and communicates the IG plan to commanders and staff (e.g., Annex U of OPORD or OPLAN).

Appendix B

Sample “Touchpoint” Slides for Interacting with the Directing Authority

1. A Command IG’s relationship and interactions with the Directing Authority are critical to the success of the IG staff section. Command IGs can set by the conditions for success at the very first “touchpoint” session conducted with the Directing Authority. The best tool for conducting initial and subsequent “touchpoint” sessions is a standard quadrangle chart that addresses in a direct manner all the things the Directing Authority must know about his or her IG staff section’s operations and efforts to enhance the command’s readiness posture. Examples of these “touchpoint” charts appear in Figures C-1 and C-2 below.




Figure C-1: Initial “Touchpoint” Chart with Sample Topics


	<h2>Command IG (CIG) / IG SEL to Directing Authority (DA) Periodic Touchpoint</h2>	
<p><u>General Information</u></p>	<p><u>Attendees</u></p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Purpose: Provide DA with updates and receive guidance regarding all four IG functions • Frequency: Recommend once weekly (with SJA present) • Duration: 15-30 Minutes for the IG portion • Location: DA's Office 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Staff Proponent: Command IG / SJA • Chair: DA • Attendees: DA, CSM (if feasible), CIG, IG SEL, SJA • Command Group Attendance: DA 	
<p><u>Inputs</u></p>	<p><u>Outputs</u></p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inspection Updates <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Results of Previous Inspections / Ongoing Inspections / Planned Inspections • Focus on FOLLOW UP, Operational Impacts, and Mitigation Measures • Teaching and Training Updates <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on who you are talking to and WHY • Assistance Case Updates <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on trends and possible impacts to the formation / leadership • Investigation Case Updates <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Present updates to specific cases (generally tied to the DA's CCIR) • Present Regulatory COAs for handling specific cases (generally tied to the DA's CCIR) • Focus on possible impacts to the formation / leadership (cases of Congressional / Presidential interest; impacts on leadership slates / selections; impacts on organizational morale) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DA Situational Awareness / Situational Understanding and guidance regarding all four functions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inspection Directives • Investigation Directives • Focus for Teach and Train Operations 	
<p><i>U.S. Army Inspector General School</i></p>		

Figure C-2: Weekly "Touchpoint" Chart with Sample Topics

Part 5

Ethics and Standards of Conduct

Table of Contents

Ethics and Standards of Conduct ***References and Extracts***

Introduction

Chapter 1 – Extract from Army Regulation 600-100, Army Leadership

Chapter 2 – Extract from Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, Army Leadership

Chapter 3 – Principles of Ethics for Government Employees

Chapter 4 – Ethics Scenario and Practical Exercise

Introduction

Ethics and Standards of Conduct

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this part of The IG Reference Guide is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) at all levels with readily available extracts from selected publications and documents related directly to the Army values and ethics.
2. **Army Values:** The values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage are the mainstay of the Army's culture of excellence. These values represent the fabric and foundation of everything for which the Army stands and represents. All IGs must not only adhere strictly to -- and personally emulate -- these values, and they must reinforce them within their respective commands routinely as part of the IG Teaching and Training function. The seven Army Values are:

Loyalty.
 Duty.
 Respect.
 Selfless Service.
 Honor. Live up to Army values.
 Integrity. Do what's right, legally and morally.
 Personal Courage. Face fear, danger or adversity (physical or moral).

3. **The Warrior Ethos:** Army Regulation (AR) 600-100, Army Leadership, paragraph 2-3, charges The Inspector General -- and all Army IGs -- with assisting commanders with "teaching and training leaders on the moral principles of the Army ethic." Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-22, Army Leadership, Part Two, Chapter Two, provides amplifying information pertaining to the Soldier's Creed. The Soldier's Creed -- which expounds upon the fundamental nature of the Warrior Ethos -- translates and codifies the Army values into a guidepost for all Soldiers and captures the essence of 'good soldiering.'

I am an American Soldier.
 I am a Warrior and a member of a team.
 I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.
 I WILL ALWAYS PLACE THE MISSION FIRST.
 I WILL NEVER ACCEPT DEFEAT.
 I WILL NEVER QUIT.
 I WILL NEVER LEAVE A FALLEN COMRADE.
 I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills.
 I will always maintain my arms, my equipment, and myself.
 I am an expert, and I am a professional.
 I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.
 I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.
 I am an American Soldier.

4. **References and Extracts:** This part provides the Army IG student with extracts from selected publications and other sources that will prove useful to a greater understanding of the nature of ethics, the Army values, and the Warrior Ethos. The references include:
- a. Extract from AR 600-100, Army Leadership
 - b. Principles of Ethics for Government Employees
 - c. Ethics Scenario and Practical Exercise

These extracts merely serve as relevant examples of Army policy and doctrine related to ethics and the Army values and provides IGs with a ready reference that will assist in the training of all Army leaders on the fundamental aspects of ethical behavior.

Chapter 1

Extract from Army Regulation 600-100

1. **Purpose:** This chapter provides IGs with an extract of AR 600-100, Army Leadership, Chapters 1 and 2.
2. **AR 600-100:** This regulation outlines the responsibility of leadership and leader development and describes the Army ethic and individual values. A complete version of this publication is available from the Army Publishing Directorate's Web site at www.apd.army.mil.

Chapter 1 General

1–1. Purpose

This regulation—

a. Establishes Army Profession and leadership policy by defining key terms and responsibilities associated with the Army Profession and appropriate leadership practices and methods for Soldiers and Army Civilians. This includes assigning responsibilities and definitions among the Army Profession and leadership policy proponent, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASA (M&RA)); the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G–1; and the Army leader development policy proponent, DCS, G–3/5/7, and Commanding General, U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (CG, TRADOC), the primary Army Profession and leadership action agent.

b. Provides direction and guidance to the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) (through TRADOC/U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC)) for research, assessment, doctrine, training, and evaluation in all areas pertaining to the Army Profession, the Army Ethic, and character development.

c. Provides direction and guidance to the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) (through TRADOC/CAC) for research, doctrine development, leadership assessment, training, and evaluation in all areas pertaining to Army leadership.

1–2. References

See appendix A.

1–3. Explanation of Abbreviations and Terms

See the glossary.

1–4. Responsibilities

Responsibilities are listed in chapter 2.

1–5. The Army Profession and Leadership Overview

a. The mission of the United States Army is to fight and win the Nation’s wars through prompt and sustained land combat, as part of the Joint force. We do this by organizing, equipping, and training Army Forces for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land; integrating our capabilities with those of the other Armed Services; accomplishing all missions assigned by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders; and remaining ready while preparing for the future. In the conduct of its mission, professional and diverse leaders of character, competence, and commitment are the Army’s asymmetric advantage. This regulation focuses on leaders at all levels and in all cohorts—officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), Soldiers, and Army Civilians. These leaders are trusted Army professionals who enable the Army to achieve the mission the right way.

b. The Army Profession is a unique vocation of experts certified in the ethical design, generation, support, and application of landpower, serving under civilian authority and entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people. The Army Profession develops, inspires, and motivates Soldiers and Army Civilians to make right decisions and to take right action according to the moral principles of the Army Ethic. The American people expect Army professionals to provide exemplary leadership that reflects the Army Ethic and is consistent with our national values.

c. The Army defines leadership as the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. The Army defines a leader as anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, exercise diverse thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization.

d. The Army Profession contributes honorable service, military expertise, responsible stewardship, and courageous esprit de corps. These essential characteristics reinforce the sacred bond of trust within the Total Army and with the American people.

e. The Army defines an Army professional as a Soldier or Army Civilian who meets the Army Profession’s certification criteria in character, competence, and commitment. All Army professionals are leaders and have the duty of being stewards of the profession, regardless of their rank or official position of authority. Army professionals live by and uphold the Army Ethic in accomplishing the mission, doing their duty, and in all aspects of life. This applies to our day-to-day interactions, at the office, in the field, on deployment, and at home, both in person and across social media. Army professionals, as leaders, must maintain and set the example in all they do. Professional and leader development is a life-long continuous

process, consisting of education, training, experience, and self-development. Army professionals strive to continuously improve their own knowledge, skills, and abilities, and as leaders they teach, coach, counsel, and mentor their subordinates. Professional and leader competence includes gaining knowledge in four primary fields: human and leader development, moral-ethical, tactical, and technical, and geo-cultural and political expertise. In addition, because Army units operate as part of a Joint force, it is important for leaders to understand Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational functions and doctrinal principles as applicable in their designated fields. Professionals keep abreast of and remain adept in advances in their chosen career field, information technology, and maintain their knowledge of the standards of conduct, policy, law, rules of engagement, and the Geneva Conventions.

f. Army leaders understand the strategic implications of their decisions and actions and contribute their best efforts to accomplish the mission while taking care of the welfare of their subordinates. They understand that leader misconduct or unethical practice must be prevented or stopped and immediately redressed. All Army leaders must motivate others to do what is right – for its own sake – and understand that decisions and actions that violate the Army Ethic are not tolerated; any such action can compromise the mission and have strategic implications contrary to the national interest.

1–6. The U.S. Army as a Military Profession and the Army Ethic

a. The Army Profession has two broad communities of practice—Soldiers, who are members of the Profession of Arms, and Army Civilians, members of the Army Civilian Corps. The principles of leadership, professional development, character development, and leader development are equally applicable to Soldiers and Army Civilians. As members of the profession progress from their initial stage of development within the culture of the Army, their character, competence, and commitment are progressively evaluated and certified as Army professionals. From the ranks of Army professionals, those deemed with the greatest potential for leadership are selected for promotion, professional military education (PME), or Army Civilian education system and charged with greater responsibility.

b. The Army Ethic is our professional ethic, defined as the evolving set of laws, values, and beliefs, embedded within the Army culture of trust that motivate and guide the conduct of trusted Army professionals who are bound together in common moral purpose. The Army Ethic articulates our shared identity as trusted Army professionals and captures in one place the moral principles by which Soldiers, Army Civilians, and all leaders are expected to live by and uphold.

1–7. Army Culture and Mission Command

a. Cultures are characterized by a shared set of beliefs, values, norms, and symbols that unite a group. The five essential characteristics of the Army Profession – trust, military expertise, honorable service, stewardship, and esprit de corps – are vital to the Army Culture. The Army Culture is unique, even within the U.S. Armed Forces; it is a system of shared meaning held by Army professionals. The Army Ethic is the Heart of the Army. The U.S. Army culture of trust is both informed by and sustains the Army Ethic. Preservation of the peace and winning the nation’s wars are inherent in our ethos – this is Why We Serve. The ethical, effective, and efficient accomplishment of the mission is the core of our ethos – this is How We Serve. Strategic leaders shape the Army’s culture while organizational and first-line leaders shape the climate of units and organizations. Culture is a longer lasting and more complex set of shared expectations than climate. Army Culture evolves slowly; it is deeply rooted in long-held beliefs passed from one generation of Soldiers to another and communicated in Army policies, doctrine, customs, traditions, songs, and ethos.

b. In contrast to culture, organizational climate refers to the perception and attitudes of Soldiers and Army Civilians as they interact within the culture with their peers, subordinates, and leaders. Observed policies and practices often drive climate, reflecting the leader’s character. The greatest influence on an organization’s climate is the quality of its leadership. The commander sets the example by establishing high standards and expectations for the organization and its members. The best commanders place a high priority on personally developing their subordinate leaders, caring for the welfare of Soldiers, Army Civilians, and their Families, while creating a rewarding climate of shared mutual trust and pride in team contributions to mission accomplishment. A healthy Army culture and organizational climate will exhibit six overarching characteristics:

- (1) The organizational culture and unit climate fosters unity, cohesion, and trust in accordance with the Army Ethic.
- (2) The culture promotes and rewards mental agility, the ability to break from established paradigms, recognize new patterns or circumstances, and adopt new solutions to problems.
- (3) The organization selects leaders and reward members who demonstrate the ability to sense and understand the environment quickly to exploit fleeting opportunities or counter unexpected threats.
- (4) The culture requires and rewards delegation of authority on the part of leaders, and the understanding and prompt, thorough execution of leader’s intent (two levels up) by subordinates.
- (5) The organizational culture selects and rewards leaders who provide clear priorities and focus their unit’s time and organizational energy on their mission.

(6) The organizational culture is one of inclusion which demands and values diversity of knowledge and perspectives that members of different groups bring and shapes how the mission is accomplished.

c. The Army seeks to execute mission command, both as a philosophy of command and as a warfighting function. As defined by Army Doctrinal Publication, mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. Trust, critical to mission command, is the bedrock of our profession. It is the internal organizing principle of the Army, and is what enables the decentralized decisionmaking by subordinates to operate within the commander's intent. Leader actions consistent with the Army Ethic strengthen mutual trust and build cohesive teams, enabling successful mission command. However, if leaders allow disconnects between word and deed, between professed values and actual practices, they breed cynicism, compromise mutual trust, and degrade organizational esprit de corps and individual morale.

d. Our national values and moral principles are reflected in the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, statute, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, treaties, status of forces agreements, the Law of Land Warfare, the standards of conduct, and our creeds and mottos. By our Oath of Service we commit ourselves to these enduring American ideals and adherence to the Army Ethic. In addition, Section 3583, Title 10, United States Code, states: Requirement of exemplary conduct. All commanding officers and others in authority in the Army are required—

- (1) To show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination;
- (2) To be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command;
- (3) To guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Army, all persons who are guilty of them; and,
- (4) To take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the Army, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.

1–8. Army professional certification

a. Certification is verification and validation of an Army professional's character, competence, and commitment to fulfill responsibilities and perform assigned duties with discipline and to standard. Through progressive certification, the Army strengthens trust by confirming the professional development of Soldiers and Army Civilians and the readiness of organizations.

(1) Certification in the Army has two purposes. For the Army Profession, certification demonstrates to the American people that the Army is qualified to perform its expert work. For Army professionals, certification also provides motivation and a sense of accomplishment.

(2) The Army Profession certifies the character, competence, and commitment of its Soldiers and Army Civilians throughout their service. Certification methods include: official promotion and evaluation systems; professional training and education within Army schools, including branch, skill, and functional area qualifications; and centralized selections and assignments for leadership and command positions.

(3) Each branch and career management proponent may develop and prescribe requirements for certification of expertise, (for example, the Expert Infantryman's Badge, Expert Field Medical Badge, Sapper, Ranger), but must include the assessment of character and commitment within the process.

b. Intrinsicly, character is one's true nature including identity, sense of purpose, values, virtues, morals, and conscience. Character, in an operational sense, is an Army professional's dedication and adherence to the Army Ethic, including the Army Values, as consistently and faithfully demonstrated in decisions and actions.

c. Competence is an Army professional's demonstrated ability to successfully perform duty with discipline and to standard. Requisite competence varies based on level of responsibility (rank or grade) and the duties associated with specific force structure positions within military career management fields and Army Civilian career programs.

d. Commitment is an Army professional's resolve to contribute honorable service to the Nation and accomplish the mission despite adversity, obstacles, and challenges. Demonstrating commitment requires the resilience to cope with, recover from, and learn from setbacks.

e. The Soldier Life Cycle is part of the Soldier For Life concept and capitalizes on a Soldier's training and professional development timeline. The goals of the Soldier Life Cycle are to—

- (1) Teach Soldiers to be Soldiers first.
 - (2) Retain quality Soldiers in the total force and support the all-volunteer force.
 - (3) Develop career readiness skills while introducing the Soldier to the many benefits the Army has to offer.
 - (4) Prepare leaders to mentor eligible Soldiers to achieve career readiness standards prior to transition from active duty.
- f.* The introduction of the Army Career Tracker (ACT) individual development plan (IDP) early in a Soldier's career, during the initial phase of the Soldier Life Cycle, enforces individual development. The benefit of having the first-line

leaders assist with the creation of professional and post service goals within 30 days of arrival to their first permanent duty station is crucial to support transition initiatives and ensures supervisors validate each Soldier Life Cycle touch point. The Army's Soldier Life Cycle consists of three phases: an initial phase, a Service phase, and a transition phase designed to match a Soldier's career progression whether serving on active duty, in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) or Army National Guard (ARNG). The Soldier Life Cycle is the cornerstone service that helps the user to focus on their career path, the value of their experience and to make informed career decisions should they remain in the Army or transition to civilian life.

g. The Army Civilian Acculturation Program serves as an on-boarding process for new Army Civilians to begin their certification as Army professionals. Certification of individuals occurs at different stages during their service and varies based upon the particular skill set. The Army is a profession of professions, some uniquely military and others with close civilian counterparts. Army Civilians are selected and hired for specific positions, based upon their documented talents and the potential they exhibit during the selection process. Most Army Civilians are initially employed on a year probationary basis. The probationary period allows the Army to introduce the newly hired Army Civilian into the Army's cultural expectations for ethical conduct and standards of performance, while simultaneously providing the Army with an opportunity to evaluate an individual's conduct and performance on the job to determine if an appointment to the civil service should become final (in accordance with Sections 801 and 802, Part 315, Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations). In parallel with, but distinct from the probationary process, is the supervisor's and senior rater's assessment and recognition of the Army Civilian as an Army professional, as evidenced by—

(1) Successful accomplishment of performance standards identified in DA Form 7223-1 (Base System Civilian Performance Counseling Checklist/Record);

(2) Development of an IDP in the ACT with the assistance of their supervisor;

(3) Completion of Civilian Education System (CES) requirements (for example, Foundation Course);

(4) Completion of supervisor development course, if required;

(5) Participation in career program specific training and education requirements, if applicable;

(6) Completion of Army required training; and,

(7) Successful completion of the Civilian Acculturation Program and all requirements set forth by their supervisor.

h. Individuals will continue to develop and achieve professional certification criteria through Army talent management initiatives, human resources career management, and training programs. Some career fields have extensive legal and administrative standards for professional certification in competence (for example, Army Acquisition Corps members, lawyers, firefighters, nurses). Certification of Army professionals may also be beneficial in meeting professional credentialing requirements of private organizations and non-Government professional associations for both promotion purposes and for transitioning into civilian life at the conclusion of active service.

1-9. Army professional development

a. The Army defines professional development as the deliberate and continuous process of education, training, and experience that prepares Soldiers and Army Civilians of character, competence, and commitment to perform present and future duty in accordance with the Army Ethic. The process of professional development of Soldiers and Army Civilians prepares them for increasing levels of responsibility. It is in the process of becoming a person of strong character that one develops as a good leader. A trusted Army professional must be an honorable servant, Army expert, and steward of the profession. The Army Leadership Requirements Model in ADP 6-22 establishes what leaders need to be, know, and do (see figure 1-1) within the Army Profession. The attributes required of leaders are character, presence, and intellect, and these qualities allow Army leaders to execute the leader competencies of leading others, developing themselves and others, and achieving the Army mission. Attributes are desired internal characteristics of a leader - this is what the Army expects leaders to be and know.




Figure 1-1 Leadership Requirements Model (ADP 6-22)

b. Character development is a shared responsibility of both the Army as a profession and the individual. Members of the Army Profession must be committed to their own development. Importantly, all organizational leaders are responsible for inspiring, motivating, enabling, and assessing the character and professional development of their subordinates.

c. The Army leader development model identifies important interactions for developing Army professionals. It requires lifelong learning and identifies three developmental domains that shape critical learning experiences: operational, institutional, and self-development. The model portrays the development of trained and ready units led by competent and confident Army professionals, and depicts a continuous cycle of education, assessment, and feedback. For each domain, specific measurable actions are required and each domain uses assessment and feedback from various sources to maximize mission readiness and to develop Army professionals.

(1) The three domains of Army leader development are dynamic and interconnected.

(2) The individual gains knowledge and skills during institutional education and training and practices them during operational assignments. Self-development enhances, sustains, and expands the knowledge, skills, and abilities gained from assignments and institutional learning.

(a) *Institutional training and education.* The Army's school system provides the education (how to think) and training (how to do) needed to perform duty position requirements. The Army's progressive, sequential, and parallel education

systems will help ensure future Army professionals are armed with the knowledge base they will need to succeed in modular formations. Soldiers and Army Civilians attend institutional training and education courses following appropriate career development models.

(b) *Operational assignments.* Operational assignments translate theory into practice by placing Army professionals in positions to apply the knowledge and skills they acquired during institutional training and education. Repetitive performance of duty position requirements - coupled with self-awareness, assessment, and feedback - refines skills, broadens knowledge, and shapes attitudes and subsequent behavior. The majority of professional development occurs while in operational assignments, learning from role models, and experience as a result of performing assigned duties.

(c) *Self-development.* Self-development is planned, goal-oriented learning that reinforces and expands the depth and breadth of an individual's knowledge base, self-awareness, and situational awareness. Self-development initiatives focus on maximizing leader strengths, reducing weaknesses, and achieving individual leader development goals. Self-development is a continuous process that takes place during institutional training and education, and during operational assignments; it should stretch and broaden the individual beyond the job or training. Civilian education is another aspect of self-development that prepares leaders for responsibilities and enhances their ability to make decisions in future conditions of uncertainties.

d. There are three types of self-development: structured self-development (SSD)—required learning that continues throughout your career and is closely linked to and synchronized with classroom and on-the-job learning; guided self-development—recommended but optional learning that will help keep you prepared for changing technical, functional, and leadership responsibilities throughout your career, and personal self-development—self-initiated learning where you define the objective, pace, and process.

- (1) Structured Self-Development 1 (SSD-1) is a prerequisite to attend the Basic Leaders Course.
- (2) Structured Self-Development 3 (SSD-3) is a prerequisite to attend the Senior Leader Course.
- (3) Structured Self-Development 4 (SSD-4) is a prerequisite to attend the Sergeant Major Course.
- (4) Structured Self-Development 5 (SSD-5) is a prerequisite for nominative assignments.

e. The Army training and development management process was developed and implemented as a means to recommend improvements to training and leader development policy, strategy, and capabilities needed to provide trained and ready units to combatant commanders. The management process starts with Councils of Colonels and culminates with providing recommendations through the Army Profession Training and Development General Officer Steering Committee (for more information, see DA Pam 350-58).

f. All leaders have a responsibility to develop those junior to them to the fullest extent possible. In addition to institutional training and education, Army professionals can facilitate development through the knowledge and feedback they provide through counseling, coaching, and mentoring.

(1) *Counseling.* Counseling is a standardized process used to provide feedback to a subordinate. Counseling focuses on the subordinate by producing a plan outlining actions the subordinate can take to achieve individual and organizational goals. It is central to Army professional development and should be part of a comprehensive program for developing subordinates. A consistent counseling program includes all subordinates, regardless of the level of each one's potential. AR 623-3 and AR 690-400 contain Army counseling requirements for Soldiers and Army Civilians.

(2) *Coaching.* In the military, coaching occurs when an Army professional guides another person's development in new or existing skills during the practice of those skills. Unlike mentoring or counseling where the mentor/counselor generally has more experience than the supported person, coaching relies primarily on teaching and guiding to help bring out and enhance current capabilities. A coach helps those being coached to understand and appreciate their current level of performance and their potential, and instructs them on how to reach the next level of knowledge and skill.

(3) *Mentoring.* Mentoring is the voluntary developmental relationship that exists between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser experience characterized by mutual trust and respect. Mentoring extends beyond the scope of chain of command relationship and occurs when a mentor provides the mentee advice and counsel. Effective mentoring will positively affect personal and professional development. Assessment, feedback, and guidance are critical within the mentoring relationship and must be valued by the mentee in order for growth and development to occur.

g. As future battlefields evolve into increasingly dynamic and fluid environments, systems that facilitate the acceleration of Army professional development are needed. The Army leader development model and tools, such as counseling, coaching, and mentoring, are development multipliers that can enhance and influence maturity, shared identity, self-awareness, adaptability, and conceptual and team-building skills in all leaders.

1-10. Leader assessment and feedback

a. The multi-source assessment and feedback (MSAF) tool is an excellent example of a self-development tool available to all individuals and units (see appendix B) which addresses leader core competencies from ADP 6-22. Individuals must

regularly conduct honest assessments of their strengths and weaknesses. The MSAF program consists of three sub-programs: The Commander 360 (CDR360), a rater initiated event for commanders, the Leader360, a self-initiated Leader event (formerly MSAF360), and Unit360, a commander directed organizational event (described in following paragraphs and appendix B). CAL is the lead agent for MSAF program support functions.

b. The Leader360 and Unit360 apply in operational, institutional, and self-development domains to all NCOs, officers (brigadier general and below), and civilian leaders in the Army. Although these are the targeted groups for participation, any Army personnel can and are encouraged to participate regardless of rank or duty position. Also, non-Army personnel who possess a common access card can register to participate in all MSAF programs on the Web site at <https://msaf.army.mil/home/login.aspx>. This assists Army personnel in joint assignments to receive feedback from their non-Army superiors, peers, and subordinates. Self-development actions include conducting a self-assessment and seeking feedback on a periodic basis through all of the MSAF programs.

c. All NCOs, officers (brigadier general and below) and civilian leaders in the Army are required to initiate and complete the Leader360 or Unit360 at least every 36 months from the end of their last assessment. For officers, the complete date of their last Leader360 or Unit360 will be recorded on DA Form 67-10-1 (Company Grade Plate (01 - 03; WO1 - CW2) Officer Evaluation Report); DA Form 67-10-2 (Field Grade Plate (04 - 05; CW3 - CW5) Officer Evaluation Report); DA Form 67-10-3 (Strategic Grade Plate (06) Officer Evaluation Report); or DA Form 67-10-4 (Strategic Grade Plate General Officer Evaluation Report), hereafter referred to collectively as the "DA Form 67-10 series" (see appendix B).

d. In place of the Leader360 or Unit360, centralized selection list (CSL) lieutenant colonel and colonel commanders and their current raters are required to participate in and complete all requirements for the CDR360 program. Commanders are required to complete two events during the course of their command tenure, which includes both a 360-degree assessment and a developmental discussion with their current rater. The CDR360 is executed as a rater's program and as such current raters are responsible for initiating and managing the CDR360 process for subordinate CSL O-5 and O-6 commanders and for the timely completion of all program components. Completion of the CDR360 event will replace the MSAF notation on the commander's DA Form 67-10 series. See appendix B for full details on requirements.

e. The Non-commissioned Officer Professional Development System (NCOPDS) will be examined periodically to determine how well NCOPDS is responding to the need for critical thinkers and life-long learners. The assessment will focus on the basic leader course, advanced leader course, senior leader course, master leader course, and sergeants major course. In addition to these programs, the assessments will look across the broad spectrum of the NCOPDS subsystems to determine how to enhance their integration and synchronization.

f. First-line leaders must regularly provide feedback on performance and assist individuals in establishing/refining a leader development plan (LDP) to guide performance improvement to include updating a Soldier's ACT record no later than 30 days upon arrival at the first unit of assignment. A second critical component of success is ensuring uniform access to current learning materials and programs. The self-development training domain must be a robust component of the Professional Development Model (PDM) providing every Soldier and Army Civilian a clear understanding of what success looks like. The LDP is located at <https://msaf.army.mil> and the PDM is located within the ACT system at <https://act-now.army.mil>.

1-11. Core leader competencies, "toxic" leadership, and destructive leadership styles

a. To produce an Army of trusted professionals in cohesive teams who adapt and win in a complex world, the Army has identified core leader competencies that pertain to all levels of leadership, both military and civilian. Core leader competencies are related leader behaviors that lead to successful performance, are common throughout the organization, and are consistent with the organizational mission and the Army Ethic. Core leader competencies support the executive core competencies that Army Civilians are expected to master as they advance in their careers.

b. All Army leaders are responsible for demonstrating consistently, including online, the following core leader competencies that are described in detail in ADRP 6-22:

(1) *Leads others.* Leaders motivate, inspire, and influence others to take the initiative, work toward a common purpose, accomplish tasks, and achieve organizational objectives.

(2) *Extends influence beyond the chain of command.* Leaders must extend their influence beyond direct lines of authority and chains of command. This influence may extend to Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and other groups, and helps shape perceptions about the organization.

(3) *Leads by example.* Leaders are role models for others. They are viewed as the example and must maintain standards and provide examples of effective behaviors. When Army leaders model the Army Values, they provide tangible evidence of desired behaviors and reinforce verbal guidance by demonstrating commitment and action.

(4) *Communicates*. Leaders communicate by expressing ideas and actively listening to others. Effective leaders understand the nature and power of communication, practice effective communication techniques so they can better relate to others, and translate goals into actions. Communication is essential to all other leadership competencies.

(5) *Creates a positive environment/fosters de corps*. Leaders are responsible for establishing and maintaining positive expectations and attitudes, which produces the setting for positive attitudes and effective work behaviors.

(6) *Prepares self*. Leaders are prepared to execute their leadership responsibilities fully. They are aware of their limitations and strengths and seek to develop and improve their knowledge. Only through preparation for missions and other challenges, awareness of self and situations, and the practice of lifelong learning and development can individuals fulfill the responsibilities of leadership.

(7) *Develops others*. Leaders develop and cultivate the lifelong learning of subordinates and teams to facilitate the achievement of organizational goals. Leaders prepare others to assume positions within the organization, ensuring a more versatile and productive organization.

(8) *Gets results*. Leaders provide guidance and manage resources and the work environment, thereby ensuring consistent and ethical task accomplishment.

(9) *Stewards the profession*. Leaders steward the profession to maintain professional standards and effective capabilities.

(10) *Builds trust*. Leaders establish conditions of effective influence and create a positive environment.

c. Attributes are desired internal characteristics of a leader – what the Army expects leaders to be and know. The Army has identified three categories of key leader attributes that leaders are responsible for demonstrating; described in more detail in ADRP 6–22:

(1) *Character*. Comprised of a person’s moral and ethical qualities, a leader’s character helps determine what is right and gives leaders motivation to do what is appropriate, regardless of the situation. Essential components of a leader’s character are Army Values, empathy, Warrior Ethos and Service Ethos, and discipline.

(2) *Presence*. The impression a leader makes to others contributes to success in leadership and is the sum of their outward appearance, demeanor, actions, and words. Essential components of a leader’s presence are military and professional bearing, fitness, confidence, and resilience.

(3) *Intellect*. Leader’s intellect draws upon the mental tendencies and resources that shape conceptual abilities applied to one’s duties and responsibilities. Essential components of a leader’s character are mental agility, sound judgment, innovation, interpersonal tact, and expertise.

d. Army professionals are required to uphold the Army Ethic and model the core leader competencies described above. They must remain vigilant to guard against counterproductive leadership behaviors from themselves as well as in the units with which they serve. Counterproductive leadership can take different forms, from incompetence to abusiveness, all of which have detrimental impacts on individuals, the unit, and the accomplishment of the mission. Counterproductive leadership behaviors can span a range of behaviors to include bullying, distorting information, refusing to listen to subordinates, abusing authority, retaliating, blaming others, poor self-control (loses temper), withholding encouragement, dishonesty, unfairness, unjustness, showing little or no respect, talking down to others, behaving erratically, and taking credit for others’ work. One such type of counterproductive leadership is toxic leadership, which is defined as a combination of self-centered attitudes, motivations, and behaviors that have adverse effects on subordinates, the organization, and mission performance. To be classified as toxic, the counterproductive behaviors must be recurrent and have a deleterious impact on the organization’s performance or the welfare of subordinates. An exacerbating factor may be if the behaviors demonstrate selfish reasons such as elevating one’s own status, grabbing power, or otherwise obtaining personal gain. Counterproductive leadership behaviors prevent the establishment of a positive organizational climate, preclude other leaders from fulfilling their requirements, and may prevent the unit from achieving its mission. They will lead to investigations and, potentially, removal from position or other punitive actions. Army leaders are required to utilize self-awareness programs (MSAF, CDR360, and others) to ensure they receive feedback indicating whether they exhibit appropriate behaviors for an Army leader. Army leaders are required to provide performance and professional growth counseling to subordinate leaders to prevent or remedy counterproductive leadership.

e. Destructive leadership styles can compromise organizational effectiveness and discourage subordinates from continuing their Army service. In a variety of ways, they undermine mutual trust and impede mission accomplishment. In senior leaders, destructive styles are particularly damaging. These types of leaders must be developed to change their destructive leadership style if possible or, if not able to change, be removed from the Army profession. Five destructive leadership styles are:

(1) *Incompetent managers*. They possess inadequate cognitive or emotional fitness or have inadequate prior experience to function at their level. They cannot move from the tactical to the strategic level when so required. They cannot make sound decisions on time.

(2) *Affable non-participant*. These leaders are interpersonally skilled, and intellectually sound, but incapable of taking charge, making decisions, providing timely guidance, and holding subordinates accountable. They provide minimal guidance, avoid decisions, are fond of committees, meetings, visitors, and often lack passion or creativity.

(3) *Insensitive driven achiever*. These leaders are usually bright and energetic and consumed by need for unit accomplishment and its attendant recognition. They often provide impressive short term results, but create a frenzied, micro-managed climate. They are frequently inattentive to the morale of their organization.

(4) *Toxic self-centered abuser*. These leaders are also usually bright and energetic, as well as goal-oriented and boss-focused. Capable of producing spectacular short term results, but are arrogant, abusive, intemperate, distrusting, and irascible. They are typically distrusting micro-managers never burdened by introspection.

(5) *Criminal*. These individuals may be energetic, bright, and sometimes charismatic. However, they cheat, lie, steal, defraud, and assault.

Chapter 2 Responsibilities

Army professionals are responsible for consistently demonstrating the Army competencies and attributes as stated in paragraph 1–10.

2–1. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

The ASA (M&RA) will—

- a. Set the strategic direction and provide overall supervision for Army Profession and leadership policy.
- b. Oversee and review all policies and programs pertaining to the human dimension, the Army Profession, and leadership.
- c. Provide policy, programming, and oversight for unit and individual readiness and training to include the Army Profession and leadership.
- d. Participate in human dimension, Army Profession, leadership research, and leader development conferences, to include the Council of Colonels relative to leadership and the Training General Officer Steering Committee, as appropriate, to include oversight of AR 600–100.

2–2. Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

The Chief of Military History (CMH), on behalf of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (AASA), will—

- a. Produce historical publications on topics relating to the Army Profession and leadership.
- b. Conduct historical research, prepare bibliographies, and develop and present narratives and other accounts of the Army Profession and leadership topics.
- c. Develop and assist Army museums in developing historical exhibits on the Army Profession and leadership topics.

2–3. The Inspector General

The Inspector General (TIG) will—

- a. Extend the eyes, ears, voice, and conscience of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, Army.
- b. Assess or investigate alleged violations of the Army Ethic.
- c. Assist commanders in teaching and training leaders on the moral principles of the Army Ethic.
- d. Provide a continuing assessment of the command, operational, managerial, logistical, and administrative effectiveness of the Army.
- e. Integrate Army Profession and leadership doctrine into IG training and certification at the Army Inspector General School. Ensure IGs understand their role in assessing, investigating, teaching, and training, and providing feedback on the Army Ethic.
- f. Integrate Army Profession and leadership policy and doctrine into civilian IG career development programs. Train civilian IGs to the same standards as military IGs as part of the Army Civilian IG career development program.
- g. Participate in Army Profession and leadership research seminars, symposia, and conferences to monitor emerging doctrine and policies.
- h. Maintain liaison with the Mission Command Center of Excellence (MCCoE) to monitor emerging Army Profession and leadership policy, doctrine, and programs; provide feedback, identify systemic issues and trends, and make recommendations for solutions or improvement; provide trends on violations for evaluation.

2-4. Chief of Public Affairs

The CPA will—

- a.* Inform the Army and the American public about the Army Profession and Army leadership programs, initiatives, policies, and how the Army Profession is developing its leaders.
- b.* Integrate into Army communications strategy the information regarding the Army Profession, the Army Ethic, character, and leadership of Soldiers and Army Civilians to reinforce trust with the American people.

2-5. Chief, National Guard Bureau

The CNGB will, directly or by delegation to the Director, Army National Guard (DARNG) —

- a.* Develop and promulgate ARNG policies consistent with DA policies for the Army Profession, Army Ethic, and leadership training and education for the ARNG and Army National Guard of the United States Soldiers, in conjunction with the DCS, G-1; DCS, G-3/5/7; TRADOC; U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM); and Office of the Chief, Army Reserve.
- b.* Ensure that Soldier training and education on the Army Profession and leadership in the Officer Education System, Warrant Officer Education System, Noncommissioned Officer Education System, and other training programs in TRADOC-accredited professional military education (PME) are in accordance with DA policy.
- c.* Support participation of leaders and units in the MSAF programs, Leader360, and Unit360. Ensure lieutenant colonel and colonel level commanders participate in two CDR360 events during their command tenure, and determine the appropriate windows for the events for ARNG component commanders (see appendix B).

2-6. Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1

The leadership mission of the DCS, G-1 is to enhance the readiness of the Army by embedding the human dimension into all Army Profession and leadership policy (in coordination with the DCS, G-3/5/7 for leader development), programs, and initiatives to enable the Army to execute its mission. In order to accomplish this mission, the DCS, G-1 will—

- a.* Exercise general staff supervision and responsibility for developing and promoting Army Profession and leadership policies (in consultation and coordination with the ASA (M&RA)).
- b.* Serve as the Army staff (ARSTAF) policy proponent for both the Army Profession and military and civilian leadership, to include oversight of AR 600-89.
- c.* Serve as ARSTAF proponent for the Army Civilian Corps Creed.
- d.* Select points of contact to coordinate with and advise the DCS, G-3/5/7; TRADOC; and other organizations, as appropriate, regarding Army Profession and leadership issues.
- e.* Participate in or support appropriate leadership and leader development conferences.
- f.* Coordinate and prioritize Army Profession and leadership research with special emphasis on the activities of the U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Approve profession and leadership research conferences that ARI organizes and conducts with the goal of coordinating research of participating agencies and organizations and reviewing findings.
- g.* Evaluate profession and leadership policies and programs as they affect units and organizations in the field. Approve, schedule, and conduct leadership conferences, when appropriate, to integrate and synchronize leadership and leader development policies, issues, and programs (working with the DCS, G-3/5/7).
- h.* Coordinate with the DCS, G-3/5/7 to ensure that Army Profession, leadership, and personnel management policies are synchronized with leader development policies.
- i.* Serve as point of contact for issues relating to civilian professional development leadership.
- j.* Serve as a permanent member of the Army Profession and Leader Development Forum and the Training General Officer Steering Committee.
- k.* Serve as Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) proponent for Active Army, Reserve, and civilian mentorship policies, programs, and initiatives.
- l.* Serve as HQDA proponent for Army Values.
- m.* Synchronize programmatic requirements through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process (DCS, G-8, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate; Army Budget Office; and DCS, G-3/5/7).
- n.* Serve as proponent for the MSAF program, to include Leader360, Unit360, and CDR360.
- o.* Ensure the Assistant G-1 for Civilian Personnel will—
 - (1) Develop, coordinate, and implement programs and policies directly associated with the development of civilian personnel readiness.
 - (2) Coordinate with the DCS, G-3/5/7 and the CG, TRADOC to ensure Army Civilian leadership and civilian personnel management policies are synchronized with Army Profession and leader development policies.

(3) Advise the DCS, G-1 on and assist the ASA (M&RA) with the impact of civilian personnel management policies on Army Profession and leadership policy, and the DCS, G-3/5/7 on leader development policies.

(4) Advise the DCS, G-1 on and assist the ASA (M&RA) with policy issues relating to civilian leadership and mentoring.

(5) Participate in Army Profession, leadership, leadership research, and leader development conferences, as appropriate.

p. Ensure the CG, U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) will—

(1) Ensure professional development programs for Army personnel, including schooling and assignment procedures, are consistent with Army Profession, leadership, leader development, and management policies.

(2) Advise and assist the leader development management process on leader development issues and policies, as required. Specifically, advise the DCS G-1 on issues and policies that pertain to Army manning priorities and assignments in order to provide the best opportunities for leader development.

(3) Advise the DCS, G-1 of the impact of implementation of personnel management policies on the Army Profession, leadership policy, and the DCS, G-3/5/7 on leader development policies.

(4) Provide resource support, as required, to ensure continued core civilian leadership training and leader development through institutional training.

(5) Participate in Army leadership, leadership research, and leader development conferences, as appropriate.

(6) Provide results or an executive summary of all Army Profession, leader, leadership, and leader development studies to MCCoE.

(7) Coordinate with the DCS, G-1 to provide the CAL data on CSL lieutenant colonel and colonel commanders eligible for the CDR360 program.

q. Ensure the Director, ARI will—

(1) Formulate and conduct a Soldier-oriented behavioral and social science multi-year research and development program, consistent with the DCS, G-1 direction, to enhance the Soldier Life Cycle/talent management (for example selection, assignment, training, leader development) and to improve human relations.

(2) Maintain coordination with Department of Defense, ARSTAF, Army commands (ACOMs), and other agencies that have responsibilities related to the Army Profession, leadership, leader development, and talent management.

2-7. Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7

The DCS, G-3/5/7 is the ARSTAF proponent for training and leader development. The DCS, G-3/5/7 leader development mission is to develop, coordinate, and program combined arms training and leader development strategies-based policy, programs, and initiatives that will achieve Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) directed levels of individual, leader, and unit training readiness required for the Army to meet national military strategy needs. The DCS, G-3/5/7 will—

a. Exercise general staff responsibility for all policies and matters relating to individual and unit training.

b. Exercise responsibility for leader development policy for the Army in accordance with AR 350-1.

c. Coordinate leader development actions with appropriate ARSTAF agencies and major Army commanders.

d. Work closely with the DCS, G-1, and TRADOC to ensure DCS, G-1 leadership policy, doctrine, and programs and DCS, G-3/5/7 leader development policy, doctrine, and programs are consistent and complementary.

e. Participate in Army Profession and leadership research, seminars, symposia, surveys, and conferences, as appropriate.

f. Manage and provide oversight on all current and future Army training and leader development recommended actions.

2-8. Chief, Army Reserve

The CAR will—

a. Prescribe training requirements for the USAR which integrate the Army Profession, the Army Ethic, leadership training and education policy in accordance with this regulation.

b. Support participation of leaders and units in the MSAF programs, Leader360, and Unit360.

c. Ensure lieutenant colonel and colonel level commanders participate in two CDR360 events during their command tenure, and determine the appropriate windows for the events for Army Reserve Component (RC) commanders (see appendix B).

2-9. The Surgeon General

TSG will—

a. Serve as the proponent for Army medical department professional development and career management.

b. Ensure that the CG, U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) will—

(1) Integrate Army Profession and leadership doctrine in all education and training programs of instruction at the U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School.

(2) Develop and manage an Army profession and leadership assessment program at the U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School.

c. Participate in Army Profession, leadership, and leadership research conferences, as appropriate.

d. Coordinate with ARI and the MCCoE on the Army Profession, leadership, and cohesion aspects of medical research, particularly the prevention and treatment of combat stress and psychiatric casualties.

e. Provide results or an executive summary of all Army Profession, leader, leadership, and leader development studies to MCCoE.

f. Provide research support to the DCS, G-1, upon request.

2-10. The Judge Advocate General

TJAG will—

a. Perform assigned responsibilities as a part of the Army's Ethics Program, as the primary ethics advisor to the CSA.

b. Manage two critical elements of the Army's Ethics Program; in compliance with all requirements in the Federal ethics rules and DOD 5500.7-R, and provide support to field commands and ethics counselors.

c. Integrate Army Profession and leadership training in courses of instruction at The Judge Advocate General Legal Center and School.

2-11. Chief of Chaplains

The CCH will—

a. Provide advice and assistance to Army leaders on the religious and spiritual connections associated with the moral responsibilities of command, ethical decisionmaking, personal values, and personal relationships.

b. Lead and support chaplain-led unit moral leadership training in support of the Army Profession and the Army Ethic.

c. Address the religious, moral, social, and ethical dimensions of Soldier and civilian actions in war and during peace through the Commander's Moral Leadership Training Program.

d. Integrate the Army Profession and leadership doctrine and training in programs of instruction at the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School.

e. Participate in Army Profession and leadership research conferences, as appropriate.

2-12. Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command

The CG, FORSCOM will—

a. Support participation of leaders and units in the MSAF programs, Leader360, and Unit360. Ensure lieutenant colonel and colonel level commanders participate in two CDR360 events during their command tenure (see appendix B).

b. Exercise general staff responsibility for all Army Profession and leadership policies, training, and matters relating to individual and unit training for FORSCOM units.

c. Serve as the office of collateral responsibility to TRADOC monitoring the development and implementation of developmental leadership assessment training products, materials, and tools for officer, warrant officer, NCO, and Army Civilian leadership training programs.

d. Conduct and participate in leadership, leadership research, and leader development conferences.

e. Monitor the integration of lessons learned into all leader development courses.

f. Provide guidance and support for leadership, leader development, and leadership research conferences.

g. Assist in the integration of approved Army Profession and leadership doctrine into Armywide programs of instruction.

h. Establish and maintain close coordination with Service schools, the research community, the civilian academic community, other Services, and services of other countries to monitor and evaluate research and studies in ethics and cohesion.

i. Develop programs in accordance with established Army standards that will enhance the communication skills (reading, writing, and listening) of leaders Armywide.

j. Be responsible for strategic professional and leader development of the Army's senior leaders; support strategic broadening.

k. Support Armywide profession and leadership efforts (for example, Army Campaign Plan, Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS), Human Dimension Strategy, Ready and Resilient Campaign, Annual America's Army-Our Profession Themes, Strategic Leaders Army Profession Symposia).

l. Participate in the Army Learning Coordination Council and establish and maintain close coordination with Service schools, the research community, the civilian academic community, other Services, and services of other countries to monitor and evaluate research and studies related to the Army Profession and leadership.

2-13. Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

The CG, TRADOC will—

a. Serve as the Army senior responsible official and principle lead for the training and leader development processes. Develop training doctrine and execute training policies and procedures as directed by HQDA. Develop Army Profession and leadership operational concepts, doctrine, training, and education programs in coordination with HQDA and based upon Army leadership theory and policies. Integrate Army leadership and leader development doctrine in all training programs in Service schools and training centers for commissioned and warrant officers, NCOs, and Army Civilians at progressive and sequential phases of career development.

b. Serve as the proponent for ADP 6-22 and ADRP 6-22.

c. Manage all leadership and leader development education and training programs of instruction, to include development and implementation of leadership assessment policy, in TRADOC schools and training centers.

d. Monitor the development and implementation of developmental leadership assessment training products, materials, and tools for officer, warrant officer, NCO, and Army Civilian leadership training programs.

e. Conduct and participate in leadership, leadership research, and leader development conferences.

f. Monitor the integration of leader development requirements into the Cadre Training Course, home station, and institutional training master plans.

g. Monitor the integration of lessons learned into all leader development courses.

h. Monitor the development and maintenance of specific proponent career maps under the TRADOC area of responsibility.

i. Serve as the proponent to plan, program, budget, and supervise through the CAL at the Army Combined Arms Center, by administering all MSAF programs (Leader360, Unit360, and CDR360) support functions.

j. Expand professional certification and credentialing use to maximize the development of Army professionals by achieving accelerated ethical maturity and inculcation of Army Values, improved ethical decisionmaking and stewardship.

k. Seek ways to unify a holistic vision to maximize individual and team performance through identification, development, and optimal integration of human capabilities; invest significantly in the human dimension.

l. Ensure the Deputy Commanding General, Initial Military Training (IMT) will—

(1) Provide integrated command and control of the IMT for the Army's officer, warrant officer, and enlisted forces to meet the Army's manpower and readiness requirements and standards.

(2) Provide oversight of Basic Officer Leaders Course A (BOLC A) tasks, pre-commissioning leadership instruction for U.S. Military Academy (USMA), Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS), and Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS).

(3) Establish and provide IMT policy and execution guidance to TRADOC commanders and staff outside the IMT chain of command. Embed the Army Profession, Army Ethic, and leadership in all facets of IMT.

(4) Direct pre-commissioning common core Soldier and officer training requirements in coordination with and executed by the U.S. Army Reserve Command, ARNG, U.S. Army Cadet Command ROTC, deputy commandants, OCS, WOCS, and USMA to ensure linkage and standards with BOLC.

(5) Conduct and participate in Army Profession and leadership research and conferences.

(6) Provide results or an executive summary of all Army Profession, leader, leadership, and leader development studies to MCCoE.

(7) Provide Center for Initial Military Training as the lead for common core IMT; establish and maintain warrior tasks and battle drills. Direct research and experimentation analysis to improve performance in IMT.

m. Ensure the CG, CAC and Commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) will—

(1) Serve as the TRADOC lead for leader development, education, and doctrine, and as the proponent for officer and civilian PME.

(2) Provide guidance and support for leadership, leader development, and leadership research conferences.

(3) Conduct instruction in leadership and ethics for the intermediate level education, Pre-Command Course (PCC), Division Commander/Assistant Division Commander Course, and other courses as directed.

(4) Coordinate closely with Service schools, training centers, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), Army Management Staff College, U.S. Army Warrant Officer Career College (USAWOCC), the Institute for Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development (INCOPD), USAR schools, ARNG State military academies, regional training institutes, and pre-commissioning schools (USMA, ROTC, OCS, and WOCS) to achieve an integrated, progressive, and sequential Army Profession and leadership instruction program.

(5) Assist in the integration of approved leadership and leader development doctrine into Armywide programs of instruction.

(6) Establish and maintain close coordination with Service schools, the research community, the civilian academic community, other Services, and services of other countries to monitor and evaluate research and studies in ethics and cohesion.

(7) Develop and provide training support materials on the Army Profession, leadership, leadership assessment to all Army service schools, TRADOC training centers, and other Army organizations.

(8) Develop and conduct leadership training for Army Civilians at the foundation, basic, intermediate, and advanced levels, as directed by TRADOC.

(9) Monitor the civilian sector for appropriate leadership training services, in coordination with the DCS, G-1 and DCS, G-3/5/7. Evaluate potential training packages and incorporate them into leadership curricula, as appropriate.

(10) Develop programs in accordance with established Army standards that will enhance the communication skills (reading, writing, and listening) of leaders Armywide. This is done in coordination with the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs; CG, TRADOC; and CG, HRC.

(11) Participate in leadership, leader development, and leadership research conferences.

(12) Conduct instruction in command, Army Profession, Army Ethic, leadership, and management for all USAWC resident and nonresident students. Coordinate with the CAC/CGSC to ensure this instruction is integrated with and linked progressively and sequentially to Army Profession and leadership instruction in TRADOC schools.

(13) Manage the Basic Strategic Art Program and the Joint Force Land Component Commander course.

(14) Be responsible for strategic professional and leader development of the Army's senior leaders.

(15) Establish and maintain liaison with the DCS, G-1; DCS, G-3/5/7; CAL; ARI; and other agencies, as needed, to ensure the coordination of Army Profession, ethical decisionmaking, character development, and leadership research and instructional activities at USAWC with TRADOC Army Profession, and leader development programs, Army Profession, Army Ethic and leadership instruction in TRADOC schools, development of Army Profession and leadership doctrine, and the overall Army Profession and moral-ethical leadership research program.

(16) Provide results or an executive summary of all Army Profession, leader, leadership, and leader development studies to MCCoE.

n. Ensure the CG, Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) on behalf of the CG, CAC will—

(1) Conduct Army Profession and leadership training.

(2) Conduct and participate in leadership, leadership research, and leader development conferences.

(3) Provide results or an executive summary of all Army Profession and leadership studies to MCCoE.

o. Ensure the Director, CAL on behalf of the CG, CAC is the Army lead for leadership and leader development research, analysis, assessment, and evaluation; leadership doctrine; coordination, development, and management of initiatives within the LDP; and the integration and synchronization of PME to sustain excellence in growing Army leaders. The Director, CAL will—

(1) Directly support CG, CAC in accomplishing all tasks required in paragraph 2-13f.

(2) Coordinate with the DCS, G-3/5/7 (DAMO-TR) and the DCS, G-1 (DAPE-MPC) to ensure that leadership and leader development policies, programs, and initiatives are synchronized with current doctrine, concepts, and theories.

(3) Facilitate the coordination and integration of research, concepts, and doctrine development, training, and evaluation in all areas of leadership, in coordination with the DCS, G-1 and the DCS, G-3/5/7.

(4) Serve as the Army lead for ADRP 6-22.

(5) Establish and maintain close coordination with Service schools, the research community, the civilian academic community, other Services, and services of other countries to monitor and evaluate research and studies in leadership, leader development, and leadership assessment.

(6) Review and evaluate leadership education and training curricula in TRADOC Service schools and training centers. Provide assistance to Service schools not under TRADOC in the review and evaluation of leadership curricula. Provide recommendations on requirements for Army leadership instructor education.

(7) Evaluate, design, and develop leader development programs and concepts. Conduct research, studies, and analysis to identify and assess leadership and leader development trends, requirements, strategies, technologies, and techniques. Develop, maintain, and promulgate leadership doctrine.

(8) Design, field, operate, and monitor leadership assessment programs and/or tools that contribute to Army leader development in institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development. Maintain liaison and coordinate with Army agencies that use assessment techniques, to include the INCOPTD, U.S. Army Cadet Command, USMA, and USAWC.

(9) Serve as the lead agent for the MSAF programs (Leader360, Unit360, and CDR360). Responsible for the development, validation, maintenance, administration, and execution of multi-source assessment programs for leader development; does not bear responsibility for individual leader accountability or tracking of program compliance.

(10) Serve as the lead for the Army Mentorship Program and all related doctrinal development.

p. Ensure the Director, CAPE on behalf of the CG, CAC, serves as the Army lead for the Army Profession, Army Ethic, and character development of Army professionals (Soldiers and Army Civilians) to reinforce trust within the profession and with the American people. The Director, CAPE will—

- (1) Directly support the CG, CAC, and the Director MCCoE in accomplishing all tasks required in paragraph 2–13I.
 - (2) Coordinate with CAL, CAC, the DCS, G–1 (DAPE–MPC), and DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–TR) and to ensure that Army Profession and leadership and Army Profession and leader development policies, programs, and initiatives are synchronized with current doctrine, concepts, and theories.
 - (3) Facilitate the coordination and integration of research, concepts, and doctrine development, training, and evaluation in all areas of the Army Profession and leadership, in coordination with the DCS, G–1, ARI, the DCS, G–3/5/7, and CAL.
 - (4) Support Armywide profession and leadership efforts (for example, Army Campaign Plan, Army Leader Development Strategy, Human Dimension Strategy, Ready and Resilient Campaign, America’s Army–Our Profession Themes, Strategic Leaders Army Profession Symposium).
 - (5) Serve as the Army lead for the Army Values and all related doctrinal development.
 - (6) Serve as the Army lead for ADRP 1.
 - (7) Establish and maintain a CAPE Web site that facilitates and promotes Army Profession research, information, education, and training materials to support institutional and operational unit AR 350–1 professional development and leadership training.
 - (8) Participate in the Army Learning Coordination Council and establish and maintain close coordination with Service schools, the research community, the civilian academic community, other Services, and services of other countries to monitor and evaluate research and studies related to the Army Profession and leadership, Army Profession and leader development, and Army Profession and leadership assessment.
 - (9) Establish and maintain coordination and liaison with HQDA, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other Services’ representatives for ethics and professionalism, and services of other countries in regards to the Army Profession and Army Ethic.
 - (10) Review and evaluate Army Profession and leadership education and training curricula in TRADOC Service schools and training centers. Provide assistance to Service schools not under TRADOC in the review and evaluation of Army Profession and leadership curricula. Provide recommendations on requirements for Army Profession and leadership instructor education.
 - (11) Evaluate, design, and develop Army Profession and leader development strategies, initiatives, and concepts. Conduct research and analysis to identify and assess Army Profession and leadership and Army Profession and leader development trends, requirements, strategies, technologies, and techniques. Develop, maintain, and promulgate Army Profession and leadership doctrine.
 - (12) Design, field, and monitor Army Profession and leadership assessment programs and/or tools that contribute to Army Profession and leader development in institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development. Maintain liaison and coordinate with Army agencies that use assessment techniques, to include the INCOPD, U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA), USAWOCC, U.S. Army Cadet Command, OCS, USMA, CGSC, and USAWC.
- q.* Ensure the Director, INCOPD will—
- (1) Provide direction and oversight of the NCOPDS; serve as force modernization proponent for NCOPDS. Develop and coordinate doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities requirements for NCOPDS; coordinate and approve related Army doctrinal qualifications and personnel policies.
 - (2) Serve as the principal advisor to the Army Leader Development Enterprise on NCO development.
 - (3) Ensure the NCOPDS meets the intent of the Army’s Leader Development Strategy and Army Learning Strategy.
 - (4) Conduct assessments and needs analysis ensuring NCOPDS is relevant, vertically aligned, and meets the needs of current and future NCOs.
 - (5) Integrate all directed NCO leader development requirements from HQDA, TRADOC, and CAC.
 - (6) Develop future strategies and initiatives for NCOPDS; develop strategic initiatives related to NCOPDS; develop concepts, identify resource requirements, and mature initiatives.
 - (7) Serve as key integrator for policy, planning, and oversight of NCOPDS; synchronize and coordinate policy related to NCO development; coordinate support for NCO leader development strategic actions designed to build foreign nation partnerships.
 - (8) Assist the CAC in developing, reviewing, and recommending revisions to Army doctrine with regard to the role, duties, and responsibilities of the NCO. Ensure that Human Dimension and Force 2025 and Beyond initiatives are reviewed and operationalized within the NCOPDS where practical and feasible.
 - (9) Conduct strategic communications programs for NCOPDS; develop and communicate NCO leader development themes and messages to the Army.
 - (10) Monitor the effectiveness of NCOPDS outputs; develop program standards and metrics.

- (11) Participate in Army Profession and leadership research, symposia, seminars, surveys, and conferences, as appropriate.
- (12) Serve as the program manager for the ACT.
 - r.* Ensure the Commandant, USAWOCC will—
 - (1) Serve as the lead agent in developing and educating current and future warrant officers.
 - (2) Integrate and implement Army Profession and leadership policy.
 - (3) Conduct instruction in Army Profession, command, leadership, and management for all USAWOCC resident students. Coordinate with CAC to ensure instructions is integrated with and linked progressively and sequentially to leadership instruction in TRADOC schools.
 - (4) Ensure warrant officer Army Profession and leadership program meets the intent of the Army's Leader Development Strategy and Army Learning Concept.
 - (5) Adjudicate Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC) common core training products developed by the proponent for officer mid-grade learning continuum.
 - (6) Serve as the appointment authority for all warrant officers (except special forces, 180A) appointed to the rank of warrant officer one upon successful completion of the WOCS.
 - (7) Serve as principal advisor regarding basic officer leadership course task development and PME common core development for warrant officers to CACs and other education institutions.
 - (8) Serve as the candidate appellate authority for USAWOCC conducted WOCS.
 - (9) Synchronize and execute simultaneous activities in support of resident and distance learning education to include: initial-entry training and senior-level PME and sequential educational integration across all cohorts.
 - (10) Coordinate and maintain relationships with the CGSC, USAWC, and sister Service education institutions to broaden educational opportunities for senior-level PME students.
 - (11) Assess WOCS training programs at State run ARNG regional training institutes to ensure compliance with established regulations and policies.
 - (12) Participate in Army Profession, leadership, and leadership research conferences, as appropriate.
 - (13) Provide results or an executive summary of all Army Profession, leader, leadership, and leader development studies to MCCoE.

2-14. Commandant, U.S. Army War College

The Commandant, USAWC will—

- a.* Conduct instruction in command, leadership, and management for all USAWC resident and nonresident students. Coordinate with CAC/CGSC to ensure instruction is integrated with and linked progressively and sequentially to leadership instruction in TRADOC schools.
- b.* Manage the Basic Strategic Art Program and the Joint Force Land Component Commander course.
- c.* Provide strategic leader development of the Army's senior leaders.
- d.* Establish and maintain liaison with the DCS, G-1; DCS, G-3/5/7; CAL; ARI; and other agencies, as needed, to ensure the coordination of leadership research and instructional activities at USAWC with TRADOC leader development programs, leadership instruction in TRADOC schools, development of Army leadership doctrine, and the overall leadership research program.
- e.* Provide research consultation and other assistance on request.
- f.* Participate actively in Army Profession and leadership research and conferences.
- g.* Provide results or an executive summary of all Army Profession, leader, leadership, and leader development studies to MCCoE.

2-15. Superintendent, U. S. Military Academy

The Superintendent, USMA will—

- a.* Conduct the Basic Officer Leader Course A (BOLC A) pre-commissioning Army Profession and leader development activities for the U.S. Corps of Cadets.
- b.* Ensure all cadets receive academic instruction grounded in empirical research that achieves the following learning outcomes: the ability to reason ethically and to apply the moral principles of the Army Ethic in decisions and actions; the ability to apply relevant frameworks, concepts, and evidence based theory to leadership situations; the ability to apply scientific understanding of human behavior to assess and influence the actions of others.
- c.* Establish and maintain liaison with the DCS, G-1; DCS, G-3/5/7; TRADOC; CAL; CAPE; ARI; U.S. Army Cadet Command; OCS; and other agencies, as needed, to ensure the coordination of Army Profession and leadership instructional activities at USMA with other pre-commissioning programs, and with TRADOC instruction.

- d.* Provide consultation, coordination, research, and other assistance in support of other pre-commissioning, Army Profession, and leadership agencies, consistent with available resources and the USMA mission.
- e.* Participate in Army Profession and leadership research conferences, and assist MCCoE in the development of Army Profession and leadership doctrine and training support materials, consistent with available resources and the Academy mission.
- f.* Advise and assist CG, TRADOC, on Army Profession, character development and leadership theory, concept, and changing perceptions of the leadership field.
- g.* Provide results or an executive summary of all Army Profession, leader, leadership, and leader development studies to MCCoE.

2-16. Commandant, U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy

The Commandant, USASMA will—

- a.* Assist CAC in developing, reviewing, and recommending revisions to Army doctrine with regard to the role and responsibilities of the NCO and Soldier.
- b.* Assist INCOPD on Army Profession and leadership instruction.
- c.* Assess, recommend, design, develop, and execute programs for NCO leader development and education through a systematic, synchronized, and integrated plan, which provides the enlisted force with a comprehensive, single point-of-entry portal for engaging in PME and professional development.
- d.* Conduct strategic communications programs, exercises, seminars, and other activities to support inquiries and analysis benefiting the Army Profession and leadership.
- e.* Develop future strategies for NCOPDS.
- f.* Provide results or an executive summary of all Army Profession, leader, leadership, and leader development studies to MCCoE.

2-17. Commandant, U.S. Army Warrant Officer Career College

The Commandant, USAWOCC will—

- a.* Integrate and implement Army Profession and leadership policy.
- b.* Conduct instruction in Army Profession, command, leadership, and management for all USAWOCC resident students. Coordinate with CAC to ensure instruction is integrated with and linked progressively and sequentially to leadership instruction in TRADOC schools.
- c.* Participate in Army Profession, leadership, and leadership research conferences, as appropriate.
- d.* Provide results or an executive summary of all Army Profession, leader, leadership, and leader development studies to MCCoE.

2-18. Commanders of Army commands, Army service component commands, and direct reporting units

ACOM, ASCC, and DRU Commanders will—

- a.* Ensure that unit level Army Profession and leadership training is conducted for assigned Active and RC forces and Army Civilians in accordance with the Army Leader Development Strategy.
- b.* Supervise in-unit Army Profession and leadership training of individual ready reserve and individual mobilization augmentee personnel assigned or attached to Active or RC units.
- c.* Participate in Army Profession and leadership research, symposia, seminars, surveys, and conferences, as appropriate.
- d.* Provide recommendations and feedback concerning Army Profession and leadership issues and programs to the DCS, G-1 or the MCCoE, as appropriate.
- e.* Ensure compliance at all levels of leadership in accordance with introductory paragraph of responsibilities this chapter.
- f.* Internalize feedback received from their own assessments as commanders, organizational leaders, and individual leaders responsible for individual and unit participation in the MSAF process. The leaders who have been assessed must expend effort to understand their feedback and work diligently to use it for their continued development and for the good of the Army.
- g.* Support participation of leaders and units in the MSAF programs, Leader360, and Unit360. Ensure completion of all CDR360 program components for those subordinate CSL lieutenant colonel and colonel level commanders in the rating chain (see appendix B for full detail on requirements).
- h.* Budget and allocate resources for the professional development (training and education as appropriate) for all members of the Army Profession.

Chapter 2

Extract from Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 6-22

1. **Purpose:** This chapter provides IGs with an extract of ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership.
2. **ADP 6-22:** ADP 6-22 represents the Army's doctrine for -- and practical application of -- Army leadership. Through historical vignettes and scenarios, the manual explains the true nature of Army leadership, its historical application, and the numerous challenges and dilemmas faced by leaders in the past. A complete copy of this field manual is available from the Army Publishing Directorate's Web site at www.apd.army.mil.

PART ONE

The Army Leader: Person of Character, Presence, and Intellect

Part One highlights the critical attribute categories of character, presence, and intellect. All Army leaders use them to reach their full potential from direct leader to strategic leader. The attributes support leadership actions valuable for continued development and effective performance.

Chapter 2 Character

FOUNDATIONS OF ARMY LEADER CHARACTER

2-1. A person's character affects how they lead. A leader's character consists of their true nature guided by their conscience, which affects their moral attitudes and actions. A leader's personal reputation is what others view as character. Leaders who firmly adhere to applicable laws, regulations, and unit standards build credibility with their subordinates and enhance trust of the Nation they serve.

2-2. Influences such as background, beliefs, education, and experiences affect all Soldiers and DA Civilians. An Army leader's role in developing others' character would be simple if it merely required checking and aligning personal values with the Army Values. Reality is much different. Becoming and remaining a leader of character is a process involving day-to-day experiences and internal fortitude. While education, self-development, counseling, coaching, and mentoring can refine the outward signs of character, modifying deeply held values is the only way to change character. Leaders are responsible for their own character and for encouraging, supporting, and assessing their subordinates' efforts to embody character.

2-3. Character consists of the moral and ethical qualities of an individual revealed through their decisions and actions. Leaders must consistently demonstrate good character and inspire others to do the same. The close teamwork demanded to execute military missions at all levels requires that everyone in the Army share certain desirable character attributes. A summary of the character attributes are shown in table 2-1 (see page 2-12). Character attributes that are of special interest to the Army and its leaders are—

- Army Values.
- Empathy.
- Warrior Ethos and Service Ethos.
- Discipline.
- Humility.

ARMY VALUES

2-4. Personal values develop over the years from childhood to adulthood. People are free to choose and hold their own values, but upon taking the oath of service, Soldiers and DA Civilians agree to live and act by the Army Values. Army Values consist of the principles, standards, and qualities considered essential for

service. The Army Values set expectations for conduct and are fundamental to making the right decision in any situation. Living, teaching, and reinforcing Army Values is an important leader responsibility.

2-5. The Army recognizes seven values that all Soldiers and DA Civilians must internalize. Embracing the Army Values is the hallmark of being an Army professional. Doing so represents a pact with teammates and the American people to be trustworthy and accountable. When read in sequence, the first letters of the Army Values form the acronym LDRSHIP:

- Loyalty.
- Duty.
- Respect.
- Selfless service.
- Honor.
- Integrity.
- Personal courage.

LOYALTY: BEAR TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, THE ARMY, YOUR UNIT AND OTHER SOLDIERS.

2-6. The first order of loyalty is to the Constitution and the ideals upon which it is based. One cannot remain loyal to the Constitution by being loyal to those who violate it. To create strong organizations, superiors, subordinates, and peers must embrace loyalty. One way that individuals demonstrate loyalty is by upholding all of the Army values. With those values as a foundation, loyalty is a two-way exchange: leaders earn loyalty and subordinates expect loyalty in return. Leaders earn subordinates' loyalty by training them well, treating them fairly, and living the Army Values. Subordinates demonstrate loyalty by working hard for their leaders and being as good as they can be at their jobs. Loyalty and trust enable the successful day-to-day operations of all organizations.

DUTY: FULFILL YOUR OBLIGATIONS—ALWAYS DO YOUR BEST.

2-7. All Soldiers and DA Civilians strive to do their best. Duty extends beyond law, regulation, and orders. Army professionals exercise initiative when they fulfill the purpose, not merely the letter, of received orders. Leaders take responsibility for their actions and those of their subordinates; it is inherent in their duty to the larger organization, the Army, and the Nation. Conscientious leaders and subordinates possess a sense of responsibility to apply their best efforts to accomplish the mission. This guides Soldiers and DA Civilians to do what is right to the best of their ability.

General Jonathan M. Wainwright Corregidor Captivity

The Japanese invaded the Philippines in December 1941. In March 1942, as General Douglas MacArthur evacuated to Australia, General Jonathan Wainwright assumed full command from the Malinta Tunnel on Corregidor Island.

Soon, the Japanese grip on the islands tightened and the Philippine defenders at Bataan were surrounded without any support other than artillery fire from Corregidor. Disease, exhaustion, and malnutrition ultimately accomplished what thousands of Japanese soldiers had not done for 90 days—Bataan was lost; more than 12,000 Filipino Scouts and 17,000 Americans became prisoners. Corregidor was in bad shape.

General Wainwright directed the defenses with the limited resources available, making frequent visits outside the tunnels to check on his men and to inspire them personally. He was never fearful of enemy fire. A tenacious warrior, he saw men next to him die and personally returned fire on the enemy. He was a unique frontline commander—a fighting general who earned the loyalty of his troops by sharing their hardships.

General Wainwright and his steadfast troops on Corregidor were the last organized resistance in the Philippines. After holding unsupported against the Japanese for a full six months, Wainwright had exhausted all possible means of resistance—no outside help could be expected.

On 6 May 1942, General Wainwright notified his command of his intent to surrender and sent a message to the President of the United States explaining the painful decision. He was proud of his country and his men and he had been forthright and loyal to both. His Soldiers had come to love, admire, and willingly obey the fighting general. President Roosevelt reassured General Wainwright in one of his last messages to him saying, “You and your devoted followers have become the living symbol of our war aims and the guarantee of victory.”

When the Japanese attempted to humiliate him personally by forcing him to march through the ranks of his defeated force, Wainwright’s Soldiers once again demonstrated loyalty and respect for their leader by struggling to their feet and saluting as he passed by.

During more than three years of captivity as the highest-ranking and oldest American prisoner of war in World War II, General Wainwright kept faith and loyalty with his fellow prisoners suffering deprivation, humiliation, abuse, and torture.

Despite his steadfast posture in captivity, he feared return to America, expecting to be considered a coward and a traitor for his Corregidor surrender. Americans at home remained loyal to the fighting general and his courageous troops. To honor him and his men, General Wainwright stood behind General MacArthur during the signing of Japan’s official surrender on the USS Missouri on 2 September 1945.

General Wainwright returned home to a hero’s welcome. During a surprise ceremony on 10 September 1945, President Truman awarded him the Medal of Honor.

RESPECT: TREAT PEOPLE AS THEY SHOULD BE TREATED.

2-8. The Army Values reinforce that all people have dignity and worth and must be treated with respect. The Nation was founded on the ideal that all are created equal. In the Army, each is judged by the content of their character. Army leaders should consistently foster a climate that treats everyone with dignity and respect, regardless of ethnicity, gender identity, sexual orientation, creed, or religious belief. Fostering a positive climate begins with a leader’s personal example. Leaders treat others, including adversaries, with respect.

The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army. It is possible to impart instruction and to give commands in such manner and such a tone of voice to inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he who feels, and hence manifests, disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.

Major General John M. Schofield
Address to the United States Corps of Cadets, 11 August 1879

SELFLESS SERVICE: PUT THE WELFARE OF THE NATION, THE ARMY, AND YOUR SUBORDINATES BEFORE YOUR OWN.

2-9. Selfless service means doing what is right for the Nation, the Army, the organization, and subordinates. While the needs of the Army and the Nation should come first, selfless service does not imply leaders should neglect their families or themselves. Unselfish, humble leaders set themselves apart as teammates who are approachable, trustworthy, and open to follower input and advice. Selfless leaders aspire to attain goals for the greater good, beyond their own interests and benefits.

HONOR: LIVE UP TO ARMY VALUES.

2-10. Living honorably, in line with the Army Values, sets an example for every member of the organization and contributes to an organization's positive climate and morale. How leaders conduct themselves and meet their obligations to the mission, other people, and the organization defines them as people and leaders.

Sergeant David B. Bleak Minari-gol, Korea—14 June 1952

SGT David B. Bleak, a medical aidman, volunteered to accompany a combat patrol tasked to capture enemy forces for interrogation. While moving up the rugged slope of Hill 499, the patrol came under intense automatic weapons and small arms fire multiple times, suffering several casualties. Enemy fired at SGT Bleak from a nearby trench while he tended the wounded.

Determined to protect the wounded, the brave aidman faced the enemy, entered the trench, and killed three enemy soldiers with his bare hands. While exiting, a concussion grenade fell in front of a fellow Soldier. Bleak shifted to shield him from the blast.

Disregarding his own injury, he carried the most severely wounded Soldier down the hillside. Attacked by two enemy soldiers, Bleak lowered the wounded man, put both adversaries out of action by slamming their heads together, and then carried the wounded American Soldier to safety.

SGT Bleak's courageous actions saved fellow Soldiers' lives and preserved the patrol's combat effectiveness. For his actions, President Dwight D. Eisenhower awarded him the Medal of Honor on 27 October 1953.

INTEGRITY: DO WHAT IS RIGHT, LEGALLY AND MORALLY.

2-11. Leaders of integrity consistently follow honorable principles. The Army relies on leaders who are honest in word and deed. Leaders of integrity do the right thing because their character permits nothing less. To instill the Army Values in others, leaders must demonstrate them. As an Army leader and a person of integrity, personal values should reinforce the Army Values.

Lieutenant Vernon Baker
Viareggio, Italy—5–6 April 1945

Lieutenant Vernon Baker of the 370th Infantry Regiment demonstrated leadership by example near Viareggio, Italy, during his company's attack against strongly entrenched German positions in mountainous terrain.

Fire from several machine gun emplacements stopped his company. LT Baker crawled to one position and destroyed it, killing three German soldiers. He then attacked an enemy observation post and killed two occupants. With the aid of one of his men, LT Baker continued the advance and destroyed two more machine gun nests, killing or wounding the soldiers occupying these positions. After consolidating his position, LT Baker finally covered the evacuation of the wounded personnel of his unit by occupying an exposed position and drawing the enemy's fire.

On the night following these events, LT Baker volunteered to lead a battalion advance through enemy minefields and heavy fire. Two-thirds of his company was wounded or dead and no reinforcements were in sight. His commander ordered a withdrawal. Baker protested that they could not withdraw; they had to stay and fight.

LT Baker stands as an inspiration to not only those who served with him. He stood courageously against the enemy and stood proudly to represent his fallen comrades when he received his Medal of Honor.

PERSONAL COURAGE: FACE FEAR, DANGER, OR ADVERSITY (PHYSICAL AND MORAL).

2-12. Personal courage is not the absence of fear; it is the ability to put fear aside and do what is necessary or right. Personal courage takes two forms: physical and moral. Effective leaders demonstrate both. Physical courage requires overcoming fears of bodily harm and doing one's duty. It triggers bravery that allows a Soldier to take risks in combat in spite of the fear of injury or death. For leaders, mission accomplishment may demand risking their own lives or those of Soldiers and justly taking the lives of enemies.

2-13. Moral courage is the willingness to stand firm on values, principles, and convictions. It enables all leaders to stand up for what they believe is right, regardless of the consequences. Leaders, who take full responsibility for their decisions and actions, even when things go wrong, display moral courage. Moral courage also expresses itself as candor—being frank, honest, and sincere with others. Carefully considered professional judgment offered to subordinates, peers, and superiors is an expression of personal courage.

**Warrant Officer Hugh C. Thompson, Jr.
My Lai, Vietnam—16 March 1968**

WO1 Hugh C. Thompson, Jr. and his two-man helicopter crew were on a reconnaissance mission over the village of My Lai, Republic of Vietnam. WO1 Thompson watched in horror as he saw an American Soldier shoot an injured Vietnamese child. Minutes later, he observed more Soldiers advancing on a number of civilians in a ditch. Suspecting possible reprisal shootings, WO1 Thompson landed his helicopter and questioned a young officer about what was happening. Told that the ground combat action was none of his business, he took off and circled the area.

When it became apparent to Thompson that the American troops were firing on more unarmed civilians, he landed his helicopter between the Soldiers and a group of villagers headed towards a homemade bomb shelter. Thompson ordered his gunner to train his weapon on the approaching Soldiers and to fire if necessary. Then he personally coaxed the civilians out of the shelter and airlifted them to safety.

WO1 Thompson's immediate radio reports about triggered a cease-fire order that ultimately saved the lives of many more villagers. Thompson's willingness to place himself in physical danger to do the ethically and morally right thing was a sterling example of personal and moral courage.

VALUES AND BELIEFS

2-14. Values and beliefs affect how people think and act. People join the Army from a society with diverse personal values and beliefs respected within the standards of legal and ethical behavior. Variation in upbringing, culture, religious belief, and tradition is reflected among those who choose to serve in the Army. Such diversity provides many benefits for a force globally engaged around the world. Good leaders value this diversity of outlook and experience and must treat all individuals with the inherent dignity and respect due every person. All leaders have the critical responsibility to ensure that subordinates adhere to the Army Values as well as standards consistent with the United States Constitution, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and Army rules and regulations.

2-15. The United States Constitution, which all Soldiers and DA Civilians swear to uphold and defend, reflects the Nation's values and is the legal foundation for both our government and the rights of individuals. At times, tensions can arise between individual beliefs protected by the Bill of Rights and the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice or other Army rules and regulations. If this tension arises, it often centers on issues of religious belief, which while protected by the Constitution in general, could conflict with a specific military rule or regulation. If such tension arises, commanders will lead their organizations consistent with the Army Values while making decisions pursuant to DOD and Army policies.

2-16. Values and beliefs create a foundation for ethical conduct. Adhering to the Army Values is essential to upholding high ethical standards of behavior. Unethical behavior quickly destroys organizational morale and cohesion—it undermines the trust and confidence essential to teamwork and mission accomplishment. Consistently doing the right thing for the right reasons forges strong character in individuals and expands to create a culture of trust throughout the organization.

Captain Humbert R. Versace Vietnam Captivity

Captain Humbert “Rocky” Versace was a West Point graduate assigned to the military assistance advisory group as an intelligence advisor during October 1963.

While accompanying a Civilian Irregular Defense Group engaged in combat operations, Versace and two fellow special forces Soldiers were taken prisoner.

They were forced to walk barefoot deep into the jungle. Once there, Versace assumed the position of senior prisoner and demanded the captors treat them as prisoners, not war criminals. He tried to escape four times, once crawling through the surrounding swamp until he was recaptured. He garnered most of the attention of the Viet Cong so that life was tolerable for his fellow prisoners. He was their role model.

He refused to violate the Code of Conduct, giving the enemy only information required by the Geneva Convention, which he would recite repeatedly.

When other Soldiers operated in those remote areas, they heard stories of Versace’s ordeal from local farmers. Speaking fluent Vietnamese and French, he would resist his captors loudly enough that local villagers could hear him. They reported seeing him led through the area barefoot with a rope around his neck, hands tied, and head swollen and yellow from jaundice. His hair had turned white from the physical stress. The farmers spoke of his strength, character, and commitment to God and country.

On 26 September 1965, after two years in captivity, he was executed in retaliation for three Viet Cong killed in Da Nang. Versace’s remains were never found, but a tombstone bearing his name stands above an empty grave in Arlington cemetery. Ironically, he was just weeks from leaving the Army to become a missionary before being captured. He wanted to return to Vietnam to help orphaned children. Most of all, he is remembered as someone with strong character and beliefs who never gave in. For his bravery, Versace received the Medal of Honor and induction into the Ranger Hall of Fame at Fort Benning.

ETHICAL REASONING

2-17. To be an ethical leader requires more than merely knowing the Army Values. Leaders must be able to live by them to find moral solutions to diverse problems. Ethical reasoning must occur in everything leaders do—in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations.

2-18. Ethical choices may not always be obvious decisions between right and wrong. Leaders use multiple perspectives to think about ethical concerns, applying them to determine the most ethical choice. One perspective comes from a view that desirable virtues such as courage, justice, and benevolence define ethical outcomes. A second perspective comes from a set of agreed-upon values or rules, such as the Army Values or Constitutional rights. A third perspective bases the consequences of the decision on whatever produces the greatest good for the greatest number as most favorable. Leaders able to consider all perspectives applicable to a particular situation are more likely to be ethically astute. When time is available, consulting peers and seniors is often helpful. Chaplains can provide confidential advice to leaders about difficult personal and professional ethical issues to encourage moral decisions in accord with personal conscience and the Army Values.

2-19. Leaders should not intentionally issue vague or ambiguous orders or instructions to avoid responsibility or accountability. Leaders have a responsibility to research relevant orders, rules, and regulations and to demand clarification of orders that could lead to criminal misinterpretation or abuse. Ultimately, Army leaders must accept responsibility for the consequences of their actions and the subordinates who execute the leader’s orders.

ETHICAL ORDERS

2-20. Making the right choice and acting when faced with an ethical question can be difficult. Sometimes the situation requires a leader to stand firm and disagree with a supervisor on ethical grounds. These occasions test one's character and moral courage. Situations in which any Army member thinks an order is unlawful can be the most difficult.

2-21. Under typical circumstances, a leader executes a superior leader's decision with enthusiasm. Unlawful orders are the exception: a leader has a duty to question such orders and refuse to obey them if clarification of the order's intent fails to resolve objections. If a Soldier perceives an order is unlawful, the Soldier should fully understand the order's details and original intent. The Soldier should seek immediate clarification from the person who issued the order before proceeding.

2-22. If the question is more complex, seek legal counsel. If an issue requires an immediate decision, as may happen in the heat of combat, make the best judgment possible based on the Army Values, personal experience, critical thinking, previous study, and prior reflection. Chances are, when a Soldier disobeys what may be an unlawful order, it may be the most courageous decision they make. The Soldier's Rules codify the law of war and outline ethical and lawful conduct in operations (see AR 350-1). They distill the essence of the law of war, the Army Values, and inform ethical conduct.

EMPATHY

2-23. Army leaders show empathy when they genuinely relate to another person's situation, motives, or feelings. Empathy does not mean sympathy for another, but a realization that leads to a deeper understanding. Empathy allows the leader to anticipate what others are experiencing and feeling and gives insight to how decisions or actions affect them. Leaders extend empathy to others in both their leader and follower roles. Leaders with a strong tendency for empathy can apply it to understand people at a deeper level. This applies to DA Civilians, Soldiers and their Families, local populations, victims of natural disasters, and enemy combatants. Empathy enhances cultural understanding and enables an Army leader to better interact with others.

2-24. Empathetic leaders are better communicators, help others to understand what is occurring, and inspire others to meet mission objectives. During operations, Army leaders gain empathy when they share hardships to gauge Soldier morale and combat readiness. They recognize the need to provide reasonable comforts and rest periods to maintain morale and accomplish the mission.

2-25. Army leaders recognize that empathy includes nurturing a close relationship between the Army and Army families. Army leaders at all levels should promote healthy families and relate to the challenges they face. Empathy for families includes providing recovery time from difficult missions, protecting leave periods, and supporting events that allow information exchange and family team building.

WARRIOR ETHOS AND SERVICE ETHOS

2-26. The Warrior Ethos, contained within the Soldier's Creed and italicized in the text below, represents the professional attitudes and beliefs that characterize the American Soldier. It reflects a Soldier's selfless commitment to the Nation, mission, unit, and fellow Soldiers. DA Civilians, while not Soldiers, embody the principles of the Warrior Ethos through a service ethos embedded within the Army Civilian Corps Creed that shapes their conduct with the same commitment. Leaders develop and sustain the Warrior Ethos through discipline, commitment to the Army Values, and pride in the Army's heritage. Embodied by Soldiers and supported by DA Civilians, the Warrior Ethos is the foundation for the esprit de corps that permeates the Army.

The Soldier's Creed

I am an American Soldier.
 I am a warrior and a member of a team.
 I serve the people of the United States, and live the Army Values.
I will always place the mission first.
I will never accept defeat.
I will never quit.
I will never leave a fallen comrade.
 I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills.
 I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.
 I am an expert and a professional. I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.
 I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.
 I am an American Soldier.

The Army Civilian Corps Creed

I am an Army Civilian—a member of the Army team.
 I am dedicated to our Army, Soldiers, and Civilians.
 I will always support the mission.
 I provide leadership, stability, and continuity during war and peace.
 I support and defend the Constitution of the United States and consider it an honor to serve our Nation and our Army.
 I live the Army values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage.
 I am an Army Civilian.

2-27. The Warrior Ethos requires unrelenting resolve to do what is right regardless of the mission. Understanding what is right requires respect for everyone involved in complex missions, such as stability or defense support of civil authorities operations. Ambiguous situations, such as when to use lethal or nonlethal force, are a test of the leader's judgment and discipline. The Warrior Ethos creates a collective commitment to succeed with honor.

2-28. The Warrior Ethos connects Soldiers of today with those whose sacrifices have sustained America's existence. The Warrior Ethos is crucial but Soldier commitment may be perishable. Consequently, the Army must continually affirm, develop, and sustain its Warrior Ethos. The key to the Warrior Ethos is a mindset developed through purposeful mental preparation. Growth in character, confidence, composure, mental agility, and resilience are outcomes of internalizing the Warrior Ethos, as well as the service ethos of DA Civilians.

Task Force Kingston Yongsong-ni, Korea—November 1950

Second Lieutenant Robert C. 'Joe' Kingston, a platoon leader in K Company, 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, was the lead element for his battalion's move northward. The terrain was mountainous in that part of Korea, the weather bitterly cold—the temperature often below zero—and the cornered enemy still dangerous.

LT Kingston inched his way forward, the battalion gradually adding elements to his force. Soon, he had anti-aircraft jeeps mounted with quad .50 caliber machine guns, a tank, a squad (later a platoon) of engineers, and an artillery forward observer under his control. Lieutenants who outranked him commanded some of the new attachments, as did the tactical air controller—a captain. LT Kingston remained in command; the battalion headquarters began referring to the growing force as "Task Force Kingston." Boggled down with casualties mounting, Task Force Kingston received reinforcements that brought its strength to nearly 300. LT Kingston's battalion commander wanted him to remain in command. One of the attached units was a rifle company, commanded by a captain. Nonetheless, the cooperative command arrangement worked because LT Kingston was a very competent leader.

Despite tough fighting, the force advanced. Hit while leading an assault on one enemy stronghold, Kingston managed to toss a grenade, just as a North Korean soldier fired a shot that glanced off his helmet. The lieutenant's resilience and personal courage inspired every Soldier from the wide array of units under his control.

DISCIPLINE

Discipline is the soul of an army.

George Washington

Commander, Continental Army (1775-81) and President of the United States (1789-97)

2-29. Discipline is essential to character, just as it is to an organization. All leaders must demonstrate self-discipline—the ability to control one's own behavior—to do the harder right over the easier wrong. Doing tasks to the established Army standard without deviation reflects discipline.

2-30. Individual discipline supports the unit or an organization. At the unit level, leaders maintain discipline by enforcing standards impartially and consistently. Often this involves attending to mundane details, which may seem less urgent than an organization's key tasks, but are necessary to ensure success. Examples include preventive maintenance checks and services, pre-combat checks and inspections, effective Command Supply Discipline Programs, Organizational Inspection Programs, and training management. When enforcing standards, Soldiers expect their leaders to do so in an impartial, transparent, just, and consistent manner.

Discipline in the Face of the Enemy Iraq—28 February 1991

About a half-hour prior to the cease-fire, a T-55 tank pulled up to an American Bradley unit that immediately prepared to engage with tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided (commonly called TOW) missiles. A vehicle section consisting of the platoon sergeant and his wingman tracked the Iraqi tank, ready to unleash two deadly shots. Suddenly, the wingman saw the T-55 stop; a head popped up from the commander's cupola. The wingman immediately radioed his platoon sergeant to hold fire, believing the Iraqi was about to dismount, possibly to surrender.

The Iraqi tank crew jumped out and ran behind a sand dune. Sensing something was off, the platoon sergeant immediately instructed his wingman to investigate the area, while he provided cover. To everyone's surprise, the wingman discovered 150 enemy combatants ready to surrender. To deal with this large number of prisoners, the Americans lined them up for disarming and checking for items of intelligence value. Then the unit called for prisoner of war handlers to pick the Iraqis up.

Before moving on, the platoon sergeant had to destroy the T-55. Before blowing it in place, the noncommissioned officer had the tank moved behind a sand berm to protect his people and the prisoners from the shrapnel of the on-board munitions.

When the tank suddenly exploded and the ammunition cooked-off, the prisoners panicked, believing the Americans would shoot them. Quickly, the Soldiers communicated that this would not happen, one saying, "Hey, we're from America, we don't shoot our prisoners!"

HUMILITY

2-31. Humility in its simplest form is the absence of arrogance. It is a sign of a leader being unselfish, working toward something more important than themselves. A person of high integrity, honesty, and character embodies the qualities of humility. For humility to apply, a leader must first have competence and confidence. A leader with the right level of humility is a willing learner, maintains accurate self-awareness, and seeks out others' input and feedback. Leaders are seen as humble when they are aware of their limitations and abilities and apply that understanding in their leadership.

2-32. Humility exists on a continuum. Too little humility represents arrogance or hubris, which may lead to overconfidence. Excess humility is problematic because it is interpreted as shyness, meekness, passivity, blind obedience, or timidity. Either extreme signals a lack of self-awareness that undermines followers' trust and confidence in the leader's ability to make good decisions, look out for the unit's welfare, and to achieve success.

2-33. It is difficult to judge our own humility. One's humility is largely determined by other people. It is a subjective perception of the leader. Humility is interpreted differently by different genders and cultures. Individuals need to guard against their biases and assess character based on the whole set of Army Values and attributes.

Table 2-1. Attributes associated with *CHARACTER*

Factors internal and central to a leader serving in either leader or follower roles that constitute an individual's character.	
Army Values	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Values are principles, standards, or qualities considered essential for successful leaders. • Guide leaders' decisions and actions in accomplishing missions, performing duty, and all aspects of life. • The Army has seven values applicable to all Army individuals: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage.
Empathy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Propensity to experience something from another person's point of view. • Ability to identify with and enter into another person's feelings and emotions, enabling clearer communications and better guidance. • Desire to care for and take care of Soldiers and others.
Warrior Ethos/ Service Ethos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal shared attitudes and beliefs that embody the spirit of the Army profession.
Discipline	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decisions and actions consistent with the Army Values; willing obedience to lawful orders
Humility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inherently motivated to support mission goals ahead of actions that are self-serving. • Possesses honest and accurate self-understanding. • Eager for input and feedback from others.

Chapter 3

Principles of Ethics for Government Employees

1. **Purpose:** This chapter provides IGs with a list of 14 ethics principles for government employees as described in Department of Defense (DoD) 5500.07-R, Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), and 5 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 2635.101(b) (incorporated by reference into chapter 2 of the JER).

2. **Principles of Ethics:** The following list of 14 principles represents the basic precepts of ethical behavior required for all who serve the Nation both in and out of uniform. Those principles are as follows:

a. Public service is a public trust, requiring employees to place loyalty to the Constitution, the laws, and ethical principles above private gain.

b. Employees shall not hold financial interests that conflict with the conscientious performance of duty.

c. Employees shall not engage in financial transactions using non-public Government information or allow the improper use of such information to further any private interest.

d. An employee shall not, except as permitted, solicit or accept any gift or other item of monetary value from any person or entity seeking official action from, doing business with, or conducting activities regulated by the employee's agency, or whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the employee's duties.

e. Employees shall put forth honest effort in the performance of their duties.

f. Employees shall not knowingly make unauthorized commitments or promises of any kind purporting to bind the Government.

g. Employees shall not use public office for private gain.

h. Employees shall act impartially and not give preferential treatment to any private organization or individual.

i. Employees shall protect and conserve Federal property and shall not use it for other than authorized activities.

j. Employees shall not engage in outside employment or activities, including seeking or negotiating employment, that conflict with official Government duties and responsibilities.

k. Employees shall disclose fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities.

l. Employees shall satisfy in good faith their obligations as citizens, including all just financial obligations, especially those -- such as Federal, State, or local taxes -- that are imposed by law.

m. Employees shall adhere to all laws and regulations that provide equal opportunity for all Americans regardless of race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or handicap.

n. Employees shall endeavor to avoid any actions creating the appearance that they are violating the law or the ethical standards set forth in this part.

Whether particular circumstances create an appearance that the law or these standards have been violated shall be determined from the perspective of a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts.

Chapter 4

Ethics Scenario and Practical Exercise

1. **Purpose:** This chapter provides IGs with an ethics scenario and practical exercise for in-class use.
2. **Practical Exercise:** A description of the issues and dilemmas associated with the scenario follows the practical exercise outlined below.

GENERAL SITUATION:

DATE: Today

PLACE: Fort Von Steuben.

YOUR IDENTITY: An Assistant IG at the Fort Von Steuben IG Office

YOUR MISSION: Identify any ethical dilemmas associated with the scenario outlined below.

One day, while dropping off an inspection report at HQ, you run into your friend, CPT Les Klew, who works in the Secretary of General Staff's (SGS) office. While there, CPT Klew asks if you've seen the new flyer that he just produced in the office for the upcoming Friends of Fort Von Steuben (FOFVS) Membership Campaign and Fundraiser Dinner Dance. Les explains that the Chief of Staff, Fort Von Steuben, made him the FOFVS Treasurer and official Fort Von Steuben liaison to the FOFVS. The Chief told him to provide "everything the Friends needed!" He even told Les how to vote on FOFVS board actions! The FOFVS really appreciated the work that CPT Klew had done and had presented him with a gold Seiko watch as an "end-of-tour" gift.

While listening to this information, you read the flyer. It announces the 3rd Annual FOFVS Membership Drive and Fundraiser dinner dance. At the bottom of the flyer is a note in the Commanding General's handwriting, which says, "One of the many great organizations supporting Soldiers and the Army -- See you on the High Ground!"

The flyer also notes that the door prizes for the Dinner Dance will be miniature busts of Baron Von Steuben donated by the Fort Von Steuben Director of Logistics (DOL) Machine shop.

CPT Klew then says, "Hey, you ought to come. It will be great ... dinner, dancing, the Division chorus, the Color Guard -- very cool, very hooah! In fact, the Chief told me that I had a mission to bring three buddies and their wives. We've even arranged to use the Chief's Government van and driver to pick us up in the housing area and drive to the club so we don't need designated drivers! Want to come?"

Something bothers you about this situation.

ISSUES:

Support to Private Organization (PO) (appointed as treasurer; provide "everything"; voting)
Conflict of Interest (Liaison)
Use of Government resources (flyer; Klew's time)
Gift (watch)
Use of Government Resources (statute; giving away)
Endorsement of PO and Fundraising (Commanding General?? Also raises senior-official issue)
Support to PO (Chorus; color guard, attendance "mission")
Use of non-tactical vehicle and driver

ETHICAL DILEMMA:

Loyalty (to Commanding General, Chief of Staff, and friend)
Duty (to report misdeeds)
Selfless Service - gifts and improper benefits
Honor - following the JER even when it hurts!
Integrity - internalizing the values
Personal Courage - What do you do now, IG?

Part 6

The Army Components' Inspectors General

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Introduction

Inspector General Support across the Army Components

1. **Introduction.** The U.S. Army, to include all components -- Active, National Guard, and Reserve – will operate together in a myriad of deployment capacities for the foreseeable future. The operational environment requires a high degree of flexibility and dexterity; organizations, leaders, and Soldiers must possess these attributes to transition seamlessly from offensive and defensive operations to stability and civil support operations in order to achieve decisive results. Army doctrine does not distinguish between the active and reserve components. While some capabilities may exist in one component and not another, the strength of the Army lies in the ability to blend the strengths and skills resident in each component to tailor the force necessary to ensure victory.

2. Inspectors General (IGs) are an integral element of each component. An IG is normally assigned to all general-officer commands. Additionally, you will find inspectors general assigned at the state level in the Joint Forces Headquarters, the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC). However, because the Army does not deploy by discrete units or components, but rather as modular packages, IGs of any one component must be prepared to execute IG functions as part of any other component.

3. In the early 1970s, General Creighton Abrams said, "If we are ever going to war again, we are going to take the reserves with us." More recently, Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) from 2003 to 2008, said, "When you call out the Guard, you call out America." The Army, and IGs by extension, executes missions in accordance with the Abrams Doctrine that emerged as a result of General Abrams's vision to ensure that the American public supported the next war.

4. While today's Army fights as a modular expeditionary team drawn from all components, members of one component are frequently unfamiliar with systems and regulatory requirements in other components. For example, there are differences in the personnel promotion systems, finance / pay systems, duty statuses, collective training availability, challenges for building and maintaining Family-support groups, and rear detachment support. These challenges are exacerbated when units are geographically separated at home station, or when an IG from parent organizations, higher headquarters, or component is not available. As an example, Soldiers often do not understand why one person gets promoted while deployed but not the other, creating perceived injustices that can grow and detract from unit readiness and warfighting capability. The bottom line is IGs must be prepared to work all issues -- AC, ARNG, and USAR -- arising in their task-organized command, no matter to which component the IG may belong.

5. This part of The IG Reference Guide is designed to provide a baseline of knowledge to prepare IGs to work with units and members of any component. The first part is a brief overview of each of the three uniformed components -- AC, ARNG, and USAR.

The second section addresses some of the common issues that confront IGs in the field by providing basic background information of the various systems, guidance on how to proceed, and point-of-contact information for each component's subject matter expert (SME). This section is not meant to be all-inclusive, since every case will be uniquely different. This information, however, will provide a starting point for all IGs seeking guidance to assist all complainants, regardless of which component the IG or the complainant may belong.

Chapter 1

Army Components

1. **Components.** The primary force structure of the U.S. Army incorporates the Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Component (RC). Component (COMPO) 1 is the Active Component (AC) or Regular Army (RA). The Reserve Component consists of Component 2, the Army National Guard (ARNG); and Component 3 is the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). The Constitution and the U.S. Code provide the legal basis for the various components (see Appendix B). A Multiple-Component (multi-compo) unit denotes a combination of any two or all three components integrated into one unit as defined on the Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) or Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). The flag or command of a multi-compo unit can be any of the three components.

2. **Component 1, Active Component (AC).** The Active Component, or Regular Army, is the federal force consisting of full-time Soldiers who are assigned to operational and institutional organizations engaged in the day-to-day Army missions. Congress determines the number of Soldiers the Army may maintain in the Regular Army.

a. The skills and organizations required for operations against contemporary threats are different from those required in the past. To meet these challenges, the Regular Army is configured to deploy rapidly and execute the first 30 days of an operation. In practice, this requirement means units of the Regular Army are organized, manned, equipped, and maintained to meet the nation's requirement for a full-time, rapidly deployable force capable of executing any mission across the full spectrum of operations.

b. Regular Army units were previously organized into division-centric units comprised of brigades and battalions augmented by supporting units as necessary. Field armies and corps were groups of divisions and supporting organizations. The Regular Army has transformed into a modular, brigade-centric organization organized to train and fight as part of a Joint force. Brigades are structured to be modular in nature to allow greater ability to tailor the force to meet the needs of any given situation. Brigades remain grouped under divisional headquarters and consist of subordinate battalions and companies. The notional organization of the 66th Infantry Division in Part 8 of this guide is representative of a current Regular Army mechanized divisional structure as of 2015.

c. The Regular Army consists of corps and divisions augmented by sustainment commands and separate brigades that provide specific operational capabilities. Unless deployed into a theater of operations, corps and divisional units report to Forces Command (FORSCOM) within the continental U.S. (CONUS), USARPAC in Alaska and Hawaii, USAREUR and Seventh Army in Europe, and EUSA and Eighth Army in Korea. In addition to conventional forces, the Regular Army provides the primary special-operations-capable units (both land and air) in support of U.S. Special Operations Command.

d. Army Regulation (AR) 10-87, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units, “prescribes the missions, functions, and command and staff relationships with higher, collateral headquarters, theater-level support commands, and agencies in the Department of the Army (DA) for Army Commands (ACOMs), Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), and Direct Reporting Units (DRUs).” ACOMs perform many Title 10 functions across multiple disciplines. ASCCs are primarily operational organizations that serve as Army components for combatant commands. Combatant Commanders can designate ASCCs as Joint Forces Land Component Commands (JFLCC) or Joint Task Forces (JTF). DRUs consist of one or more units with institutional or operational functions and provide broad, general support to the Army in a single, unique function.

e. Army IGs are assigned to Regular Army units in ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, corps, divisions, and selected separate brigades. IGs are also assigned to Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) centers and schools, Army Material Command (AMC) organizations (e.g., Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM)), Medical Command (MEDCOM) and its regional centers, and to other commands. Generally, IGs at a given installation are assigned to the Senior Commander on that installation. Only a few selected installations, such as Fort Belvoir, Fort Meade, and Fort Dix, have authorized IGs for the Garrison Commanders. Additionally, First Army, which has training and mobilization support requirements for Reserve Component organizations within continental United States (CONUS), has an assigned IG.

3. Component 2, Army National Guard (ARNG). The Army National Guard of the United States is an operational force that consists of federally recognized units and organizations of the ARNG. The ARNG has a dual mission that includes federal and state roles. In its federal role, sometimes referred to as Title 10, the ARNG provides trained units able to mobilize quickly for war, national emergencies, or other federal missions. The ARNG receives federal resources to meet its Title 10 requirements. In its state or Title 32 role, it prepares for domestic emergencies and other missions as required by state law. ARNG Soldiers serve as first responders within states during emergencies. Additionally, under Title 32, the ARNG provides forces for full-time support to homeland defense duty. Each of the 50 states, plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, are authorized ARNG units.

a. According to Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5105.77, “The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is a joint activity and is the channel of communications on all matters pertaining to the National Guard, between (1) the Departments of the Army and the Department of the Air Force, and (2) the several states.” The Chief, NGB, is a four-star general. The Secretaries of the Army and Air Force jointly develop and prescribe a charter for the NGB that covers the following matters: Administration; unit structure; strength authorizations; training and discipline; acquisition, supply, and accountability of property and equipment. While unit organization and structure is a federal matter, the states and territories retain the authority via their Adjutant General, to fix the location of units and headquarters within their states. The Secretaries of the Army and Air Force detail Regular or Active Component commissioned officers and NCOs to duty with the National Guard of each state to facilitate, assist, and, under some provisions, command National Guard organizations.

b. State executives, normally the governor, are commanders-in-chief of National Guard units, unless mobilized for federal missions. The governor normally

executes command responsibilities through The Adjutant General (TAG) and Joint Forces Headquarters. Enlisted members of the ARNG are federally recognized when they enlist in a federally recognized organization and meet the qualification requirements for their position, grade, branch, and type of organization. Officers obtain federal recognition by graduating from a military academy or officer's training camp under the supervision of an active component commissioned officer and meet the requirements for promotion and grade as specified in Title 10.

c. ARNG operational units are organized in the same manner as their active-component counterparts based on unit type and echelon of command. However, chains of command may be geographically separated and cross state lines. This fact, in conjunction with limited training time and resources, creates challenges in achieving a high degree of collective training the Active Component does not routinely face. There are currently eight divisions and numerous separate brigade and regimental organizations assigned to the ARNG.

d. IGs are assigned to the NGB, divisions, and selected separate brigades in the ARNG just as in the Active Component. Additionally, Active Component officers are assigned as State IGs in the various states and territories. The State IG normally works directly for TAG and is senior-rated by the Chief, NGB.

4. Component 3, United States Army Reserve (USAR). The U.S. Army Reserve is the Army's primary Federal Reserve force. The USAR includes all members of the reserve component not assigned to the ARNG. As an operational reserve, the USAR is organized to complement the Active Component by providing specialized units, capabilities, mobilization augmentees, and resources needed to deploy and sustain Army forces at home and overseas. The USAR is a major source of operational and force-sustainment formations trained and equipped to deploy with the other Army components in support of Title 10 mobilization authorities.

a. The senior military official in the USAR has two missions: Commanding General of the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC); and Chief, Army Reserve (CAR). USARC is a DRU to FORSCOM and commands all USAR units in CONUS not assigned to another command. Some examples of units not assigned to USARC are medical units assigned to their respective functional Active Component commands and Army Reserve units in Europe assigned to the 7th Mission Support Command and reporting to U.S. Army European Command. Army Reserve units in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan fall under the 9th Mission Support Command, unless assigned to functional commands. The Readiness Divisions (RDs) provide operational support on a regional basis to Operational and Functional Commands within the USAR.

b. IGs are assigned to USARC, the RDs, selected functional organizations, and specific reserve component installations such as Fort McCoy. The USAR is always in a federal status though its members are not always in a duty status. Therefore, USAR IGs can inspect, assist, and investigate all issues of Army interest within the USAR in accordance with guidance in AR 20-1.

5. Organizational Structure. Due to the rapid reorganization of the Army, a detailed command-and-control structure in this guide will only be a snapshot at a given time. The most current versions at the time of publication of this guide are in Appendix C.

These representations do not show the re-alignments of command often experienced during mobilizations and deployments.

6. Other Components of the Army.

a. **COMPO 4 - Not Resourced.** These are units that are required but not resourced in order to support higher priority requirements.

b. **COMPO 5 - Units not "Matched."** These are existing units that are not currently required (or "matched") by a combatant commander requirement.

c. **COMPO 6 - Army Prepositioned Sets.** Unit equipment sets forward deployed ashore and afloat to reduce deployment times.

d. **COMPO 7 - Direct Host Nation Offsets.** Augmentation provided by a host nation through a treaty or other agreement.


e. **COMPO 8 - Indirect Host Nation Offsets.** Augmentation provided by a host nation that is not specifically agreed upon but generally expected.

f. **COMPO 9 - Logistical Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).** This is an augmentation of support provided by domestic and foreign firms to the force structure.

Chapter 2

Categories of the Reserve Components

1. **Categories.** Individual participation in the Reserve Components is achieved through a variety of methods. Soldiers have the option to affiliate themselves, depending on their particular military qualifications and contractual obligations, with any of the different reserve categories. Depending on the Soldier's selected category, he or she may fall under a different command-and-control structure, which could change the IGs approach when resolving complaints presented by the individual. The illustration below shows the three major categories of the Nation's total reserve manpower: Standby Reserve, Ready Reserve, and Retired Reserve.



2. **Standby Reserve.** The Standby Reserve consists of trained and Military Occupational Specialty Qualified (MOSQ) personnel who have mobilization potential yet maintain their military affiliation without being in the Ready or Retired Reserve. Typically, they have been designated as key civilian employees or have a temporary hardship or disability. Examples of Standby Reserve Soldiers are Members of Congress, judges, and Department of the Army Civilians (DACs) who hold positions at mobilization stations and who, in their civilian capacities, are considered essential to national security. These individuals are not required to perform training and are not members of RC units. They represent a pool of trained individuals who have completed their statutory obligation and who choose to remain affiliated with the Army.

a. The Standby Reserve represents a pool of trained individuals who have completed their statutory service obligation and who choose to remain affiliated with the Army. They are not required to perform training and are not members of RC units. Standby Reserve categories include:


(1) Active Status List: Soldiers on the Active Status List may participate in Reserve training activities at no expense to the Government, earn retirement points, and be eligible for promotion. This category consists primarily of Soldiers who are temporarily medically disqualified, have a temporary hardship, reside overseas or have a missionary

obligation, have been designated as key employees, or have been approved under the provisions of AR 135-133 or by Secretarial authority.

(2) **Inactive Status List:** Soldiers on the Inactive Status List may not train for pay or retirement points and are not eligible for promotion. This category consists of individuals who possess the skills required for active duty in a time of war or national emergency. This category also consists of designated key employees who do not request assignment to the Active Status List and general officers that no longer have a valid position commensurate with their grade.

b. In time of war or national emergency declared by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law, the Standby Reserve may be involuntarily mobilized for the duration plus six months.

3. **Ready Reserve.** The Ready Reserve consists of units of both the USAR and ARNG and individuals subject to active duty to augment the active forces in time of war or national emergency. The three sub-categories of the Ready Reserve are Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), Inactive National Guard (ING), and the Selected Reserve.



a. **Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).** In the event of a major or protracted operational contingency, the IRR is the principal source of trained individuals for military manpower shortages in the active and reserve components. IRR members bring both active and reserve units to wartime strength, replace unskilled personnel in critical positions, and provide an initial source of replacements. The IRR is comprised principally of MOSQ or partially qualified individuals who have previously served in the AC or in the selected reserve. IRR Soldiers either have some portion of their Military Service Obligation (MSO) remaining or voluntarily remain in the IRR beyond their obligation. Special non-pay programs provide IRR members a variety of professional assignments and opportunities for earning retirement points and benefits. Members of the IRR are subject to active duty (AD) for training and fulfillment of mobilization requirements. IRR categories include:

(1) Control Group (Annual Training): Personnel with some type of training requirement remaining on their initial obligation and less than 36 months of active duty.

(2) Control Group (IMA): Non-unit Soldiers who are assigned to authorized augmentation positions documented on Active Army organization Tables of Distribution

and Allowances (TDAs). These Soldiers are considered available for mobilization or national emergency and are required to perform at least 14 days of Annual Training (AT) per year.

(3) Control Group (Reinforcement): Personnel who may or may not have completed their initial service obligation.

(4) Control Group (Officer Active Duty Obligator): Officers who have been selected for active duty (AD) but who do not enter AD at the time of appointment. This group includes officers who request educational delay to attend graduate school, law school, seminary, etc.

(5) Control Group (Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)): This group includes contracted cadets in the Senior ROTC Program who have enlisted in the USAR.

(6) Control Group (Delayed Training Program (DTP)): Enlisted personnel who are awaiting initial active duty. These individuals cannot participate in reserve training.

(7) Control Group (Active Guard and Reserve (AGR)): Officer and enlisted personnel assigned to the Active Guard and Reserve Program (AGR).

b. **Inactive National Guard (ING)**. The ING consists of members of the ARNG in an inactive status. Although attached to a specific unit for administrative purposes, they are not part of the Selected Reserve and do not participate in unit training activities and, hence, do not train for points and / or pay and are not eligible for promotion. Their personnel and pay records are maintained in their state. To remain in ING status, members must muster once a year with their assigned unit in their states for which they receive inactive duty training pay. They are available for involuntary active duty with the declaration of partial mobilization or a higher level of mobilization. Whereas IRR Soldiers are ordered to active duty as individuals, ING Soldier are ordered to active duty as members of the ARNG units to which they are attached.

c. **Selected Reserve**. The Selected Reserve is composed of units and individuals designated by the Army and approved by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as essential to wartime missions. They have priority for training, equipment, and personnel over other reserve elements. The Selected Reserve consists of Soldiers who are classified as trained individuals assigned to National Guard units, USAR Troop Program Units (TPUs), Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), or Soldiers serving in an Active Guard Reserve status. Selected Reserve members are paid for their military service through Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and various forms of Active Duty (AD), e.g., Active Duty for Training (ADT), and Active Duty for Operational Support (ADOS). Unit members are assigned to MTOE or TDA organizations and normally perform, at a minimum, 48 inactive-duty training assemblies and 14 days annual training per year.

4. **Retired Reserve**. The Retired Reserve comprises all RC officers and enlisted Soldiers who receive retirement pay or who are eligible to receive retirement pay upon reaching age 60 ("Gray Area" retirees) or earlier. Active Component retirees are included in the Retired Reserve. All retirees are subject to involuntary recall to active duty. Retirees represent a resource of trained individuals who may augment support and training facilities, relieve Active Component or Ready Reserve members for other duties, or perform operational missions as needed during a period of national emergency.

Chapter 3

Status and Compensation

1. To facilitate resolution of complaints, the IG will require a basic understanding of the different statuses within the various components, especially for matters concerning pay, chain of command, etc. AC basically has one status for pay -- Active Duty. However, RC has two categories of training status, Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and Active Duty, which have different rules of compensation for pay and retirement benefits.

2. **AC Training Status.** The AC is always active duty, receiving full pay and entitlements for every day of the year. Each day of federal active duty counts towards retirement eligibility. Pay includes base pay, housing allowance, and other specialty pay depending on the location and assignment of the Soldier. After successfully completing 20 years of federal active duty, the individual is entitled to full retirement benefits starting immediately upon retirement from active duty.

3. **RC Training Status.** The RC has two primary categories of training status -- Inactive Duty and Active Duty. These statuses are explained below. Each of these two categories is comprised of a number of statuses.

a. **RC Inactive Duty Training (IDT) Pay and Retirement Points.** Members of the Selected Reserve typically receive one day's basic pay (plus any entitled special pay) for each Unit Training Assembly (UTA) or Inactive Duty Training (IDT) period attended -- a day's pay for every four hours. IDT pertains to an individual's training status, pay status, and types of unit training. IDT is normally performed one weekend per month consisting of 16 hours (i.e., four day's pay). Soldiers performing this duty are authorized to receive IDT pay without duty orders. Soldiers are members of a reserve or guard unit and paid based upon authorized IDT periods. The IDT period must be at least four hours in duration. Pay for this duty is based upon grade and years of service. This pay equates to 1/30th of the active component's monthly base pay. Allowances (BAH, BAS, etc.) are not paid during IDT. Members receive one retirement point for each four hours of duty performed. A maximum of 90 IDT points are allowed per year for retirement.

(1) **Unit Training Assembly (UTA).** An authorized and scheduled IDT of at least four hours. A Soldier may perform no more than two UTAs within a 24-hour period. A UTA is equal to one day's active base pay with no allowances or one retirement point, or both. Each unit member is authorized a minimum of 48 UTAs in a year. USAR Soldiers may not exceed 48 UTAs during any calendar year.

(2) **Multiple-Unit Training Assemblies (MUTA).** The IDT period has more than one UTA. A MUTA-4 is a typical IDT weekend that consists of a full Saturday and Sunday. There can also be MUTA-2s, MUTA-3s, and MUTA-5s.

(3) **Split-Unit Training Assembly (SUTA).** SUTAs are used primarily in the ARNG. Soldiers of the same unit perform IDT at separate times, locations, or both.

(4) **Additional Training Assembly (ATA).** Funds used to support additional unit training requirements. ATAs are closely controlled due to fiscal constraints. One ATA equals four hours of duty, one day of active-duty pay, and one retirement point.

(5) **Readiness Management Assembly (RMA).** Funds used to augment full-time staff. RMAs can be used for administrative or maintenance requirements. RMAs are closely controlled due to fiscal constraints. One RMA equals four hours of duty, one day of active duty pay, and one retirement point. RMAs may not be combined with any other type of duty during the same day.

b. **RC Active Duty Training Pay and Retirement Points.** During periods of active-duty training (such as Annual Training), members of the Selected Reserve receive basic pay plus all allowances such as those for subsistence (BAS) and quarters (BAH). Total retirement points for a year are computed by adding all retirement points accrued from AD, IDT, and correspondence courses. One retirement point is accrued for each day of active duty.

(1) **Active Duty (AD).** Primarily used for collective-unit training. AD is also used for special projects, authorized military schools, and unit-support requirements. One active-duty day equals one day's pay with allowances. It also equates to one retirement point. This duty is performed in Title 10 status, so the Soldier is subject to the UCMJ.

(2) **Annual Training (AT).** Annual training is two weeks of active duty where RC units perform collective training as a unit. Some units, normally headquarters elements, are authorized to perform fragmented ATs spread out over the calendar year. Annual training may be used for authorized military schooling.

(3) **Initial Active Duty Training (IADT).** Initial training for RC personnel consists of basic training and advanced individual training or Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC). This training is performed with full allowances and can be performed as split training (BCT and AIT).

(4) **Active Duty for Training (ADT).** ADT is used for RC members enrolled in a military service school or DoD-approved school. It is used for MOS qualification or special-skills training. These funds are available for officers and enlisted personnel. The ARNG Soldier performs this training in a Title 32 status.

(5) **RC-Active Duty for Operations Support (ADOS).** This type of duty is used for temporary special-work projects for the ARNG or USAR. It is not intended to be used to fill full-time support personnel shortages. ADOS was formerly known as Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW).

(6) **Active Duty for Active Guard and Reserve (AGR).** Active Guard and Reserve Soldiers receive pay much like the Active Component Soldiers. ARNG AGR Soldiers can be in either Title 32 or Title 10 status. Both Title 32 and Title 10 AGRs receive pay from federal funding. USAR AGR Soldiers are always Title 10, federal duty status. Pay is for every day of the year while on AGR status, including housing, and certain other allowances depending on the individual's entitlements, as well as accruing leave. After 20 years of active service, the Soldier is entitled to full retirement benefits upon retiring from the Army and does not have to wait until age 60.

4. Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) Personnel. The Army recognizes that “Civilians are [an] integral part of United States Army and support all facets of the Army mission [...]. Additionally, Civilians possess critical skills which assure continuity of operations for all components.”

a. **Military Reserve Technician (MilTech) Program.** “An excepted service civilian employee who --

- Must maintain military membership in the Selected Reserve as a condition of employment, and
- Must be assigned to a position as a technician in the administration and training of the Selected Reserve, or to a position in the maintenance and repair of supplies or equipment issued to the Selected Reserve.

Military Reserve Technicians appointed after 1 Dec[ember] [19]95 must maintain military membership in the Selected Reserve Unit by which they are employed.

Any Military Reserve Technician who is involuntarily separated (not for cause) with 15 [to] 20 years [of] service can be provided placement consideration in the competitive service for positions with up to the same rate of basic pay held before separation and for which the individual is fully qualified (Title 5 USC 3329).

See also National Guard Technician (Title 32 USC 709): An excepted service civilian employee who, as a condition of employment, must maintain membership in the Army National Guard.”

(1) **National Guard Military Technicians.** “The Technician Program is responsible for organizing, administering, instructing, and training Soldiers in addition, the program is responsible for the maintenance of equipment for the entire Army National Guard (ARNG). These essential duties are outlined in Title 32 United States Code (USC), Section 709 and Title 10 USC, Section 10217. The Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) approved the Army National Guard's Military Technician (MilTech) Program for 28,810 technicians across the 50 states, the three territories, and the District of Columbia. The NDAA further defines a floor of 27,210 Dual-Status (DS) Technicians and 1,600 Non-Dual Status (NDS) Technicians.” NDAA 2022, Section 413, prescribes 22,294 non-dual status as the minimum, and 25% over that number as the maximum for Dual Status.

“Army National Guard MilTechs are classified as Dual Status (DS) technicians DS technicians are federal civilian employees under 32 USC 709 that must maintain membership in the NG. DS technicians are responsible to organize, administer, or train Guard members. DS technicians are required to wear their military uniforms while performing their Civilian duties. Non-Dual Status (NDS) are not considered MilTechs, because they are Title 5 Civilian employees of the Department of Defense (DoD) who are also employed under 32 USC 709. NDS technicians do not have to maintain membership in the National Guard and they provide valuable continuity within their respective states and territories especially when performing support functions without deployment interruptions.”

(2) **Army Reserve Military Technicians.** “The objectives of the Military Technician (MT) Program are to:

- Assist in the achievement of maximum mobilization and combat readiness of USAR troop program units through the employment of civilians.
- Use military technicians in a dual civilian / military capacity. The use of civilian employees who are military reservists of the Troop Program Unit (TPU) to which assigned as civilians will ensure that —

(a) Technicians are available at regularly scheduled training assemblies in a USAR military status that parallels their unit TOE / TDA assignment.

(b) Technicians deploy as military personnel with their unit upon mobilization.

(c) Skill levels needed for mobilization are maintained.”

b. Categories of Civilian Personnel.

(1) **Appropriated Fund (APF) Civilians.** “The term appropriated funds refers to those funds provided by Congress, normally in annual Defense Appropriations Act legislation. U.S. citizens and eligible U.S. aliens are paid from APFs and are managed within a structure of federal civil service laws. APF employees are further divided into two categories based on the nature of work performed. Military-function civilians perform support duties associated directly with the Army’s National Military Strategy (NMS) objectives. Civil-function civilians perform duties associated with the Army’s civil works program, administered by the Army Corps of Engineers. The laws governing APF employees are administered by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM).”

(2) **Non-appropriated Funds (NAF) Civilians.** “NAF Employees are paid from funds generated from sales, fees, and charges to authorized patrons. This category is comprised of U.S. civilians, foreign nationals (usually from the local labor market), and enlisted service personnel working part time during off-duty hours. All compete for employment on the basis of merit.”

(3) **Foreign / local national civilians.** “The Army also employs foreign and local nationals in both APF and NAF positions in overseas areas. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in effect with a given host country forms the basis of the employment systems for these employees. Within this framework, employee administration must be consistent with host country practices, U.S. law, and the management needs of the Army. In some cases the host government may reimburse the salary and associated personnel cost in whole or in part.”

Chapter 4

Pay

1. **Introduction.** Pay issues are one of the leading causes of frustration among Soldiers and can consume a lot of IG time. Common causes for pay issues include Soldier or command errors and dealing with different pay systems. For example, ARNG Soldiers may change pay systems depending upon the type of transaction and status the Soldier is in at the time. Prior to contacting the United States Army Financial Management Command (USAFMCOM), ARNG personnel should be referred to their state United States Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO) for assistance.

2. Pay Systems:

a. **Defense Joint Military Pay System-Active Component (DJMS-AC).** This system is used to pay Active Army and AGR Soldiers. DJMS-AC supports allotments of pay. Once loaded onto this system, a Soldier automatically is paid every month until separation. Pay dates are the 1st and 15th of the month.

b. **Defense Joint Military Pay System-Reserve Component (DJMS-RC).** This system is used to pay traditional (Title 32) ARNG Soldiers (to include National Guard technicians) and USAR Soldiers (Title 10) for Inactive Duty Training (IDT), AT, and all other periods of active duty, to include mobilization. Unlike DJMS-AC, some type of transaction must be inputted in order for the system to generate pay. This system does not support pay allotments.

c. **Integrated Personnel and Pay System – Army (IPPS-A).** IPPS-A is a Web-enabled Personnel and Pay / Human Resources (HR) management system that (when fully implemented) standardizes, streamlines, and shares critical data across the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. For more information, visit the Web site at <https://www.ipps-a.army.mil/>.

d. **Defense Travel System (DTS).** Though not a pay system covering basic pay, DTS is used by all components to cover travel, including flight tickets, hotels, and per diem. The DTS Web site is <http://www.defensetravel.osd.mil/dts/site/index.jsp>.

3. **Common Pay Issues.** The Soldier can initiate resolution to most pay problems by working the issue through the chain of command. A useful tool is the DA Form 2142, Pay Inquiry, submitted by the Soldier through the command to the local finance office.

The IG can check with the local finance point of contact, who should be the DMPO (Defense Military Pay Office) Chief, Chief Military Pay, Detachment Sergeant / Commander, CSM, or Battalion Commander. Most military pay cases that are less than 12 months old should be resolved with the local finance office. The USAFMCOM IG is appropriate if military pay cases are more than 12 months old or if related to DFAS travel. Another option for Soldiers is the ARNG Pay Ombudsman, toll free at 1-877-ARNGPAY or ARNG-MILPAY@ARNG-FSC.NGB.ARMY.MIL, or the USAR Pay Inquiry Hotline, toll free, at 1-877-462-7782. Some common problem areas follow:

- a. **Travel Payments.** Travel payments should be processed through the Defense Travel System (DTS). In the event of a hard copy DD Form 1351-2, Travel Voucher or sub-voucher, verify accuracy and completeness, to include signatures in blocks 20.a., 20.b., 21.a.; all orders and amendments; and receipts showing the "paid" status. Also, problems could arise when crossing the Fiscal Year (FY) -- New Line of Accounting.
- b. **Debts.** To resolve debts, include the following supporting documents as needed: documents that originated the debt (if known), orders / amendments, travel vouchers with backup documentation, DA Form 5960 (BAH) with backup documentation, statement of charges or financial liability investigations of property loss, documents that refute the debt, and / or cash-collection voucher.
- c. **Support Cases (Garnishments).** Supporting documents include the court order and SSN for the Soldier and ex-spouse / child's parent. The requestor for the support may not receive the full amount of court-ordered support / alimony since the limit for garnishment is 50 percent of the Soldier's 'disposable earnings if the Soldier is remarried and supporting a spouse and / or dependent child and 60 percent if the Soldier is single. Add five percent to those limits if the order states that the Soldier is 12 or more weeks behind in support payment. The individual requesting the support should work directly with the Commander or DFAS for garnishment of the Soldier's pay. (15 U.S.C., Section 1673)
- d. **Service Date Corrections.** The personnel officer needs to sign the complete and correct DA Form 1506, Statement of Service – For Computation of Length of Service for Pay Purposes, and include pay date (PEBD) and total active federal military service date (TAFMSD), contracts, orders, and all DD Form 214(s). Process this packet through the local Finance office, which submits it through the Case Management System to the Soldier Record Data Center (SRDC). SRDC verifies service dates and forwards it to DFAS through the Case Management System for processing. Note: Credible service is not accrued for students at service academies.
- e. **Retired Recall Pay.** The retiree-recalled Soldier pay accounts are placed in a non-entitled pay status with any accounts over six months manually rebuilt.
- f. **Retired Pay.** Retired pay issues can include Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) and Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC). SBP is an insurance plan that will pay the surviving spouse a monthly payment (annuity) to help make up for the loss of the retirement income. Unfortunately, sometimes the current spouse is not the one listed on the SBP documents, so the pay goes to the previous spouse as designated in the insurance. CRSC are additional funds designed to compensate for the reduction of military retired pay due to the receipt of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) compensation (also known as the VA waiver). With CRSC, the individual can receive either partial or full concurrent receipt of the military retirement pay and the VA disability compensation.
- g. **Leave.** Common leave issues for Reserve Components include leave earned, taken, or sold when demobilized. Common leave issues for the AC include erroneous periods of leave charged, not paid for leave days sold, or lost leave though Special Leave Accrual (SLA). To look into any of these issues, ask for copies of leave form(s),

leave control log(s), reenlistment paperwork, a memorandum from the Commander specifying if leave was taken and, if SLA, a copy of the SLA-approval memorandum.

h. **Civilian Pay.** When assisting Civilian Pay cases, please ensure the complainant has gone to his / her customer service representative (CSR) office for assistance first. These cases must be opened on their behalf by their customer service representative and forwarded to DFAS. All cases are assigned a Remedy number for tracking purposes.

4. RC Pay Issues During the Mobilization and Demobilization Process. There are several stages to the mobilization, deployment, and demobilization process. You should know what the phases are, what finance actions will take place, and who is responsible for each phase.

a. **Home-Station Processing.** Each state and USAR MSC conducts a Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP) check for the unit at home station. During the SRP, Soldiers in-process into active duty. One station will have finance personnel from the United States Property and Fiscal Office (USPFO for ARNG) or the USAR MSC, who will review the Soldier's pay account and ensure the Soldier is being properly paid all entitlements based on the supporting documentation. It is critical that Soldiers have copies of all the following documents with them:

- (1) SF 1199A Direct-Deposit Form
- (2) TD Form IRS W-4 and state tax withholding
- (3) DA Form 5960 (BAH, with lease / mortgage)
- (4) DA Form 4187 (COLA)
- (5) SGLV Form 8286 SGLI / Family SGLI 8286A
- (6) DD Form 1561 (Family Separation Allowance)
- (7) DD Form 2367 (OHA)
- (8) Orders supporting any special or incentive pay
- (9) Marriage / Divorce / Birth certificates

b. **Mobilization Station Processing.** Soldiers will continue to in-process at the mobilization station. Their finance personnel will review the finance records again and check their pay account to make sure that the USPFO or USAR MSC started all entitlements. Soldiers will have an opportunity at this station to make corrections to their pay.

c. **Deployment Site.** This is where Soldiers will be performing their mission. Soldiers may move to more than one deployment site while mobilized. While at the deployment site, if the Soldier has any pay problems, the Soldier should make the first-line supervisor aware of the problem and seek assistance from the unit administrative staff. Most units have a Soldier assigned to act as a liaison between the Soldier with the

pay problem and the servicing finance office. The active-duty servicing finance office is responsible to ensure all authorized entitlements are paid in a timely manner, to include theater-specific entitlements. As an IG dealing with a pay problem, get the chain-of-command involved as soon as possible.

d. **Demobilization Station Processing.** When Soldiers are released from active duty (REFRAD) and reassessed into the ARNG or USAR at the demobilization station, be sure all copies of all documents that authorize their entitlements are on hand. Each Soldier's pay account will be reviewed for accuracy, and any required adjustments will be made. If there are any unresolved pay problems, this is the place to resolve them. Paying Soldiers in a timely and efficient manner requires coordinated actions among several offices. All Soldiers have a basic responsibility to do everything they can to ensure that their pay is correct.

e. **Home Station.** At home station, unit or MSC officials review Soldier pay accounts, assist in preparing final travel vouchers for submission to the USAFMCOM, provide entitlements briefings, and resolve any remaining pay issues.

5. **United States Army Financial Management Command (USAFMCOM).** The Finance Command is one of the largest finance organizations in the world, spread out over several locations: Indianapolis (USAFMCOM IG Liaison Office; Army, Air Force, and Civilian pay; Contingency Travel), Cleveland (Retiree and Navy pay, garnishments), Columbus (Vendor Pay, Travel), and Rome, New York (AD Travel). The Indianapolis facility houses the IG Liaison Office, which is currently manned with two Army IG NCOs providing tech-channel support to field IGs. If the local IG has exhausted the support provided by the local finance office, the IG can contact the USAFMCOM IGs, preferably through email at fincomig@dfas.mil or fincomig@ignet.army.mil, for further assistance.

Chapter 5

Incapacitation Pay

1. **Incapacitation Pay (INCAP).** This is an RC-unique program designed to provide financial relief to members who are physically injured, become ill, or contract a disease during any officially determined duty (IDT, AT or AD) or in a duty-related travel status as defined by AR 135-381, paragraph 1-5 or 1-6, resulting in an inability to perform normal military duties or a demonstrated loss of military income. Prerequisites of entitlement to incapacitation pay are inability to perform normal military duties or satisfactory demonstration of loss of non-military earned income. In the latter case, the Soldier bears the burden to prove the loss. Incapacitation Pay is approved by the USAR Soldier's Readiness Division (RD) for the first 180 days. Requests beyond the first 180 days require USARC approval. ARNG Soldier approval authority is the state's Human Resource Officer (HRO) and NGB-HRP with claims submitted each month through the Soldier's administrative channels. A Line-of-Duty Investigation (LODI) has to be completed for all INCAP requests.

2. **INCAP Pay Requirements:**

a. Three basic requirements must be met in order for Soldiers to be eligible for INCAP pay:

- (1) The injury or physical malady must result in loss of income to the Soldier.
- (2) The injury or physical malady must preclude the Soldier from performing his or her civilian or military duties.
- (3) A Line of Duty Investigation (LODI) must be conducted / approved and results in an "LOD - YES" determination by an Active Component medical doctor.

b. Other requirements and issues surrounding INCAP pay are as follows:

- (1) Applicable references: AR 135-381, Incapacitation of Reserve Component Soldiers, AR 40-3, AR 600-8-1 (LOD), NGR 37-104-1, AR 135-200.
- (2) Maximum amount payable for any given period is an amount equivalent to military pay and allowances for the period.
- (3) Claims must be submitted and processed on a monthly basis following the month requested and are managed through command G-1 channels.
- (4) Commanders of Readiness Divisions have the authority to approve up to 180 days of incapacitation pay. For claims over 180 days, the approval authority is USARC.
- (5) Formal LODIs may be required for conditions such as heart attacks, stroke, genetic diseases, or previously existing conditions.
- (6) Requires re-validation by an AC doctor every three months.

Chapter 6

Other Personnel Actions

1. **Personnel Acquisition.** There are different methods by which Soldiers are accessed into the various Army components at different ranks.

a. Enlistment of Soldiers directly from civilian life is a straightforward process: The individual enlists for an eight-year obligation in the Active Component, USAR, or ARNG and is contractually obligated to serve some portion in an Active, ARNG, or TPU unit (normally four to six years). The individual attends basic combat training (BCT) and initial entry training (IET). The AC Soldier usually attends one after the other while the RC Soldier may split IET into increments over time up to two years.

b. Transfers between components: Soldiers who transfer into the RC from the AC enter at the last AC rank held and are credited with schooling completed during their AC tenure. The same is not true for enlisted reserve component Soldiers who transfer to the AC; they do not always retain their rank. Soldiers entering the other component to fill positions not within the scope of their MOS must attend the appropriate military schooling (RC or AC) in order to earn the appropriate MOS.

c. Warrant Officers (WO) may transfer between components, be appointed from within, or receive direct appointment as a prior-service warrant officer subject to MOS proponent technical certification. Transfers occur simply and without loss of time in service or skill qualification. Appointments consist of a three-step process requiring selection, successful completion of the Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS), and MOS qualification / proponent technical certification.

d. Officers can be commissioned through a Military Academy, ROTC, Officer Candidate School (OCS), or direct commission.

e. The Civilian-Acquired Skills Program (CASP) is an RC program that allows personnel to enter the Army at elevated pay grades or abbreviated training periods based upon previous training or experience. The program is focused primarily on individuals with skills applicable to the Army Medical Department (AMEDD), Judge Advocate General (JAG), or Chaplain (CHAP) branches.

f. The Simultaneous Membership Program (SMP) is designed to attract cadets into the USAR and ARNG. It involves the individual's participation in both college ROTC and an ARNG unit or USAR TPU as an active member. Pay and allowances are earned from both sources (ROTC and the RC unit). Moreover, the individual has the option of requesting active duty or a guaranteed assignment in the Reserve Component by signing a Guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty (GRFD) contract. RC participants in the SMP are non-deployable members of the Selected Reserve and remain in this status until their education is complete or until they stop attending school.

2. **Promotions.** The various components of the Army have different sets of criteria for Soldier promotion. Since the promotion systems are different between the components, misunderstandings and perceptions of unfair treatment quickly arise when Soldiers working side by side do not get promoted at the same time. Generally speaking, AC Soldiers, once in a promotable status, are on an order-of-merit list with a sequence number and will be promoted in turn, regardless of what position he or she is currently assigned. However, the RC Soldiers need to be slotted in a position of that future grade before he or she can be promoted. References include:

- a. AR 600-8-19, Enlisted Promotions and Reductions, which is a consolidated promotion and reduction policy for all elements of the Army.
- b. Personnel Policy Guidance (PPG). Policy changes published by Department of the Army provide guidance during contingency operations. Personnel Policy Guidance, Chapter 13, establishes procedures, promotion authorities, and waivers for criteria still applicable to non-deployed or mobilized Soldiers. Current guidance is located at <http://www.armyg1.army.mil/soldiers.asp>.
- c. U.S. Army Reserve Command Guidance. Current and superseded policy, clarifications, board announcements, and results may be found at the following Web site: <https://www.hrc.army.mil>.

Chapter 7

Mobilization, Deployment, and Demobilization Considerations

1. **Background.** Mobilization is the process of federalizing the ARNG and activating the USAR. The decision to activate / mobilize the reserve components is a formal process requiring considerable coordination between Combatant Commands, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, ASA M&RA, HQDA, FORSCOM, and reserve component (RC) leadership. There are seven levels of mobilization described in DoD doctrine: total mobilization, full mobilization, partial mobilization, presidential reserve call-up, reserve emergency call-up, pre-planned mobilization support, and the 15-day statute (see mobilization authorities' attachment). Each level of mobilization requires detailed processes which include, but are not limited to, defining the mission, location, duration, legal statutes, funding source, availability of personnel and equipment, and sustainability over time. Utilization statutes, directives, and policies govern the frequency and duration of activations, which provide predictability for RC Soldiers and commanders and ensure the deliberate, yet prudent, use of the RC. Additionally, National Guard and Army Reserve IGs must identify a Soldier's status when determining directing authority jurisdiction, since mobilized members will receive several types of mobilization orders. Activated Soldiers will receive a mobilization order prior to reporting at a mobilization site, a temporary change of station order (TCS) from the mobilization site to theater, and a demobilization order, otherwise known as a Release from Active Duty (REFRAD) order from the mobilization site back to their Home of Record. As each order puts a Soldier in a different status, the IG responsible may change as well, usually based on the UCMJ authority listed on the order.

2. **Mobilization Phases.** Army mobilization is a four-phase process. Phase I is Pre-Mobilization, Phase II is Alert, Phase III is Mobilization, and Phase IV is Demobilization. Phases of mobilization support both the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) requirements and Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO); however, during LSCO, phases may be compressed or occur simultaneously, which may cause RC units to transition from Phase I to Phase III rapidly based on the need to execute an OPLAN or CONPLAN or to react to other contingency requirements. First Army is FORSCOM'S responsible command for mobilization planning and execution in CONUS for conventional RC forces and the supported command for mobilization planning and execution. The following paragraphs describe four phases of mobilization; the approval authorities are further explained in Appendix D.

3. **Phase I - Pre-Mobilization.** Phase I is the responsibility of unit commanders, supported by the mobilization enterprise, to enable an RC unit to conduct operations at Home Station (HS) and to build readiness based on the designated C-level per the Army's Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM). Phase I consists of tasks and planning by the Army mobilization enterprise to enable efficient and effective mobilization and deployment of RC forces. Phase I includes selection of RC units and RC notification of sourcing (NOS), which allows RC units to begin appropriate planning for the designated mission. RC units pre-identified to support GFMAP requirements or LSCO will identify and request funding to support incremental pre-mobilization training and support costs (expenses due to unit deploying) to enhance

unit readiness for the duration of the notification pre-mobilization period. Phase I ends when the unit receives an official HQDA alert order.

4. Phase II - Alert. Phase II is the responsibility of unit commanders supported by the mobilization enterprise. Phase II begins with the signing of the Secretary of Defense orders book. HQDA publishes the alert or alert / mobilization order. FORSCOM publishes deployment orders for assigned AC and RC units providing mission-specific requirements and deployment data as applicable. RC units conduct mission-specific training, sustainment planning, and mobilization preparation. Phase II ends on mobilization date (M-date), which is the day an RC unit enters Title 10 active federal service.

5. Phase III - Mobilization. Phase III begins on the M-date as documented on HQDA mobilization order and appropriate corresponding Continental United States Army (CONUSA) mobilization order. First Army will publish the CONUSA mobilization order for conventional RC forces within CONUS, U. S. Virgin Islands (USVI), and Puerto Rico (PR). On M-date RC units are attached to either FORSCOM, First Army, an Army Service Component Command (ASCC), or a Direct Reporting Unit (DRU), or remain under parent RC chain of command. RC units will assemble at home station and move to the designated Mobilization Forces Generation Installation (MFGI), a port of embarkation, or designated mission location as directed in the appropriate order. Units move to MFGI for post-mobilization validation and follow-on deployment to meet the Latest Arrival Date (LAD) after First Army trains and validates the unit. Units mobilized in support of Defense Support of Civilian Authorities (DSCA) or similar missions conduct home-station mobilization per Appendix D and deploy directly to the mission location as directed by FORSCOM. Upon arrival in the Joint Operational Area (JOA), the gaining Combatant Command assumes Operational Command (OPCON) of the mobilized units. Phase III ends when the Combatant Command releases the unit (or designated commander), departs the JOA, and is attached to First Army for demobilization at the designated MFGI.

6. Phase IV - Demobilization. Phase IV is the responsibility of FORSCOM supported by the Army mobilization enterprise. Enterprise partners are responsible for funding and providing base operations and support services associated with demobilizing RC Soldiers and unit equipment. Phase IV, begins when units arrive at the Point of Debarkation (POD) in the JOA for re-deployment, or when released by the commander in CONUS. First Army receives attached units for demobilization validation. First Army is responsible for designating the demobilization MFGI. MFGI (Garrison Command), supported by the Army mobilization enterprise, conducts the Requirements-Based Demobilization Process (RBDP). Phase IV ends on the effective date of the HQDA demobilization order and units return to RC chain of command.

3. Deployment. Some mobilized USAR or ARNG Soldiers deploy overseas while some remain within the United States in support of various missions. Though the AC does not mobilize or demobilize, these Soldiers still deploy as well. The deployment issues are often the same across the components and, since all are now Title 10 Federal, the same regulations also often apply. Some common areas of concern are:

a. Nonsupport of Family Members: AR 608-99, Family Support, Child Custody, Paternity, applies to all Soldiers on active duty for more than 30 days. Soldiers have certain responsibilities to their dependents, and Commanders have the responsibility to

enforce this requirement. IGs are limited to two actions: First, checking for immediate needs -- food and shelter -- and referring the Family members to organizations that can assist as needed. Second, to ensure the Commander is aware of the situation and takes action in accordance with AR 608-99. Commanders need to address any questions pertaining to the Soldier's and Family member's responsibilities and requirements by working closely with the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) -- not the IG.

b. Pay issues: The overall pay amount will usually change during deployments. Additional pay sometimes includes hazardous duty pay, Family separation pay, etc. Not all Service members will be entitled to all types of pay. Pay will depend on the status of the Soldier, the type of orders the Soldiers deployed under, etc. To resolve pay issues, work with the personnel and the finance sections within the units / commands as well as the local finance office. Personnel sections should be able to provide orders and entitlement lists, and the finance sections can verify implementation of these entitlements.

c. Leave: All components, once on active duty for 30 days, earn leave. While deployed, not everyone will be able to take leave pending mission requirements and Commanders' policies. Upon redeployment, Soldier will need to take leave or, for those who will demobilize, cash out their leave.

d. Orders: The most common deployment orders come in the form of Temporary Change of Station (TCS) orders. These orders temporarily assign the Soldier to another duty location without placing him or her in a Temporary Duty status. TCS orders can be amended along the way to meet operational requirements, including extending the amount of time deployed.

4. Demobilization Process. Demobilization planning runs concurrently with mobilization planning. It ends with the decision to release RC units and individuals from active duty. Commanders must ensure that their Soldiers receive the documentation / briefings listed below before completion of the demobilization process and return to home station. Leaders at all levels need to be aware of all medical issues within their respective commands. Many Soldiers simply sign medical waivers at the MGFI so they will not be medically screened. These service members are trying to expedite the medical process so they can get home sooner. However, Soldiers often report injuries / illnesses after they return home, which causes administrative problems for the Soldier and costs the Army money better used for unit readiness and warfighting. Demobilization actions include:

- a. Receive medical / dental care and appropriate records.
- b. Update finance / personnel records.
- c. Leave settlement -- either take or sell.
- d. Receive required legal and entitlement briefings (re-employment rights).
- e. Assess Line of Duty (LOD) determination, if required.
- f. Complete DD Form 214 (Certificate of release or discharge from active duty), except for Title 10 AGR or AC Soldiers.

Chapter 8

Re-Employment Rights

1. **Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).**

Congress provided clear protection for all members of the uniformed services (including non-career National Guard and Reserve members, as well as active-duty personnel) in October 1994 with passage of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), Chapter 43 of Title 38, U.S. Code. The U.S. Department of Labor, through the Veterans Employment and Training Service (VET), provides assistance with respect to employment and reemployment rights and benefits under USERRA. The law was amended in August 2008 and:

- a. Expands coverage to include specifically the Public Health Service, the Coast Guard, and others designated by the President in time of war or emergency.
- b. Places a five-year limit (with some exceptions) on the cumulative length of time a person may serve in the armed forces and remain eligible for reemployment rights with the pre-service employer.
- c. Requires an individual to give written or verbal notice to his or her employer prior to departure for military service.

2. **Ombudsman Services.** Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) is a Department of Defense organization. It is a staff group within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD / RA), which is itself a part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. ESGR was established in 1972 to promote cooperation and understanding between RC members and their civilian employers and to assist in the resolution of conflicts arising from an employee's military commitment. It is the lead DoD organization for this mission under DoD Directive 1250.1, National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR), certified current as of 23 April 2007.

- a. Trained ESGR volunteers and the Ombudsmen Services national staff are available to respond promptly to inquiries and conflicts presented by employees or employers. More than 95 percent of all such requests for assistance are resolved in this informal process. Many problems result from poor communication between employers and their employees or from a lack of familiarization with the rights and responsibilities of each as defined by law. Today, ESGR operates through a network of thousands of volunteers throughout the nation and Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
- b. ESGR Ombudsmen are a resource for employers and members of the National Guard and Reserve and can be reached via email at USERRA@osd.mil or by phone at (800) 336-4590. See ESGR Resources page on the Web site www.esgr.org for additional information.

Chapter 9

Retirement, Transition Initiatives, and Separations

1. **Transitions Out of Service.** Soldiers from all three components transition out of service or between services for various reasons.
2. **Separations.** Separations occur for a variety of reasons: chapter actions, completing service obligations, change in status, or retirement. If leaving active duty, the DD Form 214 reflects favorable and unfavorable separations with a reenlistment eligibility code for future active-duty allowances or restrictions.
3. **Retirement.** Retirement benefits are a major source of compensation for RC participation. RC members must document the service they performed in order to be eligible for retirement, and they must request retirement benefits once they have accumulated sufficient qualifying years.
4. **Retired Reserve.** The Retired Reserve comprises all RC officers and enlisted Soldiers who receive retirement pay or who are eligible to receive retirement pay upon reaching age 60 ("Gray Area" retirees). AC retirees are included in the Retired Reserve. All retirees are subject to involuntary recall to active duty. Retirees represent a resource of trained individuals who may augment support and training facilities, relieve AC or Ready Reserve members for other duties, or perform operational missions as needed during a period of national emergency.
 - a. Eligibility for retirement differs between the AC and RC.
 - (1) **AC.** Eligibility for full retirement after 20 years of federal active duty starting the first day of retirement.
 - (2) **ARNG.** Eligibility for retirement after 20 'good' years starting at age 60 for drilling members and at the completion of 20 years of active federal service (AFS) for AGR members.
 - (3) **USAR.** Eligibility for retirement after 20 'good' years starting at age 60 for drilling members and at the completion of 20 years of active federal service (AFS) for AGR members.
 - b. One RMA equals four hours of duty, one day of active-duty pay, and one retirement point. One ATA equals four hours of duty, one day of active-duty pay, and one retirement point. A maximum of 90 IDT (i.e., UTA, ATA, or RMA) points are allowed per calendar year for retirement. A UTA is equal to one day's active base pay with no allowances and one retirement point. Retirees can work for additional retirement points without the pay. Each unit member is authorized a minimum of 48 UTAs in a year. Every day of AD also equates to one retirement point.

c. Fifty (50) retirement points (AD + IDT + correspondence course points) = one (1) qualifying year or 'good year' for retirement. Qualifying years exceeding 50 points equate to greater retirement compensation. Drilling members can retire upon completion of 20 qualifying years but do not receive retirement pay until age 60. Eligible RC members must request retirement pay when they reach age 60.

d. Retirement is based on time in grade and retirement points. A Soldier can start drawing retirement at age 60 if he or she serves 20 'good years', defined as a minimum accrual of 50 retirement points in a one-year period, and requests the retirement pay. The FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 110-181) reduced the age at which a member of the Ready Reserve can draw retirement pay by three months for every aggregate 90 days of active duty performed after 28 January 2008, not to be reduced below age 50.

e. ARNG and USAR retirees, younger than age 60 and known as 'gray area' retirees, are eligible for many of the same benefits available to AC retirees (or to them at age 60). For example, 'gray area' retirees can use the commissary, the PX, other installation facilities, limited legal assistance, Space-A Travel, and the Armed Forces Recreation Clubs (AFRCs). The 'gray area' retirees do not have medical or dental benefits and do not receive retirement pay until age 60. For the latest benefits, visit <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/Gray%20Area%20Retirements%20Branch>.

f. Retiring ARNG and USAR Soldiers can use the Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) to help with the transition from active duty.

Appendix A

Abbreviations and Acronyms

10 USC	Title 10, U.S. Code
32 USC	Title 32, U.S. Code
AC	Active Component
ACAP	Army Career and Alumni Program
ACOM	Army Command
ACS	Army Community Services
AD	Active Duty
ADOS	Active Duty for Operational Support
ADT	Active Duty Training
AFRC	Armed Forces Recreation Clubs
AFS	Active Federal Service
AGR	Active Guard Reserve
AMC	Army Material Command
AMEDD	Army Medical Department
APF	Appropriated Fund
APOE	Air Port of Embarkation
ARNG	Army National Guard
ASCC	Army Service Component Command
AT	Annual Training
ATA	Additional Training Assembly
BAH	Basic Allowance Housing
BAS	Basic Allowance Subsistence
BCT	Basic Combat Training
BOLC	Basic Officer Leadership Course
C2	Command and Control
CAC	Common Access Card
CAR	Chief, Army Reserve
CASP	Civilian Acquired Skills Program
CECOM	Communications and Electronics Command
CHAP	Chaplain
CJCS	Chief, Joint Chief of Staff
CNGB	Chief, National Guard Bureau
COLA	Cost of Living Allowance
COMPO	Component
CONUS	Continental United States
CONUSA	Continental United States Army
CRSC	Combat-Related Special Compensation
CSR	Customer Service Representative
DA	Department of the Army
DAC	Department of the Army Civilian
DANG	Director, Air National Guard
DARNG	Director, Army National Guard
DFAS	Defense Finance and Accounting Services

DJMS-AC	Defense Joint Pay System-Active Component
DJMS-RC	Defense Joint Pay System-Reserve Component
DMPO	Defense Military Pay Office
DoD	Department of Defense
DRC	Direct Reporting Command
DRU	Direct Reporting Unit
DS	Dual Status
DTP	Delayed Training Program
DTS	Defense Travel System
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
ESGR	Employer's Support of the Guard and Reserve
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FY	Fiscal Year
GMR	Graduated Mobilization Response
GRFD	Guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty
HIV	Human Immune Deficiency Virus
HR	Human Resources
HRO	Human Resource Officer
HS	Home Station
IADT	Initial Active Duty Training
IDT	Inactive Duty Training
IET	Initial Entry Training
IG	Inspector General
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee
INCAP	Incapacitation Pay
ING	Inactive National Guard
IPPS-A	Integrated Personnel and Pay System – Army
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JFLCC	Joint Forces Land Component Command
JTF	Joint Task Force
LOD	Line of Duty
LODI	Line of Duty Investigation
M-Day	Mobilization Day
MEDCOM	Medical Command
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MFTR	Multi-Functional Training Regiment (ARNG)
MILTECH	Military Technician
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MOSQ	Military Occupational Specialty Qualification
MSC	Major Subordinate Command
MSO	Military Service Obligation
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization & Equipment
MUTA	Multiple Unit Training Assembly
NAF	Non-appropriated Funds
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDS	Non-Dual Status
NG	National Guard
NGB	National Guard Bureau

NGB-HRP	National Guard Bureau – Human Resources Personnel Division
NMS	National Military Strategy
OASD/RA	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OHA	Overseas Housing Allowance
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
PEBD	Pay Entry Basic Date
POM	Preparation for Overseas Movement
PPBES	Planning, Programming, Budget & Execution System
PPG	Personnel Policy Guidance
PPP	Power Projection Platform
PRC	Presidential Reserve Call-Up
PSP	Power Support Platform
RA	Regular Army
RC	Reserve Component
RD	Readiness Division
REFRAD	Release from Active Duty
RMA	Readiness Management Assemblies
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
RST	Rescheduled Training
SBP	Survivor Benefit Program
SGLI	Servicemember's Group Life Insurance
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SLA	Special Leave Accrual
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SMP	Simultaneous Membership Program
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SPOE	Seaport of Embarkation
SRDC	Soldier Record Data Center
SRP	Soldier Readiness Processing
SUTA	Split Unit Training Assembly
TAFMSD	Total Active Federal Military Service Date
TAG	The Adjutant General
TCS	Temporary Change of Station
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TPU	Troop Program Unit
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
USAFMCOM	US Army Financial Management Command
USAR	U.S. Army Reserve
USARC	U.S. Army Reserve Command
USERRA	Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
USPFO	U.S. Property and Fiscal Officer (ARNG / ANG)
UTA	Unit Training Assembly
VA	Veterans Administration
VET	Veterans Employment and Training Service
WO	Warrant Officer
WOCS	Warrant Officer Candidate School

Appendix B

Legal Basis

- 1. Components and Authority.** There are three components of the U.S. Army: the Regular Army (RA) or Active Component (AC); the Army National Guard (ARNG); and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). The authority for the ARNG is derived from the Constitution. The general and permanent laws governing the ARNG are contained in Title 10 of the U.S. Code; however, the policy for the employment of the ARNG is found in Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. Code. The authority for the USAR is found within Title 10 of the U.S. Code.
- 2. Article 1, Section 8, U.S. Constitution.** The "Militia Clause" of the Constitution authorizes the existence of the state militia (later known as the National Guard). Simply stated, it gives Congress the right to organize, arm, and discipline the militia while allowing the states certain management prerogatives, including the appointment of officers and the authority to train. Other articles and sections of the Constitution discuss the AC and other aspects of the Armed Forces.
- 3. Title 10, U.S. Code (10 USC).** 10 USC contains the general and permanent laws governing the Armed Forces. Various sections of Title 10 establish and govern the RC. The role of the RC, as stated in Section 10102, Title 10, is "to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces in time of war or, national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require."
- 4. Title 32, U.S. Code (32 USC).** 32 USC contains the specific laws and policies for the organization, funding, and employment of the ARNG. It states that Army National Guard units shall be ordered to federal active duty and retained as long as necessary whenever Congress determines they are needed. Specifically, the general policy in 32 USC (Section 102) states: "In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line of defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times. Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of the United States, or such part of them as are needed, together with such units of other reserve components as are necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active Federal duty and retained as long as so needed."

Appendix C

Organizational Structure / Organizational Charts




Figure 1. AC - Organizational Structure – Title 10




Figure 2. ARNG - Organizational Structure -- Title 32




Figure 3. ARNG - Organizational Structure -- Title 10




Figure 4. USAR - Organizational Structure

Appendix D

Types of Mobilization

1. **Graduate Mobilization Response.** A key aspect of the mobilization-level concept is Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) actions. GMR is a flexible, decision-making process. It triggers five levels of response options that can be adjusted to the degree of severity and ambiguity of warning indicators or an event. These options allow the Government to take small or large, often reversible, steps to increase the national security emergency preparedness posture. When planning, Commanders and staff officers should understand that a lower level of mobilization does not necessarily precede a higher level of mobilization.

2. **Levels of Mobilization.** There are five levels of mobilization. Generally, the magnitude of the emergency governs the call or level of mobilization. As authorized by law or congressional resolution, and when directed by the President, the Department of Defense mobilizes all or part of the Armed Forces within the parameters of those levels.

a. **Selective Mobilization (10 USC, sections 331 / 332 / 333).** For a domestic emergency, the Congress or the President may order expansion of the active Armed Forces by mobilization of RC units and / or individual reserve Soldiers to deal with a situation where the Armed Forces may be required to protect life, federal property, and functions or to prevent disruption of federal activities. A selective mobilization would not be associated with a requirement for contingency plans involving external threats to the national security. Selective Mobilizations are:

- (1) Directed by President or Congress.
- (2) For peacetime domestic emergency.
- (3) Not associated with external threats.
- (4) For selected units.

b. **Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) (10 USC, section 12304).** Under the PRC, the President has the power to activate up to 200,000 Selected Reserve members involuntarily for 365 days without declaring a national emergency. The President may use the authority when he determines it necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission. This authority is not meant to circumvent existing controls on active-duty end strengths through successive call-ups of reserve Soldiers. A Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up is:

- (1) Directed by Presidential Executive Order.
- (2) For up to 200,000 troops for up to 365 days, including up to 30,000 IRR Soldiers.
- (3) To meet any operational mission requirements.

- (4) Done without a prior declaration of war or national emergency.

c. **Partial Mobilization (10 USC, section 12302).** For a contingency operation or war plan, or upon declaration of a national emergency, the Congress or the President may order augmentation of the active Armed Forces (short of full mobilization) by mobilizing up to one million members of the Ready Reserve (units and individuals) for up to 24 months. Actually, only the one-million-member ceiling limits the President. Congress may establish any limit desired in a congressionally declared partial mobilization and may exceed the 24-month limitation imposed on the President. Partial Mobilization:

- (1) Requires Presidential or Congressional proclamation of national emergency.
- (2) Requires an Executive Order or Congressional Declaration.
- (3) May call up to 1,000,000 troops of the Ready Reserve for up to two years (24 consecutive months of active duty).
- (4) May include the involuntary mobilization of IRR.

d. **Full Mobilization (10 USC, section 12301(a)).** Full mobilization requires passage by the Congress of a public law or joint resolution declaring war or a national emergency. It involves the mobilization of all RC units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reserve Soldiers, and the material resources needed for this expanded force structure. Full mobilization:

- (1) Requires Public Law or Joint Resolution of Congress.
- (2) Requires a declared war or national emergency.
- (3) Involves all remaining RC units (IMA and IRR).

e. **Total Mobilization (10 USC, section 12301 (a)).** Total mobilization involves expansion of the active Armed Forces by organizing and / or activating additional units beyond the existing approved force structure to respond to requirements of the emergency and the mobilization of all natural resources needed, to include production facilities to sustain such forces. Congressional authorization is required for these actions. Total mobilization includes:

- (1) Public law or a Joint Resolution of Congress.
- (2) Expansion of active armed forces.
- (3) Expansion of the industrial base.
- (4) Generation of new units as required.

Part 7

IG Office Organization and Operations

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Introduction

Inspector General Office Organization and Operations

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this section is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with field-tested methods for organizing their staff sections (offices) in ways that will enhance their effectiveness and overall value to the command.
2. **Relevance:** This section provides guidance for IGs on organizing their offices to leverage most efficiently their ability to serve as the commander's eyes, ears, voice, and conscience and to maximize IG contact with the command. Some suggestions will be more helpful to some IG staff sections than others, but IGs can modify them to meet the needs determined by situations within the command.
3. **Known Constraints:** Some suggestions in this section may require tailoring to meet the manning constraints of specific IG staff sections. To meet identified requirements, a Directing Authority (DA) may place greater emphasis on particular functions to meet identified requirements, resulting in an office organization that in turn reflects that emphasis.
4. **Assumptions:** The IG staff section is staffed with one Command IG and a mix of IGs (officers, commissioned warrant officers, and civilians in the grade of GS-11 and above) and Assistant IGs (NCOs and civilians in the grade of GS-9) necessary to meet the capabilities of the Army IG system and the command's requirements for IG support. Necessary equipment, such as a digital scanner and personal computers for every IG, is available as well as enough funding for IGs to travel as required by their duties.

Chapter 1

Battle Rhythm

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this section is to discuss the regularly planned meetings, events, and training that are important for every IG staff section.
2. **The Need for an IG Battle Rhythm:** IGs have many tools that can assist commanders with proactively addressing issues and meeting standards, but without a published battle rhythm, an IG staff section is reduced to reactive management, degrading the usefulness of those tools and reducing the IG staff section's value to the command. If an IG staff section desires to provide more than walk-in Assistance and on-order Investigative Inquiries and Investigations, the IG staff section must develop a battle rhythm and adhere to it. The IG staff section must publish and promulgate this battle rhythm so that members of the command are knowledgeable of the IG staff section's hours and IG visits.
3. **Meetings:** The purpose of regularly scheduled office meetings is to coordinate internal actions and equip IGs with information on current and emerging trends as well as to coordinate routine IG actions, duties, and responsibilities within the office and across the command. Battle-rhythm events should allow the Command IG (CIG) to present relevant, timely information during routine meetings with commanders and staff. Meetings can be organized by function. Recommended topics to cover are, but are not limited to, the status of ongoing inspections and any issues of note, how many Assistance cases have occurred since the last meeting, how many cases have been closed, any systemic issues developing across the command, and the number of cases remaining open in IGARS and for how long. More in-depth discussions with the CIG regarding Investigations should occur at a different time. When trends are identified, determine what actions the IG staff section should take: continue monitoring, notify a commander of an issue, or notify the Directing Authority (DA) of a larger systemic issue. The IG staff section may be closed during a routine weekly meeting. If so, communicate the office hours broadly via the command's master calendar, SharePoint, and IG bulletin boards posted around the command.
4. **Battlefield Circulation:** IGs should be where Soldiers and leaders are. Without planning and protecting battlefield circulation time, IGs may find themselves stuck in their offices, will lose relevance, and will be seen as not adding value to the organization.

IGs should be among the Soldiers of the command every day. The amount of time and the number of IGs tasked for this effort depends on the size of the IG staff section, but IGs should be "out and about" enough so that they visit all units in the command on a regular basis and are recognizable by members of the command. A tool to manage "battlefield circulation" duties, such as a DA Form 6, is helpful to ensure that IGs have time to complete their other IG duties as well. IGs conducting battlefield circulation should take with them an IG kitbag containing hard copies of DA Form 1559, copies of regulations pertinent to trends within the command (to be given away as necessary for Teaching and Training purposes); copies of the commander's policy

letters; and any graphs, trends data, or recent Inspection results that would benefit the command team the IG is visiting. Commanders and senior NCOs should know that while IGs are sensors, they are not spies and are there to teach and train and to assist. Assistance given during battlefield circulation must be entered into IGARS to capture the workload.

The CIG and IG NCOIC should have both individual and collective battlefield circulation plans to establish and maintain good working relationships and open lines of communication with commanders, primary staff officers, and other personal and special staff officers across the command and installation. Examples of personal and special staff members include, but are not limited to, the command's Equal Opportunity (EO) Officer, Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC), Contracting Officer, Surgeon, Safety Officer, Chaplain, and Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). When making these visits, the CIG should have 1559s and useful copies of regulations (determined by trends analysis) or portions of regulations to share with staff counterparts. The CIG should regularly take other members of the IG staff section to scheduled meetings within the command so that commanders and staff members become accustomed to thinking of the IG as representing a wider system instead of simply one person.

5. Assistance Hours: The IG staff section should publish hours during which someone will be in the office to receive Assistance cases. The IG SharePoint site, Facebook page, or other public postings should reflect these hours as should the command master calendar, if possible. Publicize these hours during battlefield circulation, in the post newspaper, and in the IG newsletter. While the IG staff section can be open at other times as well, it must be open for Assistance during the publicized times.

6. Training Time: Schedule regular time to conduct refresher or other training with all members of the IG staff section in IG skills using AR 20-1, the IG guides, and the resources available on The Inspector General School (TIGS) Web site at: <https://ig.army.mil/IG-SCHOOL-RESOURCES/TIGS-Online/>. Physical Training (PT) is training, and the IG staff section should perform regular PT in accordance with unit and office SOPs. PT with units as part of battlefield circulation has led to widespread perceptions of IGs as both credible and accessible.

7. Office Sign-Out board: IGs will be in and out of the office throughout the day. An office sign-in / out board would be invaluable to maintain visibility of all personnel and to determine that the IG staff section can meet all daily requirements.

Chapter 2

Reports and Trends Analysis

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this section is to assist the Command IG (CIG) with understanding what reports he or she should provide to the Directing Authority (DA) as well as how trends analysis can benefit the DA and the command.
2. **Appropriate Reports:** Inspections, Assistance, and Investigations require reports to the DA; Department of the Army IG (DAIG); and, in some cases, the Department of Defense (DoD) IG.

IG Inspection reports provide a record for follow-up IG Inspections and trends analysis. Because they are redacted by virtue of how the IG team writes the report, the DA can authorize distribution to whichever agencies he or she deems appropriate within the parameters set by Army Regulation (AR) 20-1, Inspector General Activities and Procedures. The DA will determine the specific types of Assistance cases and Reports of Investigative Inquiry (ROI) of which he or she wants to be made aware and briefing him or her on the conclusion of the cases will be part of closing out the case. Because a CIG can anticipate regularly submitting these reports to the DA, a color-coded folder system can assist the DA with prioritizing and controlling IG records.

Higher headquarters IG staff sections and DAIG receive reports from IG offices covering all functions. Quarterly, IG offices should send a list of approved Inspection reports through their ACOM, ASCC, or DRU IG to DAIG Inspections Division in accordance with AR 20-1, paragraph 5-2b. Because DAIG's Assistance Division (SAIG-AC) can direct an IG staff section to work an issue, it may be appropriate for the IG to forward a report for finalization to SAIG-AC before closing the case. IGs handling congressional cases must forward them through their higher IG to SAIG-AC to be finalized and closed. IG offices should review forwarded cases during their regular meetings to determine if the cases may be closed.

3. **Analyze for Trends:** IG staff sections should routinely analyze the information available to them in IGARS to assist their DA and other leaders in identifying and addressing problems as quickly as possible.

The ability of IGARS to provide immediate reports on any topic, subject, or unit that the DA or the IG desires makes it a powerful tool. Information in IGARS can be requested by unit, by subject, and even by name. Regular trends analysis should provide IG input for meetings, welcome briefings, classes, and inspection recommendations. The CIG should not wait for the DA to request trends about his or her priorities, since he or she might not know that this tool is available or its capabilities. The DA is not the only beneficiary of this information; commanders at all levels can benefit from current data on trends within their organizations. When members of the IG staff section prepare for battlefield circulation, they must analyze current Assistance and Investigations cases to determine trends related to systemic requests for assistance, wrongdoing, noncompliance, or misunderstanding that commanders should know so

they can take action, as necessary, to resolve any on-going issues that may be impacting readiness and warfighting capabilities. IGARS information increases commanders' situational awareness as well as makes IG Teaching and Training relevant and timely. Trends analysis for commanders and units should be tailored for the commander receiving it but must avoid attribution. IGs must maintain confidentiality to the best of their abilities. Army Regulation (AR) 20-1 enables IGs to create slides or send emails to leaders reflecting such trends as long as the IGs avoid attribution.

Trends analysis does not end once commanders take action to address problems (or potential problems) identified by such trends. IGs should continue to monitor trends to determine if the actions taken by commanders are effective and should provide commanders with timely feedback.

Chapter 3

Automation in the Inspector General Office

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this section is to address the uses of automation within an IG staff section.
2. **Personally Identifiable Information (PII):** IG computers may contain PII. This information, and the computers that contain it, must be maintained in accordance with Army regulations. IGs may often take laptops from their offices to perform their IG mission. The laptops should have Bitlocker applied to encrypt the hard drive and any data saved in case the laptop is lost or stolen. These laptops must be accounted for and, if lost, reported immediately to the Command IG and designated security representative in the command.
3. **Information Management Officer (IMO):** Ideally, one capable member of the IG office (an IG) should have some IT / IM knowledge to assist with computer difficulties. Otherwise, the office personnel should know the name and number of their local IT support organization.
4. **Computer Standardization:** The local IT support organization should configure and maintain every computer in the IG office. Ideally, users should have specific documents on their desktops for ease of access, such as all IG guides, AR 20-1, AR 1-201, AR 608-99, AR 623-3, DA PAM 623-3, local policy letters, and other standards pertinent to the issues prevalent in the command. This information can also be downloaded to hand-held devices like tablets and smart phones. Every computer desktop should have a shortcut to the IGMET homepage, and the latest version of the Citrix Workspace software loaded.
5. **IG-Specific Automation:** IG offices have a few specific automation needs. Every IG staff section needs a means to transcribe recorded testimony and interviews. The use of digital recorders or a transcription service will meet this requirement. If using digital recorders, the IG office should ensure the device is from an approved product list and the user has an exception to use approval from the local IT support organization. IG staff sections should have at least two digital recorders to record interviews during Investigations. They must be safeguarded since they have IG-sensitive information, and they might contain PII. To maintain confidentiality, IGs should delete digital files from digital recorders when investigations are approved and closed.
6. **Email Protocol:** IGs should not assume that only IGs will see their email and should not release IG records in their email. AR 20-1, paragraph 3-2e, specifies how to label emails containing IG information. Any email that contains an IG record must be encrypted. Furthermore, AR 20-1, paragraph 6-1f (4), states that an IG "will treat IGARs sent by email as a call-in complaint..." As such, IGs should not use "reply" when responding to a complaint via mail; successful IGs recommend sending a separate email to the complainant and requesting a phone number to complete the intake of the complaint.

7. MS Teams and SharePoint: All commands have the use of MS Teams and SharePoint Online (SPO). Use of MS Teams and SharePoint Online is effective as a central repository for Inspection scheduling and reports, IG analysis and trends, and other information that members of the IG staff section might need for their daily operations or to share with members of the command. When using either MS Teams or SharePoint Online, the IG office must ensure that the proper permissions have been set for sharing files and who can see what information within the MS Teams channels. Some IG staff sections have used their public page on SharePoint Online as a means of disseminating information regarding office hours, points of contact, issues that are not IG-appropriate, commonly used regulations, and means by which individuals can help themselves before coming to see the IG, such as consulting with their chains of command and performing research on the Army Publishing Directorate website. If an IG staff section has a healthy, populated, useful SharePoint Online site, the Command IG should ensure the community is aware of it by promoting its usefulness during routine meetings, events, and battlefield circulation across the command.

8. Personal Electronic Devices (PED): IGs must follow the approved security guidance pertaining to the use of PEDs in the office / work environment, especially if their work / office environment is classified.

Chapter 4

IG Office Operations: Inspections

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this section is to provide suggestions, recommendations, and best practices from successful IG offices about IG Inspections of systemic issues. The Inspections Guide provides detailed instructions concerning IG inspections.
2. **Selection:** When selecting Inspection topics, IGs should focus on systemic issues that impact the command.

IG inspections do not occur externally from the unit's other activities but should nest coherently within the long-range training calendar. IGs should review the Annual Training Guidance, local command policy and goals, the command vision, Strategic Readiness System reports, and trends in problem areas highlighted by IGARS. Subordinate Commanders may also make suggestions regarding IG Inspection topics. Directing Authorities (DAs) may indicate their priorities directly or indirectly. All IG Inspections should be in line with the Commander's priorities and result in increased readiness and warfighting ability.

Available resources impact the Inspection selection process. As an IG staff section recommends topics for systemic inspections, it must balance the unit's needs against the IG staff section's manning and available time. Ideally, IG staff sections use the quarterly model for Inspections, conducting one Inspection a quarter and generally performing one phase of the Inspection per month.

3. **Planning and Preparation:** A well-planned Inspection will benefit both the IGs conducting the Inspection and the units participating in the Inspection.

IG staff sections should plan Inspections within the context of all Inspections occurring across the command. The Chief of Inspections should work with the Command's OIP coordinator to make certain that IG Inspections are neither redundant nor onerous for the units being visited. IG Inspections should not surprise units; posting an updated Inspections tracker with all the scheduled Inspections across the command on the IG SharePoint site and ensuring they are on the Division's Master Calendar assists the IG and units by maintaining visibility of command, staff, and IG (to include scheduled DAIG and DoD) Inspections as well as resolving scheduling conflicts.

During the planning phase, IGs must examine regulations in depth, determining what they will specifically inspect and understanding why it is important to readiness and warfighting capability. Subject-matter experts (SMEs) (sworn in as Temporary Assistant IGs) should instruct inspectors on the more complex or technical systems, programs, or functions under inspection so that IGs are well-versed and prepared before they begin the Inspection. The IG inspectors must become as expert as possible in what they are inspecting so that they understand what they see and can Teach and Train when necessary.

Plan rehearsal time, and do not fail to rehearse. Confidence in IGs and an Inspection's products will erode if the IG inspectors do not appear to know what they are doing. During rehearsal, IGs can verify that the SMEs on their team understand how to inspect and teach and train as well as know the subject at hand. Training and rehearsal time is when IGs set the conditions for success for their Inspections.

4. **Organization:** Generally, successful IG staff sections have a seasoned IG designated as the Chief of Inspections. However, the Command IG (CIG) should participate in every IG Inspection to some degree to lend both credibility to the effort and to ensure that the Inspection meets the DA's priorities.

5. **Records:** Finalized Inspection reports have information that can greatly assist a Command. Inspection working papers consisting of names, units, and dates are IG records and contain information that IGs must safeguard.

Inspection reports are the one IG product that can have the widest dissemination, since the Directing Authority (DA) may release final Inspection reports for official use to members of the staff, command, or other agencies supporting the Command. Such wide dissemination enables all members of the command to address issues at their level and for designated staff entities or organizations to implement the report's taskers. Once approved by the DA, Inspection reports may be added to the IG SharePoint for the Command at large to use. Another approach is disseminating bound copies of the Inspection report for Command teams at the battalion level and above.

Working documents (Trip Reports, Interview / Sensing Session notes, etc.) for Inspections are IG records and should be marked in accordance with AR 20-1, Chapter 3, and maintained in accordance with the Army Records Information Management System (ARIMS). Successful IGs upload these products into the IGARS case file for the Inspection. Since these working papers are not part of a final Inspection report, these documents must not be available to anyone except IGs.

Chapter 5

IG Office Operations: Assistance

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this section is to provide suggestions and recommendations on best practices for Assistance as performed by successful IG staff section. The Assistance and Investigations Guide provides detailed instructions on how to conduct Assistance.

2. **Case-Load Management:** IGs know how to help Soldiers; they were senior leaders in the Army before they became IGs. However, managing the documentary requirements of the Assistance system can make the difference between successfully assisting the command as a whole or failing to provide the aid Soldiers requested, thus degrading the trust the command has in the IG system.

IGs should use DA Form 1559 to document their workload. IGs must address issues when they become aware of them. A community will know if the local IG has credibility and integrity, and Soldiers will feel comfortable enough to approach that IG both on and off duty. Without 1559s, valuable contact information, permission to release information within DoD, or what the complainant wants the IG to do could be lost or misinterpreted.

Successful IGs update IGARS as events unfold, to include Information IGARS. Waiting until the end of the week to update IGARS may result in the loss of pertinent information or even a failure to update or annotate the case notes at all.

3. **Assistance Records:** The retention period for Assistance records is three years from case closure. Since Army Regulation 1-201 requires case files (with all required documents) to be uploaded into IGARS, IGs are no longer required to maintain hard-copy case files once a case is closed. IGs may destroy these case files but only after the Command IG or a senior member of the IG staff section verifies that all appropriate case files have been uploaded. In most cases, the A&I Chief is responsible for the proper disposal of any hard-copy case files. Also, IGs need to maintain files that contain certain sensitive topics, such as prisoner abuse or other subjects considered of historical value. If in doubt, check with DAIG's Assistance Division (especially if the case was linked / referred to Assistance Division) and with DAIG's Records-Release Office prior to destruction. DAIG's Information Resource Management Division (IRMD) will ensure that IGARS case files are purged or retained in accordance with the requirements stated above.

Chapter 6

IG Office Operations: Investigations

- 1. Purpose:** The purpose of this section is to provide suggestions and recommendations on best practices for Investigations as performed by successful IG offices. The Assistance and Investigations Guide provides detailed instructions on how to conduct Investigations.
- 2. Equipment:** IG staff sections require specialized equipment for Investigations. To maintain IG confidentiality and PII, SOPs should address storage and control of digital recorders and a stand-alone computer used for transferring digital recordings of interviews to CDs. Likewise, office procedures regarding Interview Books should be codified, assigning responsibility for every IG to maintain his or her own book or for one person to be responsible for maintaining the overall office Interview Book. Every IG office should have a private, professionally prepared space designated where telephonic or in-person interviews can occur privately without being overheard.
- 3. Investigations Records:** The retention period for Investigations records depends on the type of record. The retention period is three years from case closure if the case was an Investigation or Investigative Inquiry with not-substantiated allegation(s). For Investigations or Investigative Inquiries with substantiated allegation(s), the retention period is 30 years. Since Army Regulation 20-1 requires case files (with all required documents) to be uploaded into IGARS, IGs are no longer required to maintain hard-copy case files once a case is closed. IGs may destroy these case files but only after the Command IG or a senior member of the IG staff section verifies that all appropriate case files have been uploaded. In most cases, the A&I Chief is responsible for the proper disposal of any hard-copy case files. Also, IGs need to maintain files that contain certain sensitive topics or that address other subjects considered of historical value. If in doubt, check with DAIG's Assistance Division (especially if the case was linked / referred to Assistance Division) and with DAIG's Records-Release Office prior to destruction. DAIG's Information Resource Management Division (IRMD) will ensure that IGARS case files are purged or retained in accordance with the requirements stated above.

Chapter 7

IG Office Operations: Teaching and Training

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this section is to discuss when IGs can reasonably assume responsibility for Teaching and Training beyond the daily responsibility to do so that is inherent in being an IG. This section assumes that teaching other Soldiers about the IG system is part of that daily responsibility.

2. **Inspections Certification:** Army Regulation 1-201, Army Inspection Policy, assigns responsibility for Inspections to many members of the command. However, many Soldiers make incorrect assumptions about the purpose of Inspections and how to conduct them properly. IGs are the Army's subject-matter experts regarding Inspections, and successful IGs have established Inspection certification programs for their commands to educate Inspectors about how to conduct Inspections successfully and how to increase the effectiveness of the Inspections process. The Inspections Guide, along with AR 1-201, is a valuable resource in developing this training.

3. **Trends Analysis:** Some trends-analysis results should be passed to a wider community. Venues where IGs should Teach and Train regulations or information based on trends analysis are newcomers' briefings, Family Readiness Group meetings, Commander / First Sergeant Courses, and professional-development classes. The emphasis of the information disseminated at these venues should not be IG-centric but should focus on information or assistance requested from the IG or trends and problem areas the community can resolve.

Appendix A

Sample Inspector General Office Standing Operating Procedure

Purpose: The purpose of this appendix is to provide a sample Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) for the notional Fort Von Steuben (FVS) IG staff section. This SOP is a model only and may be modified to assist IG staff sections with developing SOPs that meet their specific needs. This sample may contain outdated regulatory or other requirements and must not substitute for current requirements outlined in AR 20-1 and the doctrinal Guides.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 66TH INFANTRY DIVISION
FORT VON STEUBEN, VIRGINIA 22605

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Office of the Inspector General, Standing Operating Procedures (SOP),
Fort Von Steuben, Virginia

1. Purpose. This SOP provides minimum guidance for the conduct of routine business within the office of the Inspector General.
2. Applicability. These provisions apply to all personnel within the office of the Inspector General. This SOP has been developed primarily as a continuity guide and for newly assigned members. Guidance provided in regulations is not repeated, except where emphasis is deemed necessary. Army Regulation 20-1 is the designated regulation established to direct and guide Inspectors General. Template examples for specific actions can be located within The Inspections Guide and The Assistance and Investigations Guide.
3. Scope. This SOP establishes procedures and responsibilities for IGs within the Fort Von Steuben Office of the Inspector General. IGs are expected to be of the highest caliber and maintain the integrity that is expected from every Service Member.
4. General. The office of the Inspector General is part of the personal staff of the Senior Commander, Fort Von Steuben, Virginia. This SOP complies with Army Regulation 20-1 and will be reviewed and updated annually.

Droit et Avant!

ALBERT R. RIGHTWAY
LTC, IG
Command Inspector General

**FORT VON STEUBEN IG OFFICE SOP
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Note: These page numbers will not correspond to the page numbers of the SOP as it appears in the guide but are here as an example only.

Fort Von Steuben IG Office Standing Operating Procedures

1. **Purpose.** This Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) outlines the responsibilities, organization, procedures, essential references, and the daily functions that are unique to the Fort Von Steuben (FVS) Inspector General staff section in support of the Senior Commander and Commanding General (CG) as well as assigned and attached Army organizations. This SOP is a living document subject to the provisions outlined in Army Regulation 20-1, Army Inspector General Activities and Procedures; Army Regulation 1-201, Army Inspections Policy; The Inspections Guide; The Assistance and Investigations Guide; and Any changes are meant to improve daily operations and provide brief, clear, and concise procedural processes for the IG staff section.

2. Responsibilities.

a. Command IG (CIG) and Deputy IG (Deputy):

- (1) Inquire into, and periodically report upon, the discipline, efficiency, economy, morale, training and readiness of the units assigned to FVS to the CG.
- (2) Periodically propose programs of inspection to the CG.
- (3) Cooperate fully with DoD IG, DAIG, and FORSCOM IG inspection programs conducted at FVS.
- (4) Develop an IG staff section SOP and revise as necessary.
- (5) Teach and Train commanders and their staffs when appropriate and upon request.
- (6) Provide installation common trends and important IG information to incoming commanders and CSMs during the pre-command course.
- (7) Provide important IG information to incoming personnel during the newcomers briefing.
- (8) Investigate allegations of impropriety as directed by the CG or in accordance with AR 20-1.

b. Inspectors General (IGs) and Assistant IGs:

- (1) Lead and organize Inspections that provide accurate, timely information to the CG and staff affecting unit readiness regardless of topic.
- (2) Recommend Inspection topics to the CIG based on the commander's priorities, readiness, and Soldier welfare.
- (3) Ensure FVS units are aware of scheduled DoD IG, DAIG, and FORSCOM IG Inspections.
- (4) Identify trends and make assessments and then provide the information to the CIG and subordinate commanders.
- (5) Teach and train unit personnel when necessary or upon request.

c. The IG staff section will provide Assistance to all Soldiers, Family members, Department of the Army Civilians (DAC), retirees, and others who request IG Assistance on a matter of Army interest. The IG will refer cases as appropriate to component IGs, the chain of command, and government and civilian agencies.

d. The IG staff section's Manager's Internal Control Program will be part of this SOP for administrative oversight in order to ensure that daily operations are in accordance with AR 20-1, Appendix E, Army Internal Control Evaluation Checklist, in support of the Army's Managers' Internal Control Program as outlined in Army Regulation 11-2.

e. The IG staff section will review the IG staff section SOP annually and update it as required.

3. **Organization.** The IG staff section organization is in accordance with The Inspector General of the Army's (TIG) manpower review conducted in 2017 and the FVS Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). Seven Modified Table of Organization Equipment (MTOE) IG positions are authorized.

4. **IG Mission.** The FVS IG mission is to serve as an extension of the eyes, ears, voice, and conscience of the FVS CG. The IG staff section will conduct thorough, objective, and impartial Inspections, Assistance, and Investigations designed to inform, assist, and improve units in readiness and operational efficiencies through the identification of systemic issues or procedural problems. The impact will be promoting the well-being, good order, and discipline for our Soldiers and their Family members, retirees, and Civilian employees.

5. **IG Oath.** Personnel assigned to the IG staff section will take the *applicable* IG Oath. Taking the oath is a prerequisite for performance of IG duties, and the IG Oath be administered upon completion of The Inspector General School (TIGS). The CG will administer the CIG's oath at a minimum and preferably for other members of the IG staff section as well. The CIG and Deputy Inspector General (Deputy) will administer the oath to IGs and Assistant IGs if the CG opts not to do so. The CIG or Deputy is responsible for coordinating the ceremony with the Deputy Commander or Chief of Staff. The IG oath will be displayed in the IG's office.

6. **Confidentiality / Impartiality.** Each IG is in a position of public trust and will remain impartial and maintain confidentiality in accordance with Army Regulation 20-1. IGs must remain objective at all times and under all situations. Soldiers, Civilians, and Family members need to know that they can come to IGs for assistance and be assured that IGs will remain neutral. Disclosure of IG matters to non-IG personnel is not authorized and will not be tolerated.

7. **Office Procedures.** The following office procedures are considered the most important to ensure professionalism, quality customer service, and productivity:

a. Office Hours and Duty Uniform.

(1) Office Hours: Office hours are between 0830-1630 weekdays with the exception of Thursdays, when the office is closed for training from 1200-1630. The CIG and Deputy maintains the authority to adjust work schedules in accordance with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidelines; however, personnel will work within the core FVS work hours of 1000-1400 and 40 hours per week. Considerations should include mission accomplishment, staffing requirements, travel distances, car pools, etc. The Deputy will ensure that at least one IG is in the office

during duty hours. The CIG or Deputy can authorize an exception for mission requirements, FVS block leave, or holidays.

(2) Duty Uniform: Duty uniform for military personnel is in accordance with Army Regulation 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia, and the FVS Desert Standards Handbook, but generally the standard is the Army Combat Uniform (ACU). Civilian personnel will wear appropriate attire commensurate with creating a professional work environment and in accordance with OPM and CIG standards. Additionally, Inspector General Distinctive Insignia will be worn on the Army Service Uniform for Officers and Enlisted personnel in accordance with Army Regulation 20-1 and Army Regulation 670-1. Enlisted personnel will wear their Regimental Crest and Military Occupancy Skill (MOS) insignia.

b. Leave and Passes and the 59-Minute Rule.

(1) Leave: Leaves will be processed in accordance with Army Regulation 600-8-10, Leave and Passes. Military personnel will submit absence requests per the unit IPPS-A SOP. Civilians will submit leave requests through ATAAPS for approval by the CIG or Deputy no fewer than five days prior to leave. The CIG and Deputy may grant exceptions on a case-by-case basis and will recommend military leave extensions to the company commander before the end of the currently approved leave.

(2) Passes and the 59-Minute Rule: Regular and Special passes will be in accordance with Army Regulation 600-8-10 and processed the same as leaves. Civilians may receive a 59-Minute early release in accordance with OPM standards at the discretion of the command leadership, CIG, and Deputy; however, the 59-Minute Rule will not be abused or misused.

(3) Sick Call and Sick Leave: Military personnel will call in before the duty day and then report for sick call as per FVS and 66th HHBN policy. If military personnel receive quarters, then they will call to give a status and provide documentation for any quarters upon return to duty. Civilian personnel will call in before their scheduled work day or as soon as possible if there is a special circumstance. Upon return to duty, Civilian personnel will fill submit leave requests through ATAAPS prior to the end of the pay period. Civilian personnel may be required to present supporting documentation at the discretion of management but are required to provide documentation after the third day in accordance with OPM standards.

c. Battle Rhythm: The IG staff section battle rhythm is implemented and executed in order to synchronize all four IG functions and administrative support actions and requirements. IGs are required to schedule customer service and support requirements around the mandated battle rhythm functions. However, flexibility will be maintained in order to be responsive to the CG, Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, and Commanders. The current IG staff section battle rhythm is:

(1) Calendar Review: Calendar reviews will be conducted every Monday at 0900. The Deputy runs the meeting and establishes an agenda. Primary areas of emphasis are calendar review and update; CIG, Deputy, and NCOIC meetings and appointments; travel itineraries; and tasking review and updates.

(2) Battle Update Assessment (BUA): The CIG attends the BUA with the CG and installation staff every Tuesday at 0830 (select Tuesdays may be at 0800). BUA slides are due to the Secretary of the General Staff (SGS) on Mondays by 1200. The CIG is responsible for the development and submission of the BUA slide. The CIG provides the Deputy and NCIOC a copy for situational awareness. The Deputy briefs the BUA slide in the absence of the CIG.

(3) Staff Calls and Meetings: IG staff section staff meetings will be conducted every Thursday at 1300. The Deputy will run the staff call and establish an agenda. Primary areas of emphasis will be calendar review and update, tasking review and update, budget, Assistance case status and follow-up and Inspections. IGs will discuss case details to ensure the process and follow-ups are conducted in a timely manner. Assistance case follow-ups support Army Regulation 20-1, Appendix E, Army Internal Control Evaluation Checklist, E-4.

(4) Internal Control Processes (ICP): The Deputy has primary responsibility to manage the ICP and ensure systems are developed and maintained to ensure compliance with Army Regulation 20-1. Two ICP test questions are picked and evaluated weekly. Deputy discusses any discrepancies during the next staff call and directs corrective actions. The Deputy conducts follow-up evaluations NLT 30 days.

(5) Inspections Review: The Deputy and the Chief of Inspections meet every Monday at 1300 to address Inspection schedules, support requirements, staff coordination, IG Inspection tools, and developing trends for the ongoing Inspection. The Chief of Inspections briefs significant trend developments to the CIG, who provides them to the SC / DA during Inspection update briefs.

(6) Commanders and First Sergeants Course: The CIG will brief the IG portion during the Division / Installation Commanders and First Sergeants Course as scheduled by the Division G-3. The CIG prepares the slides and submits them to the G-3. The slide will focus on the following:

- Duties, Functions, and Responsibilities of the IG
- Current trends for Soldier and Family issues
- Commander's responsibilities in accordance with Army Regulation 608-99
- IG support to Commanders

(7) Newcomers Briefing (NCB): The NCOIC will present the IG portion during the Installation's Newcomers Briefing on Wednesday at 1040 or as coordinated. The NCOIC IG prepares the NCB slide and submits it NLT Monday prior to the briefing. The slide will focus on trends pertinent to incoming Soldier and their Families.

(8) Investigations Review: The Deputy and the Chief of Investigations will meet every Wednesday at 1300 to address ongoing Investigations, support requirements, staff coordination, and developing trends for any ongoing Investigation. The Chief of Investigations briefs significant trend developments to the CIG, who provides them to the SC as required. Meetings are subject to ongoing Investigations and will not occur if there are no Investigations.

(9) Training: IG staff section training is every Thursday immediately after staff call. The purpose of IG training is to ensure that all IGs remain trained in accordance

with AR 20-1 standards. The IG training NCO develops the training schedule quarterly. The Deputy approves the training NLT two weeks before a new quarter. The training schedule is posted on the bulletin board, and instructors must have the Deputy review their training one week prior to the training event. Training venues support Army Regulation 20-1, Appendix E.

(10) Budget Review: The Deputy and Administrative Assistant meet on Fridays at 1300 to address budget requirements, expenditures, supply requests, and the budget glide path. Regular Day Off (RDO) Fridays will be the exception. The Deputy will brief the CIG at least quarterly on the IG budget.

(11) ATAAPS: Civilian employees are required to complete their ATAAPS timecard NLT Wednesday before the end of the pay period for certification by the Deputy. The Deputy will submit his timecard to the CIG for approval.

d. Staff Continuity Books (CB) with duties and responsibilities: IGs will maintain a staff continuity book and update it as required. CBs will be detailed and address every duty and responsibility the IG or staff is assigned. The Deputy will establish the standard for all CBs and review them once a quarter. CBs are designed to be a stand-alone, descriptive narration of all job requirements such that any IG can pick up the CB and perform each duty.

e. Army Physical Readiness Training: Military personnel will conduct physical fitness training at a minimum of five times per week, ideally with other members of the command. Civilian personnel are encouraged to maintain their physical fitness and can schedule physical activities in accordance with the Army Wellness Program (AWP). The Deputy can alter work schedules for each IG to accommodate physical training and special requirements. Additional time can be allotted; however, time will be documented as leave or the day hours adjusted to ensure all work hours are completed. The NCOIC will monitor military personnel for ACFTs and weight-control compliance. IGs with battlefield-rotation duties are encouraged to perform PT with the units they are visiting.

f. Sponsorship and In-processing: The IG office maintains a sponsorship program that integrates newly assigned personnel and their Families into FVS and the IG community. The Deputy and NCOIC are the sponsors for incoming IGs. The sponsor will contact the individual and send a welcome packet, IG staff section numbers, and a copy of this SOP. The sponsor will personally greet the individual upon arrival and escort the new IG during the initial in-processing. In-processing will be in accordance with installation policies.

g. Evaluations: The Deputy is responsible for ensuring military and civilian evaluations are completed within established regulations and suspense. In cases where the CG is the rater / senior rater, the rater will forward the completed OER / NCOER with rater's signature through the online evaluation system to the SGS. Military rating schemes will be posted as required by regulations. The Deputy IG will rate all civilian employees, and the CIG will be the reviewer.

h. TDY Procedures:

(1) Approval for travel. The CIG or Deputy directs or approves travel as needed in order to accomplish the mission, attend training events, or participate in IG conferences. The Deputy has oversight of TDY travel to determine the most cost effective use of government funds. Army Regulation 58-1, Management, Acquisition, and Use of Motor Vehicles, governs GOV usage for TDY or travel.

(2) IGs will establish DTS accounts and process travel-order requests through DTS NLT five days prior to travel. The CIG and Deputy will approve travel and travel funds.

i. Incentive Awards (IA) and Reassignments: The CIG or Deputy initiate IAs and forward them to Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC). The awardees **will not** be told about the award until it has been processed and **approved**. Monetary awards are subject to funding availability. Performance awards are discretionary and are used only as an incentive to stimulate future high-level performance of the rated person and his or her peers. Monetary awards are defined as:

(1) Performance Award. A performance award is a cash award or time-off award used to recognize exceptional performance. This award requires a current performance evaluation on file.

(2) Special Act / Service Award. A Special Act / Service Award is a cash superior- accomplishment award given to recognize a meritorious personal effort, act, service, scientific, or other achievement accomplished within or outside assigned job responsibilities.

(3) Compensatory Time. The CIG or Deputy approve compensation time for civilian personnel. Compensation time is not authorized for military personnel; however, passes are authorized in accordance with Army Regulation 600-8-10.

(4) Reassignments. Reassignments can be employee- (one per year) or management- (discretion) initiated. Reassignments are based on outstanding performance and / or increasing duties with outstanding performance and future potential service. Reassignments must be processed through the CIG and CPAC and approved by the FVS Chief of Staff.

j. General Correspondence: Correspondence formats are specified in AR 25-50.

(1) Routing. Correspondence for signature by the CIG will be routed through the Deputy before submitting for signature. The preferred routing method is enclosing correspondence in a folder entitled "For Signature and Return" with the IG staff section routing slip attached to the cover. Correspondence for the installation headquarters or throughout the installation will be documented by the military assistant (MA) and delivered via a DA Form 200 / FVS Form 635. The MA logs in the DA Form 200 and tracks it for accountability and suspense.

(2) Email. Take extreme care to protect confidentiality when using email. Electronic mail must be used for administrative and staffing actions only. Use email encryption for any email that requests specific information for any IG issue. Minimize email attachments of IG correspondence. Each email will have the appropriate CUI

markings in accordance with the "SAIG Interim CUI Guidance to the IG Enterprise," dated 16 December 2020.

(3) Quality Control. IGs are responsible for carefully proofreading correspondence prepared for signature by the CIG or destined for outside distribution. Each IG conducts peer reviews within the office before any correspondence is sent. Typographical errors, pen-and-ink changes, and significant grammatical errors **are not** acceptable. The Army standard is a document that can be read in a simple, rapid reading generally free of grammatical and publishing errors. Correspondence intended for signature must be a professional product. Effective writing guidelines are contained in DA PAM 600-67, Effective Writing for Army Leaders, and in Part 2 of The IG Reference Guide.

(4) Mail Procedures. The Administrative Assistant is responsible for all postage and mail distribution, including Federal Express. All outgoing mail is placed in the secure out-box on the front desk. The Administrative Assistant will take and pick-up all mail daily or as needed. The Administrative Assistant is the custodian of the mail-room key. The Administrative Assistant and any IG picking up mail will have a mail certificate and the required training.

(5) Staffing Documents. The Administrative Assistant is the point of contact for staffing and review of documents and publications when and if requested. The MA will route them through IGs to the Deputy and then CIG. In accordance with Army Regulation 20-1, IG personnel will use the term "reviewed" or "reviewed with comment" when preparing replies for documents and publication reviews. The Administrative Assistant will send the staff action to the proper staff element. FVS IG staff section specific publications will be reviewed every 18 months by the IG staff section staff, and the Deputy notifies the FVS publications manager that the review process has occurred.

k. IG Nomination Procedures: Local IG nominations will be processed in accordance with Army Regulation 20-1 and Human Resource Command (HRC). The CIG, Deputy, and NCOIC will screen each local nomination applicant and make a recommendation for the endorsement to the CG. The installation G-1 forwards approved nominations to DAIG. Officers and NCOs should have operational experience, strong interpersonal skills, high moral and ethical character, and sound judgment.

l. Length of Inspector General Assignment: Officers and NCOs selected as IGs will generally serve for 36 months. Each IG must begin planning for his or her next duty assignment NLT the 12th month of his or her assignment. Extensions beyond three years are approved by the Soldier's assignment manager and for a fourth year with concurrence by TIG. The CG and FVS Command Sergeant Major (CSM) should endorse the extension request. The CIG will coordinate with the CG, and the NCOIC will coordinate with the CSM for their endorsements.

m. Security and Key Control:

(1) Opening and Close-of-Business (COB) Security Checks. The first IG in the office will do a quick walk-around of the IG staff section and determine any visible security intrusions and deficiencies. Immediately report any violations to the Security

Manager or MPs if appropriate. The MA, upon arrival in the morning, unlocks the filing cabinets and turns on the printers. At COB, the last IG will ensure the printers are turned off (except network printers), the filing cabinets are secured, and the office entrance door is locked prior to departure.

(2) Each IG is responsible for security in his or her work area. Computers will be logged off each night, and no Common Access Card (CAC) will be left in the computer. All personal file cabinets will be secured. Additionally, all case files, folders, and books will be stored in the designated drawers and locked in order to safeguard and protect IG files and information. Case files will not be left in desk drawers. Each IG is responsible for securing his or her CAC from his or her computer to prevent fraudulent use.

(3) Key Control. Key-control measures will be maintained in accordance with Army Regulation 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program. The building manager will maintain key-control logs and inventories in accordance with Army Regulation 190-13. The building manager will be the primary key-control custodian. Office personnel sign for their keys.

n. Office Property and Accountability / Supplies:

(1) Supplies. The MA has the additional duty of ordering and maintaining the office supplies for the IG staff section. Supply requests will be submitted to the MA and then approved by the Deputy. Ordering supplies will be done with the International Merchant Purchase Card (IMPAC) in accordance with DoD, DA, installation, and IMCOM systems and regulations. Monthly statements are approved by the approving official and certifying official by the fifth working day after the billing cycle.

(2) Property Accountability. The NCOIC is the Primary Hand-Receipt Holder (PHRH) for the office and is responsible for maintaining hand-receipt accountability for property issued as outlined in DA PAM 710-2-1; sub-hand-receipting property to each IG as appropriate; clearing IGs hand-receipts upon departure; developing internal procedures to ensure control and security for all property on hand, specifically automation equipment; and initiating and processing, in a timely manner, adjustment documents for lost, damaged, or destroyed property (i.e., Financial Liability Investigations of Property, Statements of Charges, and Cash Collection Voucher) in accordance with Army Regulation 735-5.

o. Inspector General Network (IGNET): Upon graduation from TIGS, new IGs will fill out the IGNET user account form and give it to the MA. The MA will send this form and a letter to DAIG requesting full access to IGNET. Safeguard your user ID and password as FOUO materials. The IGNET system will not be open when addressing issues with non-IGs in the office. Data printed from IGNET will be protected and placed in case files or protected as needed. IGNET accounts will be logged off at COB. Any breach or suspected breach of the IGNET system will be immediately reported to the security manager.

p. Automation: The Deputy and Administrative Assistant will ensure there is an annual automation cyclic plan to replace computer and automation systems in order to ensure the IG staff section is fully capable and compatible with the NEC

(Network Command) and IGMET systems and security requirements. IG staff section automation concerns and configurations will be forwarded to DAIG IRMD on an annual basis to ensure compliance.

q. File Management: The Administrative Assistant will ensure IGARS and IG staff section files are maintained in accordance with the Army Records Information Management System (ARIMS) and IG records in accordance with Army Regulation 25-400-2 and Army Regulation 20-1. IGARS containing not-substantiated allegations will be maintained for three years, and substantiated allegations will be retained for 30 years. The Administrative Assistant will ensure Inspection results are posted on the IG SharePoint portal. The Administrative Assistant will purge all IG records every October (the beginning of the fiscal year).

8. Professional Development and Training and Team Building. The FVS IG staff section employee professional development and training concept is to optimize staff career development in Career Program 55. The goal is for employees to reach individual career goals within the organizational goals. The first step is the development of the Individual Development Plan (IDP). The IDP frames the concept for all training and short- and long-term personnel and professional goals. In addition to the IDP, each employee must complete all mandatory training required from FORSCOM and the civilian education system (CES). The IG training NCO has a list of yearly training requirements for both military and civilian employees. Annual training requirements will be completed before 1 September of each year.

a. IG Professional Development (IGPD) Program: The IG staff section will conduct quarterly sessions to discuss key subjects and lessons learned during Inspections, Assistance cases, and Investigations. These sessions are the staff's time to teach, train, and refresh each other on the principles taught at the IG school. This program will allow the staff to stay current on IG concepts, Army Regulation 20-1, and key functional information. These days will be scheduled and posted on the IG calendar located on the IG SharePoint portal as well as any pertinent command calendars.

b. Team Building: Team building is an integral part of the IG staff section's overall development. As IGs, there will often be opportunities for the staff to work with different team members. To enhance this effort and to build esprit de corps, the IG staff section will conduct team-building exercises, which will take place on the last Thursday of every month with flexibility built in to account for holidays and work schedules.

c. Conferences: The IG staff section will attend the annual Southeast Region IG Conference. The office will usually send all available IGs but must maintain office capabilities with at least one IG. If funds are available and the mission allows, IGs can attend other IG conferences with approval of the CIG or Deputy.

d. The Inspector General School (TIGS). IGs are required to attend TIGS as soon as possible upon arrival to the IG staff section. Extensions may be granted by the CIG up to 180 days for extenuating circumstances, but personnel who have not attended the school may not perform IG specific duties or have access to IG records. Personnel who have not been to TIGS will not serve in the IG staff section after 180 days. The CIG or Deputy will train all acting IGs in accordance with Army Regulation

20-1 and TIGS standards. Civilian IGs must attend the TIGS one-week IG Advanced Course with the Deputy annotating the training in the IG training book. Military IGs will attend the IG Advanced Course as allocations through FORSCOM permit.

9. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The FOIA is a statutory right of access to Federal Government information. TIG is the release and initial denial authority for all IG records on behalf of the Secretary of the Army, and the DAIG Legal Advisor and the Deputy Legal Advisor are the designated representatives for processing records requested under the FOIA. The IG staff section will follow the requirements of Army Regulation 20-1 when a FOIA request is received. IGs will ensure the CIG and Deputy are notified of any FOIA request.

10. IG Assistance Function. The Assistance function of the IG mission is critical to the success of all IGs in support of the CG, leaders, Soldiers, Family members, and all those who seek IG assistance to resolve an issue or address an allegation. An IG can receive an IGAR from ANYONE and must determine if a complaint is IG-appropriate. The following steps describe the IG staff section's process in handling IGARs in accordance with The Assistance and Investigations Guide:

a. Receipt of IGARs:

(1) Call-In Complaints. IGs will take complaints over the phone but will encourage complainants to come to the office to complete a DA Form 1559. However, if the complainant cannot come into the IG staff section, the IG will complete the DA Form 1559 in accordance with Army Regulation 20-1 and The Assistance and Investigations Guide. Always ask the complainant the following five questions:

- What do you want the IG to do for you?"
- Can you email or fax supporting documents?
- Have you asked another agency for assistance?
- Is your chain of command aware of the problem?
- What is your status?

If the complaint is IG-appropriate, inform the complainant how our procedures work and that the complaint needs to be written on a DA Form 1559, IG Action Request (IGAR). Write "telephonic" in the signature block, and open the case.

(2) Walk-in Complaints. Occasionally, Soldiers, Family members and Civilian personnel come to the IG staff section with a complaint. An IG staff member will use the conference room or a private office to hear the complaint and fill out the DA Form 1559. An IG may ask another IG to help identify the issue or problem.

(3) Emails, letters, anonymous notifications, or other forms of notification. If IG-appropriate, initiate a DA Form 1559 and follow the seven-step Inspector General Action Process (IGAP).

(4) Not IG-appropriate. IGs will advise complainants of the appropriate recipient to resolve the complaint and will provide reasonable assistance (phone number, use of the office phone, an email address) to facilitate the complainant contacting that agency. The CIG or Deputy will approve all referred cases and keep

them open in order to monitor the action until complete. The IG will Teach and Train the complainant as required. The IG should provide the appropriate information in order to assist the complainant. Complainants should not leave the office feeling that the IG has ignored their issue.

(5) Non-support. Non-support is a Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) and command action; however, the IG staff section will be responsive to all non-support requests for assistance. IGs will ensure the complainant's immediate needs are met; complete a DA Form 1559; refer the case to the company commander; and ensure the commander contacts the complainant and provides the IG a copy of the final response to the complainant. At no time will the IG or IG staff section become personally involved with the complainant, take sides, or give the complainant money. Non-support second offenders will be referred to the next higher-level commander for resolution.

b. Case Management:

(1) Opening a Case. The DA Form 1559 will be opened in the IGARS database on the day it is received but NLT five working days, and the Assistance case folder will be completed with the case number and blocks 1 through 4 annotated. The Administrative Assistant will place the case number on the outside of the folder using the label-maker. The case file will contain all documents pertaining to the case. The case number is automatically assigned by IGARS. Process Information IGARs the same as open IG actionable IGARs. Organize case files in the following manner:

Left inside of folder

1. Complete Blocks 1-4
2. Complete annotations
(as case progresses)
3. Place the 1559 (electronic
/ written)

Right inside of folder

1. Acknowledgement Letter Written /
Verbal
2. All supporting documentation
3. Closing Letter

(2) Acknowledge Receipt of the IGAR. In accordance with The Assistance and Investigations Guide, each case with a known complainant will receive the standard acknowledgement letter or verbal acknowledgement. Enter the date of the acknowledgment into the case notes.

(3) Case Referrals. During the preliminary analysis step, the IG may determine that the best way to resolve the matter is to give it to the Soldier's chain of command or an installation activity or agency. The IG will use the IG staff section standard referral letter to initiate the referral process, and it must include the issue, allegation, and / or standard violated with the referenced regulation. Also provide a suspense date for the command to respond (generally 14 days). Upon receiving the response, analyze the command product to ensure all issues have been addressed in accordance with the standard. Referred IGARs are generally initiated in the IGARS database with telephonic coordination.

(4) Case Notes. Case notes are a vital part of IG cases, and they provide a chronology of the research, work, assistance, phone conversations, and effort made

to solve the complainant's problem. Case notes also serve as the basis of your synopsis in IGARS. IGs annotate case notes as they take actions in order to maintain accurate case data. Documents like statements, emails, and court orders provided during fact-finding will be summarized and entered into IGARS based on when they were received. Any Teaching and Training conducted during an Assistance Inquiry will be annotated in the case notes. IGs will remain professional when updating case notes.

(5) Closing a Case. When the complainant's problem has been resolved, complete your case notes and synopsis in IGARS. Print a final IGAR with the case notes and synopsis as well as prepare a closing letter to the complainant. Be sure to include the regulation and clearly explain the 'why' or 'why not'. Closing letters will be mailed to the complainant as required. Complete the case-folder requirements (inside and outside), and submit the case for a peer review to another IG, then to the Chief of Assistance for forwarding to the Deputy and CIG. Once the CIG has reviewed and approved the case, the AO will scan the case, and then the MA will close the case. Closed case files will be filed in the appropriate file cabinet in chronological order of case numbers by year. Case files will be safeguarded as IG records and locked in the filing cabinet at COB each evening. Do not store case files or other case-related materials in a desk drawer.

(6) Trends Analysis. Conduct case trends analysis during staff call on the first Thursday of every month to identify any systemic issues or trends. The Deputy and Chief of Assistance will lead the analytical discussion. Significant issues or trends will be reported to the CIG for further command notifications.

11. **Inspections.** The IG staff section Inspection program will focus on identifying and solving systemic issues that affect unit readiness and system, program, or function failures. The IG staff section will identify root causes in order to make recommendations that will correct the system, program, or function for the long term. Inspections will follow the Inspection principles outlined in Army Regulation 1-201 and the latest version of The Inspections Guide.

a. IG Staff Section Inspections: The IG staff section will synchronize and analyze Inspections trends and systemic issues and make recommendations to the CG on Inspection topics in the beginning of the 4th Quarter every fiscal year. Inspection topics are identified through DA-directed inspections; DAIG and ACOM Inspection focuses; installation trends; follow-up Inspections; and CG directives supporting the FVS vision and focus. Inspection topics and schedules will be incorporated into the installation's Organizational Inspection Program (OIP). The Chief of Inspections will verify that scheduled Inspections are posted on the IG SharePoint.

b. Inspection Process: The Chief of Inspections will develop an Inspection plan based on the approved Inspection topics. Each Inspection will be coordinated through the installation G-3 with a tasking order. Except for compressed and special-interest-item Inspections, tasking orders will be submitted at least six weeks before the Inspection begins and include the Inspection notification; Inspection directive; units to be Inspected; concept letter; Subject-Matter Expert (SME) requirements; and coordination instructions. The IG team will prepare the inspection tools and documentations and references NLT two weeks before the Inspection, and Inspector

training will be completed one week prior to any inspection. The Deputy will review Inspection tools to ensure they support Inspection objectives. The IG team will not deviate from the inspection schedule without significant notification to the units being Inspected or approval from the CIG or Deputy. IG Inspectors will provide Teaching and Training and general feedback to all affected personnel and organizations (out-briefing) during every Inspection in order to assist commands in meeting standards. The Inspection team will conduct at least two trends analysis briefings to the CIG and Deputy throughout the Inspections process, and significant trends will be briefed to the CG during progress reports. The Inspections team and Deputy will complete the report in accordance with the approved timeline and brief the CIG. The CIG will approve the report and have the MA complete the report cover letter for transmittal to the command group while the CIG coordinates an Inspection briefing with the CG in order to gain his approval. The Inspection team must ensure that the report is fully redacted. Approvals for recommendations will be coordinated with the G-3 for taskings. Tasking oversight will reside with the G-3 until completion, but the Chief of Inspections will conduct periodic follow-ups to check the status of the taskers. The IG team will always be prepared to work with the staff agencies or individuals tasked to help them solve or fix the problem(s). Any taskers above FVS's resolution level will be submitted through FORSCOM's IG staff section for further action at the ACOM or HQDA level as necessary. The Chief of Inspections will schedule any follow-up Inspections and synchronize the Inspection calendar and inform the G-3 OIP coordinator. Once the Inspections process is complete, the Chief of Inspections will publish the Inspection report on the SharePoint portal under the IG Inspections section.

c. Organizational Inspection Program / Intelligence Oversight: The IG staff section coordinates IG Inspections with the installation G-3 OIP coordinator. The G-3 and IG staff section OIP coordinator will work in a collaborative effort to provide oversight of the installation's OIP. OIP coordination meetings generally occur once monthly and the G-3 is responsible for publishing the time and location. The OIP calendar is on the SharePoint under the G-3 OIP tab. The Deputy or Chief of Inspections updates the installation calendar when Inspection schedule changes occur and notifies the G-3 OIP coordinator. The IG will also conduct Inspections training for unit Inspectors within the command as needed to support the division's overall OIP. The IG staff section office also provides oversight for the Intelligence Oversight (IO) Program and will inspect the program every two years in accordance with Army Regulation 20-1 and Army Regulation 381-10, The Conduct and Oversight of U.S. Army Intelligence Activities. Intelligence components subject to Intelligence Oversight Inspections will be identified and annotated in the Inspection plan by the Deputy or Chief of Inspections. FORSCOM has a published Inspection sheet that will be used in order to conduct the Inspection. The IO Inspection will be part of the installation's OIP and will be scheduled on the IG Inspection calendar on SharePoint. IO Inspections will identify training requirements, knowledge of personnel for IO compliance, and reporting procedures. IO follow-up Inspections will occur within one year of the IO deficiencies, or on-the-spot corrections will be recommended.

12. Investigative Inquiries / Investigations.

a. Investigative Inquiries and Investigations may be initiated when there is an allegation of impropriety. The IG conducting the Investigative Inquiry or Investigation will review Army Regulation 20-1 and The Assistance and Investigations Guide for

authority and process. Cases that require an Investigative Inquiry or Investigation can be initiated several ways: by the complainant, DoD IG, DAIG, FORSCOM IG (or any ACOM IG), CG, CIG, anonymously, or by a congressional inquiry. Only the Directing Authority can direct an Investigation, and the CIG can direct an Investigative Inquiry. During the process, the IG will protect the best interests of the Army; treat everyone with dignity and respect; be fair, impartial, and non-adversarial; and allow for the maximum protection of confidentiality. The IG Investigator will complete the ROI / ROII and gain the CG's or CIG's concurrence or non-concurrence with the conclusion and recommendations in accordance with AR 20-1.

(1) DAIG. Command referrals will be in accordance with The Assistance and Investigations Guide and this SOP. If DAIG is the Office of Record, forward the completed investigation to DAIG through FORSCOM IG for a quality-assurance review.

(2) Congressional Inquiry. Occasionally, the Office, Chief Legislative Liaison (OCLL), and the IG staff section will receive simultaneous complaints from the same complainant. Constituent complaints made to congressmen may be referred to DoD or sent to OCLL to be forwarded to the IG staff section for action. If the constituent makes a complaint to a state senator or assemblyman, the case most often is forwarded to DoD IG. The IG staff section will ensure there is no duplication of work. If the IG staff section identifies any duplication or actions, the Deputy will inform the IG complainant that the response will come through congressional channels.

(3) DoD Hotline. These cases are referred for either action or information purposes only by DoD IG thru DAIG and FORSCOM IG. The Deputy and Administrative Assistant will monitor DoD Hotline cases, and they will be briefed during the IG staff section staff call.

(4) Allegations against Senior Officials. Allegations against senior officials (Generals, Senior Executive Service personnel (SES), COL(P), or COL will be forwarded to DAIG Investigations Division (SAIG-IN) within two days via email or another confidential means. The IG staff section will not do any preliminary analysis into the allegation but will record the referral in IGARS in accordance with Army Regulation 20-1 and The Assistance and Investigations Guide. SAIG-IN will provide specific guidance as necessary.

(5) Allegations against Officers, NCOs, Enlisted Soldiers, and Civilians. Any IGAR containing an allegation against an Officer (COL and below), NCO, Enlisted Soldier, or Civilian, that has resulted in the initiation of an IG Investigation, Investigative Inquiry, or a command-directed action (e.g., AR 15-6 Investigation, commander's Inquiry, UCMJ action, etc.) will be reported to DAIG's Assistance Division (SAIG- AC) within two working days by entering the case into the IGARS database. Notify SAIG-IN within two days for any allegation against a COL (the reporting requirement for COLs has two parts: one report to SAIG-AC via IGARS and one to SAIG-IN). The IG staff section can work allegations against a COL following the IGAP process. The CIG and Deputy IG will be notified of all issues and allegations involving any senior officer or NCO, and the status will be briefed during IG staff section staff call.

(6) Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations. Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations will be conducted in accordance with Army Regulation 20-1 and The Assistance and Investigations Guide. The IG staff section will send an allegation of Whistleblower Reprisal to the Whistleblower Investigation and Oversight Branch (WIOB) in DAIG Assistance Division and the FORSCOM IG staff section within five working days using the Whistleblower format in The Assistance and Investigations Guide. The IG staff section will ensure that the complaint and any readily available documents are attached. The IG accepting the complaint will acknowledge the receipt in writing, informing the complainant that the IG will forward the allegation to DAIG for action. Whistleblower ROI / ROIs must have a legal review and will be briefed during IG staff section staff call.

b. Investigative Inquiry / Investigation Procedures.

(1) DoD Hotlines, FORSCOM referrals, CG-directed Investigations, or CG-directed Investigative Inquiries will be completed in accordance with Army Regulation 20-1 and The Assistance and Investigations Guide. The Deputy conducts a preliminary analysis and recommends a course of action (COA) to the CIG. Command referrals will be forwarded to the command but will remain open to ensure all allegations and / or issues have been addressed, the command has taken action, and a written report is given to the IO in accordance with Army Regulation 20-1 and Army Regulation 600-20. The IO will ensure all documents and information collected are properly marked, safeguarded, and placed in the case folder. Documents and information not used in the approved report will be destroyed after the ROI / ROI is approved.

(2) IGs will not investigate allegations when the command elects to resolve those matters using a commander's investigation or inquiry. The IG staff section will always afford the Directing Authority or subordinate commanders who have the means to investigate the opportunity to resolve the matter in command channels. When referring allegations to the command, IGs will follow the procedure outlined in Part Two, Section 3-1-1, of The Assistance and Investigations Guide.

(3) Formal Investigations: These cases are reviewed by the CIG and Deputy. The CIG will inform the CG of any issues involving leaders in his or her command, and the CG will decide whether the IG staff section or the command will investigate. The CIG will obtain a written directive for any Investigation or Investigative Inquiry directed by the CG. All notifications and ROI formats and preparations will be in accordance with Army Regulation 20-1 and The Assistance and Investigations Guide. These types of cases are few in number and extremely resource intensive. The IG staff must conduct a thorough preliminary analysis so the CIG may best advise the CG regarding investigative responsibility.

(a) Interviews and Questioning: Follow the procedures outlined in The Assistance and Investigations Guide. Use the IG staff section conference room for interviews and questioning witnesses, subjects, or suspects. The IO will do a peer evaluation and rehearsal led by the Deputy. The designated Assistant IG maintains the tape recorder and tapes. He or she is also responsible for arranging the conference room. Witnesses, subjects, or suspects will be advised of their rights if necessary and afforded due process at all times. Following the interview, the IO will

coordinate with the SJA Office for the transcription of the case. If the SJA cannot provide a transcriber, the IO will transcribe the interview.

(b) Subjects, Suspects, and Witnesses should travel to the IG staff section for questioning. Limit your traveling to evidence research. The IO will consider doing interviews over the phone and tape recording those interviews. You must make it clear to the subject that he or she is being recorded. The Deputy is the approval for any TDY for questioning.

(4) Command Notification: Upon completion of an ROI / ROII, the CIG must brief the CG on the results.

(5) Legal Review: ROIs / ROII's will have a legal review. The Administrative Assistant will submit them on a DA Form 200 to the SJA Office within three days of completion. The Administrative Assistant will brief the status of SJA reviews during the IG staff section staff call. See the Whistleblower section for legal review requirements.

(6) Case File Completion: After all actions are completed in accordance with Army Regulation 20-1 and The Assistance and Investigations Guide, the IO will close the case in IGARS. The original ROI / ROII is placed in the case file under the final closing letter if one is appropriate. Substantiated ROIs / ROII's will be maintained for 30 years. Purge unnecessary working documents from the file. The closed, completed case file is then put in the appropriate Investigations / Investigative Inquiries drawer and properly safeguarded.

(7) Disposal of documents: Shred old, unused working documents and draft copies. The IO will not use waste baskets or recycle bins for any throw-away items.

13. Teaching and Training. IGs teach skills; provide information about Army systems, processes, and procedures; and assess morale while assisting, inspecting, and investigating. The Inspector General Teaching and Training function will be incorporated in every IG staff section action. The IG staff section will be responsive to commander and staff requests for any training within the scope of the IG staff section and mission requirements. The CIG or Deputy will approve all specifically requested IG training. The CIG has approved general teaching venues like the Company Commander's Course and the Newcomers Briefing in order to inform leaders and Soldiers of installation-specific trends and areas of concern. The Chief of Inspections will teach an Inspector certification class at least quarterly or on order to members of the command in support of the division's overall OIP.

Part 8

Fort Von Steuben

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Fort Von Steuben

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Installation Facts

Fort Von Steuben is located 70 miles southwest of Richmond, Virginia, and includes two sub-posts, Conway Army Airfield (CAAF) and Camp William North. Fort Von Steuben was one of the original sites where the Continental Army mobilized and trained during the Revolutionary War.

CAAF is located 11 miles northeast of main post and is the home of the 66th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB). Formerly a USAF base, the airfield was transferred to the Army and Fort Von Steuben in 1973.

Camp William North, located 43 miles north of Fort Von Steuben, is home of the 46th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) of the Virginia Army National Guard (VAARNG) and Headquarters, 44th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) (II Corps). Elements of the VAARNG, as well as USAR units from Virginia, West Virginia, and North Carolina, use the camp extensively for training and equipment storage.

The 66th Infantry Division, located on main post, is subordinate to II Corps. The division consists of four active-component brigade combat teams.

FORT VON STEUBEN DATA

Size:	127,988 acres
Main Post	77,139 acres
CAAF	5,651 acres
Camp William North	45,198 acres
Maneuver area:	84,837 acres
Impact area:	26,671 acres
Cantonment area:	2,040 acres
Maintenance space:	310,004 sq ft
Average temperature:	54 degrees Fahrenheit
Average snowfall per year:	15 inches
Active-duty Soldiers:	16,324
Civilian work force:	3,450
Family members:	21,765
Retirees:	2,209
Number of on-post housing units:	3,172
Bachelor officer quarters:	196
Bachelor senior NCO quarters:	58
Barracks spaces available:	8,462
Reserve Component personnel:	
Attending annual training:	26,802
Attending weekend training:	11,653
Mobilization population:	45,554



66th Infantry Division

1st BCT

1st BSB
4-6 CAV
1-79 AR
2-79 AR
3-79 AR
1-66 BEB
1-60 FA

3rd BCT

3rd BSB
3-6 CAV
3-66 IN
4-66 IN
2-76 IN
3-66 BEB
3-60 FA

66th CAB (Heavy)

566th ASB
1-66 AHB (AB)
2-66 CAV (AB)
3-66 GSAB (ASLT)
E Co. 66th AVN (UAV)

66th Division Headquarters & Headquarters Battalion

66th Headquarters and Support Company (HSC)
66th Signal, Intelligence, and Sustainment (SIS) Company
Detachment, 5-77 CAV
66th Division Band

Legend:

BSB = Brigade Support Battalion
IN = Infantry
EN = Engineer
AB = Attack Battalion
ASLT = Assault Helicopter Battalion
ASB = Aviation Support Battalion
HHC = Headquarters and Headquarters Company
BSTB = Brigade Special Troops Battalion
CSSB = Combat Sustainment Support Battalion
HHB = Headquarters and Headquarters Battery

2nd BCT

2nd BSB
5-6 CAV
1-66 IN
2-66 IN
1-76 IN
2-66 BEB
2-60 FA

66th Division Artillery

HHB

66th Sustainment Brigade

BSTB
66th CSSB

AR = Armor
FA = Field Artillery
AVN = Aviation
GSAB = General Support Aviation Battalion
UAV = Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Non-Divisional Units

46th IBCT (VAARNG) (Camp William North)
533rd Service and Support Battalion
123rd Engineer Company (Bridge)
Headquarters, 44th Theater Sustainment Command (II Corps)
199th Maintenance Battalion (GS)
144th Transportation Movement Control Battalion
66th Air Support Operations Squadron (USAF)
Detachment 8, 3rd Weather Squadron, AMC (USAF)
A, B, C, and D Flights (Air Liaison)


Other Tenant Units / Activities

Coudray Army Hospital / Director of Health Services
Fort Von Steuben Soldier Recovery Unit (SRU)
Mary Beth Dental Clinic / Director of Dental Services
Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office
Defense Commissary Agency
Fort Von Steuben, USACID Detachment
Red Cross
Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers District Area Office
Maneuver Area Training Equipment Site (MATES)
Network Enterprise Center

Installation Management Command (IMCOM) Activities

Director of Human Resource Development (DHR)—Army Community Services, Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC), Army Career and Alumni Program, Army Substance Abuse Program, Child and Youth Services, etc.
Director of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security (DPTMS)
Logistics Readiness Center (LRC)
Director of Emergency Services (DES)
Director of Public Works (DPW)
Director of Family Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (DFMWR)
Director of Resource Management (DRM)
Equal Employment Opportunity Office (EEO)
Installation Chaplain
Staff Judge Advocate
Public Affairs Office
Military Historian
Internal Review and Audit Compliance (IRAC) Office
Conway Army Airfield
Garrison Headquarters, Camp William North

Legend and Unit Composition



BCT - Brigade Combat Team Composition

3 X Combined Arms Battalions


1 X Cavalry Squadron

1 X Brigade Support Battalion

1 X Engineer Battalion

1 X Field Artillery Battalion

SBCT- Stryker Brigade Combat Team



- 3 X Stryker Infantry Battalions
- 1 X Cavalry Squadron
- 1 X Field Artillery Battalion
- 1 X Brigade Support Battalion

Commander's Guidance

This tour at Fort Von Steuben is your first as an IG. The Commanding General has given the following guidance to his Command Inspector General:

1. General

a. You are part of my personal staff. You and your IG staff section work directly for me.

b. I want to employ your talents to benefit this post, the people on it, and the Army -- and to keep me from doing anything illegal or unethical.

c. Initially, I want you to take some time to look, see, and hear what is going on in the division. I am eager to hear your assessment of installation and division operations and your recommendations on how we can best use the talents and resources of the IG office.

d. Conduct all of your business in a professional and objective manner. I may forget you during the decision-making process, but do not take that omission personally. Those things happen when you are not part of the coordinating or special staff. Your responsibility is to stay informed of what is happening in the command.

e. Philosophically speaking, I want you to solve problems at the lowest possible level and let the chain of command work. Be a friend to the Battalion and Brigade Commanders and their CSMs and help them succeed.

2. Inspections

a. I want you to review immediately the division's Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) and Green Tab Memorandum #1 (enclosed). Become familiar with both items.

b. I don't want to influence your assessment of the OIP, but I am concerned about the effectiveness of the OIP and our Command Inspections. I want you to evaluate the OIP at all levels and assess the effectiveness of our total inspection effort. Things just don't seem to be going well. See what you can uncover.

c. Remember: You are assigned to a post with Maneuver, Fires, and Effects; Operational Support; and Force Sustainment units that have the primary mission of closing with and destroying the enemy. Our Soldiers, organizations, and equipment must remain ready to conduct that mission on short notice. Make aggressive use of Readiness Assistance Visits (RAVs) to bring re-missioned or recently re-deployed BCTs back up to speed during the Modernize phase of the Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM). And don't forget: we must also ensure that our installation is properly administering installation activities. Keep these facts in mind in everything you do.

d. Likewise, make sure your section is ready for war. Review your section's Mission Essential Task List (METL) and Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM). I want your thoughts on how best to use the IG when we have to deploy into combat.

3. Assistance

a. I want you to encourage Soldiers to give the chain of command a chance to work the issue first and then return to the IG if the problem is not fixed. Help the chain of command to be heroes whenever possible.

b. Remain especially responsive to the Soldiers' needs. Treat every case with equal importance. The Soldier entering your office thinks that his or her problem is important or that Soldier would not be there to seek help. Do not forget the importance of the Family and Civilian members of the command. Ensure that everyone receives fair and equal treatment.

c. I want you to work Equal Opportunity issues that involve field-grade officers or Command Sergeants Major. Maintain a good working relationship with the Division EO and Installation EEO offices.

d. Develop a method to identify possible or emerging systemic problems in the command. Work with the chain of command to correct such problems but tell me when I need to get involved.

4. Investigations and Investigative Inquiries

a. I want to define your Investigative Inquiry and Investigation efforts. I expect you to follow AR 20-1 and refer all allegations directly to the subordinate Battalion and Brigade Commanders and then close them out properly. If a subordinate Battalion Commander does not elect to investigate your referred allegation, see the Brigade Commander about it. If the Brigade Commander pushes back, then see me for guidance. As a general rule, I intend to use your investigatory capability to resolve matters that are inappropriate for a subordinate Commander's action. For instance, per AR 20-1, you will not initiate under your own authority any Investigative Inquiries or Investigations. I will direct you to investigate if necessary. If someone levels an allegation against me, I expect you to comply with AR 20-1's requirements concerning investigations of General Officers. For all other investigatory matters, follow AR 20-1 and work closely with the SJA.

b. I want you to bring me any allegations against a Master Sergeant (Sergeant First Class in 1SG position) and above as well as any other items that meet the IG CCIR we have established. Provide me with the 5Ws concerning the allegations and a recommended course of action.

c. If your recommendation is for your office to conduct the investigation, I will sign your Investigation directives. On your action memorandum soliciting my signature for a directive, I want an estimate of the time required to complete the Investigation. I expect you to be right and thorough, but you must make these cases a high priority. If I direct you to conduct an Investigative Inquiry under your own authority, you will sign the directive, but I still want to see a time estimate on the action memorandum.

5. Keeping Me Informed

a. I want you to keep me informed of what is happening in the command with respect to Soldier and Civilian problems, Investigations, Assistance Inquiries, and Inspection results. Let's plan to meet, at a minimum, on a weekly basis.

b. I do not expect you to brief me on every little problem. Keep me informed of those matters, actual or perceived, that affect -- or have the potential to affect -- the morale, training, discipline, and good order of the command. I especially want to know about issues involving drugs, racism, extremist behavior, sexual discrimination, abuse of command authority, and counterproductive leadership.

c. Keep the Chief of Staff informed inasmuch as you are able and coordinate closely with his staff. Finally, you must remember that you are a staff officer, but you report to me as one of my personal staff members.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 66TH INFANTRY DIVISION AND FORT VON STEUBEN
FORT VON STEUBEN, VIRGINIA 12345

AFVS-GC

1 January ____

SUBJECT: **Green Tab Memorandum #1:** 66th Infantry Division FY __ Objectives and Assessment Guidance

1. **Objective:** The objective of this memorandum is to provide a framework for improving operational readiness within the context of current and future overseas contingency operations by monitoring performance within the division and Fort Von Steuben. We will improve our readiness by evaluating strengths and weaknesses and reshaping priorities, policies, and plans to overcome identified weaknesses and to sustain demonstrated strengths.

2. **Army Immediate Focus Areas:** We must be aware of -- and consider -- the direction of the Army Chief of Staff (CSA) in everything that we do. The CSA has focused the Army's readiness efforts and relevance to current and future overseas contingency operations by establishing a series of immediate focus areas. The areas that demand our attention are as follows:

a. *People First:* Develop flexible, adaptive, and competent Soldiers with a **Warrior Ethos**.

b. *Winning Matters:* "Winning Matters" is our attitude. There is no second place or honorable mention in combat.

c. *Reform:* Recognize that Army transformation is part of constant change. The Army's modernization objectives will focus our modernization efforts.

d. *Joint and Expeditionary Mindset:* Retain our campaign qualities while developing a mindset aimed at conducting Joint operations quickly and with little notice.

e. *Installations:* Enhance Fort Von Steuben's ability to project power rapidly and to support our Families.

3. Discussion

a. I expect all commanders and staff members to gather and analyze evaluation data and begin working immediately to correct deficiencies within their authority to fix. I expect those individuals to prepare recommendations for improvement on those areas that fall outside their authority to resolve.

b. We have three elements within our control that will help to ensure mission accomplishment at every level within the division and installation. Those elements are:

1. Training
2. Providing Resources
3. Policy-making and administration

c. We can trace most deficiencies to one of these three elements. To some degree, we can compensate for weaknesses in one element by placing emphasis on the other two. Our goal is to maximize effectiveness in all three areas.

d. When making decisions, I expect leaders to rely on feedback from a number of sources -- from personal observations to reports of Field Training Exercises, Command Post Exercises, inspections, audits, and other activities. These sources can be internal or external to the division. Some of these sources are listed in FM 7-0, Training, and in AR 1-201, Army Inspection Policy.

e. Leaders must constantly evaluate and assess their units and Soldiers. For planning purposes, the formal methods for conducting organizational assessments will be Training Briefings, annual updates to this policy letter, Command Training Guidance, and the Organizational Inspection Program (OIP).

4. Assessment Guidance for FY __

a. Vision: The 66th Infantry Division must be the Army's best division -- trained and ready for victory. The 66th Infantry Division is a total force of quality Soldiers and Civilians. We must be a values-based organization and an integral part of the Army team that can respond to our Nation's needs during this challenging era of numerous overseas contingency operations and regional deployments. We must be able to change to meet the challenges of this war today, tomorrow, and well into the 21st Century.

b. Focus:

1. All activities in the division must contribute to the division's mission and the missions of its subordinate elements. The ability to fight and win on the 21st Century battlefield is the prime focus. Preparing for that eventuality is our peacetime challenge.

2. Combat elements must make combat readiness and Mission-Essential Task List (METL) proficiency their first priority.

3. Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organizations will focus on sustaining combat forces and preparing them to deploy, which includes performing mobilization functions related to the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard.

4. All organizations must carefully manage resources and respond proactively to the Army's reshaping efforts.

c. Methods: Inspectors and other evaluators will conduct performance-oriented evaluations instead of relying upon indirect indicators of performance such as record keeping. This requirement will demand some imaginative and innovative approaches to evaluations rather than simply 'doing it the way we have always done it.'

d. Topics of Interest: I expect commanders to focus on evaluating the readiness of their units in order to accomplish their operational tasks. The division headquarters will evaluate subordinate elements in the following areas:

1. Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM)
2. Reshaping the Army initiatives
3. Resource Management

e. Implementation: Training Briefings will be the primary forum for subordinate commanders to express their assessments of their command's strengths and weaknesses. These briefings -- combined with my personal observations and the results of inspections, audits, and other evaluations -- will shape my assessment of the division's status. I will readjust priorities, policies, and plans based upon the picture that these sources of information portray.

1. Specific guidance about training, inspections, audits, and external evaluations are in the enclosures (not provided).

2. General guidance on readiness exercises, inspections, and audits in the division is as follows:

(a) Readiness exercises will concentrate on combat readiness at the battalion and company levels. The headquarters two levels above the evaluated unit will conduct the exercises, which will take the form of Field Training Exercises (FTXs), Command Post Exercises (CPXs), and Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWTs). These exercises will normally last no more than 15 days and will culminate with an After-Action Review (AAR) attended by the commanders of the inspecting and inspected units. Rotations to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, are some of the best sources of input to commanders' assessments of their units' capabilities and standards.

(b) The division will plan and conduct Initial Command Inspections and Subsequent Command Inspections on company-level units in accordance with AR 1-201. Staff Inspections and Staff Assistance Visits will concentrate on administrative efficiency and compliance with regulatory standards at the brigade level and below. IG

Inspections will focus on widespread systemic issues that affect readiness in the division and on the installation.

(c) Division Internal Review and Audit Compliance (IRAC) auditors will concentrate on the efficiency of fiscal activities starting with the finance and accounting center, the club systems, and private organizations.

5. Integration and Coordination

a. The division G-3 is responsible for coordinating all inspections, audits, and evaluation activities, to include external evaluations by organizations above and outside the division.

b. All subordinate commanders and staff members will notify the G-3 immediately about any audit, inspection, or other evaluation that the G-3 has not coordinated.

c. The G-3 will resolve all scheduling and coordination conflicts.

d. The division Chief of Staff will be informed of any external evaluation team that visits any divisional units without prior coordination.

6. Use of the Inspector General

a. The Division IG is available and qualified to train staff and unit inspectors in inspection techniques and inspection planning. For training all inspectors, the IG uses The OIP Guide for Commanders, a handbook published by the U.S. Army Inspector General School. This guide is available to all inspectors and not just IGs. Staff principals and unit commanders should arrange for inspections training directly with the Division IG.

b. The IG system is designed to track problems down to their root causes and can identify issues that are beyond the division's ability to correct such as conflicting Army regulations. Commanders must inform the IG of issues they cannot resolve so the IG can pursue these issues to their resolution.

7. Announced and Unannounced Evaluations

a. Advantages and disadvantages exist to announcing and not announcing evaluations. Weigh each approach on its own merits.

b. Unannounced evaluations are a valid way of determining the daily status of units. However, these inspections can disrupt training and other necessary activities. Therefore, no unannounced internal or external evaluations will occur in the division without my personal approval.

c. The G-3 will coordinate announced and unscheduled evaluations by external agencies and capture those evaluations on the appropriate training calendars and schedules.

8. Readiness Assistance Visits (RAVs): The IG will execute a robust program of RAVs for all redeploying and re-missioning BCTs entering the Building Readiness module of SRM. The aim point for completion of RAVs within the BCT is 120 days after redeployment and / or achieving 70-percent of the BCT's reconstituted personnel strength. All staff agencies in the division and on the installation will support the IG in planning and conducting RAVs. Plan to get with the IG as soon as possible to determine your agency's role in re-establishing BCT systems that have eroded as a result of redeployment and the loss of institutional knowledge through reassignments and other personnel changes. RAVs are a critical aspect of the division's support for generating and sustaining readiness.


9. Updates: I will update this Green Tab Memorandum annually to reflect current changes. I will provide interim guidance as necessary and publish Green Tab Memorandums from time to time outlining goals and objectives and principles for the division and the post.

Enclosures
(not provided)

MOTTIN De La BLAME
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: A

66th Infantry Division Inspector General's Office



<u>NAME</u>	<u>BRANCH / MOS</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT</u>
LTC Rightway	Aviation	MTOE	Battalion Commander
MAJ Britton	Artillery	TDA*	Battalion XO / S-3
MAJ List	Infantry	MTOE	Battalion XO
CPT Numero	Signal	TDA*	Company Commander
MSG Competent	AG (42A)	MTOE	Brigade PSNCO
MSG Shoulder	Infantry (11B)	MTOE	1SG
MSG Smith	QM (92Y)	MTOE	Battalion S-4 NCOIC
SFC Bergerac	Ordnance (63X)	MTOE	Battalion Motor NCOIC
SFC Davenport	Infantry (11B)	MTOE	Platoon Sergeant
Mr. Newton	Civilian (GS-12)	TDA*	Auditor
Ms LaRue	Administrative	TDA*	Executive Secretary

* All TDA IGs are part of the Fort Von Steuben Senior Commander's Augmentation TDA.

Note: A sample SOP for the Fort Von Steuben IG office / staff section appears in Part 7 of this guide.

Deployment Scenario

The 66th Infantry Division deployed in support of Operation ATROPIAN RESOLVE to conduct unified action to deter Threat State aggression and restore regional stability. The Combatant Commander designated the 66th Infantry Division as a Joint Task Force (CJTF-66); however, the task force will remain as an Army-only organization until follow-on joint and coalition forces arrive and come under the CJTF's operational control. The purpose of this initial operation is the deterrence of an attack against Atropia and, if deterrence fails, the defeat of hostile military forces, and their expulsion from Atropian territory. FORSCOM identified the task organization for this operation, which included the following units:

- 66th Infantry Division
 - 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), Fort Von Steuben, VA
 - 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), Fort Von Steuben, VA
 - 46th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), (VAARNG) Camp William North, VA
 - 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division, Joint Base Lewis McChord, WA
 - 66th Division Artillery, Fort Von Steuben, VA
 - 66th Aviation Brigade, Fort Von Steuben, VA
 - 66th Sustainment Brigade, Fort Von Steuben, VA
 - 300th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB), (USAR) Fort McCoy, WI

The division task-organized the brigades (from base formations on pages 8-3, 8-4, and 8-5) and deployed them to Areas of Operation in the following locations:

Bertsi

- Headquarters, CJTF-66
 - Division Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion
- 66th Sustainment Brigade
- 66th Aviation Brigade

Velosiped Air Field

- 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT)
 - Add 2-60th FA (OPCON)
- 300th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB)
 - 51st Engineer Battalion
 - 300th Military Police Battalion
 - 300th Brigade Support Battalion (BSB)
 - Add 3-60th FA (OPCON)

Adani

- 46th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT)
- 26th BSB
- 1-29 CAV
- 3-46 IN
- 4-46 IN
- 6-46 IN
- 26th BEB
- 1-29 FA

Gosha3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)**Bamgayit**1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT)Add 1-60th FA (OPCON)66th Division Artillery

The Fort Von Steuben Inspector General office, which contained both the Division IG office and Senior Commander Augmentation (SCA) TDA IG office, separated for the operation based upon the MTOE and TDA. MAJ Britton became the SCA IG with the mission to support LTC Rightway's deployed IG staff section as a reach-back capability. In addition, the SCA IG office would support all units, agencies, and Family members remaining on Fort Von Steuben. The following task organization of both the division and SCA IG offices are as follows:

Deployed

LTC Rightway

MAJ List

MSG Competent

MSG Shoulder

MSG Smith

SFC Bergerac

SFC Davenport

Fort Von Steuben

MAJ Britton – SCA TDA IG

CPT Numero

Mr. Newton

Ms. LaRue

The Division deployed to Atropia with an area of operations that includes the provinces of Erdabil, Hachzi, Vetlie, and Sirvaki. The mission of the CJTF-66 is to execute Flexible Deterrent Options to ensure Atropian sovereignty against Threat State aggression. On order, CJTF-66 deploys additional forces to the area of operations and conducts unified action to deter Threat State aggression and, if deterrence fails, conduct operations to restore regional stability.

LTC Rightway has established the IG staff section at Bertsi. He received guidance from the CJTF Commander that, since the task force would remain an Army-only organization during the initial operation, the IG staff section would follow the Army IG system and transition to the Joint IG system once the first follow-on forces arrived. Additionally, because the Division's forces are spread across a large area of operations, Acting IGs became necessary at three locations (Adani, Gosha, and Bamgayit) to ensure that all Soldiers had access to IG support during Operation Atropian Resolve. The division has currently been in the theater of operations for two months.

CJTF-66 Area of Operations (Atropia)

